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Event: SPIE Astronomical Telescopes + Instrumentation, 2020, Online.-- et al. ; LiteBIRD is a JAXA-led Strategic Large-Class mission designed to search for the existence of the primordial gravitational waves produced during the inflationary phase of the Universe, through the measurements of their imprint onto the polarization of the cosmic microwave background (CMB). These measurements, requiring unprecedented sensitivity, will be performed over the full sky, at large angular scales, and over 15 frequency bands from 34 GHz to 448 GHz. The LiteBIRD instruments consist of three telescopes, namely the Low-, Medium-and High-Frequency Telescope (respectively LFT, MFT and HFT). We present in this paper an overview of the design of the Medium-Frequency Telescope (89{224 GHz) and the High-Frequency Telescope (166{448 GHz), the so-called MHFT, under European responsibility, which are two cryogenic refractive telescopes cooled down to 5 K. They include a continuous rotating half-wave plate as the first optical element, two high-density polyethylene (HDPE) lenses and more than three thousand transition-edge sensor (TES) detectors cooled to 100 mK. We provide an overview of the concept design and the remaining specific challenges that we have to face in order to achieve the scientific goals of LiteBIRD. ; This work is supported in Japan by ISAS/JAXA for Pre-Phase A2 studies, by the acceleration program of JAXA research and development directorate, by the World Premier International Research Center Initiative (WPI) of MEXT, by the JSPS Core-to-Core Program of A. Advanced Research Networks, and by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP15H05891, JP17H01115, and JP17H01125. The Italian LiteBIRD phase A contribution is supported by the Italian Space Agency (ASI Grants No. 2020-9-HH.0 and 2016-24-H.1-2018), the National Institute for Nuclear Physics (INFN) and the National Institute for Astrophysics (INAF). The French LiteBIRD phase A contribution is supported by the Centre National d'Etudes Spatiale (CNES), by the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and by the Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique (CEA). The Canadian contribution is supported by the Canadian Space Agency. The US contribution is supported by NASA grant no. 80NSSC18K0132. Norwegian participation in LiteBIRD is supported by the Research Council of Norway (Grant No. 263011). The Spanish LiteBIRD phase A contribution is supported by the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigacion (AEI), project refs. PID2019-110610RB-C21 and AYA2017-84185-P. Funds that support the Swedish contributions come from the Swedish National Space Agency (SNSA/Rymdstyrelsen) and the Swedish Research Council (Reg. no. 2019-03959). The German participation in LiteBIRD is supported in part by the Excellence Cluster ORIGINS, which is funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany's Excellence Strategy (Grant No. EXC-2094 - 390783311). This research used resources of the Central Computing System owned and operated by the Computing Research Center at KEK, as well as resources of the National Energy Research Scientific Computing Center, a DOE Office of Science User Facility supported by the Office of Science of the U.S. Department of Energy. European collaborators acknowledge support from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement Nos. 772253, 819478, and 849169). The European Space Agency (ESA) has led a Concurrent Design Facility study, focused on the MHFT and Sub-Kelvin coolers, and funded Technology Research Programmes for "Large radii Half-Wave Plate (HWP) development" (contract number: 4000123266/18/NL/AF) and for the 'Development of Large Anti-Reflection Coated Lenses for Passive (Sub)Millimeter-Wave Science Instruments" (contract number: 4000128517/19/NL/AS). ; Peer reviewed

The science of environmental law in modern Ukraine occupies an important place in human public life and has various levels: basic, methodological, philosophical and legal, general theoretical, industry-theoretical and applied. In the context of the proposed study, environmental science is considered at the fundamental level. It must be understood as a system of knowledge and ideas about environmental law and its constituent institutions (ownership of natural resources, environmental management rights, environmental security law, environmental legal protection, legal responsibility for environmental violations, legal climate protection, etc.), the ultimate goal of which is the development of the concept of environmental law and legislation, the study of relevant theoretical and methodological problems of this branch of law and legislation, the formation of its conceptual apparatus, scientific categories used by the legislator and law enforcement agencies, analysis of environmental policy and the role of the state in the implementation of the environmental function.The subject of environmental law science includes not only the norms and institutions of this branch of law, but also studies of environmental and legal relations regulated by other branches of legislation (environmental management, environmental tax, fee for the special use of natural resources, environmental insurance and auditing, international and European environmental community, etc.), their specificity, the reasons for the emergence, functioning and termination. ; Наука экологического права в современной Украине занимает важное место в общественной жизни человека и имеет различные уровни: базовый, методологический, философско-правовой, общетеоретический, отраслевой теоретический, прикладной. В контексте предлагаемого исследования эколого-правовая наука рассматривается на уровне фундаментальной. Ее необходимо понимать как систему знаний и идей об экологическом праве и составляющих его институтах (право собственности на природные ресурсы, право природопользования, право экологической безопасности, правовая охрана окружающей среды, юридическая ответственность за экологические правонарушения, правовая охрана климата и т.д.), конечной целью которой является разработка концепции экологического права и законодательства, исследование соответствующих теоретических и методологических проблем этой отрасли права и законодательства, формирования понятийного аппарата, научных категорий, которыми пользуется законодатель и правоприменительные органы, анализ экологической политики и роли государства в реализации экологической функции.К предмету науки экологического права относятся не только нормы и институты данной отрасли права, но и эколого-правовые отношения, урегулированные другими отраслями законодательства (экологическое управление, экологический налог, сбор за специальное использование природных ресурсов, экологическое страхование и аудит, международное и европейское экологическое сообщество и т.п.), их специфика, основания возникновения, функционирования и прекращения. ; Наука екологічного права в сучасній Україні посідає важливе місце в суспільному житті людини та має різні рівні: фундаментальний, методологічний, філософсько-правовий, загально-теоретичний, галузево-теоретичний, прикладний. У контексті запропонованого дослідження еколого-правова наука розглядається на рівні фундаментальної. Її необхідно розуміти як систему знань та ідей про екологічне право та його складові інститути (право власності на природні ресурси, право природокористування, право екологічної безпеки, правова охорона довкілля, юридична відповідальність за екологічні правопорушення, правова охорона клімату тощо), кінцевою метою якої є розробка концепції екологічного права та законодавства, дослідження відповідних теоретичних та методологічних проблем цієї галузі права та законодавства, формування понятійного апарату, наукових категорій, якими користується законодавець та правозастосовні органи, аналіз екологічної політики і ролі держави в реалізації екологічної функції.До предмета науки екологічного права належать не лише норми та інститути цієї галузі права, але й еколого-правові відносини, що врегульовані іншими галузями законодавства (екологічне управління, екологічний податок, збір за спеціальне використання природних ресурсів, екологічне страхування та аудит, міжнародне та європейське екологічне співтовариство тощо), їх специфіка, підстави виникнення, функціонування та припинення.

Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to explore the views of orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) on the kind of psychosocial support they receive in a community-based organization (CBO) in Kenya.


Design/methodology/approach
This is a mixed approach study that utilized a qualitative approach through individual interviews and quantitative approach through the use of unstructured and structured questionnaire for data collection. This mixed approach was selected since rich information could be obtained from individual interviews and was validated through quantitative data. Qualitative data were collected through individual interviews for OVC, social workers and child counseling psychologist. The items used in the individual interview guide were generated based on three areas of research interests, namely, psychological, educational and social interventions. The individual interview questions focused on what was currently being offered to OVC, their views about such services, the challenges they might be facing and suggestions for improvement. The unstructured questionnaire was designed in an open-ended manner to allow the respondents to express their views freely on the kind of psychosocial support they were receiving within the CBO. The unstructured questionnaire was divided into thematic areas, namely, psychological support, social support and educational support. The structured questionnaire was used to collect data on psychosocial support that children receive within the CBO. The items were in form of a "YES/NO" format since the children could be able to understand them so easily and respond accordingly. Both methods of data collection were selected to allow triangulation of data and improve the credibility and generalizability of data.


Findings
The findings of this study revealed that the psychosocial support for the OVC was taken care of within the CBO. The OVC get psychological support through the counseling and peer-group support, while educational intervention was done through the provision of school uniforms and educational materials. But there is a need to encourage the families to engage in income generating activities so as to help them become independent instead of overburdening the CBO which is already straining in terms of resources. The OVC also get health care support as well as shelter and accommodation.


Research limitations/implications
The study had few limitations just like any other study. One of the limitations was the few numbers of participants who took part in the study. A larger sample could have provided more information that can easily be generalized to other OVC within any given organization. But despite this limitation, the information obtained was useful in shedding light on the kind of psychosocial support that the OVC is receiving within the CBO.


Practical implications
Resources are required for an extensive research to establish the effectiveness of such services on improving the lives of OVC within the society rather than the superficial way of care without considering their psychosocial well-being. This study recommends that more support is required from the governments, the donors and other international bodies to support the escalating numbers of OVC within the society.


Social implications
Since the numbers of OVC are escalating globally, the findings of this study could add value to the importance of psychosocial support that the OVC receive within the CBO. It also gives directions for policy and program development that targets OVC in Kenya and in other parts of the world.


Originality/value
This is a research paper whereby the data were collected from the OVC and analyzed to generate first-hand information.

The article discusses the history of local taxation in Germany and its current state, focusing on the correspondence of the existing local taxes to the criteria of optimal local taxation. The author's hypothesis is that the German system of local taxation, which dates back to the imperial period, can and should be reformed in order to meet the internationally recognized criteria. The analysis is based on several criteria: the general criteria, which apply to all taxes, including federal; criteria for local and central taxes and, last but not least, criteria for relationships between local governments. The history of the three local taxes (property tax, business tax and income tax) is viewed in the light of the above-described criteria. It is shown that the local business tax needs to be adjusted according to the criteria of optimal local taxation. The author also explains why, from the theoretical perspective, it was important to transfer the revenue from the income tax to the local level in 1969 and points out that local governments currently lack the authority to set tax rates. The case of the property tax, introduced in 1936, is particularly interesting, taking into consideration the current plans to amend the existing legislation. The author compares the two possible scenarios of the future tax reforms and comes to the conclusion that only one of them fully meets the international standards. The analysis has shown that the local taxation system in Germany is quite efficient, although there is definitely some room for improvement. The combination of the business tax and the income tax allow local authorities to balance the interests of local households and businesses.For citationZimmermann H. History of local taxation in Germany. Journal of Tax Reform. 2019;5(1):57–69. DOI:10.15826/jtr.2019.5.1.060Article infoReceived December 17, 2018; accepted March 12, 2019 ; Не ограничиваясь простым описанием истории местного налогообложения в Германии, автор оценивает существующую систему и ее историческое развитие на соответствие различным критериям оптимального местного налога. Гипотеза автора говорит о том, что немецкая система местного налогообложения, сложившаяся с имперских времен, может быть реформирована, чтобы достаточно хорошо соответствовать общепринятым критериям. Для анализа выделено несколько критериев: критерии для любого налога (также федерального), критерии для местных и центральных налогов и, что не менее важно, критерии для отношений между местными органами власти. Основываясь на этих критериях, описывается история трех местных налогов (налог на имущество, местный налог на бизнес, местный налог на прибыль). Развитие налога на имущество описано с момента его введения в 1936 г. вплоть до настоящего времени. С учетом наличия планов по внесению дальнейших изменений в законодательство, оценены две возможные альтернативы его предстоящего реформирования. Сделан вывод, что из двух предлагаемых вариантов его изменения лишь один соответствует международным стандартам. На основе анализа системы реформ, последовательно изменявших местный промысловый налог, сделан вывод о необходимости его скорейшего реформирования в целях приведения в соответствие с критериями оптимального местного налогообложения. Оправдана, с теоретических позиций, важность передачи на местный уровень власти в 1969 г. доли поступлений от налога на доходы. Вместе с тем отмечен недостаток полномочий местного уровня по установлению налоговой ставки. Анализ показал, что система местного налогообложения в Германии в целом не плоха, но может быть значительно улучшена. Промысловый налог и налог на доходы, работая совместно, создают предпосылки для балансирования интересов коренного населения и предпринимательского сообщества, а в целом три названных источника доходов сформировали неплохую местную систему налогообложения Германии. Вместе с тем все элементы этой системы нуждаются в реформировании.Для цитированияЦиммерманн Х. История местного налогообложения в Германии // Journal of Tax Reform. 2019. Т. 5, № 1. С. 57–69. DOI:10.15826/jtr.2019.5.1.060Информация о статьеДата поступления 17 декабря 2018 г.; дата принятия к печати 12 марта 2019 г.

PURPOSE: Since 2016, the multicase-control study in Spain (MCC-Spain) has focused towards the identification of factors associated with cancer prognosis. Inception cohorts of patients with colorectal, breast and prostate cancers were assembled using the incident cases originally recruited. PARTICIPANTS: 2140 new cases of colorectal cancer, 1732 of breast cancer and 1112 of prostate cancer were initially recruited in 12 Spanish provinces; all cancers were incident and pathologically confirmed. Follow-up was obtained for 2097 (98%), 1685 (97%) and 1055 (94.9%) patients, respectively. FINDINGS TO DATE: Information gathered at recruitment included sociodemographic factors, medical history, lifestyle and environmental exposures. Biological samples were obtained, and 80% of patients were genotyped using a commercial exome array. The follow-up was performed by (1) reviewing medical records; (2) interviewing the patients by phone on quality of life; and (3) verifying vital status and cause of death in the Spanish National Death Index. Ninety-seven per cent of recruited patients were successfully followed up in 2017 or 2018; patient-years of follow-up were 30?914. Most colorectal cancers (52%) were at clinical stage II or lower at recruitment; 819 patients died in the follow-up and the 5-year survival was better for women (74.4%) than men (70.0%). 71% of breast cancers were diagnosed at stages I or II; 206 women with breast cancer died in the follow-up and the 5-year survival was 90.7%. 49% of prostate cancers were diagnosed at stage II and 32% at stage III; 119 patients with prostate cancer died in the follow-up and the 5-year survival was 93.7%. FUTURE PLANS: MCC-Spain has built three prospective cohorts on highly frequent cancers across Spain, allowing to investigate socioeconomic, clinical, lifestyle, environmental and genetic variables as putative prognosis factors determining survival of patients of the three cancers and the inter-relationship of these factors. ; The study was partially funded by the 'Accion Transversal del Cancer', approved on the Spanish Ministry Council on 11 October 2007, by the Instituto de Salud Carlos III-FEDER (PI08/1770, PI08/0533, PI08/1359, PS09/00773-Cantabria, PS09/01286-León, PS09/01903-Valencia, PS09/02078-Huelva, PS09/01662-Granada, PI11/01403, PI11/01889-FEDER, PI11/00226, PI11/01810, PI11/02213, PI12/00488, PI12/00265, PI12/01270, PI12/00715, PI12/00150, PI14/01219, PI14/0613, PI15/00069, PI15/00914, PI15/01032, PI17CIII/00034, PI18/00181), by the Fundación Marqués de Valdecilla (API 10/09), by the ICGC International Cancer Genome Consortium CLL (the ICGC CLL-Genome Project is funded by Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (MINECO) through the Instituto de Salud Carlos III (ISCIII) and Red Temática de Investigación del Cáncer (RTICC) del ISCIII (RD12/0036/0036)), by the Junta de Castilla y León (LE22A10-2), by the Consejería de Salud of the Junta de Andalucía (PI-0571-2009, PI-0306-2011, salud201200057018tra), by the Conselleria de Sanitat of the Generalitat Valenciana (AP_061/10), by the Recercaixa (2010ACUP 00310), by the Regional Government of the Basque Country, by the Consejería de Sanidad de la Región de Murcia, by the European Commission (grants FOOD-CT-2006-036224-HIWATE), by the Spanish Association Against Cancer (AECC) Scientific Foundation (GCTRA18022MORE), by the Catalan Government-Agency for Management of University and Research Grants (AGAUR) (grants 2017SGR723 and 2014SGR850), by the Fundación Caja de Ahorros de Asturias, and by the University of Oviedo. ISGlobal is a member of the CERCA Programme, Generalitat de Catalunya.

The South African statistics for child abuse, neglect, and death is extreme by international measures (UNICEF, 2016). Concurrently, skilled Social Workers are in demand in South Africa but subject to complex social dynamics while working under immense pressure (DHET, 2018; Calitz, Roux, & Strydom, 2014). The purpose of this study was to explore Statutory Social Workers' perceptions and experiences of their Child Protection Work. The objectives of this study was to gain insight into the role, responsibilities and experiences of Statutory Child Protection Social Workers in order to identify their perceived challenges and rewards within the profession and to make recommendations to improve Statutory Child Protection Work. The study used a qualitative research design. A purposive non-probability sampling method was used to select the 19 respondents in this study. All respondents were Statutory Child Protection Social Workers from Government and Non-Government Child Protection organisations. The data was collected using a semi-structured interview schedule to conduct one-on-one interviews. The interviews were analysed using Tesch's (2013) approach and NVIVO 12 data analysis software. Overall, the study found that while respondents experience challenges in their profession, there are rewarding aspects in Social Work that motivate them to continue in the work. More specifically, the study has found that the main responsibilities and roles of Statutory Child Protection Social Workers are embedded in the context of Statutory Social Work. In this context, Social Workers' Child protection interventions are mandated by Social Work and Child Protection legislation to respond to social problems. Main social issues reported by respondents are poor parenting, substance misuse, gangsterism, domestic violence, school dropouts, unemployment, and teen pregnancies. The study revealed the importance of effective collaborative work with the stakeholders of Child Protection Work. Most respondents reported that collaborative work in Child Protection Work can be more effective when there are clearly defined roles and responsibilities and good working relationships between collaborators. The study found that there are both extrinsic and intrinsic aspects of the work that are perceived as challenging and rewarding for respondents. The most challenging extrinsic experiences of Social Work perceived by respondents are poor working conditions, namely: concern for safety, lack of resources to do the work, high caseloads and dissatisfaction with the salary. The most challenging intrinsic experiences perceived by respondents are lack of recognition received from collaborators, the public and government. The most rewarding extrinsic experiences of Social Work perceived by respondents are; support received at work and good working relationships and support received from colleagues. Intrinsic aspects experienced as most rewarding by respondents are; achievements at work, recognition received for their work, motivation to do SW and remaining in SW, and experiencing a sense of personal and professional growth in their work. Based on the results of the study, recommendations can be made to inform Social Work Practice (workers and employers), Social Work Education and Training, Government, and future Social Work research. The study found that self-care is an important coping mechanism for the respondents to manage emotional exhaustion and the challenges of the work. Respondents' recommendations to employers include their plea for better resources, effective supervision, support and acknowledgement. Recommendations that respondents had for improvement of statutory child protection service delivery is; improved working relationships with collaborators and clarification of roles and responsibilities of collaborators, and a need for forums and networking. Recommendations that respondents had for Social Work education and training institutions included better preparation for the work while studying at university. The main recommendations that respondents echoed to government are justice for victims of abuse and neglect, better working conditions for Statutory Child Protection Social Workers and the inclusion of Social Workers' voices when Child Protection policy and legislation is developed.

Violence against women is not a social ill which has recently emerged, nor is it an unexplored topic in the realm of feminist academics, activists and lawyers. Yet despite streams of published articles unpacking the issue and numerous campaigns aimed at raising awareness about and combatting the prevalence of violence against women, it continues to be deeply entrenched in all factions of society. Furthermore, the idealistic society envisioned by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 has not translated into reality and the rights enshrined in the supreme law have not dissipated incidents of violence against women. With the aforesaid in mind, this paper intends to contribute to the array of solutions already developed, in order to assist in countering the most extreme manifestation of patriarchy, sexual gender-based violence against women.1 As the time-honoured saying goes, 'prevention is better than cure' and in the same vein, a total reliance on the legislation and the legal processes in place to deal with the aftermath of rape, sexual assault and harassment, arguably have not and will not adequately address the root causes of these crimes. Hence, this paper contemplates a mechanism to strike at the core from which sexual gender-based violence stems, that core being the psychological entrenchment of male superiority and female inferiority - in other words, gender inequality. Overlooked prejudices against girls and women need to be brought into consciousness, to address them and break them down. If gender equality is sought, then we should be encouraging children to evaluate the status quo from a younger age and prioritise their role in re-imagining a society which values and promotes equality and dignity. Accordingly, it is submitted that a potential solution may lie in children's human rights education (HRE), specifically aimed at promoting gender equality and deconstructing patriarchal beliefs and ideas about masculinity. HRE is not a novel concept and is promoted in international treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Child Convention), and has, in fact, already been implemented in schools in South Africa in order for the post-apartheid generation of children to strive towards racial integration and societal transformation. Unfortunately, it appears that the goal of gender equality has fallen somewhat to the wayside in the formulation of these HRE programmes. It is submitted that the UDHR and the Child Convention read together with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, as well at the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, support the advancement of gender equality through HRE programmes. In order to explore the possibility of developing HRE programmes in schools throughout South Africa with an underlying goal of advancing gender equality, empirical research was conducted in collaboration with the non-governmental organisation, Children's Resource Centre, based in Cape Town, which has developed a programme called the Girl Child Movement (GCM). The GCM aims to use the creative energies of girls to help build and sustain a qualitatively better world for girls and women. The goal of advancing the GCM is acutely targeted towards preventing the pain, suffering, humiliation and dehumanisation of girls and women who are subjected to incidents of sexual gender-based violence, the war on female bodies.

In early 2014, Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced the worst civil unrest it had seen since the 1992 - 1995 war as a wave of protest, called by media commentators 'the Bosnian Spring', shook the fragile country. The initially fierce and violent protests soon took a more institutionalized form as the protesters began forming plena, or citizens' assemblies, and articulating their demands through the means of direct democracy. This research seeks to give a comprehensive understanding of how the country had come to such state that its people were willing to raise up on the barricades that year. This is done by utilizing the perspective of criticism of liberal peacebuilding – a top-down led peacebuilding strategy applied in BiH. The failures of liberal peacebuilding are juxtaposed with a thorough analysis of the protest movement: who did they seek to represent, what was the object of their resistance and how did they undertake their resistance? To answer these questions, a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of documentation produced by the protesters, such as lists of demands, declarations, statements and meeting reports, is carried out. The findings of the research point out that the Bosnian Spring protest movement can be described as partly a workers' movement, building on the socialist-era tradition, and partly a populist or civic movement, claiming legitimacy also beyond the working class. The asymmetric power relations between the protesters and the political establishment served as a key factor for defining the collective identity of the movement. Attempting to escape domination by political parties, elites and governments, the movement constructed its proclaimed apolitical identity based on the people-versus-elite dichotomy. Manipulation by the establishment, years of experienced neglect and wrongdoings and common calls for solidarity between the plena served to strengthen the collective identity. The movement focused its resistance particularly on political parties, elites and governments, administrative and political inertia and neoliberalism. Calling for social justice, the movement's most common demands included taking away unjustified financial benefits from political party and government representatives and redistributing them to the society, replacing current governments with politically unaffiliated expert governments, reversing the failed post-war privatization processes and ending the impunity of repressive state-authorities and those benefiting illegally from the privatizations. The research pieces together a portrait of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has been characterized by stagnation, grey economy, corruption, clientelism, economic exploitation, a pronounced role of predatory elites and a dependency on a long-living international presence. While the poorly performing ethno-nationalist parties have dominated the legislatures, their success in repeatedly winning their seats has been contrasted by an overwhelming distrust towards them, prevalent among average Bosnians. At the same time, the importance of basic socio-economic issues for the everyday lives of Bosnians has been overlooked parallel to a disproportionate emphasis of inter-ethnic distrust. The Bosnian Spring protests fit this narrative expectedly, as the protesters' criticism of the status quo of ethno-nationalist parties and elites sent out a message that hunger weights more than political fault lines. The links between the failures of liberal peacebuilding and the witnessed resistance are deemed evident as at the root of the protesters' criticism were the same issues that liberal peacebuilding seeks to achieve: democracy, rule of law, civil society, human rights and economic liberalization. It is argued that the space for civil society actors to influence societal developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to act to bring upon positive change is highly restricted due to the domination and manipulation by the political elites.

Following the 1919 invasion of the Baltic countries and the 1920 war against Poland, the Bolsheviks' most flagrant attempt at the export of revolution was their venture to inspire a communist coup in Germany, with the redeployment of the 100,000-strong Red Army that had been concentrated at the western borders of the USSR with the hope that the Baltic countries and Poland would permit its transit to Germany without objection. The inspiration was of a grandiose scale. The Bolsheviks' assistance was not limited to just financial support to German communists and revolutionary literature sent to them: military revolutionary units, "the hundreds", were organised, military and party specialists were dispatched to Germany, and even a terrorist group for killing "inconvenient" individuals was formed on the example of the Soviet Extraordinary Commission. Had the coup in Germany succeeded, the country would have been connected with the USSR and after that the revolution would have spread globally. However, the Bolshevik leaders were facing a question of immense importance: how to redeploy their army to Germany and how to overcome the "barrier" of the new countries that had emerged after the war. The initial plan was to push through Romania and Czechoslovakia, but when Joseph Stalin rejected it, the decision was made to direct the main offensive through the so-called Vilnius corridor and to reach East Prussia along the Lithuanian-Polish border. To ensure that the Red Army reached Germany in time not battered, without losses, full of energy, and without causing an international conflict it was resolved to negotiate the transit of the Red Army with Poland and the Baltic countries. For this purpose, a diplomatic mission of the influential Bolshevik Viktor Kopp was dispatched to Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, which masked the request for transit under a defence tale: purportedly, the Triple Entente might attempt suppression of the possible revolution in Germany, in which case the Soviets would have to render "moral and material assistance" to the German proletariat. Viktor Kopp proposed that all three countries he was visiting should sign pacts of guarantees that foresaw unhindered transit of the Soviets to Germany in case of "possible events" in that country. Although the governments of Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics and Ernestas Galvanauskas and the Polish authorities occupied different positions towards Moscow, they unambiguously rejected Kopp's proposals and did not yield either to 126 Zenonas Butkus his threats or tempting concessions. Estonia assumed an identical position and communicated its negative response through traditional diplomatic channels. The Baltic countries and Poland arrived at this decision independently, without England or other Western countries promising them direct assistance or even refusing demarches to protest Moscow's actions. In this way they made a weighty contribution to averting Soviet military intervention, to the disruption of the schemes of global revolution that were threatening Germany and the whole of Europe. The larger part of the German public did not succumb to the inspirations of the coup and thus the Soviet grand inspiration of a revolution did not materialise. The danger of the export of revolution, the threat of the intervention of the Red Army in the Baltic countries and Poland did not bring much unity to these countries. Only Estonia and Latvia responded to the threat in a more adequate manner when, having overcome territorial and other disputes, they concluded a defence union on 1 November 1923 and undertook the commitment to lend political, diplomatic, and military assistance to each other. However, none of their northern or eastern neighbours joined this union before the Soviet occupation of these countries in 1940.

Following the 1919 invasion of the Baltic countries and the 1920 war against Poland, the Bolsheviks' most flagrant attempt at the export of revolution was their venture to inspire a communist coup in Germany, with the redeployment of the 100,000-strong Red Army that had been concentrated at the western borders of the USSR with the hope that the Baltic countries and Poland would permit its transit to Germany without objection. The inspiration was of a grandiose scale. The Bolsheviks' assistance was not limited to just financial support to German communists and revolutionary literature sent to them: military revolutionary units, "the hundreds", were organised, military and party specialists were dispatched to Germany, and even a terrorist group for killing "inconvenient" individuals was formed on the example of the Soviet Extraordinary Commission. Had the coup in Germany succeeded, the country would have been connected with the USSR and after that the revolution would have spread globally. However, the Bolshevik leaders were facing a question of immense importance: how to redeploy their army to Germany and how to overcome the "barrier" of the new countries that had emerged after the war. The initial plan was to push through Romania and Czechoslovakia, but when Joseph Stalin rejected it, the decision was made to direct the main offensive through the so-called Vilnius corridor and to reach East Prussia along the Lithuanian-Polish border. To ensure that the Red Army reached Germany in time not battered, without losses, full of energy, and without causing an international conflict it was resolved to negotiate the transit of the Red Army with Poland and the Baltic countries. For this purpose, a diplomatic mission of the influential Bolshevik Viktor Kopp was dispatched to Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, which masked the request for transit under a defence tale: purportedly, the Triple Entente might attempt suppression of the possible revolution in Germany, in which case the Soviets would have to render "moral and material assistance" to the German proletariat. Viktor Kopp proposed that all three countries he was visiting should sign pacts of guarantees that foresaw unhindered transit of the Soviets to Germany in case of "possible events" in that country. Although the governments of Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics and Ernestas Galvanauskas and the Polish authorities occupied different positions towards Moscow, they unambiguously rejected Kopp's proposals and did not yield either to 126 Zenonas Butkus his threats or tempting concessions. Estonia assumed an identical position and communicated its negative response through traditional diplomatic channels. The Baltic countries and Poland arrived at this decision independently, without England or other Western countries promising them direct assistance or even refusing demarches to protest Moscow's actions. In this way they made a weighty contribution to averting Soviet military intervention, to the disruption of the schemes of global revolution that were threatening Germany and the whole of Europe. The larger part of the German public did not succumb to the inspirations of the coup and thus the Soviet grand inspiration of a revolution did not materialise. The danger of the export of revolution, the threat of the intervention of the Red Army in the Baltic countries and Poland did not bring much unity to these countries. Only Estonia and Latvia responded to the threat in a more adequate manner when, having overcome territorial and other disputes, they concluded a defence union on 1 November 1923 and undertook the commitment to lend political, diplomatic, and military assistance to each other. However, none of their northern or eastern neighbours joined this union before the Soviet occupation of these countries in 1940.

Following the 1919 invasion of the Baltic countries and the 1920 war against Poland, the Bolsheviks' most flagrant attempt at the export of revolution was their venture to inspire a communist coup in Germany, with the redeployment of the 100,000-strong Red Army that had been concentrated at the western borders of the USSR with the hope that the Baltic countries and Poland would permit its transit to Germany without objection. The inspiration was of a grandiose scale. The Bolsheviks' assistance was not limited to just financial support to German communists and revolutionary literature sent to them: military revolutionary units, "the hundreds", were organised, military and party specialists were dispatched to Germany, and even a terrorist group for killing "inconvenient" individuals was formed on the example of the Soviet Extraordinary Commission. Had the coup in Germany succeeded, the country would have been connected with the USSR and after that the revolution would have spread globally. However, the Bolshevik leaders were facing a question of immense importance: how to redeploy their army to Germany and how to overcome the "barrier" of the new countries that had emerged after the war. The initial plan was to push through Romania and Czechoslovakia, but when Joseph Stalin rejected it, the decision was made to direct the main offensive through the so-called Vilnius corridor and to reach East Prussia along the Lithuanian-Polish border. To ensure that the Red Army reached Germany in time not battered, without losses, full of energy, and without causing an international conflict it was resolved to negotiate the transit of the Red Army with Poland and the Baltic countries. For this purpose, a diplomatic mission of the influential Bolshevik Viktor Kopp was dispatched to Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, which masked the request for transit under a defence tale: purportedly, the Triple Entente might attempt suppression of the possible revolution in Germany, in which case the Soviets would have to render "moral and material assistance" to the German proletariat. Viktor Kopp proposed that all three countries he was visiting should sign pacts of guarantees that foresaw unhindered transit of the Soviets to Germany in case of "possible events" in that country. Although the governments of Zigfrīds Anna Meierovics and Ernestas Galvanauskas and the Polish authorities occupied different positions towards Moscow, they unambiguously rejected Kopp's proposals and did not yield either to 126 Zenonas Butkus his threats or tempting concessions. Estonia assumed an identical position and communicated its negative response through traditional diplomatic channels. The Baltic countries and Poland arrived at this decision independently, without England or other Western countries promising them direct assistance or even refusing demarches to protest Moscow's actions. In this way they made a weighty contribution to averting Soviet military intervention, to the disruption of the schemes of global revolution that were threatening Germany and the whole of Europe. The larger part of the German public did not succumb to the inspirations of the coup and thus the Soviet grand inspiration of a revolution did not materialise. The danger of the export of revolution, the threat of the intervention of the Red Army in the Baltic countries and Poland did not bring much unity to these countries. Only Estonia and Latvia responded to the threat in a more adequate manner when, having overcome territorial and other disputes, they concluded a defence union on 1 November 1923 and undertook the commitment to lend political, diplomatic, and military assistance to each other. However, none of their northern or eastern neighbours joined this union before the Soviet occupation of these countries in 1940.

Within a short period of time, the economy underwent a radical transformation and opened many new businesses the possibility to enter the market with new methods of making money (Hira and Reilly, 2017, pp. 1f.). Online platforms and technological improvements helped sharing companies grow so big and created numerous opportunities for consumers, but also for private and commercial providers. People can now easily rent out unused goods, space or services and thus earn some additional income and increase the efficiency. At the same time, people can save money because the access to goods in the sharing economy offers price benefits compared to the purchase of a good and it increases the availability. The use of these possibilities became normal for the majority of the people, and it is barely possible to imagine a world without these digital amenities. Though the changes brought along many advantages and comfort for the users, there are also new kinds of disadvantages or even threats. Moreover, the fact that the new sharing economy is scarcely regulated yet, gives rise to set limits and obligations to the providers and the users. In the following paper, the emergence of the sharing economy will be described, and the focus will be set on the hosting platform Airbnb. This subject was chosen due to the fast-growing expansion of Airbnb on an international scale and the problematic situation on the housing market, which are current topics in European cities and frequently discussed in the news. Especially the housing shortage and the rising rents in many cities, for which Airbnb is often blamed, causes disadvantages for the residents. The difficulties regarding the regulation will be discussed and which past and current attempts were made to limit the power of Airbnb and to mitigate the impacts on the general public. The relationship between hosting platforms and the housing market will be analyzed in a qualitative study by evaluating the numerous reporting on this topic on the print media. Further, the position of citizens and users of the platform will be elucidated and what changes the government and the cities are making to regulate this new economy. Unfortunately, in many cases the negative sides of the sharing economy are ignored and only the benefits are highlighted. These in some cases short-sighted and one-sided representations lead to general enthusiasm among the consumers. This thesis, on the contrary, examines the effects of the sharing economy on its environment from both sides and also the critical aspects that are entailed will be presented, reaching from tax avoidance to the illegal offering of rooms and apartments on lodging platforms. Precisely, this paper will be oriented on the two following research questions: 1. Which regulatory problems of the sharing economy are discussed in the print media? Based on the findings on the first research question, which serves as a fundamental basis for the main focus of this thesis, the even more central question should be answered which is dealing with Airbnbs impact on the housing market. 2. Does the sharing economy have negative effects on the housing market? These questions are intended to examine possible impacts of the sharing economy on the general public. In chapter 2, the sharing economy will be defined, and the short-term lodging platform Airbnb will be presented. Also, problems concerning the regulation of the sharing economy and the housing market will be addressed. Chapter 3 gives an overview about the method of this study, the data collection process and the data analysis. The findings of the research will be elucidated in chapter 4. A summarizing discussion and the conclusion will sum up this topic in the chapters 5 and 6. ; submitted by Julian Paulus, BSc. ; Universität Linz, Masterarbeit, 2019 ; (VLID)4487562

International audience ; This article is a contribution to the political economy of consent based on the analysis of speeches, declarations, initiatives, and policies implemented in the name of resilience in the context of the Fukushima nuclear disaster. It argues that, in practice as much as in theory, resilience fuels peoples' submission to an existing reality-in the case of Fukushima, the submission to radioactive contamination-in an attempt to deny this reality as well as its consequences. The political economy of consent to the nuclear, of which resilience is one of the technologies, can be grasped at four interrelated analytical levels adapted to understanding how resilience is encoded in key texts and programs in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The first level is technological: consent through and to the nuclear technology. The second level is sociometabolic: consent to nuisance. The third level is political: consent to participation. The fourth level is epistemological: consent to ignorance. A fifth cognitivo-experimental transversal level can also be identified: consent to experimentation, learning and training. We first analyze two key symptoms of the despotism of resilience: its incantatory feature and the way it supports mutilated life within a contaminated area and turns disaster into a cure. Then, we show how, in the reenchanted world of resilience, loss opens doors, that is, it paves the way to new "forms of life": first through ignorance-based disempowerment; second through submission to protection. Finally, we examine the ideological mechanisms of resilience and how it fosters a government through the fear of fear. We approach resilience as a technology of consent mobilizing emotionalism and conditioning on one side, contingency and equivalence on the other. ; Cet article est une contribution à l'économie politique du consentement reposant sur l'analyse des discours, déclarations, initiatives et politiques prononcés et mises en place au nom de la résilience dans le contexte du désastre nucléaire de Fukushima. L'argument est qu'en pratique comme en théorie, la résilience nourrit la soumission des individus à la réalité existante - dans le cas de Fukushima, la soumission à la contamination radioactive - afin de nier cette réalité autant que ses conséquences. L'économie politique du consentement au nucléaire, dont la résilience est une des technologies, peut être appréhendée à quatre niveaux analytiques interdépendants, permettant de comprendre comment la résilience est intégrée dans les textes clés et les programmes d'actions, dans les suites de l'accident de la centrale nucléaire de Fukushima Daiichi. Le premier niveau est technologique : il renvoie au consentement par et à la technologie. Le second est socio-métabolique : il renvoie au consentement aux nuisances. Le troisième est politique : il s'agit du consentement à la participation. Le quatrième niveau est épistémologique : il renvoie au consentement à l'ignorance. Un cinquième niveau, cognitivo-expérimental, est transversal aux quatre autres : il s'agit du consentement à l'entraînement, à l'apprentissage et à l'expérimentation. Deux symptômes clés du despotisme de la résilience sont d'abord analysés : son caractère incantatoire et la manière dont elle encourage la vie mutilée en zone contaminée, transformant le désastre en remède. Est ensuite montré comment, dans le monde enchanté de la résilience, la perte c'est la porte, autrement dit, la voie vers de nouvelles « formes de vie » caractérisées par la dépossession du pouvoir fondée sur l'ignorance et par la soumission à la protection. Enfin, les mécanismes idéologiques de la résilience sont mis au jour, notamment son rôle dans l'instauration d'un gouvernement par la peur de la peur. La résilience est analysée en tant que technologie du consentement qui mobilise l'émotionalisme et le conditionnement d'une part, la contingence et l'équivalence, de l'autre.

Donald Trump and PESCO: Influence of Individual to Transatlantic Defence Structure In this study I defend the thesis that US President Donald Trump had a negative impact to transatlantic defence structure that is NATO, which led to the PESCO agreement ratification in late 2017. This agreement increases integration of most of European countries in defence sphere by allowing to cooperate in fields of military equipment purchase and various strategic defence capabilities projects, as well as requires member states to regularly increasing defence budgets in real terms and to increase defence investment expenditure to 20% of total defence spending. The PESCO agreement is entirely European project and US is not a part of it. In this research I made a statement that election of Donald Trump and his rhetoric towards NATO allies had a negative impact to whole transatlantic defence structure and forced European leaders to ratify PESCO agreement. In order to defend my statement, methodological individualism approach to this problem was used. I used Karl Raimund Popper's and Joseph Agassi's institutional individualism theory as a base of my research and created 4 subpart analysis structure, which was used in order to defend my thesis. In the first subpart, the institutional background and history of NATO was analysed. The domination of US in NATO, while European partners were less concerned with defence led to the situation where European countries were accused by United States of not participating enough in burden sharing. In the second subpart, the impact of structural situation to individual's (that is Donald Trump) circumstances and his behaviour was analysed. The European so called "freeride" in NATO was and still is a major problem that is highlighted in Trump's "America First" strategy that was used during his presidential election campaign and presidency. In the third subpart, Donald Trump's rhetoric towards NATO allies, in respect to "America First" strategy, during his presidential election campaign and during his time in office, was analysed. Donald Trump regularly criticised Europeans countries for not fulfilling their agreements and not spending 2 percent of GDP for defence. In institutional individualism view this criticism of European countries are Donald Trump's "cry" for "reform" inside the NATO. In the final subpart, the transatlantic defence structure's, that is NATO, response to Donald Trump's "reform" was analysed. NATO European leaders did not agree with D. Trump's terms and "reform" of NATO and were not willing to drastically increase defence spending. This led to situation where European leaders could not "punish" United States nor could trust US to keep their commitments to NATO anymore, therefore pushed European leaders to ratify a PESCO agreement. This research shows how agent has impact to changes in various international structures and focused primarily on Donald Trump's influence to structural changes of NATO which led to PESCO agreement ratification on the other side of Atlantic. It was done in a way in which Donald Trump is considered to be one of many individuals that belong to transatlantic defence structure and was just a part of the agent/structure influence triangle. Therefore, the main goal of this research was not to show why Donald Trump had an impact to transatlantic defence structure and PESCO, but rather to answer how he could done such impact in the agent/structure relations. However, this master's thesis can be a basis for any researcher that is willing to do so: to answer the question why during Donald Trump's presidency and not Barack Obama's, for example, the PESCO agreement was ratified and trust issues between US and European countries rose again.

This article, based on the archives stored in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia and some recently published documents, investigates the coup attempted by the Soviets on December 1, 1924 in Tallinn and evaluates its consequences within the broad context of international relations. During the research, it was established that an attempt to stage a coup in Estonia had been undertaken both by the Estonian communists and the USSR leadership, which had the highest political body– the Politburo– and the Comintern, a self-crafted tool set up for spreading the communist movement around the world, at its disposal. Thus, the revolution was masterminded by the Soviet authorities, whereas the Estonian communists were mainly responsible for its implementation. The task of the coup leadership was to seize power and hold on to it for some time, long enough to request that the USSR "renders support." Preparations were underway for such support. This is evidenced by military preparations in the northern regions of the USSR and the territory near the Estonian border as well as by the deployment of Soviet ships in the vicinity of Tallinn and the activities of the Soviet embassy located in the capital. The attempted coup turned into a putsch due to the maximum conspiracy of their organizers. The conspiracy was brought about by the then-public awareness that the revolutionary events in Germany in 1923 had been instigated by the Soviets. The attempted coup in Estonia failed due to the extraordinary defensive operations put up by the Estonian authorities and power structures as well as due to the failure to involve the workers and the other strata of society in the coup. Latvia, Estonia's only ally, was the first country to stand by Estonia's side after the country withstood the attempted coup. The lessons were learnt not only by these two countries but by Lithuania as well. They began taking adequate measures to stifle communist activities. Neither France nor England or any other Western state made plans to deploy their fleets to the Baltic Sea to support the Estonians or at least show, in a demonstrative way, their support in such a trying time. They also failed to hold any diplomatic démarches against the Soviets opposing the export of revolution practiced by the Soviets. Due to diplomatic pressure imposed by the USSR, Estonia could not publicly and officially name the actual organizers of the putsch. As a result, only the local communists were indiscriminately accused. Such forced tactics, if only indirectly, had at least partially been influencing the area of historical research as well. However, the sudden and unequivocal liquidation of the putsch in Tallinn could have prompted the USSR to no longer expand its revolutionary export to the West, and the "abstinence" of such kind had lasted until the Second World War. The war itself and the previous collusion with Adolf Hitler made it possible for Stalin to cherish even greater ambitions to renew the spread of communism in other countries. ; Straipsnyje, tiriant komunistinį 1924m. gruodžio 1d. pučą, aiškinamasi, kokį vaidmenį jį organizuojant suvaidino Estijos komunistai ir kokį faktiškai aukščiausioji SSRS valdžia– politbiuras ir nuo jo priklausomas Kominternas, kaip į šį pučą reagavo gretimos Baltijos šalys, kaip jis paveikė šių šalių tarptautinę padėtį, jų santykius su Sovietais bei Vakarų valstybėmis. Estams pučą operatyviai likvidavus, pasaulinės revoliucijos eksportas Vakarų kryptimi iš esmės sustojo, sustojo ligi pat Antrojo pasaulinio karo pradžios. Siekiama nustatyti, kaipgi estams tada pavyko ir apginti savąjį valstybingumą, ir sustiprinti gretimų šalių saugumą, taip pat kaip pučas vertintas diplomatijoje bei viešajame diskurse.