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中國作為國際證監會組織的成員國,有責任落實國際証監會組織發佈的《金融市場基礎設施原則》。儘管國際貨幣基金組織發表的評分報告肯定中國落實了國際証監會組織提倡的金融規管原則,但事實上該等原則於納入法規後未獲執行。以上的分歧現象引起了對「中國金融規管制度會趨向國際原則」說法的質疑。 ; 本研究的討論重點在於中國金融法規會否跟國際原則趨向相同。本研究以系統化綜述分析國際貨幣基金組織對各國落實《金融市場基礎設施原則》情況的評分報告,並以內容分析法分析傳媒在中國二零一五年「股災」發生前後發表關於金融市場的報導。目的在於顯示中國政府以及金融監管機構在「股災」發生前後,在監管事宜上取態有明顯分別。 ; 本研究根據目的決定論提出中國金融監管趨向於與國際原則分歧。目的決定論、趨同理論以及有限度趨同理論的分別含意及對分歧現象的解釋在本研究中獲審視。根據目的決定論,由於中國金融市場有獨特社會目標,加上中國金融市場需要兼顧中國獨特社會背景,因此中國金融監管制度應該趨向獨特。換而言之,中國金融監管制度不應引入國際原則。目的決定論的論據在於中國政府領導層與金融業監管員在共產黨內有從屬關係。該從屬關係導致監管機構的監管行為被政府俘虜。 ; 根據規制俘虜理論,金融監管機構本來的職能被政府的提出議程取締。根據經濟目標合法性,中國政府的合法性源於其維持經濟發展的能力。因此,中國政府在金融市場的利益在於鞏固其執政合法性,而中國政府要達到以上目的,則需要令金融監管機構配合其經濟政策,修改監管方法及監管重點。最終,監管機構成為推動救市,並且宣揚政府權威形象的主力。 ; 綜觀以上提到中國的獨特金融監管制度,本研究旨在指出制度安排如何影響監管機構對金融業的監管。該等影響關連到中國金融監管制度是否趨向與國際間通用的監管原則同化。 ; Evaluations by International Monetary Fund (IMF) have shown increased implementation of International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) regulatory principles in China. However, findings show that international regulatory principles have not been practiced in China. Enforcement efforts of the principles remained low in China, and this casts doubts on the claim that Chinese financial regulation would develop towards the convergence of international regulatory principles due to the globalization of regulations. ; This research discusses on whether Chinese financial regulation has adopted international regulatory practices. Systematic review of IMF reports on implementation of IOSCO principles in different countries and content analysis of media reports issued around the happening of the 2015 stock market selloff crisis in China are employed to discover and examine findings. The selloff crisis is selected as a case for studying Chinese financial regulation because government interference in financial market made China's development away from international regulatory principles apparent, and arguments of this research are built on changes in financial regulatory patterns in China. ; This research supports the view of teleological determinism applied by Wilbert ...

The study of Chinese labour politics has returned to the centre of scholarly interest as China has increasingly become involved in global production and trade. As the incidence of labour dispute and workers' strikes continued to soar, ubiquitous cases of labour rights abuse have been widely reported by international media and academics. The literature of Marxist international political economy has long predicted the insurgency of the Chinese working class resulting from rising inequality, global capital movement and labour division. In contrast, traditional Chinese labour studies are inconclusive as to whether the Chinese working class has gained enough class consciousness to become a cohesive agent for social and political change. This research examines how rising economic, social and political inequalities have impacted on the Chinese working class's agency. The research shifts the focus from top-down structural analysis to workers' agency itself, with an emphasis on their cognitive strength. The research was undertaken via a two-case comparative study of the Chinese working class in four megacities and four smaller cities. Data came mostly from statistics and field interviews. This two-case comparative study concludes that, overall, the Chinese working class had a weak behavioural strength, as manifested by inconsistent wildcat-style strikes, which had no clear political strategies. This research also concludes that the working class's cognitive agency is weak and conservative, as manifested by a weak class identification, their poor understanding of democracy, their low willingness to participate in collective action, and their weak sense of class solidarity. I argue that inequalities and capital movement do not have a simple and unidirectional relationship with the working class's collective agency. On the one hand, inequalities and capital movement can arouse the working class's behavioural strength quickly. On the other hand, workers' cognitive strength is more inert and does not correspond neatly to these two factors. The research findings show that the megacities are more economically developed, with higher inequalities, but with considerably weaker and more conservative working class agency; whereas the smaller cities are less economically developed, with lower inequalities, but with less weak and conservative working class agency. The addition of cognitive strength as a new dimension of working class study provides a pluralist analytical framework for the study of Chinese labour. The new Chinese working class are better educated and more individualised with three main characteristics - occupation-based, precarious, and conservative - which distinguish them from the older generations of workers who had a clear group identification, such as the SOE workers in the 1990s, and the rural migrant workers in the 2000s. These theoretical and empirical findings open up possibilities of new strategies for effective labour organisation that should be considered by labour NGOs, civil society and the government. These players not only need to manage the working class action carefully, but also need to better understand the workers' complex cognitive situations.