Suchergebnisse

Today few people deny the existence of regional substate diplomacy (Criekemans 2010). But there is still no common agreement on a region's right to do so and, above all, on their scope of action. This question goes against what used to be the dominant approach in international relations, the state-centric approach that leads to the logic of speaking with one voice. Increasingly, a multilevel-governance approach has contested this state-centric view and proposes an alternative logic of multiple actors speaking with their voice, nuancing strongly the seminal distinction between "sovereignty-bound" and "sovereignty-free" actors (Rosenau 1990). From the 1970s, the world has seen the growing presence of sovereignty-free actors in international relations. Among these actors, non-central or, better, substate, governments of federal states have developed intensive foreign relations. These governments are using a range of techniques: from shaping the federal government's foreign policy to establishing themselves directly in the international arena (Blatter et al. 2008). For minority nation governments this is particularly a challenge, as they have to act internally – where they have developed full-fledged legislative powers within a multinational federation – and externally – where international and national laws are often still reluctant to recognise their right of action (Lejeune 2003). Yet some minority nations have thrived in developing their own international relations. Bavaria, Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, Scotland and Wallonia are often seen as successful international players even if they are not fully sovereignty bound (Michelmann 2009; Criekemans 2010). The international actions of these minority nations have been characterised under the umbrella of "identity paradiplomacy" (Paquin 2003); that is, a willingness to use international relations to foster a nation-building process within a multinational state. This observation was particularly prevalent for minority nations strongly in competition with a federal government about their nationbuilding process, albeit for different reasons, namely Flanders, Quebec and Scotland (Paquin 2004). The case of Wallonia seems to fits less well into the identity paradiplomacy framework, which therefore raises the question of alternative roads to international relations. This is the core question of this chapter: is identity paradiplomacy the only way to go for minority nations? Quebec and Wallonia are both well known for their active foreign relations.

The participation of non-state actors to international politics has been investigated since the creation of international institutions. Yet, the rules, principles and norms of global governance are no more discussed in single, isolated institutions. Rather, with the proliferation of international regimes and organisations, international issues are now negotiated in a context of institutional interactions known as "regime complexes". This poses new questions, in particular on the negotiation burden that these new processes place on international actors. To answer this question, this contribution compares non-state participation in both contexts (single regimes and regime complexes), using the international forest negotiations as a case study. It uses quantitative methods to measure the negotiation burden of single regimes and compare it to the negotiation burden of regime complexes. The negotiation burden of single regimes is found insignificant with political interest being the major motivation for participation, while the negotiation burden of regime complexes is found relevant, requiring a certain type of material and organisational resources for non-state actors to participate. Yet a certain diversity of non-state representation is maintained within regime complexes, with non-governmental organisations being dominant with respect to business groups.

While a great deal of attention is devoted to the Pacific region as the new chessboard of international politics, Pakistan remains a key actor in terms of both threat and potential. Two observations back this argument: first, Pakistan's fundamental roles as a state are challenged by its ongoing conflict with India and internal insurgencies. Second, due to a power-status gap, Pakistan experiences difficulties in holding specific self-conceived roles. In addition to hampering its socio-economic potential, these developments prevent Pakistan's quest for normalization in the system. As a consequence, we argue that engaging with Islamabad should be a priority for Washington so as to prevent the country from further aligning with Beijing, thus reinforcing China's regional leadership and status as peer-competitor to the United States. Indeed, as the potential for deviance in the international system arises from its normative dimension, the US, as the global leader, counts among its roles that of norm-setter and primary socializer for most states. Our research proposes to look at an old puzzle with new theoretical insights. By addressing the question of Washington's engagement towards non-conforming states, we aim to document a set of socialization processes as intervening variables linking American global role as leader and primary socializer to Pakistan's process of social integration (normalization/deviance). Drawing from sociology and social psychology, the paper seeks to explore the ability of the leader to act as a primary source of role location and status recognition towards non-conforming states so as to integrate them (back) into the US-led system.

International audience ; The arrangements offered by international community as solutions to Yugoslav dissolution process have significantly affected the development of the Kosovo conflict. These policies failed to produce consensus between the parties in conflict, instead, as the paper demonstrate, they played the role of a catalyst in the initiation of the conflict. This paper, by offering a detailed reconstruction of the process by which the international community tried to settle the Kosovo case, demonstrates how the dynamics of the conflict interacted dynamically with international community attitudes and policies towards the case. The paper discusses the attitudes and policies of international community toward the Kosovo case underlining its attachment to traditional prerequisites of international order instead of inherited causes of conflict. There are three important events that underline the interference of international community in the case of Kosovo before the war: the Conference on Yugoslavia that followed up the creation of the Badinter Committee, the Dayton Agreement and the Rambouillet Talks. These events are explained in details in three separate sections since they have immediate implications for the situation in Kosovo and consequently for the development of the conflict. We first discuss the contribution of existing normative framework to models of international community behavior and their effects in the case of Kosovo conflict following with the reaction of the conflicting parties towards offered arrangements. Both moments are assumed to be of importance in providing a larger picture in the understanding of the outgrowth of Kosovo conflict.

International audience ; The arrangements offered by international community as solutions to Yugoslav dissolution process have significantly affected the development of the Kosovo conflict. These policies failed to produce consensus between the parties in conflict, instead, as the paper demonstrate, they played the role of a catalyst in the initiation of the conflict. This paper, by offering a detailed reconstruction of the process by which the international community tried to settle the Kosovo case, demonstrates how the dynamics of the conflict interacted dynamically with international community attitudes and policies towards the case. The paper discusses the attitudes and policies of international community toward the Kosovo case underlining its attachment to traditional prerequisites of international order instead of inherited causes of conflict. There are three important events that underline the interference of international community in the case of Kosovo before the war: the Conference on Yugoslavia that followed up the creation of the Badinter Committee, the Dayton Agreement and the Rambouillet Talks. These events are explained in details in three separate sections since they have immediate implications for the situation in Kosovo and consequently for the development of the conflict. We first discuss the contribution of existing normative framework to models of international community behavior and their effects in the case of Kosovo conflict following with the reaction of the conflicting parties towards offered arrangements. Both moments are assumed to be of importance in providing a larger picture in the understanding of the outgrowth of Kosovo conflict.

The Red Devils, chocolate or beer and the King, such is the typical answers given to the oft-asked question of what is still holding Belgium together. To these three symbols, two extra elements are often added: the debt and Brussels, the capital of the country and of the Flemish Region/Community, the French Community (politically but not constitutionally the Wallonia-Brussels Federation), the European Union (to be more specific, one of the three capitals, along with Strasbourg and Luxemburg), while being as well the seat of the Brussels Capital Region. Generally, the list of factors of unity in Belgium ends with this short list. Is it already too long, or on the contrary, is it really too short? This is the main question of this chapter. Paradoxically, although this question often arises, there are very few scientific writings analyzing it. To do so, this chapter will discuss six sets of factors: historical, identity, socio-economic, political, international and symbolic. Nonetheless, it is important to take into account that such enterprise seeks to be informative and not prescriptive. This chapter does not assume that Belgium should be united. There are several points of view about what Belgium should be, and this contribution merely wishes to nurture the political debate by conveying an original approach on six types of factors.

After years of political crises and negotiations, the deep-rooted conflict between Dutch- and French-speaking parties recently led to the 2011 agreement concerning a further reform of the Belgian state. This reform mainly furthers decentralises the – already federal – state structure, including the allocation of additional competences and fiscal powers to sub-national entities (Regions and Communities). But this new state reform also brings about a radical reform of the upper house: the Belgian Senate. Since 1995, the Senate was composed of three different types of members: Senators directly elected by two linguistically separated electorate (the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking electorates), Senators indirectly elected by the Community parliaments and Senators coopted by the two other types. The French- and German-speaking linguistic minorities had a fixed amount of seats in this assembly. The reform of the state radically changed the legislative competences of the Senate and its composition as its members will now be designated by Regional and Community parliaments (plus 10 coopted senators). Broadly speaking, the appointment of the majority of the Senators moved from a system of direct and language-based election to a system of indirect and mixed regional and language-based designation. This change is not without consequence for the representation of linguistic minorities. In May 2014, regional, community and federal elections will be organised in Belgium, testing for the first time this new system of designation of Senators by regional and community parliaments. This paper intends to present the 2013 reform of the Senate in Belgium and its consequence for the representation of linguistic minorities. The situations before and after the reform of the Senate will be compared, not only in terms of the way Senators are appointed but in terms of its consequence on the linguistic aspects of the regional and community elections campaign and of the profile of the appointed Senators.

Im Winter 2014/15 kam es zu einem beachtlichen Exodus aus dem Kosovo. Diese Massenmigration hat Auswirkungen nicht nur im Kosovo, sondern auch in den Zielländern, und sie wirft Fragen nach den Auslösern und möglichen Implikationen auf. Der vorliegende Policy Brief identifiziert und analysiert Antriebskräfte und einige Besonderheiten dieses Phänomens. Hauptauslöser der Massenmigration ist aus unserer Sicht ein Staatsversagen. Der große Enthusiasmus und die Hoffnungen der jungen kosovarischen Nation konnten nicht aufrechterhalten und erfolgreich in eine nachhaltige Entwicklung umgewandelt werden. Vielmehr hat sich eine hohe Frustration über die politische Kaste und die vorherrschende Vetternwirtschaft und Korruption angestaut, die selbst die Mittelschicht in die Emigration treibt. Der Migrationsansturm wurde zusätzlich durch erleichterte Reisebedingungen und Gerüchte, z. B. über unkomplizierte Asylregelungen, angetrieben, die einen regelrechten Schneeballeffekt auslösten. Den politischen Entscheidungsträgern in der EU empfehlen wir einen gelassenen und bedachten Umgang mit der Massenmigration. Änderungen in den Asyl- und Visaregelungen sind angeraten, erfordern aber eine kluge zeitliche Abfolge der Umsetzung. Legale, möglicherweise temporäre Migrationsmöglichkeiten sollten in Betracht gezogen werden, um eine unerwünschte Krisensituation im Kosovo nicht zu verstärken. Im Kosovo selbst müssen als Antwort auf die Abwanderung endlich bestehende Strukturen aufgebrochen und die Korruption bekämpft werden, denn nur leistungsfähige Institutionen und funktionierende Sozialsysteme können dem Land helfen, den wirtschaftlichen Stillstand und die Perspektivlosigkeit zu überwinden.