Suchergebnisse

The central question of this dissertation is what role national identity has played in the interdepartmental policy field of international cultural policy (ICP) in the Netherlands between 1970 and 2012. In four chapters I analyse the history of ICP and the related political debate, using a theoretical framework consisting of the main concepts of a Discourse Historic Analysis (critique, ideology, and power), and tensions within the discourses on ICP and national identity. The role of national identity in the first period (1970-1986) is characterized as 'cultural nationalism'. Culture plays an important role in distinguishing the nation state from the rest of the world, and due to the decreasing autonomy in the field of economics and politics culture is considered (by some) to be the last bearer of the national identity. The debates focus on the question whether or not the government has a role in (actively) protecting that identity. The publication of the report "Culture without borders" by the Scientific Council for Government Policy marks the beginning of the second period (1987-1996). Gradually the primacy of the policy shifts from foreign to cultural policy, and attempts are made to combine within ICP the growing cultural diversity of the Dutch society with the uniting role of a national identity. Therefore the role of national identity is characterized as 'multiculturalism'. Extra funding for international cultural activities in 1997 marks the beginning of the third period (1997-2006), in which the role of national identity is characterized as 'cultural relativism'. The relationship between culture and the nation becomes more loose, and cultural activities abroad no longer seem to represent the nation's identity. This approach in ICP contrasts strongly with the growing discontent and heated public and political debate on national identity. Characteristic for the fourth period (2007-2012) is the return to the primacy of foreign policy and the focus on diplomatic and economic goals. Culture is treated as a ...

Why did the Dutch hold on to Western New Guinea, one of the many territories that constituted the Dutch East Indies (modern-day Indonesia), when the colony became independent in 1949? This thesis argues against the traditional explanation that it was due to a singular Dutch 'decolonization trauma': an inability to let go of the glorious colonial past, combined with resentment against Indonesian nationalist leaders such as Sukarno. It shows that historians have overstated the importance of emotions in Dutch colonial policy-making and diplomacy after 1949, mainly because of their narrow scope of analysis, which has traditionally been restricted to trilateral relations between the Netherlands, independent Indonesia (which wanted to incorporate Western New Guinea, if need be with military means) and the allegedly 'anti-colonial' United States. This thesis situates Dutch decision-making in the Western New Guinea Crisis in a much wider network, incorporating the colonial policy, diplomacy and perception of other Western powers such as Britain, France, Australia, Belgium and Portugal between 1930 and 1962. It is argued that, when viewed within this network and its discourse, the Dutch decision to retain Western New Guinea is best explained with rational actor theory. The decision was inspired not so much by emotions as by cost-benefit analyses, which included the possibility of transferring the territory to a new Indonesian regime—which the Dutch expected to be more forthcoming to the interests of the Papuans, the native inhabitants of Western New Guinea, and the Dutch (economic) interests in Indonesia than the regime headed by Sukarno. Research into hitherto neglected French, Belgian, British and Dutch archives also shows that the Netherlands could count on much more support for its New Guinea policy from its Western allies—including the US—than traditional historiography suggests. It remains true that the United States forced the Netherlands to hand over Western New Guinea to Indonesia in 1962, but the Kennedy ...

Between 1949 and 1962 the Netherlands renounced its sovereignty over most of its overseas territories. Nevertheless, during the entire period of the Cold War, the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) stood by its point of view that it had a global task to fulfil. This military-naval deployment, outside the NATO treaty area during and shortly after the Cold War in relation to the structural global ambitions of the Royal Netherlands Navy's leadership, is the central theme of this study. This theme is analysed on the basis of theories and an understanding of multinational fleet operations after 1945 and Dutch policy regarding naval operations outside the NATO treaty area, but above all through regional case studies (Korean War 1950-1955, operations around the Arabian peninsula 1984-2000, and in the Adriatic Sea and Montenegrin waters 1992-2001). These case studies were examined by addressing the following central questions: to what extent did these missions involve a traditional approach to Dutch foreign policy? To what extent did the Navy's leadership influence the political-strategic decision-making on these out-of-area operations? To what extent were Dutch tasks and operations different from those of coalition partners, specifically those of the British Royal Navy, which the Royal Netherlands Navy considered to be its 'sister navy'? To what extent did the existing national and international perceptions of the RNLN influence Dutch decision-making on these missions, and how much did the participation in multinational fleet operations subsequently contribute to the objectives the Dutch government had in mind? In all the three case studies, the national and international perception of the Netherlands as a maritime nation and the ability to deploy high-quality navy units were taken into account in the Dutch government's decision-making regarding the RNLN participation in multinational fleet operations. The missions always received international, and especially British and American, appreciation and respect. The fact that ...