Suchergebnisse

The subject of this study is the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the Security Council in the period 1946 2000. Because of their right of veto the cooperation of the permanent members has a significant influence on the functioning of the Council. The most important aspects of the cooperation that were investigated are the intensity of the cooperation and the ef-fectiveness of this cooperation in preventing and ending wars. To investigate these aspects, for both the intensity and the effectiveness measuring instruments were constructed. These measuring instruments were based on comprehensive sets of so-called 'leading indicators' and statistical methods and techniques. The intensity of the cooperation increased gradually from 1946 until 1990 (the end of the Cold War). Then it started to increase rapidly until 1996. From 1996 a slight decrease can be discer-ned. The strong increase in the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the security Council can be established in all the majors forms of cooperation in the Council: the numbers of adopted strategic resolutions and presidential statements, the numbers of employed means (like peacekeeping missions and enforcement actions) and the amounts of money that were spent on peacekeeping activities. Further it was established that the response times of the Council regarding potential and waged wars dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War. The effectiveness of the cooperation of the permanent members in the Council was, insofar this was measurable with the applied method, not good for many years, but after the Cold War a clear improvement can be discerned. This goes for the prevention of wars, as well as for post war peacebuilding and the ending of wars. Also the numbers of potential and waged wars in which the Council not intervened dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War, as well as the use of vetoes. The large number of potential and waged wars in which the Council did not intervene during the Cold War was nearly exclusively caused by 'non decisions' (the non placing of wars on the agenda), and not by the use of vetoes by permanent members, as is often assumed in literature. Further, a comparison of two phase classifications of the Cold War showed that the great powers, even when there are great tensions among them, are prepared to cooperate in the Security Council to resolve strategic matters, if they consider this in their interest. Analyses of the adopted strategic resolutions during the Cold War revealed that cooperation here was nearly exclusively limited to issues that were not core issues of the Cold War. From this it can be concluded that cooperation against third party states was a basis of cooperation of the great powers in the Security Council. Finally, the results of this study show clearly that the Security Council was regarded and used to a large extent by the permanent members in the period 1946 2000 as an instrument of foreign policy to pursue their national interests, and not as an instrument of the world community to prevent and end wars.

The European Union and the NATO have 21 of their 27 and 26, respectively, member states in common. The friction between the two institutions is based on the fact that the EU has matured into a well established strategic actor, with its own policies and priorities, and growing ambitions and capacities. The present article discusses a stable and flexible two-pillar model to end the EU-NATO competition. The two-pillar construction that is proposed here implicates a pragmatic attitude, in which each separate case will be looked into separately, to then appoint the organization that will be the best suited for the job. Adapted from the source document.

A little appreciated member of the international community in 2004, Belgium has developed the previous years into a constructive diplomatic element that takes to heart its international responsibility (examples: troops in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Balkans, and an effective diplomatic intervention concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo). Responsibly for this success are called Belgian impartiality, its open ears, imagination and collaboration regarding multilateralism. Furthermore, the EU's enlargement by 10 states is discussed, the rejecting of the European Constitution by France and the Netherlands, and the strengthened position of the BENELUX within the EU. A second topic: relations with the neighboring countries France, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg. A last item discusses cooperation in multilateral development projects. References. O. van Zijl

In spite of an approval of the financial perspectives 2007-2013 and the economic boom of the euro zone, "crisis" has not left the EU. It is installed in the institutions, but also and especially it has infected the spirits of European citizens. An article that treats the pros, cons and influences of the EU enlargement from 15 to 25 states, discussing the attitudes of single member states regarding for example immigration, the treatment of files and common questions, pluralistic votes that render difficult processes now that the Rhine-model (a BENELUX and Franco-German alliance) no longer has the upper hand. Furthermore is discussed European Parliament and Justice Court, both influenced in their functioning by the enlargement of the EU. Belgium's future role lies in seeking alliances with same-spirited member states, and to fill in the EU's delivery-gap regarding citizen demands for more justice, freedom and security, and a more uniform Europe as regards energy and foreign policy. References. O. van Zijl

Internal dispute, the crisis surrounding the war in Iraq, arguments concerning the financial perspectives for 2007-2013 and a double negative result of the referenda (in France and the Netherlands) concerning the European Constitution, mean a crisis for the EU. In the year and a half which have expired between 2005 and 2007, many plans have progressed slightly, but little have been concretized. In defense of Prime Minister Verhofstadt's "The United States of Europe", on socioeconomic policies, technological cooperation, unified justice, security policies, diplomacy, and a European army -- a plan that has not found its way to either the public or high political discussions. It is suggested to take it up with a limited number of member states, so that other countries will follow later. In general, the author reproaches European politicians lack of emotion: more open conflicts of Left against Right, large against small, swiftly and non-too-soft -- therein lies the nature of democracy, and therefore also the future of European politics. Figures, References. O. van Zijl

Since the end of the Cold War, three sensitive shifts have taken place within the NATO: territorial defense turned into "security", including securing the quality of life of NATO citizens; regional arena turned into a global one; suppressing Communism became the suppression of terrorism. Five discussed elements: threat evaluation aka "fight against terrorism", which sometimes loses touch with the unstable geo-strategic context; lacking flexibility and anticipation as regards to a hard to identify, asymmetric, and ever-changing enemy; a pro-active or protective contract attitude; the political context of current military operations; NATO regarding the UN and the EU. References. O. van Zijl