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This article discusses the recent debate between Jürgen Habermas and Wolfgang Streeck on the relationship between capitalism and democracy in Europe. The article recounts Streeck's analysis of the financial crisis, the transformation of the tax state into the debt state, and the development of the EU towards an international consolidation state, which informs Streeck's call for a retreat from Europe to the nation-state as the last line of defense against neoliberal capitalism. The article proceeds to sketch Habermas's criticism of Streeck's argument, and it illustrates how Habermas' proposal for a reconstitution of the EU as a supranational democracy is motivated by foundational concerns in his critical theory of society. Finally, the article argues that the debate results in an unresolved dilemma: while only a democratized EU can reestablish the supremacy of politics over globalized markets, the EU is more likely to become further entrenched as an international consolidation state.

The Nordic countries have long been renowned for their contribution to international peace and security. This contribution – occasionally viewed by both Nordic and non-Nordic policy-makers and academics as a particular model for facilitating peace and development in international affairs – is based on a combination of active contributions to peaceful conflict resolution, a high level of development aid and a continuous commitment to strengthening international society. However, recently Scandinavians have been making headlines for reasons that seem to contrast with their well-established brand as humane internationalist peacemakers. This article identifies the characteristics of the Nordic model for international peace and security and discusses how and why it has changed.

The idea of Vietnam's opening, cooperating and integrating into the world has been sprung up in the very early days of the modern Vietnamese diplomacy under the leadership of President Ho Chi Minh. In the Doi Moi era, with creative application of Ho Chi Minh's Thoughts on international cooperation and integration, the Communist Party of Vietnam has gradually supplemented, improved and developed its perception on international integration in accordance with the evaluation of the world situation, international relations, new trends, the interactive relations between Vietnam and the world, opportunities and challenges for Vietnam in realizing the goals of security, development and raising its position in the international arena. The research paper will focus on studying the evolution of the Communist Party of Vietnam's perception on international integration, a crucial factor contributing to significant achievements in the cause of national renovation in general and foreign policy renewal in particular. ; Tư tưởng mở cửa, hợp tác và hội nhập với thế giới của Việt Nam đã được hình thành từ những ngày đầu tiên của nền ngoại giao Việt Nam hiện đại, dưới sự lãnh đạo của Chủ tịch Hồ Chí Minh. Bước sang thời kỳ Đổi Mới, vận dụng sáng tạo Tư tưởng Hồ Chí Minh về hợp tác và hội nhập quốc tế, Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam đã từng bước hoàn thiện, bổ sung và phát triển tư duy về hội nhập quốc tế trên cơ sở đánh giá tình hình thế giới, quan hệ quốc tế, các xu thế mới, các mối tương quan giữa Việt Nam và thế giới cũng như những cơ hội và thách thức đối với Việt Nam trong việc thực hiện các mục tiêu đảm bảo an ninh, phát triển và nâng cao vị thế của đất nước. Bài viết tập trung tìm hiểu quá trình phát triển tư duy của Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam về hội nhập quốc tế, nhân tố quan trọng góp phần đem lại những thành tựu đáng kể trong sự nghiệp đổi mới đất nước nói chung và đổi mới về đối ngoại nói riêng.

International economic integration is one of the major policies of the Vietnam's Government and the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in the time of doi moi (renovation). This policy has been mentioned in several important resolutions and been implemented intensively since the Ninth National Congress of CPV. Through the national congresses of CPV, the policy of international economic integration has had new developments with new contents which have met the requirements of the domestic situation and matched with the general trend of our time. The Eleventh National Congress of CPV have developed the policy of foreign relations to a new height, in which international integration has become a major orientation of foreign relations. With this orientation, the characteristics and the level of international intergation have been improved, the scope of international integration has been extended. ; Hội nhập kinh tế quốc tế là một chủ trương lớn của Đảng và Nhà nước ta trong thời kỳ đổi mới. Chủ trương đó đã được đề cập đến trong nhiều nghị quyết quan trọng và được triển khai mạnh mẽ từ Đại hội IX đến nay. Qua các kỳ Đại hội Đảng, chủ trương hội nhập kinh tế quốc tế đã có những bước phát triển mới với những nội dung mới, vừa đáp ứng đòi hỏi của tình hình trong nước vừa phù hợp với xu thế chung của thời đại. Đại hội XI của Đảng đã phát triển đường lối, chính sách đối ngoại lên một tầm cao mới, trong đó, hội nhập quốc tế trở thành định hướng đối ngoại lớn. Với định hướng này, tính chất và trình độ hội nhập quốc tế được nâng cao, phạm vi hội nhập quốc tế được mở rộng.

Grønlands udenrigspolitiske repræsentanter benytter den store internationale interesse for Arktis til at positionere Grønland som en mere selvstændig udenrigspolitisk aktør. Det er muligt, da Danmark er afhængig af Grønland for at opretholde sin status som "arktisk stat", og fordi Grønlands udenrigspolitiske kompetence er åben for fortolkning. Denne artikel analyserer, hvordan repræsentanter for skiftende grønlandske regeringer har udvidet det udenrigspolitiske handlerum ved i diskurs og praksis at styrke Grønlands position i en arktisk kontekst. Det er blandt andet opnået ved 1) højlydt at italesætte utilfredshed i Arktisk Råd, 2) stiltiende symbolske handlinger ved Ilulissat-erklæringens tiårs jubilæum, og 3) ved at mime suverænitet ved Arctic Circle konferencen, der pga. sin mere uformelle struktur er særligt nyttig til at styrke bilaterale internationale relationer. ; Greenland's foreign policy representatives use the great international attention to the Arctic to appear and act as a more sovereign foreign policy actor. This is possible due to Denmark's dependence on Greenland to maintain its "Arctic state" status and because Greenland's foreign policy competence is open to interpretation. The article analyzes how representatives of shifting Greenlandic governments have expanded the foreign policy room for manoeuvre in discourse and praxis to strengthen Greenland's position at Arctic-related events. This has been achieved by, among other things, 1) outspoken discontent in the Arctic Council, 2) tacit gestures at the Ilulissat Declaration's 10-year anniversary, and 3) by mimicking full sovereignty at the Arctic Circle conference serving as a particularly useful platform for enhancing bilateral international relations due to its more informal setup.

Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.

Δεν παρατίθεται περἰληψη στα ελληνικά. ; Lina Venturas – Dimitria Groutsis, The Cold War and international migration regulation: The establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration The immediate post WWII period saw the establishment of the Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) (now International Organisation for Migration, IOM), as a key organisation in the management of post WWII migration. This paper examines the debates and policies surrounding the creation of the ICEM as an agent responsible for the facilitation and administration of labour migration from parts of Europe to a variety of overseas countries. At the conclusion of the Second World War, the problems surrounding 'surplus population' and unemployment in Europe were discussed in many international forums. It was from these discussions that a consensus emerged which saw emigration as a viable solution. To this end, in 1951, the International Labour Organisation convened a Migration Conference in Naples, bringing together key stakeholders. The Naples Conference failed, an outcome driven mainly by the US. The US was particularly concerned with economic stagnation and mounting social unrest related to the 'surplus population' in European countries in this Cold War period. At the same time however, it strived at limiting international influence over migration and refugee policies and on receiving countries retaining their sovereign immigration policies. In spite of the disagreements and through a process of negotiation, the US subsequently led the creation of an intergovernmental body, which was established at a conference convened in Brussels in 1951. This newly formed organisation, initially named the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME), was open only to states with a 'liberal' political regime and had specifically designed functions based on inter-governmental negotiations. The US ensured its predominance in the organization through budgetary control and other means. In 1953, the PICMME became a permanent 'fixture' of migration regulation and was renamed the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). Hereafter, ICEM offered operational and financial assistance for migrants' transportation, language training, reception facilities, settlement services and labour market placement.

The region of Southeast Asia is faced with a complex set of challenges stemming from political, economic and religious developments at the national, regional and global level. This paper sets out to examine trade-, foreign- and security policy implications of the issues confronting the region. In ASEAN, the Southeast Asian countries are continuing their ambitious attempts at further integration. Plans outlining deeper security and economic communities have been adopted. However, huge differences in political systems, economic development and ethnic/religious structures are hampering prospects of closer cooperation. The highly controversial conflict case of Burma/Myanmar is testing the much adhered-to principle of non-interference and at the same time complicating relations with external powers. Among these, the United States and China are dramatically strengthening their interests in the region. American influence is not least manifesting itself in light of the war against terrorism, which the region is adapting to in different ways and at different speeds. By contrast, the European Union does not seem to answer Southeast Asian calls for further engagement. A flurry of bilateral and regional trade agreements is another prominent feature of the economic landscape of the region. This is to a certain degree a reflex ion of impatience with trade liberalization in the WTO and within ASEAN itself. Structures of economic cooperation are under rapid alteration in Southeast Asia. The paper analyses the above-mentioned developments with a view to assessing the prospects of future stability, economic development and integration in and among ASEAN countries. It is concluded that although the scope for increased economic benefit and political harmonization through ASEAN integration alone is limited, the organization could still prove useful as a common regional point of reference in tackling more important policy determinants at national and global level.

Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; Alexandros N. Teneketzis, Art and Politics in Cold War. The International Sculpture Competition for the Monument to the Unknown Political Prisoner The gradual transfer of the metropolis of the western art world from Paris to New York and specifically in circles around the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) under the leadership of Alfred H. Barr Jr. and with the theoretical foundation by Clement Greenberg, but practically under the guidance and financing from the CIA, was also visible in the case of public memory and art about the Second World War. The international institution that was the cause for the widespread diffusion of the artistic standards grown in USA was the "International Sculpture Competition for the Monument to the Unknown Political Prisoner", which was organized under the auspices of the Institute of Contemporary Arts (ICA) in London and the Tate Gallery, but actually with the encouragement, blessings and supervision of the CIA. The competition was from the beginning a large turnout and the proposals submitted until January 1953 surpassed 3.500 –mainly abstract or semi­abstract stylistic suggestions. The biggest names at the time in the international arena of sculpture in West took part, while artists from the Eastern Bloc boycotted the process. Therefore were precluded any realistic academic representative works and of course any relationship with socialist realism, giving thus the tone for both the style, and for all other future monuments in the western world. Eventually, the first prize of 2.500 pounds awarded to the British sculptor Reg Butler, unknown to the general public until that time but with a decisive commitment to abstraction. However, the work of Butler was never completed, principally because of the changing international circumstances and relationships after the death of Stalin in '53 and Khrushchev's secret speech in '56. The new "Thaw" era in East­West relations imposed the final rejection in 1960. A public monument like that of Butler's, which would refer to the previous tense situation, was no more possible. Nevertheless, the dual objective of recognition and legitimization of abstract art in the western world and at the same time of the weakening of socialist realism and therefore of communism was promoted and achieved up to a certain degree.

Zoi Mella, The Greek Civil War and the Spanish Press during Franco's DictatorshipIn this article we would like to approach a quite unknown subject: the presence of the Greek Civil War in the Spanish Press. Our objective was to ascertain the impact this event had at the post war Spanish Press. How would react Spain in view of such a confrontation, especially since it had already experimented a Civil War? It was a complicated period for Greece, as well as for Spain, a time when both countries experienced problems of different nature but equally serious: Greece was suffering the devastating consequences of the Second World War and Spain was trying to encounter the contempt of the international political world. The Greek Civil War was the first confrontation between two worlds that were exiting reinforced from the Second World War. It became the field of conflict between the USSR and the Anglo-Saxon allies during several years. The interior problem of some rebels, who couldn't, or wouldn't, adapt themselves to the new post war situation or were discontented with the new regime, was transformed to an international matter of great impact, that managed to confront USSR, on one hand, and the US and Great Britain, on the other, in the International Organism of the United Nations. Our interest was centred in the various approaches that the newspapers and the magazines of the time made. Moreover we were interested in the points of view and the conclusions manifested by the diverse papers, according to their political and ideological affinities, without forgetting the strict regime of control and censure that was in force at that moment. This investigation forms part of a broader subject that is the bilateral relations of these two countries, rather different at first sight, that during the XX century were affected by very similar events, such as a civil war. ; Zoi Mella, The Greek Civil War and the Spanish Press during Franco's DictatorshipIn this article we would like to approach a quite unknown subject: the presence of the Greek Civil War in the Spanish Press. Our objective was to ascertain the impact this event had at the post war Spanish Press. How would react Spain in view of such a confrontation, especially since it had already experimented a Civil War? It was a complicated period for Greece, as well as for Spain, a time when both countries experienced problems of different nature but equally serious: Greece was suffering the devastating consequences of the Second World War and Spain was trying to encounter the contempt of the international political world. The Greek Civil War was the first confrontation between two worlds that were exiting reinforced from the Second World War. It became the field of conflict between the USSR and the Anglo-Saxon allies during several years. The interior problem of some rebels, who couldn't, or wouldn't, adapt themselves to the new post war situation or were discontented with the new regime, was transformed to an international matter of great impact, that managed to confront USSR, on one hand, and the US and Great Britain, on the other, in the International Organism of the United Nations. Our interest was centred in the various approaches that the newspapers and the magazines of the time made. Moreover we were interested in the points of view and the conclusions manifested by the diverse papers, according to their political and ideological affinities, without forgetting the strict regime of control and censure that was in force at that moment. This investigation forms part of a broader subject that is the bilateral relations of these two countries, rather different at first sight, that during the XX century were affected by very similar events, such as a civil war.

Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of August The Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views. ; Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of AugustThe Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views.

Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; Anna Mahera, Émigration et développement économique dans la Grèce d'après guerre. L'approche du problème par le milieu politique de Centre-gauche Dans les premières années de l'après guerre, en Grèce se pose de nouveau le problème du mode de développement économique. En effet, la perspective de l'arrivée massive des capitaux américains en combinaison avec la disponibilité d'une main-d'oeuvre autochtone créent des conditions favorables à un projet d'industrialisation. C'est au sein des milieux politiques grecques qu'un tel projet est élaboré, alors que les instances internationales —comme le Food and Agriculture Organisation des Nations Unies— signalent les graves difficultés à surmonter. Progressivement, dans le climat de la guerre froide des années 1950, la quasi-totalité des forces politiques grecques ont abandonné l'idée d'un développement industriel, admettant la position subalterne occupée par le pays dans la division internationale du travail. Celui-ci doit se contenter au rôle de fournisseur de main-d'oeuvre vers les pays européens, en particulier vers l'Allemagne, en phase de reconstruction économique, à travers Γ émigration du travail qui prend une grande ampleur dans les années 1950 et 1960. Tout au plus, la Grèce peut-elle envisager le développement du secteur des services. Contrairement aux autres forces politiques, le Centre-gauche a parcouru ce chemin avec une décennie de retard, en raison de la présence en son sein d'une réflexion économique affirmée, émanant d'économistes de haut niveau, orientés vers l'économie de la planification, et peut-être aussi à cause de l'éloignement de ce milieu du jeu politique immédiat. Le rangement du Centre-gauche à la politique officielle d'émigration intereuropéenne a marqué la fin d'une période de fermentation sur le projet d'industrialisation de la Grèce dont l'origine remonte à l'entre-deux-guerres.

I marts 2005 var det 20 år, siden Mikhail Gorbatjov kom til magten i Sovjetunionen som generalsekretær for Sovjetunionens Kommunistiske Parti og fremlagde sit program til reform af det sovjetiske system. Nøgleordene i reformen var perestrojka, glasnost og demokratisering. De fik ikke alene betydning indadtil, men også udadtil i forholdet til omverdenen, der hurtigt fattede lid til Gorbatjov og hans nyskabelser. Dette working paper giver et overblik over Gorbatjovs og hans meningsfællers opfattelse af udviklingen siden da og deres vurdering af reformernes skæbne og skildrer Ruslands stilling på verdensscenen i dag. Dette indebærer også en kritisk vurdering af præsident Vladimir Putins indenrigs- og udenrigspolitik. Der tegnes et billede af et svagt Rusland, der ikke har frigjort sig fra den sovjetiske arvs byrde, men tværtimod på mange måder søger tilbage til den autoritære styreform, et Rusland, der ved inertiens kraft stadig nyder en vis respekt, om end ikke anseelse i det internationale samfund. ; In March 2005 it was 20 years since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union as Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and presented his programme for reform of the Soviet system. Key words in the reform were perestroika, glasnost and democratization. They became important not only internally but also externally in the relations to the outside world that swiftly put its trust in Gorbachev and his innovations. This working paper gives an overview of the perception that Gorbachev and his like-minded have of the development since then, presents their evaluation of the fate of the reforms and of the position of Russia on the world scene today. This also includes a critical evaluation of the domestic and foreign policies of President Vladimir Putin. The paper outlines a weak Russia that has not released itself from the burden of the Soviet heritage but on the contrary in many ways goes back to the authoritarian form of government, a Russia that by inertia still enjoys a certain respect although not esteem in the international community.

On April 25, 2013, UN's Security Council established a 12,600-strong peacekeeping force for Mali. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) is to take over and continue the security and stabilization task that the French-led military operation in cooperation with UN's African-led International Support Mission to Mali, AFISMA, initiated in January 2013. The aim of this report is to present a number of long- and short-term perspectives for the recently initiated peace- and state-building process in Mali by focusing on the historical, structural and political causes of the crisis in Mali. Understanding these causes and handling their derived conflict potentials provide a minimum of prerequisites for establishing long-term peace. The report is structured according to four intertwined conflict potentials: Mali's fragile state, the status and background of the Tuareg rebellion, the organized crime and the regional cooperation. .

The Arctic is characterized by a well-functioning international governance regime. Arctic and non-Arctic states aim to solve the challenges following climate change in concert. However, certain challenges and processes may destabilize the intergovernmental order in the long run. This report distinguishes between global and regional dynamics. Future global struggles between the great powers may have repercussions in the high north. On the regional level itself, four questions may destabilize Arctic governance: the status of the North-East Passage, unresolved border disputes, the role of China, and the introduction of more military capabilities. The report offers two guidelines for the strategic approach of the Commonwealth of Denmark towards the Arctic. Firstly, the Commonwealth can play a constructive role for the future stability of the Arctic by aiming, to the extent possible, to solve the four regional challenges. Secondly, the approach of the Commonwealth towards the question of Arctic stability cannot be disentangled from Copenhagen's global priorities.