Suchergebnisse

Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of August The Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views. ; Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of AugustThe Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views.

Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; Anna Mahera, Émigration et développement économique dans la Grèce d'après guerre. L'approche du problème par le milieu politique de Centre-gauche Dans les premières années de l'après guerre, en Grèce se pose de nouveau le problème du mode de développement économique. En effet, la perspective de l'arrivée massive des capitaux américains en combinaison avec la disponibilité d'une main-d'oeuvre autochtone créent des conditions favorables à un projet d'industrialisation. C'est au sein des milieux politiques grecques qu'un tel projet est élaboré, alors que les instances internationales —comme le Food and Agriculture Organisation des Nations Unies— signalent les graves difficultés à surmonter. Progressivement, dans le climat de la guerre froide des années 1950, la quasi-totalité des forces politiques grecques ont abandonné l'idée d'un développement industriel, admettant la position subalterne occupée par le pays dans la division internationale du travail. Celui-ci doit se contenter au rôle de fournisseur de main-d'oeuvre vers les pays européens, en particulier vers l'Allemagne, en phase de reconstruction économique, à travers Γ émigration du travail qui prend une grande ampleur dans les années 1950 et 1960. Tout au plus, la Grèce peut-elle envisager le développement du secteur des services. Contrairement aux autres forces politiques, le Centre-gauche a parcouru ce chemin avec une décennie de retard, en raison de la présence en son sein d'une réflexion économique affirmée, émanant d'économistes de haut niveau, orientés vers l'économie de la planification, et peut-être aussi à cause de l'éloignement de ce milieu du jeu politique immédiat. Le rangement du Centre-gauche à la politique officielle d'émigration intereuropéenne a marqué la fin d'une période de fermentation sur le projet d'industrialisation de la Grèce dont l'origine remonte à l'entre-deux-guerres.

Lambros Flitouris, The Suez Crisis and the Greek-French Relations The Suez crisis in 1956 constitutes an important point in the development of the international relations at the period of the cold war. 1956 is a landmark year for the appointment of the Arabic nationalism as a basic constitutive element of the anti-colonialist wave that convulsed the world. During this period, the relations of Greece with the states involved in the crisis were to a large extent precarious. The anti-imperialists tones of Nasser found impression in the Greek common opinion that was exceptionally irritated from the EOKA's fight in Cyprus. In the present article we examine one particular aspect of the crisis: the relations of Greece with France. The agreements of economic collaboration that was achieved by Markezinis in 1953 signalled a new era in the activation of French capital in Greece. In combination with the big cultural tradition that Prance had in the country but also with the crisis in the relations of Greece with the UK because of the Cypriot question, the French factor in Greece acquired a great importance. However, the French diplomacy followed the policy of London and because of this the relations between Greece and France faced their more important post-war crisis. The Greek common opinion also turned against France, while the French diplomacy lost a great opportunity to strengthen her place in Greece. In the sector of economic relations and cultural exchanges befell a period of algidity with extensions in the Greek internal political life. The crisis of the period 1956-1958 constituted a negative parenthesis in the traditionally good relations between Athens and Paris, while it could be characterized as an adjacent negative result of the anti-colonial struggle and the Cypriot affair. ; Lambros Flitouris, The Suez Crisis and the Greek-French RelationsThe Suez crisis in 1956 constitutes an important point in the development of the international relations at the period of the cold war. 1956 is a landmark year for the appointment of the Arabic nationalism as a basic constitutive element of the anti-colonialist wave that convulsed the world. During this period, the relations of Greece with the states involved in the crisis were to a large extent precarious. The anti-imperialists tones of Nasser found impression in the Greek common opinion that was exceptionally irritated from the EOKA's fight in Cyprus. In the present article we examine one particular aspect of the crisis: the relations of Greece with France. The agreements of economic collaboration that was achieved by Markezinis in 1953 signalled a new era in the activation of French capital in Greece. In combination with the big cultural tradition that Prance had in the country but also with the crisis in the relations of Greece with the UK because of the Cypriot question, the French factor in Greece acquired a great importance. However, the French diplomacy followed the policy of London and because of this the relations between Greece and France faced their more important post-war crisis. The Greek common opinion also turned against France, while the French diplomacy lost a great opportunity to strengthen her place in Greece. In the sector of economic relations and cultural exchanges befell a period of algidity with extensions in the Greek internal political life. The crisis of the period 1956-1958 constituted a negative parenthesis in the traditionally good relations between Athens and Paris, while it could be characterized as an adjacent negative result of the anti-colonial struggle and the Cypriot affair.