Introduction : le droit de la société internationale -- La supériorité du droit international par rapport au droit interne -- La hiérarchie des normes au sein du droit international -- Les traités entre etats -- Les accords passés entre et par des autorités non étatiques -- Les engagements non contraignants entre etats (le droit international "flexible" ou "soft law") -- Les actes unilatéraux des etats -- Les actes unilatéraux des organisations internationales -- Les actes unilateraux transnationaux -- La coutume -- Les principes généraux du droit -- La doctrine -- La jurisprudence -- L'équité -- Les normes subsidiairesles destinataires des normes du droit international : la personnalité internationale -- La mise en œuvre des normes du droit international -- Les obstacles à l'application du droit international dans l'ordre interne -- Le droit international devant le juge interne français -- Controle preventif et controle repressif -- Le recours à des mesures de contrainte -- Le recours aux organisations internationales -- Le recours à des moyens diplomatiques -- Le recours à l'arbitre international -- Le recours au juge international -- Le contrôle de l'application du droit international par le juge national
This 2nd edition remains faithful to its approach as an introduction to international criminal law, both accessible and comprehensive. However, it also seeks to go further than the 1st edition, by highlighting the many new normative and jurisprudential developments. With this objective, it offers a greater array of articles analysing interesting and important questions. In this 2nd edition, the articles that complement the general introduction are written in English. This is intended to be a reference book for all students and teachers, but also professionals of international criminal law. Cette 2e édition du Droit international pénal reste fidèle à son approche de la matière: proposer une introduction à la fois accessible et complète au droit international pénal. Elle cherche aussi à aller plus loin que la 1re édition, en mettant en évidence les activités normatives ainsi que les nombreux et nouveaux développements jurisprudentiels. Avec cet objectif, elle offre une plus grande gamme d'articles analysant des questions actuelles et importantes. Ces articles qui complètent la présentation générale sont rédigés en anglais. Il s'agit là d'un ouvrage de référence qui s'adresse à tous les étudiants et enseignants, mais aussi aux professionnels du droit international pénal.Sur le contenuLe précis présente le droit international pénal au travers des thèmes suivants: historique, sources, infractions (agression, génocide, crime contre l'humanité, crimes de guerre), multitude d'infractions, formes de responsabilité pénale (p.ex. la complicité, la responsabilité du supérieur, etc.), circonstances excluant la responsabilité, obstacles à la poursuite, principes de procédure; compétence pénale nationale (exemple de la Suisse); tribunaux ad hoc; la CPI et son fonctionnement. Sont étudiés dans les contributions séparées des sujets tels que l'exécution de la peine, le statut des victimes devant les Chambres extraordinaires pour le Cambodge, ou encore la phase préliminaire dans le procès international pénal.
The opening of the Colombian economy, decided in 1990, was supposed to promote a new model of growth and development based on exports (and Foreign Direct Investment). This dissertation argues that the opening was not made in order to promote growth and development, and that these two phenomena did not live up to what was expected. This result is based on an International Political Economy approach: taking into account power relationships may give a better explanation of economic phenomena. The first chapter shows that the structural characteristics of the Colombian economy made its opening unable to generate growth and development. This assertion is based on the analysis of the lack of competitiveness and of the institutional flaws of the Colombian economy, as well as on the potential increase in the spatial inequalities of development resulting from the opening. The second chapter thus highlights that the opening aimed at achieving some objectives peculiar to the United States. These objectives are made of economic considerations (typically the access to foreign markets and to raw materials) as well as political ones (dealing with the threats caused by Marxist guerrilla groups within the framework of the American foreign policy). This second chapter explains a series of means at the disposal of the United States to obtain the opening. These means go from coercion (such as sanction threats) to legitimation (to give rise to a Colombian pro-opening government). The third chapter shows that the opening did not lead to an export-led growth. On the contrary, it led to an unstable growth regime. The latter is based on the foreign capital flows. The latter feed the purchase of real estate assets by credit. The housing sector is thus stimulated, which in turn stimulates other economic activities, within the framework of spill-over effects. However, when foreign capital flows lack, real-estate asset purchases are penalized, thus preventing the expansion of the housing sector and eventually of aggregate production itself (spill-over effects no longer work). However, given the power relationship exercised by the United States, the Colombian government had to purchase American military equipment massively, in order to fight against the Colombian guerrillas. By doing so, the economic policy could not stabilize the economy at that time. Besides, the subsequent intensification of the conflict increased the violence within the Colombian territory, thus leading to the migration of skilled workers and to the destruction of infrastructures. The recession had thus been exacerbated. This scenario occurred a few years after 1990, resulting in the worst economic crisis of the 20th century in Colombia with a -5 % recession in 1999. The fourth chapter questions the changes followed by the production and exchange structures because of the opening, to show that these changes did not really contribute to development. Colombia tends to neglect its historic international specialization in coffee and other cultures like wheat, rice, barley, sorghum or cotton, to privilege other cultures whose positive effects on development are lower. As regards the industries of extraction of raw materials (in particular hydrocarbons), they are oriented toward exportation but they promote few development. In addition, the Colombian productive system may lack of this type of input in the future. Finally, if the manufacturing industry was able to increase at the rate of the growth regime, it owes it to the protection still remaining with the differential treatment for developing countries in the World Trade Organization, and less to the export opportunities given by the opening. When this treatment will be eliminated or at least decreased, a whole part of the Colombian economy will be threatened. ; L'ouverture de l'économie colombienne, décidée en 1990, fut présentée comme un promoteur de croissance et développement sur la base des exportations (et des Investissements Directs Etrangers). Cette thèse soutient que l'ouverture n'a pas été décidée afin de favoriser la croissance et le développement et que ces deux phénomènes n'ont pas été à la hauteur de ce qui était anticipé. Ce résultat est fondé sur une analyse en termes d'Economie Politique Internationale : les relations de pouvoir peuvent être utiles pour répondre à des questions d'ordre économique. Le premier chapitre montre que les caractéristiques structurelles de l'économie colombienne rendaient son ouverture impropre à générer croissance et développement sur la base des exportations. Cette proposition s'appuie sur l'analyse de la compétitivité sectorielle et des carences institutionnelles de l'économie colombienne, ainsi que sur l'accroissement potentiel des inégalités spatiales de développement suite à l'ouverture. Le deuxième chapitre s'attache alors à mettre en évidence que l'ouverture répond à des objectifs propres aux Etats-Unis. Ces objectifs sont à dominante économique (typiquement la création des débouchés extérieurs et l'accès à des matières premières) ou politique (lutte contre les guérillas d'inspiration communiste dans le cadre de la politique étrangère américaine). Le deuxième chapitre expose une série des moyens à la disposition des Etats-Unis afin d'obtenir l'ouverture du gouvernement colombien de l'époque. Ces moyens vont de la coercition (par exemple la menace de sanction) à la légitimation (favoriser l'élection d'un gouvernement pro-ouverture). Le troisième chapitre montre que l'ouverture n'a pas instauré un régime de croissance fondé sur les exportations. Au contraire, elle a instauré un régime instable fondé sur une dynamique spéculative sur les actifs immobiliers à partir des flux de capitaux étrangers venant nourrir l'achat de ces actifs à crédit. Lorsque ces capitaux finissent tôt ou tard par manquer, de tels achats sont pénalisés et viennent interrompre la dynamique. Celle-ci ne peut plus tirer la croissance via des effets d'entrainement du secteur de la construction sur le reste de l'économie. Mais pris au piège de la relation de pouvoir exercée par les Etats-Unis, le gouvernement colombien n'a pas cherché à stabiliser la conjoncture. Il a dû privilégier les dépenses en équipement militaire américain pour lutter contre les guérillas colombiennes. L'intensification subséquente du conflit armé a accentué la violence au sein du territoire. Il en résulta la destruction d'infrastructures, ainsi qu'une migration de travailleurs qualifiés. La récession en a été d'autant plus accentuée. Ainsi l'ouverture débouche-t-elle sur la pire crise économique du XXème siècle en Colombie, avec une récession de -5% en 1999. Le quatrième chapitre enquête sur les changements des structures de production et d'échange suite à l'ouverture, pour ainsi montrer que ces changements n'ont que peu favorisé le développement. La Colombie tend à négliger sa spécialisation internationale historique dans le café et la plupart des cultures transitoires (blé, riz, orge, sorgo, coton, etc.) pour privilégier d'autres cultures dont les effets positifs sur le développement sont moindres. Bien que les hydrocarbures et d'autres matières brutes bénéficient d'un certain potentiel d'exportation, le développement des territoires où l'extraction a lieu reste faible. Se pose en outre un problème de soutenabilité de l'extraction. Enfin, si l'industrie manufacturière a pu croitre au rythme du régime de croissance, elle le doit à la protection dont elle bénéficie encore dans le cadre du traitement différentiel des pays en développement à l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce et moins aux opportunités d'exportation données par l'ouverture. Le jour où ce traitement sera diminué voire supprimé, toute une partie de l'économie colombienne est menacée.
The opening of the Colombian economy, decided in 1990, was supposed to promote a new model of growth and development based on exports (and Foreign Direct Investment). This dissertation argues that the opening was not made in order to promote growth and development, and that these two phenomena did not live up to what was expected. This result is based on an International Political Economy approach: taking into account power relationships may give a better explanation of economic phenomena. The first chapter shows that the structural characteristics of the Colombian economy made its opening unable to generate growth and development. This assertion is based on the analysis of the lack of competitiveness and of the institutional flaws of the Colombian economy, as well as on the potential increase in the spatial inequalities of development resulting from the opening. The second chapter thus highlights that the opening aimed at achieving some objectives peculiar to the United States. These objectives are made of economic considerations (typically the access to foreign markets and to raw materials) as well as political ones (dealing with the threats caused by Marxist guerrilla groups within the framework of the American foreign policy). This second chapter explains a series of means at the disposal of the United States to obtain the opening. These means go from coercion (such as sanction threats) to legitimation (to give rise to a Colombian pro-opening government). The third chapter shows that the opening did not lead to an export-led growth. On the contrary, it led to an unstable growth regime. The latter is based on the foreign capital flows. The latter feed the purchase of real estate assets by credit. The housing sector is thus stimulated, which in turn stimulates other economic activities, within the framework of spill-over effects. However, when foreign capital flows lack, real-estate asset purchases are penalized, thus preventing the expansion of the housing sector and eventually of aggregate production itself ...
International audience ; The current concern, in the number of local or international conflicts, where there are problems of reconciliation, collective identity, political, security, economic and environmental interdependencies is in favour of a closer look at these issues, which can only encourage such international negotiations. International negotiation is a complex and specific decision-making process in which people tend to find a common agreement instead of acting unilaterally. A privileged tool of exchange between people, of the adjustment of their points of view, of the coexistence of their social identities and of the resolution of their conflicts, international negotiation is one of the most fundamental springs of life. Moreover, international negotiation of all types (diplomatic, political, commercial, cultural, economic, and environmental) is affected by cultural phenomena: the differences in goals and objectives that separate negotiators are added here, a cultural difference, which can make them difficult and opaque. Culture greatly influences the process, communication, cognition, motivation and actions of the protagonists. Knowledge of the cultural peculiarities of the opposing party could have a positive effect on the perception of the country and on the communication of negotiators and the search for solutions, on the other hand, its ignorance or negligence can lead to complications, risks of disagreements or interruptions of negotiation, etc. Moreover, the international negotiator is in a position of the interface of two relations that with his own country and that with the opposing party. His dilemma here, caught between conflicting objectives, is to defend the positions of his own country, his own interests and reach an agreement with the opposing party. During long or short discussions at the negotiating table, he must propose new solutions, try to change expectations, adapt strategies, styles and tactics and, at the same time, exchange ideas with his adversary to reach a mutually acceptable ...
International audience ; The current concern, in the number of local or international conflicts, where there are problems of reconciliation, collective identity, political, security, economic and environmental interdependencies is in favour of a closer look at these issues, which can only encourage such international negotiations. International negotiation is a complex and specific decision-making process in which people tend to find a common agreement instead of acting unilaterally. A privileged tool of exchange between people, of the adjustment of their points of view, of the coexistence of their social identities and of the resolution of their conflicts, international negotiation is one of the most fundamental springs of life. Moreover, international negotiation of all types (diplomatic, political, commercial, cultural, economic, and environmental) is affected by cultural phenomena: the differences in goals and objectives that separate negotiators are added here, a cultural difference, which can make them difficult and opaque. Culture greatly influences the process, communication, cognition, motivation and actions of the protagonists. Knowledge of the cultural peculiarities of the opposing party could have a positive effect on the perception of the country and on the communication of negotiators and the search for solutions, on the other hand, its ignorance or negligence can lead to complications, risks of disagreements or interruptions of negotiation, etc. Moreover, the international negotiator is in a position of the interface of two relations that with his own country and that with the opposing party. His dilemma here, caught between conflicting objectives, is to defend the positions of his own country, his own interests and reach an agreement with the opposing party. During long or short discussions at the negotiating table, he must propose new solutions, try to change expectations, adapt strategies, styles and tactics and, at the same time, exchange ideas with his adversary to reach a mutually acceptable ...