Suchergebnisse

Po upadku komunizmu i zakończeniu zimnej wojny wydawało się, że świat na trwałe wchodzi w okres stabilizacji, pokoju i współpracy. Szybko jednak okazało się, że świat narastającej globalizacji ma różne oblicza, także negatywne, co rzutuje na prawie każdą sferę życia, także na bezpieczeństwo. Spadło co prawda zagrożenie nuklearne, ale pojawiły się nowe zagrożenia oraz nasiliły te, które przedtem przesłonięte były rywalizacją Wschód – Zachód. Chodzi głównie o konfl ikty etniczno- -religijne, kulturowe i cywilizacyjne, w tym rozlewające się konfl ikty wewnętrzne w państwach słabych i upadłych, proliferację broni masowego rażenia, niebezpieczne ambicje państw dyktatorskich. Ogromny wpływ na ład międzynarodowy i bezpieczeństwo miały zamachy 11 września 2001. Zmieniły one percepcję zagrożeń dla bezpieczeństwa. Terroryzm uznany został za największe zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa, a ogłoszona przez prezydenta Busha walka z terroryzmem doprowadziła Stany Zjednoczone i prawie cały Zachód do zaangażowania w dwie wojny: w Iraku i w Afganistanie. O ile interwencję w Afganistanie i obalenie reżimu Talibów można uznać za swoiste prawo do samoobrony Stanów Zjednoczonych (a właściwie po uruchomieniu art. 5 traktatu waszyngtońskiego za sprawę całego NATO), bo Al-Kaida, która była organizatorem zamachów 11 września, za przyzwoleniem tego reżimu była na stałe zainstalowana w tym kraju, to już interwencja w Iraku miała wątpliwe podstawy prawne, a właściwie była ona jednostronną decyzją USA, podjętą mimo protestów połowy sojuszników NATO. To co nastąpiło potem, w ramach wojny z terroryzmem, przekształciło się w totalny chaos, przypominający wojnę domową, w Iraku obecnie wygasającą, w Afganistanie zaś, już w warunkach obecności tam Międzynarodowych Sił Wsparcia Bezpieczeństwa (ISAF), coraz bardziej nasilającą się. W ostatnich dwóch latach warunki bezpieczeństwa w Afganistanie, za które w praktyce, w ramach ISAF, odpowiedzialne jest NATO, gwałtownie się pogorszyły. Gwałtownie wzrosła liczba zamachów terrorystycznych, a talibowie odzyskują pozycje, kontrolując już prawie 40% obszaru Afganistanu. Sytuacja w Afganistanie i odpowiedzialność NATO za bezpieczeństwo tego kraju budzi ogromne zaniepokojenie przywódców państw natowskich oraz kierownictwa sojuszu. Staje się to również jednym z centralnych problemów nowej administracji waszyngtońskiej. Trwające już siedem lat i rosnące zaangażowanie NATO i sił koalicyjnych w Afganistanie, pionierskie w ramach misji out of area, mimo zaangażowania ok. 64 tysięcy żołnierzy, sprzętu i idących w miliardy dolarów kosztów operacji nie przynosi jak dotąd, oczekiwanych rezultatów. Dlatego też przygotowana i realizowana jest nowa strategia obecności USA i NATO w Afganistanie. Zaangażowanie NATO w Afganistanie często interpretowane jest jako swoisty test dla Sojuszu, jako wyraz rosnącej odpowiedzialności za bezpieczeństwo globalne, w tym za zwalczanie nowych zagrożeń, takich jak terroryzm, których eskalacja jest także ubocznym skutkiem globalizacji. Autor nie w pełni podziela te opinie, choć niewątpliwie obecność NATO w Afganistanie jest ważną i trudną próbą dla Sojuszu, w tym także dla Polski ze względu na rosnące zaangażowanie sił zbrojnych naszego kraju w tę operację. Sprawa udziału NATO jednak rzutuje na stan bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego, eskaluje napięcia i budzi negatywne emocje cywilizacyjno-kulturowe, utrudnia walkę z terroryzmem, kładzie się cieniem na i tak niejasny obraz sytuacji na Bliskim i Środkowym Wschodzie. Na wiele spraw z zakresu bezpieczeństwa globalnego i regionalnego, w tym narodowego poszczególnych krajów (choćby USA), patrzy się przez pryzmat Afganistanu. ; When the cold war ended, after the collapse of communism and when fi nally the Soviet Union disintegrated, there was a widespread feeling through the world that at long last universal peace had descended on earth. The fear of war in which weapons of mass destruction would be used had vanished. Today's world is a vastly different place. It is a world of globalization, which has both good and bad sides. This inexorable process has extended the opportunities of worldwide interchange. But this same globalization process and associated technology have also brought major new threats and intensifi ed existing ones. The threats we face are seamless, running across the boundaries of defence, foreign affairs, domestic and social life. It has left nations and peoples ever more vulnerable to phenomena ranging from international crime and terrorism through to cyber-attacks, health pandemics, energy politics, resource shortages and fi nancial crisis. We are facing the problem of failed states, WMD proliferations, rough countries challenges. We all have to agree that it was a great impact of 9/11 terrorist hijackers and attacks on security. The perception of international security threats has changed. Terrorism has been recognized as the biggest threat for security. The war on terrorism, declared by George W. Bush, has engaged United States and almost the whole West in two wars: in Iraq and in Afghanistan. As far as Afghanistan case is concerned, one has to recognize the legitimacy of American intervention (as did the UN Security Council), as U.S. had the right to self-defence after Al-Qaeda attacks, operating from Afghan territory. In the case of intervention in Iraq there are far going doubts about its legitimacy. The result was not only the overthrow of both regimes, of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Taliban in Afghanistan, but a real mess – if not a civil war – in Iraq. Today, after seven years, the security situation in Iraq has much improved, but in Afghanistan there is ongoing process of violence escalation. In the last years the conditions of security in Afghanistan, for keeping which responsible is ISAF (and practically NATO, being a core of ISAF), has dramatically deteriorated. The number of terrorist attacks has enormously increased and Taliban have regained the control over 40% of Afghan territory. The security situation in Afghanistan and NATO's responsibility for that is the reason of deep concern for both the leaders of NATO member states and Alliance itself. The new American administration has made the confl ict a policy priority. President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan, including the decision to commit an additional 30 000 U.S. military forces to address the confl ict. NATO's engagement in Afghanistan is treated as a kind of test for Alliance and a confi rmation of NATO's rising responsibility for global security, opening new out of area alliance missions. It is also important for Poland, taking in consideration the rising number of Polish troops in Afghanistan. Many questions of global and regional [Middle East] security are treated in the framework of Afghanistan case. ; Многие считали, что после падения коммунизма и окончания холодной войны, мир входит в период стабилизации, мира и сотрудничества. Однако вскоре ока- залось, что в эпоху глобализации мир имеет разные обличия, в том числе нега- тивные, что отражается почти на каждой сфере жизни, в том числе и на безопас- ности. Хотя и уменьшилась ядерная угроза, но появились новые угрозы, а также усилились те, которые ранее, в связи с соперничеством Востока и Запада, на- ходились на втором плане. Главным образом здесь необходимо иметь ввиду эт- ническо-религиозные, культурные и цивилизационные конфликты, в том числе, внутренние конфликты в слабых и распавшихся государствах, распространение оружия массового уничтожения, опасные шаги диктаторских государств. Огромное влияние на международный порядок и безопасность оказали террористические акты 11 сентября 2001 года. Они полностью изменили вос- приятие угроз безопасности. Терроризм был признан самой большой угрозой безопасности, а провозглашенная президентом Бушем война с терроризмом вовлекла Соединённые Штаты и почти весь Запад в ведение двух войн: в Ира- ке и в Афганистане. Если интервенцию в Афганистане и свержение режима та- либов еще можно признать своеобразным правом на самозащиту Соединённых Штатов (а имея ввиду 5 статью Вашингтонского договора делом всего НАТО), поскольку Аль-Каида, ответственная за организацию терактов 11 сентября, с согласия режима талибов имела постоянные базы в этой стране, то интер- венция в Ираке имела очень слабые юридические основания и в действитель- ности она была односторонним решением США, принятым вопреки протестам половины союзников НАТО. То, что произошло в рамках войны с терроризмом, позже превратилось в тотальный хаос, приведший к ослабевающей гражданс- кой войне в Ираке, и усиливающейся войне в Афганистане, происходящей в ус- ловиях присутствия там Международных сил содействия безопасности (ISAF). В последние два года безопасность в Афганистане, за которую в действитель- ности в рамках ISAF, несет ответственность НАТО, сильно ухудшилась. Возрос- ло количество террористических актов, а талибы контролируют уже почти 40% территории Афганистана. Ситуация в Афганистане и ответственность НАТО за безопасность этой стра- ны, вызывает огромное беспокойство глав государств членов НАТО, руководс- тва союза, а также становиться одной из главных проблем новой вашингтон- ской администрации. Продолжающееся уже семь лет и растущее присутствие НАТО и коалиционных сил в Афганистане, не взирая на контингент численностью около 64 тысяч солдат, современную технику и исчисляющуюся в миллиар- дах долларов стоимость операции, пока не принесло ожидаемых результатов. В связи с чем, подготавливается и реализуется новая стратегия присутствия США и НАТО в Афганистане. Действия НАТО в Афганистане часто интерпретированы как своеобразный тест для союза, как проявление растущей ответственности за глобальную бе- зопасность, в том числе за борьбу с новыми угрозами, такими как терроризм, эскалация которого в какой-то степени является побочным следствием глоба- лизации. Автор не полностью разделяет такое мнение, хотя, несомненно, при- сутствие НАТО в Афганистане – это важное и тяжелое испытание для союза, в том числе также для Польши, ввиду возрастающего присутствия вооружён- ных сил Польши в этой операции. Вопрос участия в операции НАТО, хотим мы этого или нет, отражается на состоянии международной безопасности, вызыва- ет напряжения и отрицательные цивилизационно-культурные эмоции, затруд- няет борьбу с терроризмом, оказывает влияние на и так непростую ситуацию на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке. На многие вопросы в сфере глобальной и ре- гиональной безопасности, в том числе и национальной, отдельных стран (даже США), нужно смотреть сквозь призму Афганистана.

There is no doubt now that energy is fundamental to our development. Global energy trends such as higher energy demand and prices, big differences across regions, structural changes in an oil and gas industry increasingly dominated by national companies, the prospect of irreversible climate change, as well as demand for energy security all highlight the need for a rapid transition to a low-carbon, efficient and environmentally benign energy system. The search for energy alternatives involving locally available and renewable resources is one of the main concerns of governments, scientists and business people worldwide. As researchers tackle problems according to global trends, an overwhelming body of research focusing on bioenergy in relation to other types of renewable energy might illustrate the role bioenergy has as the most important renewable energy source for the near and medium-term future. Thus, analyzing the amount of existing research, we found that about 50% (4,911 records) of 9,724 renewable energy records available were bioenergy records. We also found that publications on each of the four main sources of biomass (agriculture, forest, waste and other) represent about one quarter of the 4,911 bioenergy records retrieved. Biomass – the fourth largest energy source after coal, oil and natural gas - is the largest and most important renewable energy option at present and can be used to produce different forms of energy. As a result, it is, together with the other renewable energy options, capable of providing all the energy services required in a modern society, both locally and in most parts of the world. Renewability and versatility are, among many other aspects, important advantages of biomass as an energy source. Moreover, compared to other renewables, biomass resources are common and widespread across the globe. The sustainability potential of global biomass for energy is widely recognized. For example, the annual global primary production of biomass is equivalent to the 4,500 EJ of solar energy captured each year. About 5% of this energy, or 225 EJ, should cover almost 50% of the world's total primary energy demand at present. These 225 EJ are in line with other estimates which assume a sustainable annual bioenergy market of 270 EJ. However, the 50 EJ biomass contributed to global primary energy demand of 470 EJ in 2007, mainly in the form of traditional non-commercial biomass, is only 10% of the global primary energy demand. The potential for energy from biomass depends in part on land availability. Currently, the amount of land devoted to growing energy crops for biomass fuels is only 0.19% of the world's total land area and only 0.5-1.7% of global agricultural land. Although the large potential of algae as a resource of biomass for energy is not taken into consideration in this report, there are results that demonstrate that algae can, in principle, be used as a renewable energy source. From all of these perspectives, the evidence gathered by the report leads to a simple conclusion: Biomass potential for energy production is promising. In most cases, shifting the energy mix from fossil fuels to renewables can now be done using existing technology. Investors in many cases have a reasonably short pay-back because of good availability of lowcost biomass fuels. The latter is of course dependant on local incentives, however. Overall, the future of bioenergy is also to a large extent determined by policy. Thus, an annual bioenergy supply covering global energy demand in 2050, superseding 1,000 EJ, should be possible with sufficient political support. Global production of biomass and biofuel is growing rapidly due to the increasing price of fossil fuels, growing environmental concerns, and considerations regarding the security and diversification of energy supply. There are many scenarios that predict a high potential for biomass in the future. There have also been many studies performed in recent decades to estimate the future demand and supply of bioenergy. Overall, the world's bioenergy potential seems to be large enough to meet the global energy demand in 2050. The current stock of standing forest is a large reservoir of bioenergy and in line with the theoretical potential of biomass energy. However, most of the research studies on biomass potentials ignore existing studies on demand and supply of wood, despite the extensive literature and data on the subject. Taking into account data from a variety of international sources, rough estimates of the energy production potential of woody biomass from forestry show that, in theory, the demand for wood fuel and industrial roundwood in 2050 can be met, without further deforestation, although regional shortages may occur. However, the shift in the energy mix requires much more investment in infrastructure, equipment and in some cases R&D. Moreover, a prerequisite for achieving bioenergy's substantially high potential in all regions is replacing current inefficient and low-intensive management systems with best practices and technologies.

Central Europe is part of the continent with its historical and cultural identity and a unique geopolitical role (geopolitical wedge between Germany and Russia). Central Europe includes the Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, which for centuries have been the subject of rivalry between Poland and Russia and the area of influence of powers neighboring this region. Depending on the results of this rivalry, the status of Ukrainian-Belarusian territories varied between the "great borderland" and the periphery of various powers, most often the Republic of Poland or the Russian Empire. However, their role was different for both countries. For the Commonwealth, they constituted a necessary resource for maintaining its subjectivity, sovereignty and, consequently, independence. However, for Russia they were a route to master Central Europe and to influence Western Europe. In the history of the Ukrainian-Belarusian lands, three alternative variants of concentration and political rivalry were possible. The first – the formation in this subregion of Central Europe of the countries with high political subjectivity, based on significant demographic, geopolitical and economic resources. The second – the occupation of the Ukrainian-Belarusian border entirely by one of the neighboring powers as a result of military actions or EU agreements, which made them a "great borderland", strengthening the potential of the country of its belonging. The third – the division of Ukrainian-Belarusian lands between state organisms with high subjectivity (the loss of the status of "great borderland" in favor of being peripheries), actually preventing internal political consolidation, but deepening the diversity of the subregion in terms of religion, religion, ethnicity, culture and language, mental, and consequently also socio-economic. In the historical process, all three scenarios were implemented, which contributed to giving the Ukrainian-Belarusian lands as a constitutive feature of the "Central European syndrome", however questioned in the international environment, primarily by Russia recognizing this area as part of its own civilization and cultural circle. ; Europa Środkowa jest częścią kontynentu z własną tożsamością historyczną i kulturową oraz unikatową rolą geopolityczną (geopolitycznego klina między Niemcami i Rosją). Do Europy Środkowej należy zaliczyć ziemie ukraińskie i białoruskie, które przez wieki były przedmiotem rywalizacji między Polską i Rosją oraz obszarem wpływów mocarstw niesąsiadujących z tym regionem. W zależności od wyników tej rywalizacji status ziem ukraińsko-białoruskich wahał się między "wielkim pograniczem" a peryferiami różnych mocarstw, najczęściej Rzeczypospolitej lub Imperium Rosyjskiego. Jednak dla obu tych państw ich rola była odmienna. Dla Rzeczypospolitej stanowiły one konieczny zasób dla utrzymania jej podmiotowości, suwerenności, a w konsekwencji – niepodległości. Natomiast dla Rosji były szlakiem do opanowania Europy Środkowej oraz oddziaływania na Europę Zachodnią.W dziejach ziem ukraińsko-białoruskich były możliwe trzy alternatywne warianty koncentracji i rywalizacji politycznej. Pierwszy – ukształtowanie w tym subregionie Europy Środkowej państw o wysokiej podmiotowości politycznej, opartej na znacznych zasobach demograficznych, geopolitycznych i gospodarczych. Drugi – zajęcie ukraińsko-białoruskiego pogranicza w całości przez jedno z sąsiednich mocarstw w wyniku działań militarnych lub układów unijnych, co czyniło z nich "wielkie pogranicze", wzmacniające potencjał państwa swojej przynależności. Trzeci – podział ziem ukraińsko-białoruskich między organizmy państwowe o wysokiej podmiotowości (utrata statusu "wielkiego pogranicza" na rzecz bycia peryferiami), faktycznie uniemożliwiający wewnętrzną konsolidację polityczną, lecz pogłębiający zróżnicowanie subregionu pod względem religijno-wyznaniowym, etnicznym, kulturowo-językowym, mentalnym, a w konsekwencji również społeczno-gospodarczym. W procesie historycznym były realizowane wszystkie trzy scenariusze, co przyczyniło się do nadania ziemiom ukraińsko-białoruskim jako cechy konstytutywnej "syndromu środkowoeuropejskiego", jednak kwestionowanego w środowisku międzynarodowym, przede wszystkim przez Rosję uznającą ten obszar za część własnego kręgu cywilizacyjno-kulturowego. ; Центральная Европа является частью континента с его исторической и культурной самобытностью и уникальной геополитической ролью (геополитический клин между Германией и Россией). Центральная Европа включает в себя украинские и белорусские земли, которые на протяжении веков были предметом соперничества между Польшей и Россией и зоной влияния держав, граничащих с этим регионом. В зависимости от результатов этого соперничества, статус украинско-белорусских территорий варьировался между «великой границей» и периферией различных держав, чаще всего Речи Посполитой или Российской империи. Однако их роль была разной для обеих стран. Для Речи Посполитой они являлись необходимым ресурсом для поддержания ее субъективности, суверенитета и, следовательно, независимости. Однако для России это был путь к овладению Центральной Европой и влиянию на Западную Европу.В истории украинско-белорусских земель были возможны три альтернативных варианта концентрации и политического соперничества. Первый – формирование в этом субрегионе Центральной Европы стран с высокой политической субъектностью, основанных на значительных демографических, геополитических и экономических ресурсах. Второй – оккупация украинско-белорусской границы целиком одной из соседних держав в результате военных действий или союзных соглашений, которые сделали их «великой границей», усиливая потенциал страны своей принадлежности. Третий – разделение украинско-белорусских земель между государственными организмами с высокой субъектностью (утрата статуса «великих пограничных территорий» в пользу периферии), фактически предотвращающее внутриполитическую консолидацию, но углубляющее разнообразие субрегиона с точки зрения религии, этнической принадлежности, культуры и языка, менталитета, а следовательно, и социально-экономической дифференциации. В историческом процессе были реализованы все три сценария, которые способствовали тому, что украинско-белорусские земли стали характерной чертой «центральноевропейского синдрома», хотя и подвергались сомнению в международной среде, в первую очередь в связи с тем, что Россия признала этот район частью своего цивилизационно-культурного круга.

After regaining independence in 1918, the Polish state, apart from the necessity of building a state apparatus, was forced to fight for its borders and then for their recognition on the international arena. Another extremely important task of Polish diplomacy was the issue of creating a system of alliances that would give Poland and the newly revived states of the subregion security guarantees. To this end, in the first years after the end of the war, Warsaw intensively sought to create a permanent form of political and military cooperation within the Central and Eastern Europe subregion and the Baltic Sea. In Warsaw, on March 17, 1922, an agreement was signed by Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Finland, which in the far-reaching plans of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to be a step towards establishing the so-called of the Baltic Union. The problem, however, was that in Finland at the time, the tendency to strengthen cooperation with the Scandinavian countries and the desire to adopt a policy of neutrality played a large role. Lithuania, however, was not willing to further strengthen relations with Poland, with which it remained in conflict after the occupation of Vilnius in April 1919 by the troops of General Lucjan Żeligowski. The fact that Vilnius was captured by Polish troops aroused waves of criticism in Western Europe towards Warsaw. The opportunity to improve the image came in January 1923, when Lithuania removed the French garrison and annexed the so-called Klaipeda country. Warsaw's balanced and calm reaction to Lithuanian moves was positively assessed by the Western powers. Although none of the concepts of building an alliance capable of opposing Soviet Russia and thus ensuring the security of itself and its allies has not been implemented, their analysis today allows us to put forward the thesis that the fate of this part of Europe has never been indifferent to Poland and it has always been associated with security of the entire subregion, as evidenced by the current political and military commitment in the form of battalion battle groups under the NATO initiative known as enhanced forward presence (eFP). ; Państwo polskie po odzyskaniu niepodległości w 1918 r. poza koniecznością budowania aparatu państwowego zmuszone zostało do walki o swoje granice a następnie o ich uznanie na arenie międzynarodowej. Kolejnym niezwykle istotnym zadaniem dyplomacji polskiej stała się kwestia stworzenia systemu sojuszy, które dałyby Polsce i nowo odrodzonym państwom subregionu gwarancje bezpieczeństwa. W tym celu Warszawa w pierwszych latach po zakończeniu wojny intensywnie zabiegała o stworzenie stałej formy współpracy polityczno-militarnej w obrębie subregionu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej oraz Morza Bałtyckiego. W Warszawie 17 marca 1922 r. doszło do podpisania przez Polskę, Łotwę, Litwę, Estonię i Finlandię układu, który w dalekosiężnych planach polskiego MSZ miał być krokiem ku powołaniu do życia tzw. związku bałtyckiego. Problem polegał jednak na tym, że w Finlandii w tym czasie dużą role odgrywały tendencje zacieśnienia współpracy z państwami skandynawskimi oraz chęć obrania polityki neutralności. Litwa zaś nie była skłonna do dalszego zacieśniania relacji z Polską, z którą pozostawała w konflikcie po zajęciu Wilna w kwietniu 1919 r. przez oddziały gen. Lucjana Żeligowskiego. Fakt ten wzbudził w Europie Zachodniej fale krytyki względem Warszawy. Okazja do poprawy wizerunku nadarzyła się w styczniu 1923 r, kiedy to Litwa usunęła garnizon francuski i dokonała aneksji tzw. Kraju Kłajpedy. Wyważona i spokojna reakcja Warszawy na posunięcia Litwinów została pozytywnie oceniona przez mocarstwa zachodnie. Chociaż żadna z koncepcji zbudowania sojuszu zdolnego przeciwstawić się Rosji Radzieckiej a tym samym zapewnić bezpieczeństwo sobie oraz sojusznikom, nie została zrealizowana, jednak ich analiza pozwala nam dzisiaj wysunąć tezę, że losy tej części Europy nigdy nie były Polsce obojętne i zawsze wiązały się one z bezpieczeństwem całego subregionu, czego dowodem jest obecne zaangażowanie polityczne i militarne w postaci batalionowych grup bojowych w ramach inicjatywy NATO znanej, jako wzmocniona Wysunięta Obecność (ang. enhanced Forward Presence – eFP). ; Після відновлення незалежності в 1918 році польська держава, крім необхідності побудови державного апарату, була змушена боротися за свої кордони, а потім і за їх визнання на міжнародній арені. Ще одним надзвичайно важливим завданням польської дипломатії було питання створення системи союзів, яка би дала Польщі та нововідродженим державам гарантії безпеки субрегіону. Із цією метою у перші роки після закінчення війни Варшава посилено прагнула створити постійну форму політичного та військового співробітництва в межах субрегіону Центрально-Східної Європи та Балтійського моря. У Варшаві 17 березня 1922 р. Польща, Латвія, Литва, Естонія та Фінляндія навіть підписали угоду, яка в далекосяжних планах польського Міністерства закордонних справ повинна стати кроком до створення т. зв. Балтійського союзу. Однак проблема полягала в тому, що в той час у Фінляндії велику роль відігравала тенденція до зміцнення співпраці зі скандинавськими країнами та бажання прийняти політику нейтралітету. Литва, однак, не бажала надалі зміцнювати відносини з Польщею, з якою вона залишалася в конфлікті після окупації Вільнюса у квітні 1919 р. військами генерала Лучана Желіговського. Цей факт викликав хвилі критики щодо Варшави у Західній Європі. Можливість покращити імідж з'явилася у січні 1923 року, коли Литва усунула французький гарнізон та анексувала т. зв. Клайпедський край. Урівноважена та спокійна реакція Варшави на литовські кроки була позитивно оцінена західними державами. Хоча жодна з концепцій побудови альянсу, здатного протистояти Радянській Росії і таким чином запевнити безпеку собі та своїм союзникам, не була втілена в життя, однак їх аналіз сьогодні дозволяє висунути тезу про те, що доля цієї частини Європи ніколи не була байдужою для Польщі. Вона завжди була пов'язана з безпекою усього субрегіону, про що свідчить нинішня політична та військова прихильність у формі бойових груп батальйонів як частини ініціативи НАТО, як посилена Розширена Присутність.

Knowledge and valuation of ecosystem services are important components for reaching the governmental goals for improving the natural environments. Recreational fishing has more than one million practitioners nationwide.Knowledge about the fishers and their catches increases the ability to assess whether the ecosystem services are retained. In addition, it gives means for evaluating the actions for the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of oceans, lakes and rivers. Knowledge of recreational fishing is also needed in order to follow up the details in its environmental objectives relating to outdoor recreation, tourism industry and the governmental goals in the open-air policy. The EU's common fisheries policy, the Swedish environmental policy and Swedish fisheries policy all emphasize that ecosystem-based management should be implemented. Thus, there are needs for knowledge of the ecosystems which are exploited by humans. Fish populations are important components of aquatic ecosystems, and are affected by the surrounding environment, while they themselves affect the structures of the aquatic food-webs. Fishes often have regulatory functions in the ecosystems, and thereby contribute to valuable ecosystem services in addition to the more obvious services as providing food and recreation for humans. Mostly issues regarding the impacts of fishing-related activities on fish populations have been focused on commercial fishing. A widespread and intensive commercial fishing may lead to the depletion of stocks or, at worst, a collapse of the fish populations; the fish population reaching such low levels that recovery may be difficult. In recent years the knowledge of the impact of recreational fishing on aquatic systems has increased, but still the effects of recreational fishing on ecosystem are relatively poorly studied, compared to commercial fisheries. For many, it may be difficult to accept that recreational fishing may affect fish populations; each fisher/angler favour just their own fisheries without bearing in mind that although the small influence from each individual fisherman may be small, it will be significant when many fishermen harvest from the same stock. Recreational fishing and its effects on the aquatic ecosystems are often neglected in fisheries science, mainly due to the lack of data to estimate recreational fishing harvest with a sufficient resolution to calculate the effort and landings of recreational fisheries. In this report, we try to give an overall picture of the fish species needing increased knowledge in order to get an estimate of harvest in recreational fisheries and thereby the effect on fish populations. Furthermore, we also try to give a picture of international studies and finally to give examples of methods concerning how and to what extent one may conduct studies in Sweden. Our proposal is largely based on combining different surveys in specific areas that we believe can be used to scale-up the results. We suggest data collation of recreational fishing is concentrated to areas with public waters, because in other water bodies the land owner has sovereignty under the law. The focus areas we point out are those already having some data collection, both in terms of recreational fishing and environmental monitoring / stock assessment and where there are non-fishing protective areas nearby. Collection of data should not be made in all areas at every year; three areas are suggested to become intensive areas (data collection every year) and the remaining areas data collection will take place every three years - on a rolling schedule. The sampling methods we recommend are national survey (i.e. mail and telephone surveys), recording of catches in fishing tourism, voluntary catch registration of individual anglers, collection of data from fishing competitions, on-site inventory of fishing effort (e.g. count fetter and trailers), inventory of catch per effort (e.g. by creel-surveys) and fish tagging studies. For the west coast we propose one focus area, Älgöfjorden. At the coasts of Bohuslän County and the northern part of Halland County the fishing pressure is high for lobster and crab and therefore a focus area should be established in this area. We suggest that data are collected by on-site visits for inventorying fishing effort (counting numbers of pots / buoys / fishing people), combined with catch registration can return an estimates on catch per effort, and this can then be applied to a larger area. Another potential focus area is the area around Torhamn (Blekinge) which, for example, is popular area recreational fishing for pike. Torhamn is one of three national reference areas for coastal fish monitoring on the East Coast and has been monitored since 2002. It is also desirable to study aspects of fishing mortality in recreational fisheries. To our knowledge, there are no national studies that have explored the effects of catch-and-release in natural environments over long periods of time. The Bråviken Bay is a relatively limited and well-defined area having considered high recreational fishing pressure, but large time series from fish monitoring programmes are lacking. This site will give good opportunities for studying pike, pikeperch and to some extent also sea trout, data collection is suggested to take place every third year. An adjacent area is Kvädöfjärden having fish monitoring time series from 1989. Closely situated to Kvädöfjärden is Licknevarpefjärden where fishing has been prohibited since 1970. Additional areas that are of interest to follow up with some regularity are Asköfjärden, Gålö and / or Lagnö in the Stockholm archipelago. In the future it might be fruitful to shift data collection intensity between Torhamn in Blekinge and an area in Stockholm archipelago. Such decision should be based on factors like where the most practical solutions / contact network can be found. In the Gulf of Bothnia angling with nets, traps and similar gears are relatively widespread. We suggest that Långvind Bay in Gävleborg County, is an area for the study of recreational fishing in a relatively sparsely populated county and is most likely typical for large parts of the Gulf of Bothnia. Data collection is suggested to take place every year. As for the Gulf of Bothnia the recreational fishery in the Bothnian Bay are mainly targeting the whitefish, sea trout and, to some extent also perch. By monitoring the recreational fisheries in Kinnbäcksfjärden near Piteå, we hope to be able to describe the local recreational fishing patterns and then apply these values for catch per effort for most of the coastal strip of the Bothnian Bays. Recreational fishing is widespread in all of the five largest lakes in Sweden, and there is a need for data collection in all five. In Lake Vänern, Lake Vättern and Lake Mälaren there are fish monitoring data of good quality and regularity. However, in the two smallest lakes, Lake Hjälmaren and Lake Storsjön in Jämtland County, few test fishing areas and few studies regarding recreational fishing have been made. For Lake Vättern we suggest that data collection is done every year; especially the archipelago in the northern part of the lake will be an excellent area for the study of recreational fishing for pike. In the other four lakes we propose that data collection is made every third year. By studying recreational fishing - its practitioners, scope, gear-use, and harvest, it will be possible to achieve a more detailed view of how recreational fishing is done and how it varies along the Swedish coast and in the five largest lakes. Such knowledge is important for the managers of common fisheries resources and the monitoring of environmental status and evaluating the recreational goals established by the Swedish governments.

POLITICS BY PROVINCE: Goal-oriented rational action or value-oriented rational action in closed debate on the Wadden region and public consultation on the ecological infrastructure General This thesis is a study of political conduct, and of provincial politics in particular. It is based on three research projects. The first two research projects are empirical studies that examine, respectively, the functioning of the discussion platform for government bodies relating to the Wadden Islands area and the relationship between the regional press and provincial political organs. Each of these two projects is based on a defined problem, a theoretical framework, methodology and conclusions. Although both case studies deal with provincial politics, they are completely separate from each other. The third case study is theoretical. It seeks to clarify the rationalization theories of Max Weber and Karl Mannheim, and place the concepts of goaloriented rational action and value-oriented rational action in their theoretical context. This theoretical chapter produces a number of research questions that can be used as a 'rationality grid' to be applied to the two empirical case studies in order to determine what form of action, goal-rational or value-rational, characterizes provincial politics. Chapter One describes the background to the studies and gives a short introduction to the research themes. This chapter also presents a view of contemporary provincial politics and discusses the scientific position from which this thesis has been written, emphasizing the unique role of the sociological vision. How does the government manage the Wadden Sea? The first section examines the way in which the government manages the Wadden Sea. The study is based on an evaluation study of the functioning of the Coördinatiecollege Waddengebied (CCW) in the period 1987 to 1994. The CCW (a platform for administrative consultation between the government, the Wadden provinces and the Wadden municipalities) was set up in 1980 for the purpose of "ensuring coherent administration and an coordinated policy by the government, provinces and municipalities with regard to the Wadden region." The study is based on a bottleneck analysis; in other words, by identifying problems, concrete solutions can be proposed. The evaluation study employed a combination of two popular lines of research in organizational sociology literature – the 'whole-system approach' and the 'parties approach'. In the whole-system approach, shared values or a feeling of solidarity are what unites the organization. In the parties approach, the organization is seen as a coalition of parties with different interests and aims. The parties work together for their own benefit, or because negative sanctions force them to do so. Both approaches are integrated in the 'parties-withina-system' perspective, which focuses on the relationships between the parties and the organization as a whole. This integral approach was used to evaluate the functioning of the CCW because the CCW places great emphasis on shared values and responsibilities, which are the core elements of the whole-system approach. At the same time, however, the CCW is composed of different parties which all have their own tasks, powers and interests – the core elements of the parties approach. This perspective has been tailored to the evaluation of the CCW using the following criteria: shared values, support base, differing interests, power structure, sense of purpose, and success/failure factors. The study is based on qualitative interviews with participants in the CCW platforms, telephone interviews with councillors and members of the States General, dossier analyses and reconstructions from minutes from the CCW consultations on the following cases: enlarging the scope of the Nature Conservation Act; delegation of powers with regard to inspection and control; co-ordination of international activities, problems relating to 'traditional brown shipping'; the review of the Waddenzee II Key Planning Decision, and gas extraction in the Wadden Sea. This treatment of the original research report emphasizes a systematic description of conduct within the context of the administrative co-ordination of the Wadden region, which is usually of a closed nature. The main problem areas are the following:  a lack of shared values due to the fact that the purpose of the Wadden consultation platform is given a different interpretation depending on the interests in question;  by way of preparation for the Wadden consultations, a process of harmonization takes place within the various authorities, thereby creating an administrative support base. However, this process of preliminary consultation and feedback reveals the other side of the bureaucratic coin – this circuit is, administratively and politically speaking, strongly inward-looking;  there are no substantial conflicts of interest between the layers of government. However, mutual suspicion exists with regard to the extent to which other parties are committed to the Wadden policy. Each party suspects that the other parties will ultimately allow economic interests to prevail;  with regard to the delegation of authority, the balance of power between the government and the provinces is seen as unacceptable. The continuous lack of consensus, whether manifest or otherwise, is a barrier to discussion on a equal footing;  there are various problems relating to the sense of purpose, including the role of the Chairman and the lack of a clear definition/delegation of tasks. This analysis shows that the problems are not related to the structure of the Wadden consultative platform but rather to its culture, and more specifically to the participants' perceptions of the role and responsibilities of the platform. In addition, there appears to be a distinct lack of leadership. The main conclusions are as follows:  harmonization within the various Wadden authorities (government, provinces and municipalities) hampers harmonization between the Wadden authorities;  the representatives from the three layers of government do not present the role and purpose of the consultative platform in a consistent and uniform way;  the CCW is hampered in its work by an ongoing debate about how powers are delegated between the layers of government. Because the analysis of success and failure factors revealed that clearly defined relationships between the government authorities are essential for successful consultation, possible solutions aim to create that clarity. Recommendations have been laid down, for example, relating to the role of the Chairman, drawing up the agenda, and clearly defining the tasks of the various bodies. Although, as far back as 1995, the CCW largely acknowledged the problem areas and supported the proposals for improvement, none of the recommendations will actually be implemented before 2001. Politics and the press on the ecological infrastructure in Friesland and Drenthe Section 2 describes a study of the relationship between the regional press and northern provincial politics. The basis for the study is the political decision-making regarding the establishment of the ecological infrastructure in the provinces of Friesland and Drenthe in the period 1989 to 1996. The conclusion of a survey of the relationship between the printed press and parliamentary democracy is that the main function of the press is to provide information, criticism and comment. The role of information-provider is examined on the basis of the following:  actual report of a meeting of the Provincial Councils;  a news report giving information about matters relating to the ecological infrastructure in both provinces;  a background article describing the context, history and/or different interpretations of matters relating to the ecological infrastructure. The role of critic is examined on the basis of the following:  editorial comment;  a column in which one of the editors gives his opinion under his own name;  opinions of third parties, in which a third party, who is not an editor, is given the opportunity to express an opinion. Using four recent examples, it is then argued that the central question relating to the relationship between politics and the press is one of management – who controls political communication or, put another way, is the relationship determined by 'party logic' or by 'media logic'? The study will compare decision-making on the ecological infrastructure (as this was perceived in decision-making meetings of the provincial councils) with reporting by the regional press in both provinces. The decision-making process of the provincial councils was reconstructed for this purpose. The result is not only an analytical reconstruction of the decision-making surrounding the ecological infrastructure in Friesland and Drenthe, but also a chronicle of provincial political customs and morals. A quantitative and qualitative analysis subsequently shows how the regional press fulfils its role as information provider and critic. The quantitative analysis addresses the question of how often the press fulfils its role as information provider and critic with regard to decision-making on the ecological infrastructure. The qualitative analysis addresses the question of how the press fulfils those roles. It is argued that the quality of the information provided is determined by the degree of objectivity, but that the best measure of quality is a clear standpoint. These conclusions were used to formulate an 'ideal' against which the quality of informative and critical articles can be measured. A factual report is as objective as possible when:  it deals not only with the decision itself, but also with the opinion-forming process;  it gives the opinion not only of the representatives of official bodies, but also of opponents or those outside such bodies;  the reporter does not give his own opinion. A news report or background article is as objective as possible when:  it presents more than one perspective and/or quotes more than one authority on the subject. An editorial or column makes a constructive critical contribution when:  the author adopts a clear standpoint;  the context (history, background or current event) of that standpoint is given;  the author describes how the standpoint was reached, and on which information or authorities it is based. Conclusions about the information function:  in almost half of the cases, the regional newspapers do not report on provincial council meetings relating to the ecological infrastructure. The people who live in the province, but fall outside a given environmental or agricultural target group, will not become informed about the ecological infrastructure by reading their local newspaper. Neither will they become informed about the role of the provincial government in this;  in the reports which do deal with meetings of the provincial councils, there is a lack of balance. Generally speaking, no effort is made in such reports to show the full palette of political colours represented in the provincial council;  there is only relatively wide newspaper coverage on occasions when political emotions are running high. Examples are: Friesland in 1993, when an agreement was reached with the agricultural sector, and Drenthe in 1993, when an amended programme of intent for the soil-protection areas was introduced (the agricultural lobby also played an important role in this). This attention from the press can be explained by incident politics. Political groups hold widely different opinions; they make no effort to hide their differences and journalists are keen to pick up on this. Another possible explanation is that, in these cases, ecological policy is heavily influenced by the farming lobby, which itself is strongly supported by influential political groups;  the news reports are usually brief and present an event from only one perspective, without a journalistic contribution from the author. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that press releases sent to the newspapers have been published without any further interpretation;  the most common simple perspective is that which opposes the ecological infrastructure;  there are very few background articles. Background articles that clarify the situation, and outline the problems confronting provincial politicians, are indispensable with regard to a far-reaching and complex plan such as the development of the ecological infrastructure of the two provinces;  it is notable that most of the background articles are only written from one perspective, with very little informative context. On the basis of these findings, it appears that the way in which the regional press fulfils its role as information provider leaves room for improvement. Scant attention is paid to council decision-making and the quality of reporting also leaves something to be desired. Little can be said about how the press fulfils the role as critic because so few articles appear in this context. The question Who controls political communication? cannot therefore be answered because the press pays too little attention to provincial politics. Goal-oriented or value-oriented rationality: which form of rationality determines political action? Section 3 examines which form of rationality (i.e. goal-oriented or value-oriented rationality) occurs most in the closed discussions between government bodies in the Wadden study, or in public discussions on the ecological infrastructure from the study of the relationship between politics and the press. For this purpose the rationalization theories from the work of Weber and Mannheim were used. Both Weber and Mannheim recognise increasing instrumental and formal rationality (Weber) and functional rationality (Mannheim) in all areas of life, and a decrease in material rationality (Weber) and substantial rationality (Mannheim). Weber and Mannheim identify the rise and influence of a specific form of instrumental rationality, particularly within economic, legal and bureaucratic institutions. Within such institutions, actions are characterized by goal-oriented rationality. This means that the prevalent institutional pattern of norms and values that more or less prescribes how people should act within the institutions (role-related behaviour) places great emphasis on goal-rational behaviour. In order to establish whether this also applies in provincial politics and administration, a study was made of the conception of rationality in the work of Weber and Mannheim. The question of whether goal-oriented or value-oriented rationality is dominant is addressed by a secondary analysis of the material. The secondary analysis takes the form of a 'rationality grid' that is applied to the material from the two empirical studies. The grid has a coarsely meshed structure that can separate out goal-oriented and value-oriented rationality. Following the study of Weber and Mannheim's concepts of rationality, goal-oriemted rational action is defined in this study as action that is geared towards finding the most appropriate means to achieve a goal that is considered as given. When action is successful in terms of the defined goal, we speak of goal-oriented rational action and formal rationality. Success or effectiveness is therefore the measure for goal-rational behaviour. The essence of this concept is expressed in the following questions:  is conduct geared towards resources and procedures within the given of administrative co-ordination or within the structured political (provincial) discussions?  are the goals open to discussion? If action is a logical extension of or derives from a higher value or ideal, we speak of 'valueoriented rational action' and 'material rationality'. The extent to which an action is valueoriented is therefore the measure for value-rationality. In this study, value-oriented rational action is defined as action that is based on the assessment of the desirability of a given goal by means of a party-political value system. The essence of the concept, as used in the present context, is expressed in the following question:  is the action geared towards assessing the desirability of a particular goal, based on a political value system? Conclusions: 1. With regard to discussion between government bodies on the subject of the Wadden region, the hypothesis was that, within the sphere of formalised and regulated administrative co-ordination in the Wadden region, actions are largely determined by goal-oriented rationality. The purpose of the discussion platform is, after all, to co-ordinate and realise goals defined elsewhere. The hypothesis is confirmed – the Wadden discussion platform is characterized by goal-oriented rational action. But this type of action is not related to the ultimate goal of the discussion platform but rather to another goal: the increasing of the influence and governance of the government layer in question. 2. With regard to the decision-making on the ecological infrastructure in Friesland and Drenthe, the hypothesis was that political decision-making debates are characterized by the discussion of values to be lived up to and aims to be realised. It is therefore to be expected that such debates are mainly characterized by value-oriented rationality. However, the findings do not confirm this hypothesis. The discussions of the provincial councils of Drenthe and Friesland are certainly not goal-rational in nature, yet neither can they be described as valuerational. Actions are indeed geared towards assessing the desirability of a particular goal, but that assessment is not based on a political value system. It is not party-political principles that determine political conduct; it would be more true to say that conduct is based on notions of consistency in terms of policy and support.