In this work the author is trying to describe the features of terror act, identify possibilities of delimitation from other criminal acts. There is created a hypothesis, that in the Penal code of Lithuania Republic the features of terror acts' consist are not clearly defined. There is emphasized the problem of differentiation of terror, terror act and terrorism concepts. The author is noticing that there are more studies about terrorism, in many cases they are of political or historical character, more analyzing the issues of terrorism, its' spread ant the activity of terrorist organizations, paying less attention for the analysis of terror acts, that are means for spreading terrorist ideology. In this work there is trying to distinguish terrorism and terror act, describing as criminal act, individual, unrepeatable, concurrent from concrete person, who realize these terror acts and its' victims. In this work also is revealed terror's, as creator of irrational fair, role in terror act. Following the decisions of Lithuania High Court, international juridical acts, other research work, in this master work are formulated concepts concerning the consist of terror act. There is emphasizing the importance of society's security as worth in penal law, which can be attempting by terror act. Society's security is described as state without danger, in this case danger is comprehensible as real possibility to make harm for saved objects (for example, strategic objects, the destruction of these objects harms to country's defense and economical safety) or to decrease the common security's level. The society's security can be offended and by causers' activities in penal code described work, meeting, residence or public places. In this work terrorist act is related with influence for the society, its' intimidation. There is predicating that by terror acts there are attempting in two levels: what disturbs for terror acts, and through what they are trying to reach their aims. The ideology of terrorist groups is described as the system of conviction, through criminal acts linked to citizens. From this rises aim of terror act. For this, ideology is jumping-off point, it describes terror acts very clearly and is the feature, which is suggested to be involved into terror act's consist. Emphasizing the main features of terror acts consist, it is possible to say that, they help distinguish terror acts from other criminal acts such as property's destruction in a dangerous for society way, murder or war acts. There are highlighted problems of distinguishing theoretical and practical acts. Concluding the analyzed material, there was created a hypothesis which confirmed that in Penal code the features of terror act consist are not enough regulated. There is also stating that in juridical technique's position, the juridical construction of terror act is chaotic, without strong conception, making problems of distinguishing it from other criminal acts.
This study examines the concept of human security from two different biopolitical perspectives. Although the works of both Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben offer ground for reading the discourse of human security as limiting the life lived by its subjects, this study will not seek to conflate their works - as is often done in contemporary social sciences and International Relations - but instead seeks to differentiate between a Foucauldian and an Agambenite critique of human security, and between a Foucauldian and an Agambenite account of biopolitics and biopower. Importantly, this study examines also the implications of the different problematics of human security that emerge from Agamben and Foucault's accounts of biopolitics in terms of a discussion of the different accounts of the possibility of political agency that they entail. The empirical material used in this study consists mainly of the 2003 Human Security Now report by the Commission on Human Security, Survival, Livelyhood and Dignity. Through Agamben's work, the discourse of human security can be read as constituting 'bare life'; the human of which is essentially a desubjectified subject. For Agamben, the human has been captured by (bio)sovereign power, and the discourse of human security can be read as contributing to this (bio)sovereign subjection. A Foucauldian problematic of human security, in contrast, offers an account of the human of human security as both the object and subject of power. Human security can be seen as working through various techniques of power both on the level of the individual and on the level of the population. The framework for the deployment of the techniques of the self and techniques of domination is provided by (neo)liberalism. Whereas Foucault understands resistance as being internal to power, Agamben deems it necessary to escape the power that captures life. Agamben's work entails a rethinking of both politics and ontology as his understanding of political liberation is based on a rethinking of the concept of potentiality. Whereas Foucault's account of power offers a more detailed and differentiated critique of human security, Agamben's metaphysical account of power sees human security as part of the transhistorical workings of power that pervade our whole understanding of life and politics. While Foucault allows for the strategic use of the discourse of rights, Agamben rejects all normative discourse. A Foucauldian critique of human security recognises that the discourse of human security can be reshaped through problematisation and competition between different discourses. An Agambenite critique of human security does not consider it possible to reshape the discourse of human security as it is predicated on the same concepts - the human, the citizen, rights, law, identity - that mark the subjection of life by power. Whereas Foucault's understanding of political agency is grounded on the conditions of the contemporary world, Agamben gestures towards rethinking 'the human' beyond those conditions.
In this work the author is trying to describe the features of terror act, identify possibilities of delimitation from other criminal acts. There is created a hypothesis, that in the Penal code of Lithuania Republic the features of terror acts' consist are not clearly defined. There is emphasized the problem of differentiation of terror, terror act and terrorism concepts. The author is noticing that there are more studies about terrorism, in many cases they are of political or historical character, more analyzing the issues of terrorism, its' spread ant the activity of terrorist organizations, paying less attention for the analysis of terror acts, that are means for spreading terrorist ideology. In this work there is trying to distinguish terrorism and terror act, describing as criminal act, individual, unrepeatable, concurrent from concrete person, who realize these terror acts and its' victims. In this work also is revealed terror's, as creator of irrational fair, role in terror act. Following the decisions of Lithuania High Court, international juridical acts, other research work, in this master work are formulated concepts concerning the consist of terror act. There is emphasizing the importance of society's security as worth in penal law, which can be attempting by terror act. Society's security is described as state without danger, in this case danger is comprehensible as real possibility to make harm for saved objects (for example, strategic objects, the destruction of these objects harms to country's defense and economical safety) or to decrease the common security's level. The society's security can be offended and by causers' activities in penal code described work, meeting, residence or public places. In this work terrorist act is related with influence for the society, its' intimidation. There is predicating that by terror acts there are attempting in two levels: what disturbs for terror acts, and through what they are trying to reach their aims. The ideology of terrorist groups is described as the system of conviction, through criminal acts linked to citizens. From this rises aim of terror act. For this, ideology is jumping-off point, it describes terror acts very clearly and is the feature, which is suggested to be involved into terror act's consist. Emphasizing the main features of terror acts consist, it is possible to say that, they help distinguish terror acts from other criminal acts such as property's destruction in a dangerous for society way, murder or war acts. There are highlighted problems of distinguishing theoretical and practical acts. Concluding the analyzed material, there was created a hypothesis which confirmed that in Penal code the features of terror act consist are not enough regulated. There is also stating that in juridical technique's position, the juridical construction of terror act is chaotic, without strong conception, making problems of distinguishing it from other criminal acts.
The aim of this study is to gain knowledge and understanding of the life experiences of Australian Defence Force (ADF) peacekeepers who were deployed to East Timor as part of the International Force for East Timor (InterFET), and/or the United Nations Transitional Administration East Timor (UNTAET) force, and of their families who remained in Australia. In-depth interviews were conducted with a sample of ADF men and women who were deployed, as well as their non-deployed partners, to help achieve this aim. A social work ecological understanding, that considered micro, meso and macrosystem levels, provided a framework to illuminate the complexity of the deployment experience. Deployment to war and peacekeeping operations poses a number of risks for military personnel and their families. Deployment has been shown to have a significant deleterious impact on people who undergo the experience with respect to physical and mental health. Non-deployed family members may also be negatively affected. In reviewing the literature, only two Australian studies of limited scope were found. The Australian knowledge base for social work practice is very limited in this setting. Understanding of families' experience of living through and following a military deployment requires scholarly study to establish further knowledge in this field. The study found the overall deployment experience was affected by a complex array of circumstances at each of the levels which compounded and interacted to influence interviewees' outcomes with respect to physical and mental health, and family functioning. Microsystem level circumstances included the uncertainty of deployment, concerns about children and adolescents, physical and mental health and family functioning problems, the advantages and disadvantages of communicating during separation, and finding meaning in the experience. Living and working conditions in East Timor of ADF personnel, the communities in which non-deployed respondents lived, social support and networks, and perception of military family support organisations, were important aspects at the mesosystem level. Finally, macrosystem level circumstances included the military institution, culture and policies. Interviewees described a range of positive and negative experiences of social work practice at all three system levels. The conclusion of the thesis highlights that the military institution and its culture pervaded every aspect of respondents' daily lives and influenced behaviour and consequent outcomes. It is concluded that military family life is incongruent with military duty associated with deployment and its aftermath. Military family life is placed under great stress with military duty pertaining to a deployment. The primary recommendation is that policies need to change those aspects of the military institution and its culture that negatively affects families. Social workers in the Australian military setting, with their ecological focus, are well-placed to intervene across micro, meso and macrosystem levels. This will lead to better outcomes for military families who require coordinated care throughout all the stages of deployment and after their military careers.
To the Editors, It is a dicey proposition to assign a book review to an author whose previous work is in direct competition with the book being reviewed. There is always the chance the reviewer won't have the maturity to get over himself and engage the text objectively. Sadly, this appears to have been the case with Mark Zuehlke, who has published a book about Canadians in the Spanish Civil War and reviewed my book Renegades: Canadians in the Spanish Civil War for the most recent issue of the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. Before he even addresses the content of Renegades, Zuehlke draws dark conclusions about the book based on the supposed symbolism of its cover photo. If Zuehlke had reviewed the European edition of my book, whose publishers chose a different cover, he would presumably have been forced to think up a whole new line of attack. Zuehlke also has a go at the title of my book and employs a dictionary to list the various meanings of "renegade." When he finally gets around to saying something about what I wrote, rather than exploring the hidden meaning of eye patches in a cover photo and the etymology of the title, Zuehlke accuses me of exaggerating the involvement of the Communist Party and likens me to a character in a Bullwinkle cartoon who believes a Martian invasion is a Communist plot. Serious scholars can decide for themselves whether Zuehlke's accusations have any merit. I will only say that the conclusions I draw are based on years going through declassified documents from the archives from the Communist International. When I say that the majority of Canadian volunteers were Communists, it's because I have established the party affiliation for almost 900 of them (in addition to researching a multitude of other biographical details about almost 1,700 men). Zuehlke had access to material from these archives when he researched his own book but made comparatively little use of it. The documents he did consult were those that are available on microfilm at Library and Archives Canada – a valuable resource, but a fraction of what's out there. This is a shame, and not just because it detracts from his own publication. He might also have saved himself some embarrassment when reviewing mine. In an effort to pad out his Bullwinkle analogy, Zuehlke cites the example of the Canadian volunteer Bill Williamson, who, Zuehlke says, was not a Communist but an "adventurer." In fact, Williamson was a proud party member. If Zuehlke had spent the time that I have combing through the Comintern documents, if he had traveled to Britain and listened to the almost 20 hours of interviews with Williamson at the Imperial War Museum Sound Archive in London, he would have known this, and lots more besides. Perhaps he finds such painstaking research dry and tiresome. Michael Petrou Ottawa February 9, 2009
Oil in Mexico has been the cornerstone on which the Mexican State has built upon since its nationalization. It has been the main federal income source, it has supported industrial development and has allowed the State to increase international reserves. Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), the National Oil Company (NOC), is a supply of vital resources for the government by financing public spending, providing certainty to the economy as well as providing extra resources for local governments. However, for decades, fiscal, institutional, legal and organizational constraints have not allowed the NOC to fully behave as a profit maximizing firm that chooses optimal strategies for reinvesting its own resources and/or subcontracting other firms with advanced technologies, such as deep-water technology. In this paper we describe the history of the hydrocarbon sector in Mexico, discuss its performance, analyze its legal, contractual and fiscal conditions, and study the corporate governance of PEMEX as well as its financial, operative independence and regulatory architecture. We further study the main aspects related to geology and technology, the evolution of discoveries and the success rates of exploration in the Mexican oil industry. We also analyze details of investment strategies, and the role of Cantarell and the deep and ultra-deep oil fields. We finally analyze the drivers of performance, counterfactual scenarios, and alternative hypotheses. ; El petróleo en México ha sido la piedra angular sobre la que el Estado mexicano se ha construido desde su nacionalización. Ha sido la fuente principal de ingresos federales, ha apoyado el desarrollo industrial y ha permitido al Estado aumentar las reservas internacionales. Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), la compañía nacional de petróleo (NOC), es una fuente de recursos vitales del gobierno para la financiación del gasto público, proporciona seguridad a la economía, así como proporciona recursos adicionales para los gobiernos locales. Sin embargo, durante décadas, las restricciones fiscales, institucionales, jurídicas y de organización no han permitido que la NOC se comporte plenamente como una empresa de maximización del beneficio que elige estrategias óptimas para reinvertir sus propios recursos y/o subcontratar otras empresas con tecnologías avanzadas, como la tecnología de aguas profundas. En este artículo describimos la historia del sector de hidrocarburos en México, discutimos su desempeño, analizamos sus condiciones fiscales, contractuales y legales, y estudiamos el gobierno corporativo de PEMEX, así como su independencia operativa y su arquitectura regulatoria. Estudiamos también los principales aspectos relacionados con la geología y la tecnología, la evolución de los descubrimientos y las tasas de éxito en la exploración en la industria petrolera mexicana. También analizamos los detalles de las estrategias de inversión, y el rol de Cantarell y de los campos profundos y ultraprofundos. Finalmente, analizamos los determinantes del desempeño, escenarios contrafactuales e hipótesis alternativas.
Low tax revenue and slow economic growth are two central concerns in developing countries. However, policies that raise tax revenue also harm economic growth. With tax revenue coming mainly from large capital-intensive firms, and with a large informal sector, policies that aid large firms and policies that discourage entry of new firms both help increase tax revenue. Entrepreneurial activity as a result is discouraged, lowering growth. There is a basic tension in policy design between current tax revenue and economic growth. In fact, a loss in tax revenue can itself reduce growth, due to less spending on education and infrastructure. It can also undermine political support for the reforms from the poor and from government bureaucrats, both of whom are key beneficiaries of government expenditures. What policies encourage growth without undue loss of current expenditures? One is debt finance, but this creates the risk of a financial crisis if tax revenue rises too slowly to repay this debt. A second is user fees, but such fees still undermine political support from the poor. A third is partial reform, maintaining both higher taxes on and some protection for easily taxed firms, even while barriers to entry are eased.
Kazakhstan's foreign policy, since its independence, has successfully avoided favoring any one country based on what Astana styles as a "multi-vectored" approach to foreign policy. Yet in terms of its conduct of defense and security policies, this paradigm simply does not fit with how the regime makes policy in its most sensitive areas of security cooperation. Indeed, its closest defense ties are still with Russia, which have deepened and intensified at a bilateral level as well as through multilateral initiatives in the context of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This is most evident in a close analysis of the evolution of its armed forces, including various efforts to reform its military and achieve mobile, combat capable, and professional forces. Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), Kazakhstan's defense posture has favored closer links with the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while it has also pursued inconsistent efforts to extract better defense cooperation from Moscow. In 2003, shortly after the U.S. intervention in Iraq, President Nursultan Nazarbayev took the controversial step of agreeing to send engineers from Kazakhstan's embryonic peacekeeping battalion (KAZBAT) to support demining efforts placed under Polish command. Of course, the "deployment," though politically useful for Washington in displaying evidence of the diverse nature of the "coalition of the willing," was also beneficial for a highly ambitious political elite in Astana keen to showcase Kazakhstan's armed forces and project a positive image for the Kazakhstani military and its contribution to the new international order. It was not without domestic risk, since it represented the first instance of troops being sent beyond the region by any state within Central Asia, but this was managed carefully through the state controlled media and despite opposition from a pacifist contingent within Kazakhstan's parliament. Nevertheless, the Kazakhstani authorities gauged the risk to be manageable, since these engineers were not deployed operationally in the sense of taking on active peacekeeping duties; they were unlikely to see action in the theater itself. Moreover, the high profile and overemphasized importance of this cooperative initiative, which finally ended with the withdrawal of KAZBAT from Iraq at the request of the Iraqi government in October 2008, reaped dividends for the Nazarbayev regime as it could claim to be active in international stabilization efforts. In reality, the elements of KAZBAT were transported to Iraq using U.S. military transport aircraft since Kazakhstan lacked strategic airlift capabilities, and were maintained and helped through U.S. assistance. In the aftermath of Uzbekistan's alienation by the West following the tragic events in Andijan in May 2005, Kazakhstan was temporarily willing to acquiesce in being regarded as the region's security leader; NATO officials referred to Kazakhstan as NATO's "anchor" in Central Asia. This, in fact, is way beyond Kazakhstan's capabilities. The authorities have since mostly dropped these claims from official discourse. In other words, by paying close attention to KAZBAT, an entirely false impression of a largely unreformed and cumbersome post Soviet legacy force is engendered, with all the issues this entails, ranging from bullying, poor morale, underfunding, limited combat capabilities, and corruption at senior levels. This is also worsened by the manifold problems stemming from Soviet or Russian manufactured military equipment and hardware, often aging and desperately in need of repair, which severely inhibits the operational capabilities of Kazakhstan's air force, for example. Kazakhstan proved willing to receive much aid and assistance for its military from Western donors, principally the United States, Turkey, and NATO. Astana deepened its partnership with NATO and made efforts to strengthen its defense ties with Washington by agreeing to implement longer-term cooperation plans in the frameworks of "5-year plans" agreed between the U.S. Department of Defense and Kazakhstan's Ministry of Defense. In January 2007, Nazarbayev appointed Daniyal Akhmetov as the country's first ever civilian defense minister. This, coupled with Kazakhstan securing the Chaimanship of the OSCE in 2010, seemed to herald promising achievements in its defense posture, but these hopes have rapidly faded since. Understanding the problems, challenges, and continued failings of the defense leadership in Kazakhstan involves first appreciating how limited its military reforms have proven in practical terms. Akhmetov was reportedly shocked in the early part of his tenure to discover how poorly trained, disciplined, and often corrupt Kazakhstan's armed forces remain, despite several years of the state talking up "military reform." Although corruption is something of a sine qua non in the region, it is particularly crucial to recognize its debilitating effect on efforts to reform the armed forces. This will persist as an obstacle to achieving progress in successfully implementing military reform for the foreseeable future.Also, despite Kazakhstan's closer relations with Western militaries, it has in real terms deepened and strengthened its ties with Russia. The close nature of this defense cooperation relationship, reflected in Kazakhstan's new military doctrine, its intensified military and security training and educational agreements, as well as stepping up the frequency of military exercises, is also coupled with shared multilateral ties within the frameworks of the CSTO and SCO. Washington's military assistance programs have therefore often run into geopolitical issues, such as the limiting effect on its objectives emanating from Kazakhstan's political and defense relationship with Russia, or sensitivities to its close proximity to China, as well as internal issues surrounding Astana's military reform agenda. Defense spending in Kazakhstan will also be subject in the short to medium term depending on how the government handles its unfolding financial crisis and continued exposure to the global financial crisis, coupled with the sliding price of oil on the world markets. These issues, sharply refocused by the Russian military exposure of weaknesses within Georgia's armed forces despite several years of time-phased U.S. training and equipment programs, serve to question the aims, scope, and utility of American defense assistance programs calibrated to enhance Kazakhstan's military capabilities. While Astana grapples with these internal issues and remains politically sensitive to the anxieties of Moscow as it perceives U.S. training and aid to the Kazakhstani armed forces, success will be modest. New deeper and more closely monitored programs are needed and, combined with multilateral cooperative initiatives, should be a matter of urgent priority; otherwise, such programs will underperform and languish in the repetition of the misjudgements of the past.--P. v-viii. ; "February 2009." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-65). ; Kazakhstan's foreign policy, since its independence, has successfully avoided favoring any one country based on what Astana styles as a "multi-vectored" approach to foreign policy. Yet in terms of its conduct of defense and security policies, this paradigm simply does not fit with how the regime makes policy in its most sensitive areas of security cooperation. Indeed, its closest defense ties are still with Russia, which have deepened and intensified at a bilateral level as well as through multilateral initiatives in the context of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This is most evident in a close analysis of the evolution of its armed forces, including various efforts to reform its military and achieve mobile, combat capable, and professional forces. Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), Kazakhstan's defense posture has favored closer links with the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while it has also pursued inconsistent efforts to extract better defense cooperation from Moscow. In 2003, shortly after the U.S. intervention in Iraq, President Nursultan Nazarbayev took the controversial step of agreeing to send engineers from Kazakhstan's embryonic peacekeeping battalion (KAZBAT) to support demining efforts placed under Polish command. Of course, the "deployment," though politically useful for Washington in displaying evidence of the diverse nature of the "coalition of the willing," was also beneficial for a highly ambitious political elite in Astana keen to showcase Kazakhstan's armed forces and project a positive image for the Kazakhstani military and its contribution to the new international order. It was not without domestic risk, since it represented the first instance of troops being sent beyond the region by any state within Central Asia, but this was managed carefully through the state controlled media and despite opposition from a pacifist contingent within Kazakhstan's parliament. Nevertheless, the Kazakhstani authorities gauged the risk to be manageable, since these engineers were not deployed operationally in the sense of taking on active peacekeeping duties; they were unlikely to see action in the theater itself. Moreover, the high profile and overemphasized importance of this cooperative initiative, which finally ended with the withdrawal of KAZBAT from Iraq at the request of the Iraqi government in October 2008, reaped dividends for the Nazarbayev regime as it could claim to be active in international stabilization efforts. In reality, the elements of KAZBAT were transported to Iraq using U.S. military transport aircraft since Kazakhstan lacked strategic airlift capabilities, and were maintained and helped through U.S. assistance. In the aftermath of Uzbekistan's alienation by the West following the tragic events in Andijan in May 2005, Kazakhstan was temporarily willing to acquiesce in being regarded as the region's security leader; NATO officials referred to Kazakhstan as NATO's "anchor" in Central Asia. This, in fact, is way beyond Kazakhstan's capabilities. The authorities have since mostly dropped these claims from official discourse. In other words, by paying close attention to KAZBAT, an entirely false impression of a largely unreformed and cumbersome post Soviet legacy force is engendered, with all the issues this entails, ranging from bullying, poor morale, underfunding, limited combat capabilities, and corruption at senior levels. This is also worsened by the manifold problems stemming from Soviet or Russian manufactured military equipment and hardware, often aging and desperately in need of repair, which severely inhibits the operational capabilities of Kazakhstan's air force, for example. Kazakhstan proved willing to receive much aid and assistance for its military from Western donors, principally the United States, Turkey, and NATO. Astana deepened its partnership with NATO and made efforts to strengthen its defense ties with Washington by agreeing to implement longer-term cooperation plans in the frameworks of "5-year plans" agreed between the U.S. Department of Defense and Kazakhstan's Ministry of Defense. In January 2007, Nazarbayev appointed Daniyal Akhmetov as the country's first ever civilian defense minister. This, coupled with Kazakhstan securing the Chaimanship of the OSCE in 2010, seemed to herald promising achievements in its defense posture, but these hopes have rapidly faded since. Understanding the problems, challenges, and continued failings of the defense leadership in Kazakhstan involves first appreciating how limited its military reforms have proven in practical terms. Akhmetov was reportedly shocked in the early part of his tenure to discover how poorly trained, disciplined, and often corrupt Kazakhstan's armed forces remain, despite several years of the state talking up "military reform." Although corruption is something of a sine qua non in the region, it is particularly crucial to recognize its debilitating effect on efforts to reform the armed forces. This will persist as an obstacle to achieving progress in successfully implementing military reform for the foreseeable future.Also, despite Kazakhstan's closer relations with Western militaries, it has in real terms deepened and strengthened its ties with Russia. The close nature of this defense cooperation relationship, reflected in Kazakhstan's new military doctrine, its intensified military and security training and educational agreements, as well as stepping up the frequency of military exercises, is also coupled with shared multilateral ties within the frameworks of the CSTO and SCO. Washington's military assistance programs have therefore often run into geopolitical issues, such as the limiting effect on its objectives emanating from Kazakhstan's political and defense relationship with Russia, or sensitivities to its close proximity to China, as well as internal issues surrounding Astana's military reform agenda. Defense spending in Kazakhstan will also be subject in the short to medium term depending on how the government handles its unfolding financial crisis and continued exposure to the global financial crisis, coupled with the sliding price of oil on the world markets. These issues, sharply refocused by the Russian military exposure of weaknesses within Georgia's armed forces despite several years of time-phased U.S. training and equipment programs, serve to question the aims, scope, and utility of American defense assistance programs calibrated to enhance Kazakhstan's military capabilities. While Astana grapples with these internal issues and remains politically sensitive to the anxieties of Moscow as it perceives U.S. training and aid to the Kazakhstani armed forces, success will be modest. New deeper and more closely monitored programs are needed and, combined with multilateral cooperative initiatives, should be a matter of urgent priority; otherwise, such programs will underperform and languish in the repetition of the misjudgements of the past.--P. v-viii. ; Mode of access: Internet.
Betrifft muslimische Frauen aus folgenden Ländern: Afghanistan, Algerien, Bahrain, Bangladesch, Kanada, Ägypten, Frankreich, Indonesien, Iran, Irak, Israel und Palästina, Jemen, Jordanien, Kuwait, Libanon, Malaysia, Marokko, Nigeria, Pakistan, Katar, Saudi-Arabien, Somalia, Sudan, Syrien, Tunesien, Türkei, USA
Publisher description: "Societies around the world have experienced a flood of information from diverse channels originating beyond local communities and even national borders, transmitted through the rapid expansion of cosmopolitan communications. For more than half a century conventional interpretations, [the authors] argue, have commonly exaggerated the potential threats arising from this process. A series of firewalls protects national cultures. This book develops a new theoretical framework for understanding cosmopolitan communications and uses it to identify the conditions under which global communications are most likely to endanger cultural diversity. The authors examine empirical evidence at both the societal level and the individual level, examining the outlook and beliefs of people in a wide range of societies. The study draw on evidence from the World Values Survey, which covers 90 societies in all major regions worldwide from 1981 to 2007. The conclusion considers the implications of the authors' findings for cultural politics
7. 1633-1635: Letters from Tunis by Osman/Thomas d'Arcos, a Convert to Islam, Les Correspondants de Peiresc:Lettres inédites publiées et annotées, ed. PhilippeTamizey de Larroque, 2:23-28, 36-39. French original.46 1868. 1635: Letter About Muslim Captives Converted toChristianity, Rabat National Library, MS Ji ̄m 223,101-103. 192; 9. 1635: Expulsion of the Moriscos, Muhammad ibnʻAbd al- RafI ʻ ibn Muhammad al- Andalusi, Al- Anwaral- Nabawiyah fi ̄ Aba' Khair al- Bariyah, in A. Turki, "Watha'iq al- hijra al- Andalusiyah al- Akhirah, "Hawliyat al- Jamiʻah al- Tunisiyah 4 (1967): 27-39.56 194.
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While much has been made of the value of employment relative to unemployment, much less is known about the value of work relative to retirement. We here use two European panel datasets to first show that psychological well-being (measured on the EURO-D and GHQ scales) barely changes on average when individuals retire. However, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the size of the change between job type and between individuals. Some gain on leaving work, while others experience substantial falls in well-being on retiring, suggesting that they may have preferred to carry on working. We suggest that the results of these analyses can help to inform policy aiming to encourage labour supply by older workers. ; Si la valeur du travail relativement au chômage a été au centre de nombre de travaux, il n'en va pas de même pour la valeur du travail par rapport à la retraite. Nous exploitons deux bases de données de panel européennes afin de montrer dans un premier temps que le bien-être psychologique (mesuré par les indices EURO-D et GHQ) des individus ne varie quasiment pas lorsque ceux-ci prennent leur retraite. Cette variation est toutefois très hétérogène selon le type d'emploi occupé avant la retraite d'un individu à un autre. Certains gagnent à s'arrêter de travailler tandis que d'autres voient leur bien-être se dégrader considérablement à la retraite et préféreraient donc probablement continuer à travailler. Nous pensons que les résultats de ces analyses peuvent être utiles aux politiques visant à encourager la participation des seniors au marché du travail.
While much has been made of the value of employment relative to unemployment, much less is known about the value of work relative to retirement. We here use two European panel datasets to first show that psychological well-being (measured on the EURO-D and GHQ scales) barely changes on average when individuals retire. However, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the size of the change between job type and between individuals. Some gain on leaving work, while others experience substantial falls in well-being on retiring, suggesting that they may have preferred to carry on working. We suggest that the results of these analyses can help to inform policy aiming to encourage labour supply by older workers. ; Si la valeur du travail relativement au chômage a été au centre de nombre de travaux, il n'en va pas de même pour la valeur du travail par rapport à la retraite. Nous exploitons deux bases de données de panel européennes afin de montrer dans un premier temps que le bien-être psychologique (mesuré par les indices EURO-D et GHQ) des individus ne varie quasiment pas lorsque ceux-ci prennent leur retraite. Cette variation est toutefois très hétérogène selon le type d'emploi occupé avant la retraite d'un individu à un autre. Certains gagnent à s'arrêter de travailler tandis que d'autres voient leur bien-être se dégrader considérablement à la retraite et préféreraient donc probablement continuer à travailler. Nous pensons que les résultats de ces analyses peuvent être utiles aux politiques visant à encourager la participation des seniors au marché du travail.