Suchergebnisse

The subject of this study is the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the Security Council in the period 1946 2000. Because of their right of veto the cooperation of the permanent members has a significant influence on the functioning of the Council. The most important aspects of the cooperation that were investigated are the intensity of the cooperation and the ef-fectiveness of this cooperation in preventing and ending wars. To investigate these aspects, for both the intensity and the effectiveness measuring instruments were constructed. These measuring instruments were based on comprehensive sets of so-called 'leading indicators' and statistical methods and techniques. The intensity of the cooperation increased gradually from 1946 until 1990 (the end of the Cold War). Then it started to increase rapidly until 1996. From 1996 a slight decrease can be discer-ned. The strong increase in the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the security Council can be established in all the majors forms of cooperation in the Council: the numbers of adopted strategic resolutions and presidential statements, the numbers of employed means (like peacekeeping missions and enforcement actions) and the amounts of money that were spent on peacekeeping activities. Further it was established that the response times of the Council regarding potential and waged wars dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War. The effectiveness of the cooperation of the permanent members in the Council was, insofar this was measurable with the applied method, not good for many years, but after the Cold War a clear improvement can be discerned. This goes for the prevention of wars, as well as for post war peacebuilding and the ending of wars. Also the numbers of potential and waged wars in which the Council not intervened dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War, as well as the use of vetoes. The large number of potential and waged wars in which the Council did not intervene during the Cold War was nearly exclusively caused by 'non decisions' (the non placing of wars on the agenda), and not by the use of vetoes by permanent members, as is often assumed in literature. Further, a comparison of two phase classifications of the Cold War showed that the great powers, even when there are great tensions among them, are prepared to cooperate in the Security Council to resolve strategic matters, if they consider this in their interest. Analyses of the adopted strategic resolutions during the Cold War revealed that cooperation here was nearly exclusively limited to issues that were not core issues of the Cold War. From this it can be concluded that cooperation against third party states was a basis of cooperation of the great powers in the Security Council. Finally, the results of this study show clearly that the Security Council was regarded and used to a large extent by the permanent members in the period 1946 2000 as an instrument of foreign policy to pursue their national interests, and not as an instrument of the world community to prevent and end wars.

'Will the Netherlands be defended?' The debate about NATO's main lines of defence at the beginning of the 1950sAt the beginning of the 1950s, the Netherlands would not have been able to defend itself in the event of a Soviet attack. Despite the fact that NATO, under the leadership of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Eisenhower, and later General Ridgway, was in the process of rapidly building up its defences, it was still incapable of conducting a forward defence. The pivotal political and military issue in the short term centred on one question: Which areas in Western Europe could and should be kept and which not? Answers to this question exposed conflicting national interests and points of view, particularly those of the Dutch and the French. As it was taking a considerably long time to build up the Netherlands' defences, the Dutch government had very few trump cards to add weight to its demands. Indeed, in the summer of 1952, when Parliament asked to be given a precise account of how the Dutch defences were progressing, the government was practically boxed into a corner.

This thesis is about International Medical Graduates or foreign doctors, trained outside the European Economic Area, who settle permanently in the Netherlands. From the early nineties the number of foreign doctors residing in the Netherlands either as refugees or as partners/spouses of Dutch citizens has risen steadily. Foreign doctors who wish to practise medicine in the Netherlands must obtain a declaration of professional competence, issued by the Department of Public Health, Welfare and Sports (VWS). A considerable number of foreign doctors received negative decisions by the Health Department. They were not allowed to practise medicine in the Netherlands. As a result, from the mid nineties, a growing number of foreign doctors applied to the medical faculties for admission as medical students in order to obtain a Dutch medical degree. Therefore, in 1995, it was decided to institute the Committee Influx Foreign Doctors (CIBA), a central placing committee. Between 1996 and 2007 the CIBA has processed over a 1000 admission requests. Until 2002, in spite of the imminent shortage of doctors, the Department of Health had done little to enhance the use of the expertise brought in by the foreign doctors for the benefit of Dutch society. The focus of this investigation has been: 1. How is it guaranteed that foreign doctors meet the medical quality standards (knowledge, skills, attitude), or how is the assessment of these qualities measured. And 2. After obtaining permanent residency in the Netherlands, do foreign doctors have access to the profession for which they had qualified before in their country of origin or another non-EEA country? Late 2001 the Department of Health and the medical schools were stimulated to cooperate in order to improve the additional training programmes for foreign doctors. It led to the new assessement procedure for foreign doctors that came into force in December 2005. This thesis contains two reports on the medical careers of foreign doctors. These investigations showed that nearly all ...

Zoi Mella, The Greek Civil War and the Spanish Press during Franco's DictatorshipIn this article we would like to approach a quite unknown subject: the presence of the Greek Civil War in the Spanish Press. Our objective was to ascertain the impact this event had at the post war Spanish Press. How would react Spain in view of such a confrontation, especially since it had already experimented a Civil War? It was a complicated period for Greece, as well as for Spain, a time when both countries experienced problems of different nature but equally serious: Greece was suffering the devastating consequences of the Second World War and Spain was trying to encounter the contempt of the international political world. The Greek Civil War was the first confrontation between two worlds that were exiting reinforced from the Second World War. It became the field of conflict between the USSR and the Anglo-Saxon allies during several years. The interior problem of some rebels, who couldn't, or wouldn't, adapt themselves to the new post war situation or were discontented with the new regime, was transformed to an international matter of great impact, that managed to confront USSR, on one hand, and the US and Great Britain, on the other, in the International Organism of the United Nations. Our interest was centred in the various approaches that the newspapers and the magazines of the time made. Moreover we were interested in the points of view and the conclusions manifested by the diverse papers, according to their political and ideological affinities, without forgetting the strict regime of control and censure that was in force at that moment. This investigation forms part of a broader subject that is the bilateral relations of these two countries, rather different at first sight, that during the XX century were affected by very similar events, such as a civil war. ; Zoi Mella, The Greek Civil War and the Spanish Press during Franco's DictatorshipIn this article we would like to approach a quite unknown subject: the presence of the Greek Civil War in the Spanish Press. Our objective was to ascertain the impact this event had at the post war Spanish Press. How would react Spain in view of such a confrontation, especially since it had already experimented a Civil War? It was a complicated period for Greece, as well as for Spain, a time when both countries experienced problems of different nature but equally serious: Greece was suffering the devastating consequences of the Second World War and Spain was trying to encounter the contempt of the international political world. The Greek Civil War was the first confrontation between two worlds that were exiting reinforced from the Second World War. It became the field of conflict between the USSR and the Anglo-Saxon allies during several years. The interior problem of some rebels, who couldn't, or wouldn't, adapt themselves to the new post war situation or were discontented with the new regime, was transformed to an international matter of great impact, that managed to confront USSR, on one hand, and the US and Great Britain, on the other, in the International Organism of the United Nations. Our interest was centred in the various approaches that the newspapers and the magazines of the time made. Moreover we were interested in the points of view and the conclusions manifested by the diverse papers, according to their political and ideological affinities, without forgetting the strict regime of control and censure that was in force at that moment. This investigation forms part of a broader subject that is the bilateral relations of these two countries, rather different at first sight, that during the XX century were affected by very similar events, such as a civil war.

Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of August The Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views. ; Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of AugustThe Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views.

Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; Anna Mahera, Émigration et développement économique dans la Grèce d'après guerre. L'approche du problème par le milieu politique de Centre-gauche Dans les premières années de l'après guerre, en Grèce se pose de nouveau le problème du mode de développement économique. En effet, la perspective de l'arrivée massive des capitaux américains en combinaison avec la disponibilité d'une main-d'oeuvre autochtone créent des conditions favorables à un projet d'industrialisation. C'est au sein des milieux politiques grecques qu'un tel projet est élaboré, alors que les instances internationales —comme le Food and Agriculture Organisation des Nations Unies— signalent les graves difficultés à surmonter. Progressivement, dans le climat de la guerre froide des années 1950, la quasi-totalité des forces politiques grecques ont abandonné l'idée d'un développement industriel, admettant la position subalterne occupée par le pays dans la division internationale du travail. Celui-ci doit se contenter au rôle de fournisseur de main-d'oeuvre vers les pays européens, en particulier vers l'Allemagne, en phase de reconstruction économique, à travers Γ émigration du travail qui prend une grande ampleur dans les années 1950 et 1960. Tout au plus, la Grèce peut-elle envisager le développement du secteur des services. Contrairement aux autres forces politiques, le Centre-gauche a parcouru ce chemin avec une décennie de retard, en raison de la présence en son sein d'une réflexion économique affirmée, émanant d'économistes de haut niveau, orientés vers l'économie de la planification, et peut-être aussi à cause de l'éloignement de ce milieu du jeu politique immédiat. Le rangement du Centre-gauche à la politique officielle d'émigration intereuropéenne a marqué la fin d'une période de fermentation sur le projet d'industrialisation de la Grèce dont l'origine remonte à l'entre-deux-guerres.

The Policy of Independence. The Background of a Crucial Phrase in Dutch Foreign Policy 1900-1940The phrase 'policy of independence' was coined by the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Van Karnebeek after the First World War. It has aroused a lot of discussion ever since. The phrase is often portrayed as sign of a change from a passive policy of neutrality to a much more active foreign policy. In this article the use of the phrase and the question of continuity or discontinuity are raised. This is done first of all on the basis of some crucial episodes from the First World War and subsequently the Dutch policy towards the German emperor and crown prince, Belgium and the League of Nations. This contribution argues that throughout those years the Dutch government pursued a policy characterized by activity and adopted an attitude that adhered to international law. Even before 1914 this approach was referred to as 'independent'. Thereafter, Van Karnebeek coined the phrase 'policy of independence' to give expression to this prevailing attitude.

In deze bijdrage wordt naar aanleiding van het gewijzigde voorstel voor een Europese betalingsbevelprocedure (2006) aandacht besteed aan de harmonisatie van het IPR en procesrecht in de Europese Unie, de totstandkoming van de Europese betalings-bevelprocedure, doelstelling en toepassingsgebied van de voorgestelde verordening, het verloop van de procedure en de gevolgen voor Nederland. Tot slot wordt gewezen op het belang van de coherentie van het Europees procesrecht, dat op deelgebieden en in ver-schillende instrumenten momenteel tot stand wordt gebracht. Abstract: [European Civil Procedure under Construction. The (amended) proposal for a European Order for Payment Procedure] On the occasion of the publication of the amended proposal for a European Order for Payment Procedure (2006) attention is paid to the harmonisation of Private International Law and Procedural Law in the European Union, the bringing about of the European Order for Payment Procedure, the objectives and scope of the proposed regulation, the course of the proceedings and its impact in the Netherlands. It is pointed out that it is important to ensure the coherence of European procedural law, since it is being brought about in pieces and in different instruments.

Response, Henk te VeldeDuring my research I have greatly benefited from the historiography of political parties and I agree with Bosmans that the relatively new approach of political culture should collaborate with classic political history. However, I am more interested in similarities between different political currents and how they compare with the international scene. Another area of particular interest for me is the public aspect of political leadership and how this relates to the time in which it takes place. The issue is, therefore, not the party political aspects of Colijn's leadership but rather the praise he received at that time from outside his own party. The most prominent political leaders were not modest administrators but 'partisan', controversial members of the best-organised and strongest parties, such as the orthodox Protestant ARP. Among many other things, I analyse the relevance of clichés about 'Calvinist' and 'religious' politics with regard to the public appeal of ex-orthodox Protestant Den Uyl. Unfortunately, however, Van Deursen seems to believe, unjustly, that I am expressing my own personal opinion on Calvinism.

Y. Kleistra, Hollen of stilstaan. Beleidsverandering bij het Nederlandse ministerie van buitenlandse zaken P.R. Baehr, M.C. Castermans-Holleman, F. Grünfeld, Human rights in the foreign policy of the Netherlands E.M. van den Berg, The influence of domestic NGOs on Dutch human rights policy. Case studies on South Africa, Namibia, Indonesia and East Timor. The role of human rights in post-1945 Dutch foreign policy: Politicological and historical literature, Maarten KuitenbrouwerThe second Dutch government under Prime Minister Kok fell in 2002 following the publication of a critical report by the Dutch Institute for Wartime Documentation (NIOD) on the Srebenica issue. This event forms the starting point for a review of the recent literature on the role of human rights in Dutch foreign policy during the last few decades in both political science and history. Both disciplines share the 'decisionmaking analysis' in international relations theory as a common background. In addition, political scientists and historians have often found themselves researching the same human rights issues that affect Dutch relations with a series of non-Western countries. An explanation of Dutch policy is usually sought based on a combination of internaland external factors. In general, comparative analyses and research into its effectiveness are still conspicuous by their absence. All in all, there are more similarities than differences between recent political and historical studies on the role of human rights in Dutch foreign policy.

Lambros Flitouris, The Suez Crisis and the Greek-French Relations The Suez crisis in 1956 constitutes an important point in the development of the international relations at the period of the cold war. 1956 is a landmark year for the appointment of the Arabic nationalism as a basic constitutive element of the anti-colonialist wave that convulsed the world. During this period, the relations of Greece with the states involved in the crisis were to a large extent precarious. The anti-imperialists tones of Nasser found impression in the Greek common opinion that was exceptionally irritated from the EOKA's fight in Cyprus. In the present article we examine one particular aspect of the crisis: the relations of Greece with France. The agreements of economic collaboration that was achieved by Markezinis in 1953 signalled a new era in the activation of French capital in Greece. In combination with the big cultural tradition that Prance had in the country but also with the crisis in the relations of Greece with the UK because of the Cypriot question, the French factor in Greece acquired a great importance. However, the French diplomacy followed the policy of London and because of this the relations between Greece and France faced their more important post-war crisis. The Greek common opinion also turned against France, while the French diplomacy lost a great opportunity to strengthen her place in Greece. In the sector of economic relations and cultural exchanges befell a period of algidity with extensions in the Greek internal political life. The crisis of the period 1956-1958 constituted a negative parenthesis in the traditionally good relations between Athens and Paris, while it could be characterized as an adjacent negative result of the anti-colonial struggle and the Cypriot affair. ; Lambros Flitouris, The Suez Crisis and the Greek-French RelationsThe Suez crisis in 1956 constitutes an important point in the development of the international relations at the period of the cold war. 1956 is a landmark year for the appointment of the Arabic nationalism as a basic constitutive element of the anti-colonialist wave that convulsed the world. During this period, the relations of Greece with the states involved in the crisis were to a large extent precarious. The anti-imperialists tones of Nasser found impression in the Greek common opinion that was exceptionally irritated from the EOKA's fight in Cyprus. In the present article we examine one particular aspect of the crisis: the relations of Greece with France. The agreements of economic collaboration that was achieved by Markezinis in 1953 signalled a new era in the activation of French capital in Greece. In combination with the big cultural tradition that Prance had in the country but also with the crisis in the relations of Greece with the UK because of the Cypriot question, the French factor in Greece acquired a great importance. However, the French diplomacy followed the policy of London and because of this the relations between Greece and France faced their more important post-war crisis. The Greek common opinion also turned against France, while the French diplomacy lost a great opportunity to strengthen her place in Greece. In the sector of economic relations and cultural exchanges befell a period of algidity with extensions in the Greek internal political life. The crisis of the period 1956-1958 constituted a negative parenthesis in the traditionally good relations between Athens and Paris, while it could be characterized as an adjacent negative result of the anti-colonial struggle and the Cypriot affair.