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Printed in Great Britain. ; The puzzling case.--The powers in men.--From man-beast to citizen.--Soil of delusion and brutality.--We must finish the work.--Notes (chiefly bibliographical, p. [223]-227) ; Mode of access: Internet.

The 1st and 2nd Additional Protocols introduced a new rule which prohibits attacks against works and installations containing dangerous forces, even if they represent military objectives, because those dangerous forces could have a negative impact on civilians. It is not very sure that these rules became a part of the customary law, but practice shows that states are aware of the considerable risks which would emerge. As a consequence, states recognize that, in any armed conflict, it is necessary to take special precautionsin order to avoid releasing these dangerous forces and not cause any threats among civilians. According to the two protocols, this requirement of taking precautions is applicable to any kind of armed conflict.Keywords: customary international law; international conflicts; noninternational conflicts; Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention.

Every page on the Web represents an international publication. A client machine in Germany can easily access a server in Michigan, but the copyright laws in the USA differ in a number of significant ways. This column looks at two specific examples, one where there is a difference in the length of protection, and another where German moral rights legislation gives privileges not found in the US law. Although the examples are German and American, similar differences exist between other legal systems. ; Peer Reviewed

States address many of today's global problems in international organizations (IOs). At the same time, regional international organizations (RIOs) play important roles in IOs, as a series of case studies suggests. RIO member states can speak on behalf of an RIO in IO negotiations. This paper explores under what conditions states voice RIO positions instead of national ones in IOs and thereby turn into agents of regionalization. Based on a novel dataset of more than 500 international negotiations and a quantitative analysis of theory-guided International Relations hypotheses, this paper shows that states are increasingly likely to negotiate on behalf of an RIO, when they regard grouping positions into regional blocs in IO negotiations as more effective, when they have a formal role as RIO chair, and when they possess financial and staff capacities needed in order to voice a regional position in international negotiations.

"April 1989." ; Shipping list no.: 89-268-P. ; Caption title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

International audience ; Opinions tribunals dealing with environmental issues have multiplied over the last several years as a consequence of the rise of international environmental law and its promotion by international networks. Drawing on an ethnographic investigation of one of those tribunals—the International Monsanto Tribunal— this article reflects on the many objectives they often pursue: strengthening political positions, publicizing environmental and health social struggles, and promoting legal theories. In our case, we show that articulating those objectives involved intense work to stage the tribunal's legitimacy. We analyze this work and how it was put to the test during and after the sessions of the tribunal. Our article broadly suggests that environmental opinion tribunals are political arenas where rights and identities are not only asserted but also negotiated and legitimized.

International audience ; Opinions tribunals dealing with environmental issues have multiplied over the last several years as a consequence of the rise of international environmental law and its promotion by international networks. Drawing on an ethnographic investigation of one of those tribunals—the International Monsanto Tribunal— this article reflects on the many objectives they often pursue: strengthening political positions, publicizing environmental and health social struggles, and promoting legal theories. In our case, we show that articulating those objectives involved intense work to stage the tribunal's legitimacy. We analyze this work and how it was put to the test during and after the sessions of the tribunal. Our article broadly suggests that environmental opinion tribunals are political arenas where rights and identities are not only asserted but also negotiated and legitimized.

International audience ; Opinions tribunals dealing with environmental issues have multiplied over the last several years as a consequence of the rise of international environmental law and its promotion by international networks. Drawing on an ethnographic investigation of one of those tribunals—the International Monsanto Tribunal— this article reflects on the many objectives they often pursue: strengthening political positions, publicizing environmental and health social struggles, and promoting legal theories. In our case, we show that articulating those objectives involved intense work to stage the tribunal's legitimacy. We analyze this work and how it was put to the test during and after the sessions of the tribunal. Our article broadly suggests that environmental opinion tribunals are political arenas where rights and identities are not only asserted but also negotiated and legitimized.

There is no international bankruptcy law, but only the national bankruptcy laws of various states. The failure of a multinational firm therefore raises difficult questions of conflict and cooperation among national bankruptcy regimes. Theorists have proposed various reforms to the uncoordinated territorial approach that most states pursue when a multinational firm suffers financial distress. Among these reform proposals, universalism has long been the dominant idea. Under universalism, the bankruptcy regime of the debtor firm's home country would govern, and that regime would have extraterritorial reach to treat all of the debtor's assets and claimants worldwide. Despite its conceptual dominance, universalism has yet to find vindication in any concrete policy enactments. No universalist arrangements exist. While recent challenges to universalism have emerged, the current lively debate over universalism and rival proposals focuses almost exclusively on their comparative efficiencies. This article provides an entirely new perspective. Applying insights from elementary game theory and international relations theory, I show that universalism is politically implausible. Even for states interested in establishing universalist arrangements, they will be unable to do so. They will find themselves caught in a prisoners' dilemma with no ready solution. I conclude therefore that universalism holds only dubious promise as a prescription for international bankruptcy cooperation.

The global economy has in recent years been characterized among other things by large imbalances between countries and regions, capital flow volatility, and large reserve accumulation by several countries, in some cases well beyond any reasonable measure of reserve adequacy. The global imbalances were most clearly reflected in large current account deficits in the US and large current account surpluses in many emerging market economies in Asia and elsewhere. The surpluses were in at least some cases the result of aggressive export oriented policies and limited exchange rate flexibility. Persistent large imbalances are themselves a potential source of disruptive developments, and the policies of the largest reserve accumulators are likely to have played a role in creating the conditions that brought about the global financial crisis. The report of a high level EU group of experts concluded among other things that ―credit expansion in the US was financed by massive capital inflows from the major emerging countries with external surpluses, notably China. By pegging their currencies to the dollar, China and other economies such as Saudi Arabia in practice imported loose US monetary policy, thus allowing global imbalances to build up. Current account surpluses in these countries were recycled into US government securities and other lower-risk assets, depressing their yields and encouraging other investors to search for higher yields from more risky assets. In this environment of plentiful liquidity and low returns, investors actively sought higher yields and went searching for opportunities. Risk became mis-priced.

The global economy has in recent years been characterized among other things by large imbalances between countries and regions, capital flow volatility, and large reserve accumulation by several countries, in some cases well beyond any reasonable measure of reserve adequacy. The global imbalances were most clearly reflected in large current account deficits in the US and large current account surpluses in many emerging market economies in Asia and elsewhere. The surpluses were in at least some cases the result of aggressive export oriented policies and limited exchange rate flexibility. Persistent large imbalances are themselves a potential source of disruptive developments, and the policies of the largest reserve accumulators are likely to have played a role in creating the conditions that brought about the global financial crisis. The report of a high level EU group of experts concluded among other things that -credit expansion in the US was financed by massive capital inflows from the major emerging countries with external surpluses, notably China. By pegging their currencies to the dollar, China and other economies such as Saudi Arabia in practice imported loose US monetary policy, thus allowing global imbalances to build up. Current account surpluses in these countries were recycled into US government securities and other lower-risk assets, depressing their yields and encouraging other investors to search for higher yields from more risky assets. In this environment of plentiful liquidity and low returns, investors actively sought higher yields and went searching for opportunities. Risk became mis-priced.

This paper addresses the puzzle of why, and under what conditions, international organizations cease to exist. International relations literature offers rich explanations for the creation, design and effectiveness of international institutions and organizations, but surprisingly little effort has gone into studying the dynamics of IO termination. Yet if we want to understand why and under what conditions international organizations endure, we must also explain why they often fail to do so. The present paper formulates and tests theoretical conjectures about IO termination using a combination of statistical analysis and historical case studies. My analysis is based on an original dataset covering the period 1815-2016. I find that exogenous shocks is a leading proximate cause of IO deaths since 1815 but that international organizations that are well-established, have large memberships and technical mandates have higher survival rates. My analysis leads me to suggest a number of refinements to existing theories institutional robustness.

Changes in the role of collective action at the international level, in the international economic environment, and, most importantly, our better understanding of economics in general require that we rethink the role of international financial institutions (IFIs). For multilateral development banks like the World Bank, their central mission, the promotion of growth and the reduction of poverty, is clear. The steps toward fulfilling this mission in a changing world are also relatively clear, and many of these institutions have already begun processes of renewal. But all of the IFIs have, in one way or another, also been involved in crisis management, especially in recent years. Here, future roles are less clear because they depend on the redefinition of the international financial architecture - a redefinition that has been hotly debated, but has not yet crystallised into a shared vision. The theoretical underpinnings - as well as the practical implementation - of alternative visions will require far more development before clarity on a future role will be attained. In this essay, I will address these questions from the perspective of the theory of international public goods, which is a powerful way to organise our thinking both on why we have IFIs in the first place, and the role that they should play in a changing world.

1 Introduction – An Empirical-Normative Turn in Research on Legalization 2 Legalizing International Relations 3 Democratic Participation in International Institutions 4 Legalization, Democracy, and Politics – A Harmonious or Tension-Ridden Relationship? 5 Methodology 6 Biotechnological Patents – Regulation, Interests, and Affectedness 7 Empirical Analysis of Legalization across International Institutions – Selective Expansion with the Handbrake On 8 Empirical Analysis of Democratic Participation in International Institutions – Undemocratic Trends to Different Extents 9 Legalization's (Un)Democratic Forces at Work 10 Conclusion – Laying Down the Law Appendix Bibliography ; A deeper understanding of international legalization's effect on democratic participation in international institutions is urgently needed. Policies that were formerly regulated within the domestic context have been subjected to international law (IL). This has resulted in a growing number of international agreements and bodies. Some of these institutions gained new legal quality in terms of their legal obligations, procedural rules, and dispute settlement. With this trend of growing international legalization, also the normative expectations of IL have increased. In particular the key standard of democratic participation has to be met by international institutions to be considered legitimate in the long run. This crucial relationship between international legalization and democratic participation has been neither systematically theorized nor empirically researched so far. The project forms part of a larger research strand on the interplay between law, politics, and democracy. By introducing a model of legalization's structure-inherent and actor-dependent effects, I demonstrate that legalization's costs cause powerful actors to restrict democratic participation in highly legalized international institutions. Only a formalization of membership rules tends to have a positive impact on democratic access. Biotechnological patents serve as field of ...

The article is devoted to the examination of the formation of new vectors for international relations development within the global format of cooperation. The establishment and unification of BRICS in the international legal sphere through a wide range of common interests and views of its members towards issues facing the modern world reflect objective tendencies of world development to the formation of amultipolar international relations system and determination of particular large country actors of broad integration and having many dimensions. The authors reveal particular characteristics of the international-legal status of BRICS, which make it possible to have an effective impact on challenges facing the modern world. The legal BRICS status differs crucially from traditional legal approaches to international organizations. Acting as a special subject of world politics, creating more trusted interaction conditions, BRICS focuses its attention on the alternative world order principles within the new model of global relations. Such a format of multilateral cooperation, as well as more trusted and additional mechanisms of international interaction, gives the members an opportunity to demonstrate their geopolitical and geoeconomic world significance, and in addition their demanded humanitarian role, which, as the analysis of the mentioned actor demonstrates, is aimed at forming its own interaction model. The logic of the BRICS agenda extension to the level of an important global management system element demonstrates the goal in the field of action and, accordingly, intensive progress of humanitarian imperatives. For these humanitarian imperatives, the issues of international peacekeeping, security, protection, encouraging human rights and providing stable development are an objective necessity, especially for active demonstration of the members' viewpoints on the international scene. For understanding the process of the alignment of international security humanitarian imperatives it is necessary to study the existing objective needs in conjunction with each country, member of BRICS.