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The Global Nutrition Report (GNR) provides a global profile and country profiles on nutrition for each of the United Nations' 193 member states, and includes specific progress for each country. It will be a centerpiece of the Second International Conference on Nutrition (ICN2) in Rome on 19-21 November, organized by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization. ; Supplementary Online Materials ix Acknowledgments x Abbreviations xii Executive summary xiii Chapter 1 ntroduction 2 Chapter 2 Nutrition Is Central to Sustainable Development 7 Chapter 3 Progress toward the World Health Assembly Nutrition Targets Is Too Slow1 5 Chapter 4 The Coexistence of Different Forms of Malnutrition Is the "New Normal" 22 Chapter 5 The Coverage of Nutrition-Specific Interventions Needs to Improve 29 Chapter 6 Interventions Addressing the Underlying Determinants of Nutrition Status Are Important, but They Need to Be More Nutrition sensitive 38 Chapter 7 The Enabling Environment Is Improving, but Not Quickly Enough 47 Chapter 8 The Need to Strengthen Accountability in Nutrition 56 Chapter 9 What Are the Priorities for Investment in Improved Nutrition Data? 67 Chapter 10 Key Messages and Recommendations 71 Appendix 1 The Nutrition Country Profile: A Tool for Action 75 Appendix 2 Which Countries Are on Course to Meet Several WHA Targets? 77 Appendix 3 Which Countries Are on Course for Which WHA Targets? 79 Appendix 4 Donor Spending on Nutrition-Specific and Nutrition-Sensitive Interventions and Programs 84 Appendix 5 How Accountable Is the Global Nutrition Report? 86 Appendix 6 Availability of Data for Nutrition Country Profile Indicators 88 Notes 91 References 95 PANELS Panel 11 Types of Nutrition Investment, Lawrence Haddad 4 Panel 21 Nutrition and the Sustainable Development Goals—No Room for Complacency, Michael Anderson 11 Panel 22 Some New Data from India: What If?, Lawrence Haddad, Komal Bhatia, and Kamilla Eriksen 12 Panel 23 How Did Maharashtra Cut Child Stunting?, Lawrence Haddad 13 Panel 24 Can Improving the Underlying Determinants of Nutrition Help Meet the WHA Targets?, Lisa Smith and Lawrence Haddad 14 Panel 41 Malnutrition in the United States and United Kingdom, Jessica Fanzo 25 Panel 42 Regional Drivers of Malnutrition in Indonesia, Endang Achadi with acknowledgment to Sudarno Sumarto and Taufik Hidayat 26 Panel 43 Compiling District-Level Nutrition Data in India, Purnima Menon and Shruthi Cyriac 27 Panel 44 Targeting Minority Groups at Risk in the United States, Jennifer Requejo and Joel Gittelsohn 28 Panel 51 Measuring Coverage of Programs to Treat Severe Acute Malnutrition, Jose Luis Alvarez 37 Panel 61 Trends in Dietary Quality among Adults in the United States, Daniel Wang and Walter Willett 41 Panel 62 How Did Bangladesh Reduce Stunting So Rapidly?, Derek Headey 43 Panel 63 Using an Agricultural Platform in Burkina Faso to Improve Nutrition during the First 1,000 Days, Deanna Kelly Olney, Andrew Dillon, Abdoulaye Pedehombga, Marcellin Ouédraogo, and Marie Ruel 45 Panel 71 Is There a Better Way to Track Nutrition Spending? 48 Panel 72 Tracking Financial Allocations to Nutrition: Guatemala's Experience, Jesús Bulux, Otto Velasquez, Cecibel Juárez, Carla Guillén, and Fernando Arriola 49 Panel 73 A Tool for Assessing Government Progress on Creating Healthy Food Environments, Boyd Swinburn 51 Panel 74 Engaging Food and Beverage Companies through the Access to Nutrition Index, Inge Kauer 52 Panel 75 How Brazil Cut Child Stunting and Improved Breastfeeding Practices, Jennifer Requejo 54 Panel 81 Scaling Up Nutrition through Business, Jonathan Tench 61 Panel 82 How Civil Society Organizations Build Commitment to Nutrition, Claire Blanchard 62 Panel 83 Building Civil Society's Capacity to Push for Policies on Obesity and Noncommunicable Diseases, Corinna Hawkes 63 Panel 84 Can Community Monitoring Enhance Accountability for Nutrition?, Nick Nisbett and Dolf te Lintelo 64 Panel 85 National Evaluation Platforms: Potential for Nutrition, Jennifer Bryce and colleagues 65 Panel 86 The State of African Nutrition Data for Accountability and Learning, Carl Lachat, Joyce Kinabo, Eunice Nago, Annamarie Kruger, and Patrick Kolsteren 66 ; PR ; IFPRI1; CRP4; B Promoting healthy food systems ; DGO; A4NH; PHND ; CGIAR Research Program on Agriculture for Nutrition and Health (A4NH)

International audience ; The arrangements offered by international community as solutions to Yugoslav dissolution process have significantly affected the development of the Kosovo conflict. These policies failed to produce consensus between the parties in conflict, instead, as the paper demonstrate, they played the role of a catalyst in the initiation of the conflict. This paper, by offering a detailed reconstruction of the process by which the international community tried to settle the Kosovo case, demonstrates how the dynamics of the conflict interacted dynamically with international community attitudes and policies towards the case. The paper discusses the attitudes and policies of international community toward the Kosovo case underlining its attachment to traditional prerequisites of international order instead of inherited causes of conflict. There are three important events that underline the interference of international community in the case of Kosovo before the war: the Conference on Yugoslavia that followed up the creation of the Badinter Committee, the Dayton Agreement and the Rambouillet Talks. These events are explained in details in three separate sections since they have immediate implications for the situation in Kosovo and consequently for the development of the conflict. We first discuss the contribution of existing normative framework to models of international community behavior and their effects in the case of Kosovo conflict following with the reaction of the conflicting parties towards offered arrangements. Both moments are assumed to be of importance in providing a larger picture in the understanding of the outgrowth of Kosovo conflict.

International audience ; The arrangements offered by international community as solutions to Yugoslav dissolution process have significantly affected the development of the Kosovo conflict. These policies failed to produce consensus between the parties in conflict, instead, as the paper demonstrate, they played the role of a catalyst in the initiation of the conflict. This paper, by offering a detailed reconstruction of the process by which the international community tried to settle the Kosovo case, demonstrates how the dynamics of the conflict interacted dynamically with international community attitudes and policies towards the case. The paper discusses the attitudes and policies of international community toward the Kosovo case underlining its attachment to traditional prerequisites of international order instead of inherited causes of conflict. There are three important events that underline the interference of international community in the case of Kosovo before the war: the Conference on Yugoslavia that followed up the creation of the Badinter Committee, the Dayton Agreement and the Rambouillet Talks. These events are explained in details in three separate sections since they have immediate implications for the situation in Kosovo and consequently for the development of the conflict. We first discuss the contribution of existing normative framework to models of international community behavior and their effects in the case of Kosovo conflict following with the reaction of the conflicting parties towards offered arrangements. Both moments are assumed to be of importance in providing a larger picture in the understanding of the outgrowth of Kosovo conflict.

The military is generally considered to act as a professional when it comes to retreating forces from military battleground or international conflict areas. At the same time recent national experiences with the withdrawal of national troops from international peacekeeping operations are filled with disappointments and crises. In this article the authors question the idea that these disappointments and crises are simply due to problems of reduced military competence or military morale. They argue that the military is still the alleged expert who knows how to perform military retreats and other military actions. At the same time they show that network-like decision-making structures that are inherent to the deployment of troops in international peacekeeping missions, have become a major obstacle for the military to act in its own right. The lessons that government can learn from the military experience are firstly, that decisions for national public cutbacks should be accompanied by a more in-depth (re)consideration of public (key) tasks than up to now was considered appropriate, and secondly, that more trust should be shown in the skills, knowledge and motivation of professionals to delineate and constrain the boundaries of their own fields of expertise.

Klep, Christ, Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica. De nasleep van drie ontspoorde vredesmissies (Dissertatie Utrecht 2008; Amsterdam: Boom, 2008, 385 blz., ISBN 978 90 8506 668 2)When the Home Front meets Foreign Parts. The Aftermath of Commissions of Inquiry into derailed Peace MissionsPeace Missions take place in difficult and volatile circumstances. It is therefore hardly surprising that some peace missions become 'derailed'. Christ Klep zooms in on three 'derailed' missions in his book and focuses on the value of Commissions of Inquiry which are subsequently set up as a result of public and political pressure. Do they succeed in revealing the 'how' and the 'why' of such derailments and – above all – identifying those who are responsible? Based on a broad spectrum of questions and extensive source materials, Klep concludes that 'the number of escape routes from the labyrinth of responsibility is practically infinite'; a clear message for all those taking part in international and domestic politics. It is here that the author skillfully and expertly succeeds: exposing the complex entanglement of domestic and foreign policy, even concerning events that sometimes happen away from the capital city.

Klep, Christ, Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica. De nasleep van drie ontspoorde vredesmissies (Dissertatie Utrecht 2008; Amsterdam: Boom, 2008, 385 blz., ISBN 978 90 8506 668 2).ResponseThe validity of my comparative approach (Somalia-Rwanda-Srebrenica) still stands, in my opinion. At the level of political responsibility and the process of coming to terms with events, the similarities are stronger than the differences. My estimation that the Inquiry reports were 'hijacked' by almost all of the stakeholders involved (especially the Canadian, Belgian and Dutch governments) is more of a matter of fact and a political reality than a reproach that ought to have legal implications. Finally, the question of how far the three governments that were involved learned lessons from the three affairs is difficult to answer. Was it not also the wider developments (for example, the switch from the 'blue' missions to the more robust 'green' missions) that compelled the lessons to be drawn out?

The subject of this study is the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the Security Council in the period 1946 2000. Because of their right of veto the cooperation of the permanent members has a significant influence on the functioning of the Council. The most important aspects of the cooperation that were investigated are the intensity of the cooperation and the ef-fectiveness of this cooperation in preventing and ending wars. To investigate these aspects, for both the intensity and the effectiveness measuring instruments were constructed. These measuring instruments were based on comprehensive sets of so-called 'leading indicators' and statistical methods and techniques. The intensity of the cooperation increased gradually from 1946 until 1990 (the end of the Cold War). Then it started to increase rapidly until 1996. From 1996 a slight decrease can be discer-ned. The strong increase in the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the security Council can be established in all the majors forms of cooperation in the Council: the numbers of adopted strategic resolutions and presidential statements, the numbers of employed means (like peacekeeping missions and enforcement actions) and the amounts of money that were spent on peacekeeping activities. Further it was established that the response times of the Council regarding potential and waged wars dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War. The effectiveness of the cooperation of the permanent members in the Council was, insofar this was measurable with the applied method, not good for many years, but after the Cold War a clear improvement can be discerned. This goes for the prevention of wars, as well as for post war peacebuilding and the ending of wars. Also the numbers of potential and waged wars in which the Council not intervened dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War, as well as the use of vetoes. The large number of potential and waged wars in which the Council did not intervene during the Cold War was nearly exclusively caused by 'non decisions' (the non placing of wars on the agenda), and not by the use of vetoes by permanent members, as is often assumed in literature. Further, a comparison of two phase classifications of the Cold War showed that the great powers, even when there are great tensions among them, are prepared to cooperate in the Security Council to resolve strategic matters, if they consider this in their interest. Analyses of the adopted strategic resolutions during the Cold War revealed that cooperation here was nearly exclusively limited to issues that were not core issues of the Cold War. From this it can be concluded that cooperation against third party states was a basis of cooperation of the great powers in the Security Council. Finally, the results of this study show clearly that the Security Council was regarded and used to a large extent by the permanent members in the period 1946 2000 as an instrument of foreign policy to pursue their national interests, and not as an instrument of the world community to prevent and end wars.

'Will the Netherlands be defended?' The debate about NATO's main lines of defence at the beginning of the 1950sAt the beginning of the 1950s, the Netherlands would not have been able to defend itself in the event of a Soviet attack. Despite the fact that NATO, under the leadership of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Eisenhower, and later General Ridgway, was in the process of rapidly building up its defences, it was still incapable of conducting a forward defence. The pivotal political and military issue in the short term centred on one question: Which areas in Western Europe could and should be kept and which not? Answers to this question exposed conflicting national interests and points of view, particularly those of the Dutch and the French. As it was taking a considerably long time to build up the Netherlands' defences, the Dutch government had very few trump cards to add weight to its demands. Indeed, in the summer of 1952, when Parliament asked to be given a precise account of how the Dutch defences were progressing, the government was practically boxed into a corner.

The central question of this dissertation is what role national identity has played in the interdepartmental policy field of international cultural policy (ICP) in the Netherlands between 1970 and 2012. In four chapters I analyse the history of ICP and the related political debate, using a theoretical framework consisting of the main concepts of a Discourse Historic Analysis (critique, ideology, and power), and tensions within the discourses on ICP and national identity. The role of national identity in the first period (1970-1986) is characterized as 'cultural nationalism'. Culture plays an important role in distinguishing the nation state from the rest of the world, and due to the decreasing autonomy in the field of economics and politics culture is considered (by some) to be the last bearer of the national identity. The debates focus on the question whether or not the government has a role in (actively) protecting that identity. The publication of the report "Culture without borders" by the Scientific Council for Government Policy marks the beginning of the second period (1987-1996). Gradually the primacy of the policy shifts from foreign to cultural policy, and attempts are made to combine within ICP the growing cultural diversity of the Dutch society with the uniting role of a national identity. Therefore the role of national identity is characterized as 'multiculturalism'. Extra funding for international cultural activities in 1997 marks the beginning of the third period (1997-2006), in which the role of national identity is characterized as 'cultural relativism'. The relationship between culture and the nation becomes more loose, and cultural activities abroad no longer seem to represent the nation's identity. This approach in ICP contrasts strongly with the growing discontent and heated public and political debate on national identity. Characteristic for the fourth period (2007-2012) is the return to the primacy of foreign policy and the focus on diplomatic and economic goals. Culture is treated as a ...

This thesis is about International Medical Graduates or foreign doctors, trained outside the European Economic Area, who settle permanently in the Netherlands. From the early nineties the number of foreign doctors residing in the Netherlands either as refugees or as partners/spouses of Dutch citizens has risen steadily. Foreign doctors who wish to practise medicine in the Netherlands must obtain a declaration of professional competence, issued by the Department of Public Health, Welfare and Sports (VWS). A considerable number of foreign doctors received negative decisions by the Health Department. They were not allowed to practise medicine in the Netherlands. As a result, from the mid nineties, a growing number of foreign doctors applied to the medical faculties for admission as medical students in order to obtain a Dutch medical degree. Therefore, in 1995, it was decided to institute the Committee Influx Foreign Doctors (CIBA), a central placing committee. Between 1996 and 2007 the CIBA has processed over a 1000 admission requests. Until 2002, in spite of the imminent shortage of doctors, the Department of Health had done little to enhance the use of the expertise brought in by the foreign doctors for the benefit of Dutch society. The focus of this investigation has been: 1. How is it guaranteed that foreign doctors meet the medical quality standards (knowledge, skills, attitude), or how is the assessment of these qualities measured. And 2. After obtaining permanent residency in the Netherlands, do foreign doctors have access to the profession for which they had qualified before in their country of origin or another non-EEA country? Late 2001 the Department of Health and the medical schools were stimulated to cooperate in order to improve the additional training programmes for foreign doctors. It led to the new assessement procedure for foreign doctors that came into force in December 2005. This thesis contains two reports on the medical careers of foreign doctors. These investigations showed that nearly all ...

Why did the Dutch hold on to Western New Guinea, one of the many territories that constituted the Dutch East Indies (modern-day Indonesia), when the colony became independent in 1949? This thesis argues against the traditional explanation that it was due to a singular Dutch 'decolonization trauma': an inability to let go of the glorious colonial past, combined with resentment against Indonesian nationalist leaders such as Sukarno. It shows that historians have overstated the importance of emotions in Dutch colonial policy-making and diplomacy after 1949, mainly because of their narrow scope of analysis, which has traditionally been restricted to trilateral relations between the Netherlands, independent Indonesia (which wanted to incorporate Western New Guinea, if need be with military means) and the allegedly 'anti-colonial' United States. This thesis situates Dutch decision-making in the Western New Guinea Crisis in a much wider network, incorporating the colonial policy, diplomacy and perception of other Western powers such as Britain, France, Australia, Belgium and Portugal between 1930 and 1962. It is argued that, when viewed within this network and its discourse, the Dutch decision to retain Western New Guinea is best explained with rational actor theory. The decision was inspired not so much by emotions as by cost-benefit analyses, which included the possibility of transferring the territory to a new Indonesian regime—which the Dutch expected to be more forthcoming to the interests of the Papuans, the native inhabitants of Western New Guinea, and the Dutch (economic) interests in Indonesia than the regime headed by Sukarno. Research into hitherto neglected French, Belgian, British and Dutch archives also shows that the Netherlands could count on much more support for its New Guinea policy from its Western allies—including the US—than traditional historiography suggests. It remains true that the United States forced the Netherlands to hand over Western New Guinea to Indonesia in 1962, but the Kennedy ...

Dutch-American relations in the post-war period have been inexorably intertwined with the Cold War. In the course of the 1960s the East-West struggle entered a new phase with the beginning of a period of détente, which had important consequences for the Dutch-American relationship. In this dissertation, which focuses on the governmental level, the following issues are dealt with: firstly, to what extent was the relationship affected by the complicating developments that took place in the years 1969-1976? Secondly, how did Dutch and American policy makers view the relationship? Finally, what did the asymmetry in the relationship mean and were the Dutch able to exert any influence? When taking into account both international and domestic factors, the picture that emerges is one of both change and continuity. What makes the period concerned stand out is the fact that the Atlantic Alliance was at a point where a redefinition of the common goals seemed unavoidable. Security concerns and preserving the American dominant position in the international arena were the foremost concerns of President Nixon and NSC-advisor Kissinger. These ideas clashed with those of Dutch politicians of for instance the Labour Party who wanted détente, an active human rights policy and development cooperation to be part of the Atlantic foreign policy agenda. The American embassy in The Hague was aware of these changes: it noticed a turn to the left in Dutch society and the political landscape. The Dutch cabinets in the period concerned faced domestic pressure to take a more critical stance towards the United States, where the Nixon administration faced problems concerning its image and credibility because of the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal. On the other hand, unmistakable signs of continuity in the Dutch-American relationship were present. The Dutch governments in the years concerned did not turn away from Atlantic cooperation, as the Netherlands remained dependent on the American military commitment to Western Europe. Détente was ...

The conflict over Kashmir has been a core issue between India and Pakistan since their independence. It is not only just a territorial conflict but also the core issue of the region, which has been changing along with the regional and international environment. In particular, after the 1990's, the people of Kashmir committed to armed resistance, which has become the focus of the risk to regional and international security because both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers. Resolution of this problem is quite difficult because it would require committing to the ideas of national integration of both countries. Specifically, for India, it is secularism; for Pakistan, it is the two-nation theory. However, the people of Kashmir want to choose their own destiny—integration with neither India nor Pakistan. India promised Kashmir a degree of freedom and democracy under article 370 of the Indian Constitution; however, for the time being, these right have been curtailed. To resolve this issue, two main plans have been presented by both countries; a referendum and the partition of Kashmir along the Line of Control. But, these ideas disregard the right of self-determination or the nationalist sentiment of the people of Kashmir. Recently a new idea emerged based on the notion of shared sovereignty. The history of discord between India and Pakistan has caused critical anxiety for regional peace and stability. However, there will is hope that a constructive solution to this problem can be found in the future through continuity of dialogue and negotiation between the two countries. We as an international society surrounding these nations, we should maintain a supportive stance for continued cordial dialogue.