Suchergebnisse

Today few people deny the existence of regional substate diplomacy (Criekemans 2010). But there is still no common agreement on a region's right to do so and, above all, on their scope of action. This question goes against what used to be the dominant approach in international relations, the state-centric approach that leads to the logic of speaking with one voice. Increasingly, a multilevel-governance approach has contested this state-centric view and proposes an alternative logic of multiple actors speaking with their voice, nuancing strongly the seminal distinction between "sovereignty-bound" and "sovereignty-free" actors (Rosenau 1990). From the 1970s, the world has seen the growing presence of sovereignty-free actors in international relations. Among these actors, non-central or, better, substate, governments of federal states have developed intensive foreign relations. These governments are using a range of techniques: from shaping the federal government's foreign policy to establishing themselves directly in the international arena (Blatter et al. 2008). For minority nation governments this is particularly a challenge, as they have to act internally – where they have developed full-fledged legislative powers within a multinational federation – and externally – where international and national laws are often still reluctant to recognise their right of action (Lejeune 2003). Yet some minority nations have thrived in developing their own international relations. Bavaria, Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, Scotland and Wallonia are often seen as successful international players even if they are not fully sovereignty bound (Michelmann 2009; Criekemans 2010). The international actions of these minority nations have been characterised under the umbrella of "identity paradiplomacy" (Paquin 2003); that is, a willingness to use international relations to foster a nation-building process within a multinational state. This observation was particularly prevalent for minority nations strongly in competition with a federal government about their nationbuilding process, albeit for different reasons, namely Flanders, Quebec and Scotland (Paquin 2004). The case of Wallonia seems to fits less well into the identity paradiplomacy framework, which therefore raises the question of alternative roads to international relations. This is the core question of this chapter: is identity paradiplomacy the only way to go for minority nations? Quebec and Wallonia are both well known for their active foreign relations.

The participation of non-state actors to international politics has been investigated since the creation of international institutions. Yet, the rules, principles and norms of global governance are no more discussed in single, isolated institutions. Rather, with the proliferation of international regimes and organisations, international issues are now negotiated in a context of institutional interactions known as "regime complexes". This poses new questions, in particular on the negotiation burden that these new processes place on international actors. To answer this question, this contribution compares non-state participation in both contexts (single regimes and regime complexes), using the international forest negotiations as a case study. It uses quantitative methods to measure the negotiation burden of single regimes and compare it to the negotiation burden of regime complexes. The negotiation burden of single regimes is found insignificant with political interest being the major motivation for participation, while the negotiation burden of regime complexes is found relevant, requiring a certain type of material and organisational resources for non-state actors to participate. Yet a certain diversity of non-state representation is maintained within regime complexes, with non-governmental organisations being dominant with respect to business groups.

While a great deal of attention is devoted to the Pacific region as the new chessboard of international politics, Pakistan remains a key actor in terms of both threat and potential. Two observations back this argument: first, Pakistan's fundamental roles as a state are challenged by its ongoing conflict with India and internal insurgencies. Second, due to a power-status gap, Pakistan experiences difficulties in holding specific self-conceived roles. In addition to hampering its socio-economic potential, these developments prevent Pakistan's quest for normalization in the system. As a consequence, we argue that engaging with Islamabad should be a priority for Washington so as to prevent the country from further aligning with Beijing, thus reinforcing China's regional leadership and status as peer-competitor to the United States. Indeed, as the potential for deviance in the international system arises from its normative dimension, the US, as the global leader, counts among its roles that of norm-setter and primary socializer for most states. Our research proposes to look at an old puzzle with new theoretical insights. By addressing the question of Washington's engagement towards non-conforming states, we aim to document a set of socialization processes as intervening variables linking American global role as leader and primary socializer to Pakistan's process of social integration (normalization/deviance). Drawing from sociology and social psychology, the paper seeks to explore the ability of the leader to act as a primary source of role location and status recognition towards non-conforming states so as to integrate them (back) into the US-led system.

The Red Devils, chocolate or beer and the King, such is the typical answers given to the oft-asked question of what is still holding Belgium together. To these three symbols, two extra elements are often added: the debt and Brussels, the capital of the country and of the Flemish Region/Community, the French Community (politically but not constitutionally the Wallonia-Brussels Federation), the European Union (to be more specific, one of the three capitals, along with Strasbourg and Luxemburg), while being as well the seat of the Brussels Capital Region. Generally, the list of factors of unity in Belgium ends with this short list. Is it already too long, or on the contrary, is it really too short? This is the main question of this chapter. Paradoxically, although this question often arises, there are very few scientific writings analyzing it. To do so, this chapter will discuss six sets of factors: historical, identity, socio-economic, political, international and symbolic. Nonetheless, it is important to take into account that such enterprise seeks to be informative and not prescriptive. This chapter does not assume that Belgium should be united. There are several points of view about what Belgium should be, and this contribution merely wishes to nurture the political debate by conveying an original approach on six types of factors.

After years of political crises and negotiations, the deep-rooted conflict between Dutch- and French-speaking parties recently led to the 2011 agreement concerning a further reform of the Belgian state. This reform mainly furthers decentralises the – already federal – state structure, including the allocation of additional competences and fiscal powers to sub-national entities (Regions and Communities). But this new state reform also brings about a radical reform of the upper house: the Belgian Senate. Since 1995, the Senate was composed of three different types of members: Senators directly elected by two linguistically separated electorate (the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking electorates), Senators indirectly elected by the Community parliaments and Senators coopted by the two other types. The French- and German-speaking linguistic minorities had a fixed amount of seats in this assembly. The reform of the state radically changed the legislative competences of the Senate and its composition as its members will now be designated by Regional and Community parliaments (plus 10 coopted senators). Broadly speaking, the appointment of the majority of the Senators moved from a system of direct and language-based election to a system of indirect and mixed regional and language-based designation. This change is not without consequence for the representation of linguistic minorities. In May 2014, regional, community and federal elections will be organised in Belgium, testing for the first time this new system of designation of Senators by regional and community parliaments. This paper intends to present the 2013 reform of the Senate in Belgium and its consequence for the representation of linguistic minorities. The situations before and after the reform of the Senate will be compared, not only in terms of the way Senators are appointed but in terms of its consequence on the linguistic aspects of the regional and community elections campaign and of the profile of the appointed Senators.

Como respuesta al conflicto armado que se ha desarrollado en Libia a lo largo de 2011, la UE ha ejecutado las sanciones decididas por el Consejo de Seguridad que no implican el uso de la fuerza, ha destinado más de 150 millones de euros de ayuda humanitaria a la región, ha puesto en marcha la operación FRONTEX "EPN Hermes Extensión 2011", y ha proyectado una operación militar de apoyo a la asistencia humanitaria, la EUFOR Libia, que nunca se ha desplegado. En una perspectiva más general, las revueltas populares que se han sucedido en varios Estados del sur del Mediterráneo, entre ellos Libia, en el que se ha desembocado en una guerra civil, han certificado el fracaso de la política exterior de la UE en esta región. En efecto, durante la última década la política euromediterránea de la UE ha estado mucho más centrada en la cooperación económica y comercial —sobre todo en el campo energético— y en el control de la inmigración irregular, que en el escrupuloso respeto del ordenamiento internacional y la promoción de la democracia, el Estado de derecho y el respecto de los derechos humanos, así como el desarrollo económico y social de la población de los Estados del sur del Mediterráneo. ; As a response to the armed conflict occurred in Libya during year 2011, the EU has applied those Security Council sanctions not involving the use of force. Likewise, the EU has allocated more than E 150 million to humanitarian assistance in the region having implemented Frontex Operation «EPN Hermes Extension 2011» as well and having designed a military operation in support of humanitarian assistance there —the so-called EUFOR Libya, never deployed before. From a more general perspective, people's uprisings in several Southern Mediterranean States —which in the Libyan case has led to a civil war— have proved the failure of EU's foreign policy in the region. In fact, EU's Euro-Mediterranean Policy in the last decade has been mainly focused on financial and trade cooperation (especially in the energy field) and on irregular migration control, to the detriment of the full respect for International Law, and the promotion of democracy, the rule of Law and the respect for human rights, and the economic and social development of the peoples in Southern Mediterranean States. ; Trabajo elaborado en el marco del proyecto de investigación coordinado, concedido por el Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, "La Política Mediterránea de la Unión Europea en perspectiva: el proceso de Barcelona, la Unión para el Mediterráneo y los intereses españoles" (DER2009-14238-C02-01).

Les universitats europees tenen la responsabilitat i estan compromeses en la construcció de l'Europa i la Societat del Coneixement. La creació de l'espai europeu d'educació superior (EEES) suposa tenir en compte les iniciatives dels governs i implica desenvolupar processos de reorganització i transformació de la intervenció socioeducativa. L'experiència interuniversitària és la primera d'un procés d'innovació docent que hom pretén implementar en successius cursos . El principal objectiu era motivat per l'oportunitat d'experimentar una aplicació de social networking, adquirint competències de l'educador social en la construcció del coneixement a través de la discussió en xarxa, utilitzant estratègies socioconstructivistes. ; Las universidades europeas tienen la responsabilidad y están comprometidas en laconstrucción de la Europa y la Sociedad del Conocimiento. La creación del espacio europeo de educación superior (EEES) supone tener en cuenta las iniciativas de los gobiernos e implica desarrollar procesos de reorganización y transformación de la intervención socioeducativa. La experiencia inter-universitaria es la primera de un proceso de innovación docente que se pretende implementar en sucesivos cursos. El principal objetivo estaba motivado por la oportunidad de experimentar una aplicación de social networking, adquiriendo competencias del educador social en la construcción del conocimiento a través de la discusión en red, utilizando estrategias socioconstructivistas. ; European universities are responsible for, and committed to, making Europe a knowledge-based society. The creation of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) involves taking into account initiatives from the government, and developing procedures for reorganising and transforming social-education methods. The inter-university experience is the first in an innovative teaching process that is to be implemented in succeeding academic years. The main aim is based on the opportunity to try out a social networking application by acquiring the skills of a social educator in building knowledge through on-line discussions, using social constructivism strategies.

L'aparició de la Direcliva Europea de lliure circulació de treballadors és el punt de partida per la que l'Oficina Europea de l'AJEJI decideixi contactar i emplaçar al món professional europeu a realitzar un treball conjunt a partir de dues trobades es construeix una part del que s'anomena la Plalaforma Comuna de la professió. Aquest primer treball serveix de base per consruir; amb les aportacions dels altres continents presents en l'Associació internacional allò que s'anomena el Marc Conceptual de les funcions i competencies dels educadors socials a escala internacional. Els reptes de futur passen per construir el cos teòric de la professió des dels professionals i donar visibilitat al treball socioeducatiu aprofitant els canals administratius i burocràctics de la Unió Europea. ; La aparición de la Directiva Europea de libre circulación de trabajadores es el punto de partida para que la Oficina Europea de la AJEJI decida contactar y emplazar al mundo profesional europeo a realizar un trabajo conjunto. A partir de dos encuentros se construye una parte de lo que se denomina la Plataforma Común de la profesión. Este primer trabajo sirve de base para construir, con las aportaciones de los otros continentes presentes en la Asociación Internacional lo que se denomina el Marco Conceptual de las funciones y competencias de los educadores sociales a escala internacional. Los retos de futuro pasan por construir el cuerpo teórico de la profesión desde los profesionales y dar visibilidad al trabajo socioeducativo aprovechando los canales administraticos y burocráticos de la Unión Europea. ; The appearance of the European Directive on free movement of workers was the starting point for when the European Office of the AIEJI decided to contact and cali upon the professionals in Europe to carry out a joint project. After two meetings a part of what is caused the Common Platfom for the profession was constructed. This first project is the basis for building the Conceptual Framework of the Functions and Competences of Social Educators. on an international scale and wtlh contributions from the other continents present in the international Associalion. Future challenges include establishing a theoretical body for the profession by professionals and to promote the work of social education by making use of adminislralive and bureaucratic channels of the European Union.