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THE CONCEPT OF LOCAL POLITICAL CONFLICT PRESUPPOSES LOCAL ISSUES OR CONTROVERSIES THAT CAN BE SETTLED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES. LOCAL AUTHORITIES ARE INVOLVED IN VIOLENT CONFLICT BECAUSE RIOTS DO HAPPEN SOMEWHERE, VIZ ON THE TERRITORY OF A LOCAL GOVERNMENT, WHETHER OR NOT THE CONFLICT IS ABOUT LOCAL ISSUES. THE OBJECTIVES OF ACTION HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT TO DETERMINE WHETHER A CONFLICT IS A LOCAL ONE. THE OBJECTIONS OF AN ACTION CAN BE THE CHANGE OF LOCAL POWER HOLDERS OR A CHANGE OF THEIR POLICIES. REPLACEMENT OF LOCAL OFFICIALS BY LOCAL ACTION IN THE DUTCH SITUATION IS NOT SO OBVIOUS. IN MOST CASES A DECISION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IS REQUIRED, EG THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW MAYOR. BY-ELECTIONS FOR POLITICAL REASONS HAVE NEVER OCCURRED. WHAT HAS HAPPENED IS THE PUTTING ASIDE OF A LOCAL COUNCIL & APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSIONER BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. IN MANY CASES LOCAL AUTHORITIES MUST HAVE COOPERATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO REALIZE PLANS OF IMPORTANCE, AT LEAST FINANCIALLY. EVEN WHERE THIS PROBLEM DOES NOT EXIST, A LOCAL GOVERNMENT COULD NOT DEVIATE TOO MUCH FROM NATIONAL POLICIES. LOCAL REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE IT IS SUBORDINATE GOVERNMENT. LOCAL CONFLICT CANNOT CHANGE '1ST ORDER POLITICS' (POLICIES) OR '2ND ORDER POLITICS' (POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS) VERY FAR; THE LIMITS ARE TO BE FOUND IN THE NATIONAL SYSTEM. RECENTLY ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO CHANGE THE WAY (PROPORTIONALLY TO THE STRENGTH OF ALL POSSIBLE PARTIES IN THE COUNCILS) THAT PROVINCIAL BOARDS OF ALDERMAN ARE TRADITIONALLY COMPOSED. THOUGH THIS PROCEDURE MIGHT BE REASONED AS A POLITIZATION OF LOCAL & PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, THE MAIN EFFECT WILL BE TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES IN COMPETITION FOR SEATS. HA.

THE ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN VOTING BEHAVIOR IS OFTEN BASED UPON RECALL DATA. THE NOTE OF RELIABILITY OF THIS TYPE OF DATA IS QUESTIONED. RECALL DATA UNDERESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF CHANGES IN PARTY CHOICE. NO EVIDENCE HAS BEEN FOUND THAT THE USE OF RECALL DATA HAS ANY CONSEQUENCES FOR THE STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STABILITY OF PARTY CHOICE & SUCH VARIABLES AS POLITICAL INTEREST, POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, & EDUCATION. THE ANALYSIS OF THE RELIABILITY OF QUESTIONS ON TURN-OUT IS NOT CONCLUSIVE. THERE ARE VERY STRONG INDICATIONS THAT IN EACH ELECTION STUDY NONVOTERS GIVE LESS RELIABLE ANSWERS THAN VOTERS. THIS UNRELIABILITY IS ESPECIALLY HIGH WHEN RECALL DATA ARE USED. 11 TABLES. HA.

THEORY FORMATION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE HAS HEADED TOWARD A "NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY" WITHIN WHICH 4 CLUSTERS ARE DISTINGUISHED: (1) 'SPATIAL MODELS OF PARTY COMPETITION', (2) THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, (3) THEORIES OF ALLOCATION OF VALUES, UNDER SPECIFIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER, IE COALITION THEORIES, BARGAINING THEORIES & REINTERPRETATIONS OF DUOPOLY THEORIES, & (4) THEORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR. THE 4 CLUSTERS ARE THE RESULT OF THE INTEGRATION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE & ECONOMICS. THE SIMILARITY IN THEORETICAL STRUCTURE OF THE 4 CATEGORIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE WITH THE CORRESPONDING THEORIES IN MICROECONOMICS, WELFARE ECONOMICS, & PUBLIC ECONOMICS CONSISTS OF THESE ELEMENTS: (A) THE PREPONDERANCE OF A DEDUCTIVE (VS INDUCTIVE) STRATEGY OF THEORY BUILDING, (B) THE 2 PREMISES OF INDIVIDUALISM & GOAL-ORIENTED BEHAVIOR, (C) PREOCCUPATION WITH VARIOUS CORRESPONDING AMENDMENTS ON ASSUMPTIONS IN THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERFECT COMPETITION, & (D) THE THEORY OF ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR AS BASED ON THE AMENDMENT OF THE ASSUMPTION OF PERFECT & COSTLESS INFORMATION & THE HOLISTIC ('UNITARY ACTOR') OF DECISION-MAKING IN THE THEORY OF THE FIRM. MODIFIED HA.

NEXT TO THE PARTY ELITE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THERE ARE SEVERAL POLICY ELITES IN THE USSR. THEY CONSIST OF OFFICIALS IN EVERY FIELD OF POLICY & HAVE THEIR BASIS OF POWER IN THE RESOURCES THAT ARE ALLOCATED IN THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET. MOST RESOURCES FLOW TO THE ECONOMY, THE SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL SECTOR, THE MILITARY, & THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS. ELITES IN THESE SECTORS CAN BE MOST INFLUENTIAL IN THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS. THE PARTY ELITE MAKES ALL LONG-TERM POLICY DECISIONS, IT CAN REGULATE THE RECRUITMENT OF NEW MEMBERS INTO THESE POLICY ELITES & IT CAN CALL THE ELITES TO ACCOUNT BY PERMITTING PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF POLICY DECISIONS. POLICY ELITES HAVE MORE INFLUENCE IN POLICY-MAKING WHEN THEY HAVE MORE REPRESENTATIVES IN THE POLITBURO & THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THEIR REPRESENTATION HAS GROWN SINCE 1953--IRREGULARLY--BUT THE PARTY ELITE STILL HAS THE MAJORITY IN THESE PARTY ORGANS. POLICY ELITES HAVE INFLUENCE AS THERE IS A CONSTANT FLOW OF THEIR MEMBERS INTO THE PARTY ELITE. THIS MAKES THE PARTY ELITE LESS COHERENT & CAUSES MORE INTERNAL DISPUTES. YET THE POLICY ELITES ARE NOT CONTENT WITH POSSIBILITIES TO INFLUENCE POLICY MAKING; THEY ARE IN OPPOSITION TO THE PARTY ELITE THAT DOES NOT WANT TO GIVE THEM MORE INFLUENCE, ESPECIALLY IN LONG-TERM POLICY DECISIONS. HA.

In order to study the problem of income inequality it is necessary to define the situation of income equality & to define the concept of deviation from that situation. It is possible to define equality as a situation in which the relationships between incomes correspond to the rule x1 : x2....: xn = 1:1...: 1 (xi being the income of person i), & as a situation in which this relationship satisfies the rule xi -- xj = 0 for all pairs i, j out of the pop. The choice of the definition leads to diff standards of income inequality; in the 1st case, income inequality is measured relatively, in the 2nd it is measured absolutely. The choice of definition must be based on whether people perceive income diff's relatively or absolutely: the position is taken here that people perceive income diff's in relative terms. Inequality is measured as 0 = s/ X, s being the standard deviation. Analogous to the analysis of variance this standard allows for unraveling the total inequality into a part that can be explained by inequality between (soc & econ) groups, & a part that can be explained by inequality that exists within groups. Such an unraveling is an essential condition for gov'al & union policies aimed at levelling the existing income inequality. An examination of the extent to which incomes are unequally distributed in the Netherlands & an evaluation of gov'al & union policies viewed in light of the desirability of decreasing the income inequality are also undertaken. Appendix 1 contains formulas by which income inequality can be studied horizontally & vertically. In Appendix 2 a hyp states the relationship between the amount of power & the willingness to use that power a group possesses on the one hand & the share the group will get in the nat'l income on the other hand. Modified HA.

An attempt to show how digraph-theory may be utilized in developing a soc network-theory, esp in the field of local power & influence. Some of the ways are indicated in which digraph-theory, which serves as a descriptive-explicative mathematical model, can be used to analyze componenets of theory of local power. Power is conceptualized as a system of SR. This presupposes in every local community a certain network of exchange ties. A mathematical description is sought of some of the properties of such a power-network. A mathematical model is used in the sense of a collection of definitions. The theory of graphs as a mathematical model in the study of local power configurations is, at least in the beginning, a descriptive theory of power structures. In a descriptive model based on the theory of graphs the power configuration (made of local influentials & the set of relationships among them) is conceptualized as a graph (a directed, possibly valued, multi-graph). When this is done, theorems about the graph, which is assumed to be isomorphic to the power configuration, can be translated into corresponding statements about the power structure. In this context the validation of such statements is a purely logical validation, a consequence of the assumed isomorphy between the graph & the power configuration. This descriptive approach is presented here. 27 Figures. Modified HA.

As a starting point comparative pol'al sci is circumscribed as the field within the discipline of pol'al sci which, in the methodological sphere, focuses on problems of comparison &, as to the substantial side, concentrates on problems of pol'al change, pol'al development, & pol'al modernization. The elaboration is accomplished by posing 3 questions: (1) Does comparative pol'al sci have a method of its own (the comparative method)? (2) Does comparative pol'al sci have a subject matter of its own? (3) If the previous questions are answered in the negative, does comparative pol'al sci refer to a particular perspective as regards pol'al life? It is concluded that comparative pol'al sci, although lacking a method & a subject matter of its own, may be considered a subdiscipline of pol'al sci: standing for a relativistic outlook on pol'al life, it seems to have an important task in the context of pol'al sci. Its main characteristic will remain the search for universal generalizations. B. J. S. Hoetjes (U of Amsterdam, the Netherlands) in a COMMENT, states that a definition of a field of (pol'al) sci should give the characteristics of the substantial problems & concerns within such a field. For a definition of comparative pol as a subfield of pol'al sci this implies the rejection of a purely methodological definition, the more because the comparative method does not seem to offer any distinct approach to the study of pol; one should look for a category of empirical pol'al phenomena to characterize the subfield. On this point Rosenthal is not seen to be very clear: he mentions the pol'al problems of developing areas as 'the' typical object of comparative pol, but the basic concern, according to him, is the widening of the empirical base to the theories, hyp's & generalizations. Since the study of any topic could very well contribute to this purpose, there remains no typical topic to characterize the subfield of comparative pol. At the same time, the widening of the empirical range of pol'al theories by itself can be considered the typical & legitimate concern of the 'empirical pol'al theorist' as a specialist within the field of pol'al sci. It seems useless as well as confusing to double-label this specialist as 'comparative pol'al sci'st.' Modified HA.

Power diff's & power motivation are analyzed in micro structures in a series of simulation studies, & in macro structures in field studies. The power distance reduction theory is used as a tool for this analysis. The theory consists of 14 hyp's; the core of the theory holds that persons tend to strive for reduction of power diff's between themselves & the more powerful, & that they will do so more strongly the smaller this diff is. These hyp's are strongly supported by the empirical data. It is concluded that certain societal & org'al structures provide favorable conditions for the so-called 'power learning'; that is for learning to shift from dysfunctional power relationships, such as blind formal or negative sanction power, toward more functional power, such as expert power; from power toward non-power influence, such as persuasion; also & specifically from large power diff's toward reduced power diff's. This 'power learning' is seen as an important target for work councils, Sch's, unions, etc. 2 Figures. Modified HA.

A DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF A SERIES OF CONFLICTS CONCERNING POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE U OF AMSTERDAM IS PRESENTED. ON 20 DEC 1972 THE COUNCIL OF THE DEPT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (IN WHICH STAFF & STUDENTS ARE REPRESENTED) ADOPTED A NEW SYSTEM OF INTERDISCIPLINARY GROUPS WITHIN THE DEPT. THIS DECISION WAS THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE FOR THE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, H. DAUDT, & 5 STAFF MEMBERS TO SUSPEND THEIR TEACHING ACTIVITIES. THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE U & THE U COUNCIL BECAME INVOLVED IN THIS ISSUE. ORDERED TO RESUME THEIR TEACHING ACTIVITIES, THESE CIVIL SERVANTS APPEALED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT. THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED CONSIST OF OFFICIAL LETTERS, STATEMENTS, RULINGS, & EXTRACTS FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE PUBLIC BODIES THAT DEALT WITH THE MATTER. THE CONFLICT, WHICH STANDS UNRESOLVED AT THE TIME OF PUBLICATION, CAN BE SEEN AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF MORE OVERALL DEBATE ABOUT THE POSITION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE DUTCH U'S & STUDENT ACTIVISM. HA.

Problems concerning the subsidization of pol'al parties are discussed. 1st the situation in countries other than the Netherlands is considered. Public funds are used for direct support of pol'al parties in Argentina, Germany, Israel, Turkey & Sweden. Indirect support (tax facilities, air time, etc) is given in many more countries. Arguments against subsidization are: (1) it makes parties dependent on the gov; (2) it freezes the pol'al pattern; & (3) it is contrary to the private character of pol'al parties. The form of subsidization is seen to be an important consideration: a form must be sought which guarantees equality of opportunity between the parties. There are no principle objections to subsidization, however, direct support is rejected for the present because it is difficult to find a system of allocation which is perfect & equitable from all points of view, & because subsidization would serve to increase the psychol'al distance between the parties & the electorate. If subvention is desired, the best system is seen to be one in which allocation depends on the amount contributed by the party members & the number of seats in parliament. This amount would be limited, & the subsidization regulated by law. The parties would be obliged to publish their income & expenditures. Modified HA.

Interrelations between 124 Dutch business Corp's & financial Co's & instit's are analyzed as they are generated by interlocking manag & supervision boards in 1969. In this graph-theoretical model the most important characteristics of the network of interlocking manag & supervision boards are found to be: (1) The network consists of one large component, in which nearly all big Corp's, financial Co's & instit's are connected by interlockings, & a small number of isolated elements. (2) The center of the network consists largely of financial Co's & instit's. (3) The center of the network of interlocking between the 60 financial Co's & instit's consists of 3 banks, 2 insurance Co's, 1 investment trust, 3 semi-gov'al financial instit's, & 1 mortgage bank. (4) The central financial Co's & instit's are connected by an extremely dense network: 86% of all pairs are directly connected by 1 or more interlockings. (5) The financial Co's & instit's in the center of the network between the 60 financial units also have the largest number of edges with the 64 business Corp's, together with 3 other financial units. (6) The connectivity & density in the network between the 64 business Corp's are also due to persons who are also manager or managing director in financial Co's or instit's. An interlocking constitutes at least a COMM channel between the Corp's. Moreover, managers & managing directors are chosen mainly by cooperation. Therefore the network is interpreted as one of COMM & cooperation. Corp's, Co's, & instit's in the center of the network of interlockings are able to gather & distribute a large amount of information which gives them power: the ability to determine the outcomes of decision making processes, resulting in value allocations. 2 Figures, 9 Tables. Modified HA.

The existence of pol'al power often evokes a dilemma: On the one hand, pol'al power is considered necessary for attaining common goals; on the other hand, it causes a great deal of discontent on the part of the citizens. A rough classification is attempted with regard to the problems that are involved in pol'al power, to point to their causes & to discuss possible solutions. The problems that surround pol'al power seem to be brought about for the greater part by the generality of power; in other words, by a lack of specificity. Often the power is ill-adjusted to the goals of the members of the power system. Roughly speaking, this imperfect adjustment is manifested in 2 ways: (a) Those in power are not able to attain some of the objects of the members of the system. (b) Those in power pursue objects that are not endorsed by the members of the system. It is believed that better measuring instruments are required to check the use of power. It seems probable that this use of power is determined for a major part by the influence that is exercised on the authorities by persons & org's in society. Therefore, it is of major importance to find out who have a great deal influence & who have little. Investigation into this distribution of influence, therefore, is a kind of evaluation-res into the use of power. This res should be carried out by independent agencies. Modified HA.

The article deals with the proper identification & localization of the effect of election predictions on voting behavior. As a revision of the "traditional bandwagon concept" stemming from the 1930's & 1940's, which is still in use despite its conceptual fallacy, new lines of thought are merged into the definition of the "modern bandwagon concept:" the relative & subjective bandwagon effects, together with the relative & subjective underdog effects & the slack effect, constitute the declaration effect as a resultant. Using matrices based upon party preferences, upon exposure to, perception of & interpretation of election predictions, & upon possible voting behavior, the several effects are localized. The real existence of effects is briefly discussed in relation to favorable or neutralizing conditions from the fields of pol'al sci & of mass COMM's. A warning is issued, on methodological & pol'al grounds, against too quick an acceptance of US res findings as valid for the Netherlands. IPSA.

The results of a res project on small local-pressure groups in Amsterdam, treated within D. Easton's (A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE, New York, NY: 1967) theoretical framework for the analysis of pol'al systems. The municipality of Amsterdam was considered as the pol'al system & the rest of the Netherlands constituted the parameters of the system. The main analytical category used was 'demands,' because the concept 'support' caused considerable problems of operationalization. The activities of the groups are analyzed in 4 phases: feedback-stimuli, feedback-response, feedback-information, & output reaction. In the 1st phase a main distinction was introduced between groups which emerged as a result of an output of the authorities (the intra-genetic), & groups which emerged as a result of a situation in the parameters of the system (the extra-genetic). The 2nd phase includes the interpretation of the stimuli & the resulting formulation of demands. In the 3rd phase a distinction was made between indirect information feedback by means of activities such as demonstrations & appearance in the media of COMM; & direct information feedback by means of a direct contact with the authorities. The 4th phase was mainly dedicated to the behavior of the authorities. The main result of the res was the distinction between intra- & extra-genetic groups. This distinction was important for the following characteristics of the groups: intra-genetic groups more often appoint one man as the spokesman of the group; they consider more the people of certain parts of Amsterdam as concerned by their demands; they are more active in approaching the media of COMM; & are more often approached by authorities. Extra-genetic groups consider more the whole pop of Amsterdam or even the Netherlands as concerned by their demands; are more often related to pol'al parties; have less formal responsibility to the concerned people or members; & feel themselves less tied to the wishes of the people concerned. 5 Figures, 18 Tables. Modified HA.

It seems that the demonstrations on the Binnenhof in the Hague do not in general affect the views held by those for whose benefit the demonstrations are held: the members of the Second Chamber of the States General. This conclusion is drawn from a small-scale investigation of the effect of such demonstrations, which was undertaken by a number of pol'al sci students of the Free U of Amsterdam. The possible effects of 14 demonstrations held in the parliamentary yr 1968-1969 & in late 1969, were studied. In only one case was there evidence of influence on a number of Second Chamber members: the demonstrations held by young workers on Jun 26 & Nov 1, 1969. These demonstrations differed from most others in the mass participation, the careful preparation & org, the extensive coverage in the news media & in the wide support given to them, including that of trade unions. 4 Tables, 1 Diagram. HA.