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This article discusses the recent debate between Jürgen Habermas and Wolfgang Streeck on the relationship between capitalism and democracy in Europe. The article recounts Streeck's analysis of the financial crisis, the transformation of the tax state into the debt state, and the development of the EU towards an international consolidation state, which informs Streeck's call for a retreat from Europe to the nation-state as the last line of defense against neoliberal capitalism. The article proceeds to sketch Habermas's criticism of Streeck's argument, and it illustrates how Habermas' proposal for a reconstitution of the EU as a supranational democracy is motivated by foundational concerns in his critical theory of society. Finally, the article argues that the debate results in an unresolved dilemma: while only a democratized EU can reestablish the supremacy of politics over globalized markets, the EU is more likely to become further entrenched as an international consolidation state.

The Nordic countries have long been renowned for their contribution to international peace and security. This contribution – occasionally viewed by both Nordic and non-Nordic policy-makers and academics as a particular model for facilitating peace and development in international affairs – is based on a combination of active contributions to peaceful conflict resolution, a high level of development aid and a continuous commitment to strengthening international society. However, recently Scandinavians have been making headlines for reasons that seem to contrast with their well-established brand as humane internationalist peacemakers. This article identifies the characteristics of the Nordic model for international peace and security and discusses how and why it has changed.

The Global Nutrition Report (GNR) provides a global profile and country profiles on nutrition for each of the United Nations' 193 member states, and includes specific progress for each country. It will be a centerpiece of the Second International Conference on Nutrition (ICN2) in Rome on 19-21 November, organized by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization. ; Supplementary Online Materials ix Acknowledgments x Abbreviations xii Executive summary xiii Chapter 1 ntroduction 2 Chapter 2 Nutrition Is Central to Sustainable Development 7 Chapter 3 Progress toward the World Health Assembly Nutrition Targets Is Too Slow1 5 Chapter 4 The Coexistence of Different Forms of Malnutrition Is the "New Normal" 22 Chapter 5 The Coverage of Nutrition-Specific Interventions Needs to Improve 29 Chapter 6 Interventions Addressing the Underlying Determinants of Nutrition Status Are Important, but They Need to Be More Nutrition sensitive 38 Chapter 7 The Enabling Environment Is Improving, but Not Quickly Enough 47 Chapter 8 The Need to Strengthen Accountability in Nutrition 56 Chapter 9 What Are the Priorities for Investment in Improved Nutrition Data? 67 Chapter 10 Key Messages and Recommendations 71 Appendix 1 The Nutrition Country Profile: A Tool for Action 75 Appendix 2 Which Countries Are on Course to Meet Several WHA Targets? 77 Appendix 3 Which Countries Are on Course for Which WHA Targets? 79 Appendix 4 Donor Spending on Nutrition-Specific and Nutrition-Sensitive Interventions and Programs 84 Appendix 5 How Accountable Is the Global Nutrition Report? 86 Appendix 6 Availability of Data for Nutrition Country Profile Indicators 88 Notes 91 References 95 PANELS Panel 11 Types of Nutrition Investment, Lawrence Haddad 4 Panel 21 Nutrition and the Sustainable Development Goals—No Room for Complacency, Michael Anderson 11 Panel 22 Some New Data from India: What If?, Lawrence Haddad, Komal Bhatia, and Kamilla Eriksen 12 Panel 23 How Did Maharashtra Cut Child Stunting?, Lawrence Haddad 13 Panel 24 Can Improving the Underlying Determinants of Nutrition Help Meet the WHA Targets?, Lisa Smith and Lawrence Haddad 14 Panel 41 Malnutrition in the United States and United Kingdom, Jessica Fanzo 25 Panel 42 Regional Drivers of Malnutrition in Indonesia, Endang Achadi with acknowledgment to Sudarno Sumarto and Taufik Hidayat 26 Panel 43 Compiling District-Level Nutrition Data in India, Purnima Menon and Shruthi Cyriac 27 Panel 44 Targeting Minority Groups at Risk in the United States, Jennifer Requejo and Joel Gittelsohn 28 Panel 51 Measuring Coverage of Programs to Treat Severe Acute Malnutrition, Jose Luis Alvarez 37 Panel 61 Trends in Dietary Quality among Adults in the United States, Daniel Wang and Walter Willett 41 Panel 62 How Did Bangladesh Reduce Stunting So Rapidly?, Derek Headey 43 Panel 63 Using an Agricultural Platform in Burkina Faso to Improve Nutrition during the First 1,000 Days, Deanna Kelly Olney, Andrew Dillon, Abdoulaye Pedehombga, Marcellin Ouédraogo, and Marie Ruel 45 Panel 71 Is There a Better Way to Track Nutrition Spending? 48 Panel 72 Tracking Financial Allocations to Nutrition: Guatemala's Experience, Jesús Bulux, Otto Velasquez, Cecibel Juárez, Carla Guillén, and Fernando Arriola 49 Panel 73 A Tool for Assessing Government Progress on Creating Healthy Food Environments, Boyd Swinburn 51 Panel 74 Engaging Food and Beverage Companies through the Access to Nutrition Index, Inge Kauer 52 Panel 75 How Brazil Cut Child Stunting and Improved Breastfeeding Practices, Jennifer Requejo 54 Panel 81 Scaling Up Nutrition through Business, Jonathan Tench 61 Panel 82 How Civil Society Organizations Build Commitment to Nutrition, Claire Blanchard 62 Panel 83 Building Civil Society's Capacity to Push for Policies on Obesity and Noncommunicable Diseases, Corinna Hawkes 63 Panel 84 Can Community Monitoring Enhance Accountability for Nutrition?, Nick Nisbett and Dolf te Lintelo 64 Panel 85 National Evaluation Platforms: Potential for Nutrition, Jennifer Bryce and colleagues 65 Panel 86 The State of African Nutrition Data for Accountability and Learning, Carl Lachat, Joyce Kinabo, Eunice Nago, Annamarie Kruger, and Patrick Kolsteren 66 ; PR ; IFPRI1; CRP4; B Promoting healthy food systems ; DGO; A4NH; PHND ; CGIAR Research Program on Agriculture for Nutrition and Health (A4NH)

Grønlands udenrigspolitiske repræsentanter benytter den store internationale interesse for Arktis til at positionere Grønland som en mere selvstændig udenrigspolitisk aktør. Det er muligt, da Danmark er afhængig af Grønland for at opretholde sin status som "arktisk stat", og fordi Grønlands udenrigspolitiske kompetence er åben for fortolkning. Denne artikel analyserer, hvordan repræsentanter for skiftende grønlandske regeringer har udvidet det udenrigspolitiske handlerum ved i diskurs og praksis at styrke Grønlands position i en arktisk kontekst. Det er blandt andet opnået ved 1) højlydt at italesætte utilfredshed i Arktisk Råd, 2) stiltiende symbolske handlinger ved Ilulissat-erklæringens tiårs jubilæum, og 3) ved at mime suverænitet ved Arctic Circle konferencen, der pga. sin mere uformelle struktur er særligt nyttig til at styrke bilaterale internationale relationer. ; Greenland's foreign policy representatives use the great international attention to the Arctic to appear and act as a more sovereign foreign policy actor. This is possible due to Denmark's dependence on Greenland to maintain its "Arctic state" status and because Greenland's foreign policy competence is open to interpretation. The article analyzes how representatives of shifting Greenlandic governments have expanded the foreign policy room for manoeuvre in discourse and praxis to strengthen Greenland's position at Arctic-related events. This has been achieved by, among other things, 1) outspoken discontent in the Arctic Council, 2) tacit gestures at the Ilulissat Declaration's 10-year anniversary, and 3) by mimicking full sovereignty at the Arctic Circle conference serving as a particularly useful platform for enhancing bilateral international relations due to its more informal setup.

Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.

The region of Southeast Asia is faced with a complex set of challenges stemming from political, economic and religious developments at the national, regional and global level. This paper sets out to examine trade-, foreign- and security policy implications of the issues confronting the region. In ASEAN, the Southeast Asian countries are continuing their ambitious attempts at further integration. Plans outlining deeper security and economic communities have been adopted. However, huge differences in political systems, economic development and ethnic/religious structures are hampering prospects of closer cooperation. The highly controversial conflict case of Burma/Myanmar is testing the much adhered-to principle of non-interference and at the same time complicating relations with external powers. Among these, the United States and China are dramatically strengthening their interests in the region. American influence is not least manifesting itself in light of the war against terrorism, which the region is adapting to in different ways and at different speeds. By contrast, the European Union does not seem to answer Southeast Asian calls for further engagement. A flurry of bilateral and regional trade agreements is another prominent feature of the economic landscape of the region. This is to a certain degree a reflex ion of impatience with trade liberalization in the WTO and within ASEAN itself. Structures of economic cooperation are under rapid alteration in Southeast Asia. The paper analyses the above-mentioned developments with a view to assessing the prospects of future stability, economic development and integration in and among ASEAN countries. It is concluded that although the scope for increased economic benefit and political harmonization through ASEAN integration alone is limited, the organization could still prove useful as a common regional point of reference in tackling more important policy determinants at national and global level.

The conflict over Kashmir has been a core issue between India and Pakistan since their independence. It is not only just a territorial conflict but also the core issue of the region, which has been changing along with the regional and international environment. In particular, after the 1990's, the people of Kashmir committed to armed resistance, which has become the focus of the risk to regional and international security because both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers. Resolution of this problem is quite difficult because it would require committing to the ideas of national integration of both countries. Specifically, for India, it is secularism; for Pakistan, it is the two-nation theory. However, the people of Kashmir want to choose their own destiny—integration with neither India nor Pakistan. India promised Kashmir a degree of freedom and democracy under article 370 of the Indian Constitution; however, for the time being, these right have been curtailed. To resolve this issue, two main plans have been presented by both countries; a referendum and the partition of Kashmir along the Line of Control. But, these ideas disregard the right of self-determination or the nationalist sentiment of the people of Kashmir. Recently a new idea emerged based on the notion of shared sovereignty. The history of discord between India and Pakistan has caused critical anxiety for regional peace and stability. However, there will is hope that a constructive solution to this problem can be found in the future through continuity of dialogue and negotiation between the two countries. We as an international society surrounding these nations, we should maintain a supportive stance for continued cordial dialogue.

I marts 2005 var det 20 år, siden Mikhail Gorbatjov kom til magten i Sovjetunionen som generalsekretær for Sovjetunionens Kommunistiske Parti og fremlagde sit program til reform af det sovjetiske system. Nøgleordene i reformen var perestrojka, glasnost og demokratisering. De fik ikke alene betydning indadtil, men også udadtil i forholdet til omverdenen, der hurtigt fattede lid til Gorbatjov og hans nyskabelser. Dette working paper giver et overblik over Gorbatjovs og hans meningsfællers opfattelse af udviklingen siden da og deres vurdering af reformernes skæbne og skildrer Ruslands stilling på verdensscenen i dag. Dette indebærer også en kritisk vurdering af præsident Vladimir Putins indenrigs- og udenrigspolitik. Der tegnes et billede af et svagt Rusland, der ikke har frigjort sig fra den sovjetiske arvs byrde, men tværtimod på mange måder søger tilbage til den autoritære styreform, et Rusland, der ved inertiens kraft stadig nyder en vis respekt, om end ikke anseelse i det internationale samfund. ; In March 2005 it was 20 years since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union as Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and presented his programme for reform of the Soviet system. Key words in the reform were perestroika, glasnost and democratization. They became important not only internally but also externally in the relations to the outside world that swiftly put its trust in Gorbachev and his innovations. This working paper gives an overview of the perception that Gorbachev and his like-minded have of the development since then, presents their evaluation of the fate of the reforms and of the position of Russia on the world scene today. This also includes a critical evaluation of the domestic and foreign policies of President Vladimir Putin. The paper outlines a weak Russia that has not released itself from the burden of the Soviet heritage but on the contrary in many ways goes back to the authoritarian form of government, a Russia that by inertia still enjoys a certain respect although not esteem in the international community.