Suchergebnisse

'Will the Netherlands be defended?' The debate about NATO's main lines of defence at the beginning of the 1950sAt the beginning of the 1950s, the Netherlands would not have been able to defend itself in the event of a Soviet attack. Despite the fact that NATO, under the leadership of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Eisenhower, and later General Ridgway, was in the process of rapidly building up its defences, it was still incapable of conducting a forward defence. The pivotal political and military issue in the short term centred on one question: Which areas in Western Europe could and should be kept and which not? Answers to this question exposed conflicting national interests and points of view, particularly those of the Dutch and the French. As it was taking a considerably long time to build up the Netherlands' defences, the Dutch government had very few trump cards to add weight to its demands. Indeed, in the summer of 1952, when Parliament asked to be given a precise account of how the Dutch defences were progressing, the government was practically boxed into a corner.

Raportissa tarkastellaan sotilaallisen t&k-panostuksen ja kilpailukyvyn välisiä yhteyksiä. Aineistona käytetään brittiläisen International Institute for Strategic Studies -laitoksen (IISS) "The Military Balance" -raportin tietoja länsimaiden sotilaallisen t&kpanostuksen kehityksestä. Julkisen vallan sotilaallisia t&k-panostuksia verrataan maiden julkisiin siviilipuolen t&k-menoihin, sotilaallisiin hankintamenoihin, sekä suhteessa maiden BKT:hen ja puolustusbudjetteihin. Raportissa on mukana myös tiivis katsaus sotilaallisen t&k-panostuksen ja tuottavuuden välistä yhteyttä kuvaavista kansainvälisistä tutkimuksista. Raportin tulosten mukaan sotilaallisella t&k-panostuksella ja kilpailukyvyllä ei ole suoraa yhteyttä. ; This study discusses the relationship between military R&D and competitiveness. The study is based mainly on a British International Institute for Strategic Studies -institutes publication "The Military Balance", and furthermore its information about the development of Western countrye´s military R&D-stakes for the years 1994 -2001. Government military R&D is compared for government R&D, defence expenditure and also to the countries gross domestic product and defence budgets. The study also includes tight review about the previous international studies, which are focused to study the relationship between military R&D and productiveness. The study concludes, that there are no direct connection between military R&D and competitiveness.

The question whether the Belgian foreign policy is marked by a continuity or break between the first & second turns of Guy Verhofstadt as a prime minister of this country's governments is addressed, surveying developments in the 1999-2004 period & scrutinizing the rhetorical declarations & concrete initiatives "on the ground" by the foreign minister Louis Michel. The diplomatic style of the first & second administrations are compared, & the principles & directions of Belgian foreign policy in 2004 are assessed in the context of the state of political affairs on the global arena, with special attention to the split between the EU & US on the war in Iraq, the division inside the former vis-a-vis supporting or opposing US intervention in this Middle Eastern country, & the recent troubles the EU experiences with greater degree of political integration, projecting also into a lack of coherent, uniform foreign policy on the supranational level. Some of the major issues the Belgian foreign policy must deal in 2004 & beyond are identified: securing democratic & peaceful governance in Central Africa, responding to the anti-Belgian campaign conducted by the US, & supporting the process of strengthening the EU position as a relevant actor on the geopolitical stage. Z. Dubiel