In: Ibsen , M F 2016 , ' Den Europæiske Union : Supranational demokrati eller international konsolideringsstat? ' , Politik , bind 19 , nr. 3 , s. 48-65 .
This article discusses the recent debate between Jürgen Habermas and Wolfgang Streeck on the relationship between capitalism and democracy in Europe. The article recounts Streeck's analysis of the financial crisis, the transformation of the tax state into the debt state, and the development of the EU towards an international consolidation state, which informs Streeck's call for a retreat from Europe to the nation-state as the last line of defense against neoliberal capitalism. The article proceeds to sketch Habermas's criticism of Streeck's argument, and it illustrates how Habermas' proposal for a reconstitution of the EU as a supranational democracy is motivated by foundational concerns in his critical theory of society. Finally, the article argues that the debate results in an unresolved dilemma: while only a democratized EU can reestablish the supremacy of politics over globalized markets, the EU is more likely to become further entrenched as an international consolidation state.
In: Wivel , A 2017 , ' What Happened to the Nordic Model for International Peace and Security? ' , Peace Review , bind 29 , nr. 4; Peace Journalism , 9 , s. 489-496 . https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2017.1381521
The Nordic countries have long been renowned for their contribution to international peace and security. This contribution – occasionally viewed by both Nordic and non-Nordic policy-makers and academics as a particular model for facilitating peace and development in international affairs – is based on a combination of active contributions to peaceful conflict resolution, a high level of development aid and a continuous commitment to strengthening international society. However, recently Scandinavians have been making headlines for reasons that seem to contrast with their well-established brand as humane internationalist peacemakers. This article identifies the characteristics of the Nordic model for international peace and security and discusses how and why it has changed.
학위논문(석사)--서울대학교 대학원 :사회과학대학 정치외교학부(외교학전공),2019. 8. 박성우. ; The study of Rousseau's international politics can largely be divided into two main branches: Realism with a pessimistic view towards peace in international politics and Cosmopolitanism via education as depicted in Emile. However, neither interpretation exhaustively covers Rousseau's international political thought. Accepting the framework that International Political Thought should coherently and consistently interpret the individual, national, and international levels of politics, this thesis embodies Stoicism's 'Theory of Oikeiosis' to assess Rousseau's international political thought, focusing on Emile. This study pays attention to Emile because the study of humans embodied in the work contains both a discussion of all three layers – the individual, national and the international - of Rousseau's international political thought, and enough materials to infer his 'Politics of Survival.' Previous studies of Emile has primarily been published by cosmopolitans to invoke idealistic ideas such as conscience, morality, and patriotism. If put under a more realist lens, however, the same ideas could be interpreted as a part of living his life for Emile, or the individual, under the goal of self-preservation. Early in his life, Emile grows up with only negative education as an isolated individual and learns how to live alone. Later, Emile gradually learns how to interact with the society, breaking from his isolated shell to live as a part of a community. In this process, Emile establishes a political society and utilizes concepts that he garnered while in it, such as morality and religion, according to his goal of self-preservation. Although Emile fulfills his duties as a citizen of a Republic, ideas such as civic virtue and patriotism that were created within the country do not initially extend to the outside world. With time, however, Emile's world view expands to encompass the entire human population, and Emile comes to care for even communities outside of his direct community. When the idea of a confederation of countries to resolve the state of war outside of the community turns out to be unfeasible, Rousseau adopts a new solution for the international political situation which is for each individual to strive to do their best in the given situation such as by finding a safe place for his or her freedom of survival. This thesis scrutinizes Emile to depict this process, of the individual striving for survival beyond the community and extending to the nation, international politics, and the entire universe. This research interprets Rousseau's international political thought as 'International Political Thought of Survival' by repurposing cosmopolitan internal mechanisms as tools for survival, while also distinguishing itself from realism by underlining Rousseau's negative pacifism. As such, this thesis provides a balance between the cosmopolitan and realist interpretations of Rousseau's international politics and also attempts to bridge the rift between his national and international political thought by extracting 'survival' as a consistent idea embedded throughout the levels. Moreover, this study criticizes the realist international political theorists' arbitrary selection and selective interpretation of Rousseau and argues the need for a more diversified approach to Rousseau's international political thought. ; 루소의 국제정치관에 대한 연구는 크게 국제정치 상황에서 평화를 비관적으로 바라보는 현실주의와 『에밀』에서의 교육을 통해 국제적 평화를 이룰 수 있다는 세계시민주의의 두가지 갈래로 나눌 수 있다. 그러나 이러한 해석들이 가지는 문제점은 루소의 정치사상이 두 극단의 측면을 모두 지니고 있는 점을 포괄하기 어렵기에, 루소의 국제정치사상을 좀 더 잘 이해할 수 있는 모습으로 재해석할 여지를 준다. 특히 국제정치사상이 개인과 국가 그리고 국제정치의 일관성있는 해석을 가져야 한다는 틀에 입각하여, 스토아사상에서 비롯된 '자기화 이론'을 참고해 『에밀』을 중심으로 루소의 국제정치사상을 살펴본다. 본 연구가 『에밀』에 주목하는 이유는 이 저작에서 드러나는 인간학이 루소 국제정치사상의 여러 층위(개인-국가-국제관계)에 대한 논의를 모두 포함하고 있으면서, '생존의 정치학'을 설명하기에 적합한 내용을 담고 있기 때문이다. 흔히 『에밀』은 세계시민주의자들에게 주로 사용되어 양심이나, 덕성, 애국심 등의 관념을 이상주의적 관점으로 해석하는 데 활용된다. 그러나 『에밀』의 내용을 좀 더 현실주의적 차원에서 논의해본다면, 이들은 모두 자기보존이라는 목표 아래 에밀 개인이 삶을 살아내기 위한 과정의 일부로 볼 수 있다. 초기 에밀은 고립된 개인으로서 소극적 교육을 받으며 자라는데, 이동안은 혼자서 사는 법을 배운다. 이후 에밀은 점차 주변 사회와 관계하는 법을 배우게 되는데, 인간의 마음과 사회를 알아가면서 점점 고립된 인간을 지나 공동체에서 살아가는 법을 깨닫는다. 주변 사회를 알아가게 된 에밀은 정치공동체를 세우고 그 안에서 배운 도덕성과 종교 등의 관념을 자신의 생존방식에 맞게 사용한다. 공화국 내 시민이 된 에밀은 책임감으로 국가 내에서의 의무를 다하지만, 시민적 덕성이나 애국심 등 한 국가 안에서 만들어질 수 있는 관념들은 외부 세계까지 확장되지 않는다. 그렇지만 에밀의 세계관은 인류 전체를 포함하는 인식으로까지 확대되고, 에밀은 공동체 밖의 공동체를 신경쓰는 인간이 된다. 공동체 밖의 전쟁상태에서 국가적 연합은 하나의 해결책으로 제시되지만 이는 실현불가능한 것으로 판명나고, 루소의 국제정치적 해결책은 '생존의 자유'를 위해 가장 안전한 장소를 찾는 등 개인이 생존을 위해 계속적으로 주어진 바에서 최선을 다하는 노력의 방식을 채택하고 있다. 결과적으로 본 연구에서는 『에밀』을 통해 개인이 공동체를 넘어 국가와 국제정치 그리고 우주 전체를 아우르는 세계관 안에서 생존이라는 목표를 위해 달려가는 모습을 보여준다. 본 연구는 세계시민주의자들이 사용하는 내적 기제들을 생존을 위한 도구적 측면에서 활용하면서도, 소극적 의미의 평화론을 통해 현실주의와도 거리를 두며 '생존의 국제정치사상'으로 루소 국제정치사상을 재해석하고 있다. 이는 횡으로는 루소 국제정치관의 해석에 대한 중도적 균형을 잡으면서도, 종으로는 생존이라는 매개를 통해 국내정치와 국제정치 간의 균열을 메울 수 있는 가능성을 제시한다. 더불어 본 연구는 지금까지 현실주의 국제정치이론에서 루소의 정치사상을 부분적으로 인용해왔던 것에 대해 비판을 던지면서 루소 국제정치사상을 좀 더 다각적으로 접근할 필요가 있음을 주장한다. ; Ⅰ. 서 론 1 1. 문제제기와 연구질문 1 2. 기존문헌 검토 및 분석 3 1) 루소의 국제정치관에 대한 연구 3 2) 루소의 국제정치를 현실주의 관점에서 바라본 연구 7 3) 루소의 국제정치를 세계시민주의 관점에서 바라본 연구 9 4) 본 연구의 방향성: 루소의 국제정치사상 재해석 12 3. 본 연구의 접근법 14 1) 일관성의 국제정치사상 14 2) 스토아철학과 히에로클레스의 동심원 16 4. 논문의 구성 18 Ⅱ. 예비적 고찰 21 1. 『에밀』의 중요성과 해석방법 21 2. 생존의 정치학 25 Ⅲ. 개인에서 공동체로 31 1. 고립된 개인과 소극적 자유 31 1) 소극적 교육 31 2) 고독한 인간 33 2. 인간의 마음을 알아가는 것 35 1) 생존과 자기애 35 2) 사회를 알아가는 것 38 Ⅳ. 공동체 속의 개인 41 1. 도덕성과 종교의 역할 41 1) 동정심을 기반으로 한 양심과 이성의 작용 41 2) 도덕성과 종교의 관계 45 3) 정치공동체 안에서 일반의지의 역할 47 4) 정치와 종교 49 (1) 정치적 도구로서의 시민종교 50 (2) 입법과 통치에서의 종교 활용 52 2. 이상국가 속의 개인 55 1) 이상국가의 설립 가능성 55 2) 공화국과 시민적 덕성 58 3) 애국심과 세계시민주의 60 Ⅴ. 공동체 밖의 개인 64 1. 인식의 확장 64 1) 공동체 밖의 공동체 64 2) 우주적 질서에 대한 인식 66 2. 국가적 연합과 영구평화를 위한 해결책 69 3. 생존을 위한 계획 73 1) 가장 안전한 장소 73 2) 소극적 평화론과 생존의 의미 76 Ⅵ. 결 론 78 1. 생존의 국제정치사상 78 2. 본 연구의 목적과 함의 79 참고문헌 82 Abstract 88 ; Master
As a motivational factor of action, political efficacy is an important predictor of political behaviour. The term was invented to capture the extent to which people feel that they can effectively participate in politics and shape political processes. Today, we have a comprehensive knowledge of the individual-level factors (socio-demographic variables, political preferences etc.) that shape the level of internal and external dimensions of political efficacy. However, while it is widely demonstrated that media consumption influences the level of political efficacy, the country-level media context factors affecting it have rarely been studied. This paper reports the findings of extensive research on how two crucial features of the media context, the political significance of the media and the level of political parallelism in the media system, shape the level of external and internal political efficacy. The investigation draws upon the dataset of the seventh round (2014 – 2015) of the European Social Survey (ESS) and includes more than twenty-two thousand respondents from nineteen European democracies. The research hypothesizes that in countries where the media play a more important role, people have lower levels of external and higher levels of internal political efficacy. Political parallelism, which shows the extent to which media outlets are driven by distinct political orientations and interests within a particular media system, is expected to directly increase both external and internal political efficacy. Its indirect effect is also hypothesized, arguing that partisan media amplifies the winner-loser gap in political efficacy as a kind of "echo chamber". The findings show that in countries where the media play a major role in shaping political discourse, people have lower levels of external political efficacy, while the political parallelism of the media system indirectly affects the external dimensions of political efficacy. Internal political efficacy is, however, not related to these context-level factors.
What we today call the international system was created by the West from early modern age. This term is often used in political theory, but less focused on how to classify integrative forces within the international system. In the context of this study, we are attempting to lay down some conceptual basis. How do we understand the linking and unifying factors within the international system? Initially, the emergence of the international system was largely attributed to political factors in theory, but we can also refer to other explanatory principles: one considers economic factors and civilizational factors are taken into consideration as essential aspects of the international structures. According to our viewpoint, inter-civilization dialogue seems to be a "third way" that goes beyond the expansive one-sidedness of Western universalism and the world-level confrontation of hostile civilizations. This "civilizational approach" incorporates the two previous aspects - economic and political - and this is what gives its importance. In our view, inter-civilization dialogue is the only viable way to create global ethos, and only the resulting "intellectual revolution" can make national and supranational economic and political institutions to operate in effective way under the conditions of globalization.
Grønlands udenrigspolitiske repræsentanter benytter den store internationale interesse for Arktis til at positionere Grønland som en mere selvstændig udenrigspolitisk aktør. Det er muligt, da Danmark er afhængig af Grønland for at opretholde sin status som "arktisk stat", og fordi Grønlands udenrigspolitiske kompetence er åben for fortolkning. Denne artikel analyserer, hvordan repræsentanter for skiftende grønlandske regeringer har udvidet det udenrigspolitiske handlerum ved i diskurs og praksis at styrke Grønlands position i en arktisk kontekst. Det er blandt andet opnået ved 1) højlydt at italesætte utilfredshed i Arktisk Råd, 2) stiltiende symbolske handlinger ved Ilulissat-erklæringens tiårs jubilæum, og 3) ved at mime suverænitet ved Arctic Circle konferencen, der pga. sin mere uformelle struktur er særligt nyttig til at styrke bilaterale internationale relationer. ; Greenland's foreign policy representatives use the great international attention to the Arctic to appear and act as a more sovereign foreign policy actor. This is possible due to Denmark's dependence on Greenland to maintain its "Arctic state" status and because Greenland's foreign policy competence is open to interpretation. The article analyzes how representatives of shifting Greenlandic governments have expanded the foreign policy room for manoeuvre in discourse and praxis to strengthen Greenland's position at Arctic-related events. This has been achieved by, among other things, 1) outspoken discontent in the Arctic Council, 2) tacit gestures at the Ilulissat Declaration's 10-year anniversary, and 3) by mimicking full sovereignty at the Arctic Circle conference serving as a particularly useful platform for enhancing bilateral international relations due to its more informal setup.
This paper explores how Britain's and Colombia's privileged relations with the United States (U.S.) influenced their journey through the European Community (EC) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). The Anglo–American Special Relationship (AASR) was compatible with British participation in the European Single Market, but not with adherence to creating the EC's common currency, nor with leadership in building a European defence structure autonomous from NATO. Thus, since the start of the Iraq war, Britain played a rather obstructive role in what later was called European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The US–Colombia Partnership (USCP), based on a longstanding military association reinforced under Plan Colombia, naturally discouraged any meaningful Colombian participation in UNASUR's South American Security Council (CDS), a regional cooperative security project, promoted by Brazil. Cherished projects of the liberal CAP – such as triangular cooperation (to export Colombian security expertise to Central America with U.S. co-financing and oversight) and NATO partnership – also distracted Colombia's interest from UNASUR, diminishing the latter's relevance collaterally. A role for UNASUR – alongside the Organization of American States (OAS) – in South American security management was compatible with the liberal CAP, but not with the neoconservative CAP. Even a lopsided complementation – such as the one between NATO and the CSDP – proved unviable between the OAS and UNASUR.
Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.
Tanulmányunk a nemzetközi rendszer átalakulásával foglalkozik, azt Polányi kettős mozgásának a nemzetközi politikai gazdaságtan három vizsgálati szintjére (rendszer szintje, nemzetállam szintje, ideák szintje) való kiterjesztésével mutatja be. A cél annak az ingamozgásnak a bemutatása, mely az önszabályozó piac és a Bretton Woodsi "beágyazott liberalizmus" között írható le. Bemutatjuk azt is, hogy a populista pártok napjainkban megfigyelhető növekvő népszerűsége a piacosító folyamatokkal szembeni ellenmozgásként értelmezhető. = Our paper examines the transformation of the international economic system. We examine the process of Polanyi's double movement on the three levels of analysis of the international political economy: systemic, domestic and cognitive. Our aim is to show that during the development of the international system a certain pendulum is present which swings between the idea of the self-regulating market and 'the embedded liberalism' of the Bretton Woods System. We will also show, that the increasing popularity of populist political parties might be also understood as a countermovement against forces of marketization.
Geopolitics as a multidisciplinary branch of social science and as a theory of foreign policy appeared on the Latin-American continent in the second half of the 1920s. The main features they include are the next: aggressive approach to the space, the continental adaption of the organic state-theory elaborated by Ratzel and Kjellen, moreover, the developed geopolitical theory was thought to be converted into practice via the growing role of the army. In all Latin- American countries the armed forces and their various institutions became the scientific centre of elaborating the new attitude to the international relations as a theory. When the army az an institution assumed the political power, however, it was given an opportunity to put these theories into practice. With the definition of the constant and conjuntural national goals those countries of the vast territories aimed at both re-determination of their international economic and political positions and solving their problems connected with their own inner space. Therefore the regional transitions, the settling in the rarely- populated areas, the usage of sources of raw material and reserves, the control of transport and communication network of international significance and obtaining the influence over the new territories were the problems that in many of those countries came to the front. On the Latin-American continent the geopolitical schools with important theo-retical background were established in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. In this study we are going to introduce the Chilean geopolitical theory and practice established by generals Ramon Cañas Montalva and Augusto Pinochet. Apart from the theoretical outlines we will analyse the Chilean attitude to the possession of the Beagle-channel, The Drake-passage and the Magellan-strait and the Antarctic. ; Geopolitics as a multidisciplinary branch of social science and as a theory of foreign policy appeared on the Latin-American continent in the second half of the 1920s. The main features they include are the next: aggressive approach to the space, the continental adaption of the organic state-theory elaborated by Ratzel and Kjellen, moreover, the developed geopolitical theory was thought to be converted into practice via the growing role of the army. In all Latin- American countries the armed forces and their various institutions became the scientific centre of elaborating the new attitude to the international relations as a theory. When the army az an institution assumed the political power, however, it was given an opportunity to put these theories into practice. With the definition of the constant and conjuntural national goals those countries of the vast territories aimed at both re-determination of their international economic and political positions and solving their problems connected with their own inner space. Therefore the regional transitions, the settling in the rarely- populated areas, the usage of sources of raw material and reserves, the control of transport and communication network of international significance and obtaining the influence over the new territories were the problems that in many of those countries came to the front. On the Latin-American continent the geopolitical schools with important theo-retical background were established in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. In this study we are going to introduce the Chilean geopolitical theory and practice established by generals Ramon Cañas Montalva and Augusto Pinochet. Apart from the theoretical outlines we will analyse the Chilean attitude to the possession of the Beagle-channel, The Drake-passage and the Magellan-strait and the Antarctic.
The region of Southeast Asia is faced with a complex set of challenges stemming from political, economic and religious developments at the national, regional and global level. This paper sets out to examine trade-, foreign- and security policy implications of the issues confronting the region. In ASEAN, the Southeast Asian countries are continuing their ambitious attempts at further integration. Plans outlining deeper security and economic communities have been adopted. However, huge differences in political systems, economic development and ethnic/religious structures are hampering prospects of closer cooperation. The highly controversial conflict case of Burma/Myanmar is testing the much adhered-to principle of non-interference and at the same time complicating relations with external powers. Among these, the United States and China are dramatically strengthening their interests in the region. American influence is not least manifesting itself in light of the war against terrorism, which the region is adapting to in different ways and at different speeds. By contrast, the European Union does not seem to answer Southeast Asian calls for further engagement. A flurry of bilateral and regional trade agreements is another prominent feature of the economic landscape of the region. This is to a certain degree a reflex ion of impatience with trade liberalization in the WTO and within ASEAN itself. Structures of economic cooperation are under rapid alteration in Southeast Asia. The paper analyses the above-mentioned developments with a view to assessing the prospects of future stability, economic development and integration in and among ASEAN countries. It is concluded that although the scope for increased economic benefit and political harmonization through ASEAN integration alone is limited, the organization could still prove useful as a common regional point of reference in tackling more important policy determinants at national and global level.
This paper is aimed at analysing the impact of the crisis of the liberal international order on the transatlantic relations. Both the EU and the US have vital interest to maintain the existing international order, however regarding certain foreign policy goals we witness an increasingly divergent approach to world politics. This is the case with the Middle East, where the EU acts as a global player based on historical ties, while the United States have recently started a gradual disengagement from the region. The so-called post-American Middle East have its own opportunities as well as challenges for the European diplomacy. This article focuses on the differences between the EU and the US foreign policy goals related to the Middle East. It primarily addresses the Iranian nuclear program and the Middle East Peace Plan recently launched by the US. The author argues despite some differences in interests, the EU and the US do not perceive the region in an entirely different way.
Der Artikel sucht eine Antwort auf die Frage, welche Rolle die Unabhängige Kleinwirtenpartei der Kulturdiplomarie zu einer Zeit geben wollte, zu der die politische Pluralität einzelartige Möglichkeiten zur nationalen Entwicklung geboten hat. Die Analyse zeigt, dass die Partei eine europäische, gleichzeitig verpflichtet-nationale Kulturpolitik führte. Durch Forschungen wurde bewiesen, dass die Partei mit der Kriegsbeendigung in kurzer Zeit von einem Null-Standpunkt zu einer niveauvollen Kulturpolitik kommt, die den Forderungen der politischen Pluralität entspricht. Zur Zeit der internationalen Isolierung wollte die Partei ein reales Nationalitätsbild (Ungarnbild) schaffen. Die UKWP wollte eine kritische Stellung zur nationalen Vergangenheit beziehen, aber sie hatte diese Erwartung auch im Falle der Nachbarvölker. Als eine Möglichkeit der ungarischen Entfaltung hat sie die Zusammenarbeit im Karpaten-Becken gesehen. Ihrer Ansicht nach ist die "große Welt" durch die Nachbarn, durch die Versöhnung der Völker im Karpaten-Becken zu erreichen.
학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 외교학과, 2012. 2. 신범식. ; 본 논문의 핵심 질문은 색깔 혁명 발생으로 민주화에 성공한 그루지야와 우크라이나의 이후 민주주의 발전 양상은 왜 달랐는가이다. 색깔 혁명 이후, 우크라이나의 민주주의는 진전을 보였지만, 그루지야는 그렇지 못했다. 본 연구는 색깔혁명 이후 미국과 러시아의 갈등 구도와 양국의 대(對) 그루지야, 우크라이나 정책이 각국의 국내 엘리트-대중 관계에서 엘리트 자율성, 그리고 민주화에 미친 영향에 주목하였다. 9.11 테러 이후 미국과 러시아는 협력 체제에 있었지만, 색깔 혁명의 발생으로 인해 양국은 갈등 구도에 들어서게 된다. 그루지야와 우크라이나는 미․러 갈등 구도의 중심에 있었다. 활용가능성의 요인으로 인해, 그루지야는 우크라이나보다 전략적 가치가 더 큰 곳이었다. 미․러 갈등 구도 속에서 그루지야 집권 엘리트들은 높은 엘리트 자율성을 가질 수 있었다. 미국은 그루지야에게 큰 경제 원조, 정치적 지원을 하였다. 또한 그루지야-러시아 관계 악화와 2008년 전쟁 발발은 정권의 권위주의 정책을 정당화하고 국내를 결집시키는 기제로 작용하여 그루지야 집권 엘리트들이 높은 자율성을 갖게 해주었고, 이는 민주화 저해로 이어졌다. 우크라이나는 그루지야와 반대였다. 미․러 갈등 구도 속에서 우크라이나 엘리트들은 낮은 자율성을 가졌다. 우크라이나의 집권 엘리트들은 서방과 러시아 양측 모두로부터 확고한 정치적, 경제적 지원을 얻을 수 없었다. 오히려 러시아의 정책으로 인해 국내의 반 오렌지, 대항 엘리트가 공고해지면서, 집권 엘리트의 자율성은 낮아졌다. 엘리트들의 낮은 자율성과 대중에 대한 높은 의존성은 대중 영합주의 정책과 정국 불안의 결과를 낳았으나, 이는 오렌지 혁명 이후 우크라이나 민주주의의 발전을 제한적으로나마 가능하게 해주었다. 본 연구는 민주화 연구에서 그동안 비교적 주목을 덜 받아온 국제적 요인을 다루고, 외교 정책, 국내 엘리트-대중 관계, 민주화의 연계를 통합적으로 보여준다는 점에서 함의가 있다. 본고는 많은 기존 연구들이 상정해 온, 민주화에 대한 서구 민주화 증진 정책의 긍정적 영향과 권위주의 국가의 부정적 영향이라는 단순한 명제의 한계를 드러내주고 있다. 또한 민주주의 지원 정책에서 민주화 단계별로 정책을 달리할 필요성에 대해서 시사한다. ; What caused the difference in democratic trajectories between Georgia and Ukraine after the Color Revolutions? Since the occurrence of the Color Revolutions, Georgia's democracy has laid in tatters, whereas Ukraine has achieved a relatively successful democracy. Georgia and Ukraine share similar domestic determinants which have been discussed in previous democratization literature. This study, however, focuses on the international factor as an explanation for the different democratic fates of democracy between the two countries. Comparing both countries, this thesis uses a framework that integrates international factors, elite autonomy in domestic elite-mass relations, and democratization. The study argues that international factors, specifically the foreign policies of the US and Russia, provide an explanation for the difference in democratic outcomes for the two countries. Following the events of September 11, 2001, US-Russian relations improved. However, the occurrence of the Color Revolutions caused deterioration in the ties between the two countries, and both started to adopt different foreign policies towards the post-Soviet region. Caught in the middle of this conflict between the two great powers were Georgia and Ukraine. The unconditional US support for Georgia and Russia's assertive policy towards Georgia which culminated in the Russian-Georgian War in 2008 enabled the Georgian elites to attain high elite autonomy, thus resulting in democratic stagnation for Georgia. In contrast, Ukraine did not garner the support of either the US or Russia; rather, it was pressured by Russia. The anti-Orange elites in Ukraine were effectively supported by Russia, and, thus, were able to function as a forceful political opposition to the incumbent elites. Therefore, the Ukrainian elites only garnered low autonomy, which resulted in democratic progress in Ukraine despite domestic political chaos. This study contributes to further understanding of the impact of international factors upon democratization. In addition, this thesis creates implications for democracy promotion policy. The conclusion of the thesis challenges the predominant assumption that Western democracy promotion is conducive to actually democratization, and that authoritarian countries' authoritarian promotion policy is harmful to democratization. In the process of democracy promotion policy, policymakers and implementers need both careful monitoring of the process of democratic assistance and coordination with other countries. ; Master
After the transformation to democracy and market economy the Visegrad Four (V4) countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) have rejoined the group of donors providing international development assistance to poor emerging countries. The aim of the paper is to help to better understand the foreign aid policy and practice of the V4 countries and their contribution to the development of the poor emerging countries by providing foreign aid for them. The main research questions focus on the following issues: What is the history and the major motif of the V4 countries for providing foreign aid? Which are the most preferred beneficiary countries and why? How much foreign aid and in what area is provided? How does it relate to other international donors? What does it mean to the recipient countries? Are there similarities or differences between the V4 countries in this respect? What are the major features distinguishing V4 donors from others? What kind of challenges and opportunities can arise? The hypotheses of the research to be tested are as follows: 1. Providing foreign aid by the V4 countries has its roots in the past regime which still has an influence on the present practice. 2. The V4 countries represent a special model for development cooperation with the aid recipient countries. 3. The major motif of the V4 countries for providing foreign aid was to support the geopolitical interest of the ex "Soviet Block", while after the change of the regime the aspiration of the V4 countries shifted towards gaining economic benefits from the cooperation with the aid recipient countries. The method of the research is literature review related to development theory and foreign aid as well as statistical analysis based on data on Official Development Assistance (ODA). Results prove the hypotheses.