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Today few people deny the existence of regional substate diplomacy (Criekemans 2010). But there is still no common agreement on a region's right to do so and, above all, on their scope of action. This question goes against what used to be the dominant approach in international relations, the state-centric approach that leads to the logic of speaking with one voice. Increasingly, a multilevel-governance approach has contested this state-centric view and proposes an alternative logic of multiple actors speaking with their voice, nuancing strongly the seminal distinction between "sovereignty-bound" and "sovereignty-free" actors (Rosenau 1990). From the 1970s, the world has seen the growing presence of sovereignty-free actors in international relations. Among these actors, non-central or, better, substate, governments of federal states have developed intensive foreign relations. These governments are using a range of techniques: from shaping the federal government's foreign policy to establishing themselves directly in the international arena (Blatter et al. 2008). For minority nation governments this is particularly a challenge, as they have to act internally – where they have developed full-fledged legislative powers within a multinational federation – and externally – where international and national laws are often still reluctant to recognise their right of action (Lejeune 2003). Yet some minority nations have thrived in developing their own international relations. Bavaria, Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, Scotland and Wallonia are often seen as successful international players even if they are not fully sovereignty bound (Michelmann 2009; Criekemans 2010). The international actions of these minority nations have been characterised under the umbrella of "identity paradiplomacy" (Paquin 2003); that is, a willingness to use international relations to foster a nation-building process within a multinational state. This observation was particularly prevalent for minority nations strongly in competition with a federal government about their nationbuilding process, albeit for different reasons, namely Flanders, Quebec and Scotland (Paquin 2004). The case of Wallonia seems to fits less well into the identity paradiplomacy framework, which therefore raises the question of alternative roads to international relations. This is the core question of this chapter: is identity paradiplomacy the only way to go for minority nations? Quebec and Wallonia are both well known for their active foreign relations.

The participation of non-state actors to international politics has been investigated since the creation of international institutions. Yet, the rules, principles and norms of global governance are no more discussed in single, isolated institutions. Rather, with the proliferation of international regimes and organisations, international issues are now negotiated in a context of institutional interactions known as "regime complexes". This poses new questions, in particular on the negotiation burden that these new processes place on international actors. To answer this question, this contribution compares non-state participation in both contexts (single regimes and regime complexes), using the international forest negotiations as a case study. It uses quantitative methods to measure the negotiation burden of single regimes and compare it to the negotiation burden of regime complexes. The negotiation burden of single regimes is found insignificant with political interest being the major motivation for participation, while the negotiation burden of regime complexes is found relevant, requiring a certain type of material and organisational resources for non-state actors to participate. Yet a certain diversity of non-state representation is maintained within regime complexes, with non-governmental organisations being dominant with respect to business groups.

While a great deal of attention is devoted to the Pacific region as the new chessboard of international politics, Pakistan remains a key actor in terms of both threat and potential. Two observations back this argument: first, Pakistan's fundamental roles as a state are challenged by its ongoing conflict with India and internal insurgencies. Second, due to a power-status gap, Pakistan experiences difficulties in holding specific self-conceived roles. In addition to hampering its socio-economic potential, these developments prevent Pakistan's quest for normalization in the system. As a consequence, we argue that engaging with Islamabad should be a priority for Washington so as to prevent the country from further aligning with Beijing, thus reinforcing China's regional leadership and status as peer-competitor to the United States. Indeed, as the potential for deviance in the international system arises from its normative dimension, the US, as the global leader, counts among its roles that of norm-setter and primary socializer for most states. Our research proposes to look at an old puzzle with new theoretical insights. By addressing the question of Washington's engagement towards non-conforming states, we aim to document a set of socialization processes as intervening variables linking American global role as leader and primary socializer to Pakistan's process of social integration (normalization/deviance). Drawing from sociology and social psychology, the paper seeks to explore the ability of the leader to act as a primary source of role location and status recognition towards non-conforming states so as to integrate them (back) into the US-led system.

The Red Devils, chocolate or beer and the King, such is the typical answers given to the oft-asked question of what is still holding Belgium together. To these three symbols, two extra elements are often added: the debt and Brussels, the capital of the country and of the Flemish Region/Community, the French Community (politically but not constitutionally the Wallonia-Brussels Federation), the European Union (to be more specific, one of the three capitals, along with Strasbourg and Luxemburg), while being as well the seat of the Brussels Capital Region. Generally, the list of factors of unity in Belgium ends with this short list. Is it already too long, or on the contrary, is it really too short? This is the main question of this chapter. Paradoxically, although this question often arises, there are very few scientific writings analyzing it. To do so, this chapter will discuss six sets of factors: historical, identity, socio-economic, political, international and symbolic. Nonetheless, it is important to take into account that such enterprise seeks to be informative and not prescriptive. This chapter does not assume that Belgium should be united. There are several points of view about what Belgium should be, and this contribution merely wishes to nurture the political debate by conveying an original approach on six types of factors.

After years of political crises and negotiations, the deep-rooted conflict between Dutch- and French-speaking parties recently led to the 2011 agreement concerning a further reform of the Belgian state. This reform mainly furthers decentralises the – already federal – state structure, including the allocation of additional competences and fiscal powers to sub-national entities (Regions and Communities). But this new state reform also brings about a radical reform of the upper house: the Belgian Senate. Since 1995, the Senate was composed of three different types of members: Senators directly elected by two linguistically separated electorate (the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking electorates), Senators indirectly elected by the Community parliaments and Senators coopted by the two other types. The French- and German-speaking linguistic minorities had a fixed amount of seats in this assembly. The reform of the state radically changed the legislative competences of the Senate and its composition as its members will now be designated by Regional and Community parliaments (plus 10 coopted senators). Broadly speaking, the appointment of the majority of the Senators moved from a system of direct and language-based election to a system of indirect and mixed regional and language-based designation. This change is not without consequence for the representation of linguistic minorities. In May 2014, regional, community and federal elections will be organised in Belgium, testing for the first time this new system of designation of Senators by regional and community parliaments. This paper intends to present the 2013 reform of the Senate in Belgium and its consequence for the representation of linguistic minorities. The situations before and after the reform of the Senate will be compared, not only in terms of the way Senators are appointed but in terms of its consequence on the linguistic aspects of the regional and community elections campaign and of the profile of the appointed Senators.

As a motivational factor of action, political efficacy is an important predictor of political behaviour. The term was invented to capture the extent to which people feel that they can effectively participate in politics and shape political processes. Today, we have a comprehensive knowledge of the individual-level factors (socio-demographic variables, political preferences etc.) that shape the level of internal and external dimensions of political efficacy. However, while it is widely demonstrated that media consumption influences the level of political efficacy, the country-level media context factors affecting it have rarely been studied. This paper reports the findings of extensive research on how two crucial features of the media context, the political significance of the media and the level of political parallelism in the media system, shape the level of external and internal political efficacy. The investigation draws upon the dataset of the seventh round (2014 – 2015) of the European Social Survey (ESS) and includes more than twenty-two thousand respondents from nineteen European democracies. The research hypothesizes that in countries where the media play a more important role, people have lower levels of external and higher levels of internal political efficacy. Political parallelism, which shows the extent to which media outlets are driven by distinct political orientations and interests within a particular media system, is expected to directly increase both external and internal political efficacy. Its indirect effect is also hypothesized, arguing that partisan media amplifies the winner-loser gap in political efficacy as a kind of "echo chamber". The findings show that in countries where the media play a major role in shaping political discourse, people have lower levels of external political efficacy, while the political parallelism of the media system indirectly affects the external dimensions of political efficacy. Internal political efficacy is, however, not related to these context-level factors.

What we today call the international system was created by the West from early modern age. This term is often used in political theory, but less focused on how to classify integrative forces within the international system. In the context of this study, we are attempting to lay down some conceptual basis. How do we understand the linking and unifying factors within the international system? Initially, the emergence of the international system was largely attributed to political factors in theory, but we can also refer to other explanatory principles: one considers economic factors and civilizational factors are taken into consideration as essential aspects of the international structures. According to our viewpoint, inter-civilization dialogue seems to be a "third way" that goes beyond the expansive one-sidedness of Western universalism and the world-level confrontation of hostile civilizations. This "civilizational approach" incorporates the two previous aspects - economic and political - and this is what gives its importance. In our view, inter-civilization dialogue is the only viable way to create global ethos, and only the resulting "intellectual revolution" can make national and supranational economic and political institutions to operate in effective way under the conditions of globalization.

This paper explores how Britain's and Colombia's privileged relations with the United States (U.S.) influenced their journey through the European Community (EC) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). The Anglo–American Special Relationship (AASR) was compatible with British participation in the European Single Market, but not with adherence to creating the EC's common currency, nor with leadership in building a European defence structure autonomous from NATO. Thus, since the start of the Iraq war, Britain played a rather obstructive role in what later was called European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The US–Colombia Partnership (USCP), based on a longstanding military association reinforced under Plan Colombia, naturally discouraged any meaningful Colombian participation in UNASUR's South American Security Council (CDS), a regional cooperative security project, promoted by Brazil. Cherished projects of the liberal CAP – such as triangular cooperation (to export Colombian security expertise to Central America with U.S. co-financing and oversight) and NATO partnership – also distracted Colombia's interest from UNASUR, diminishing the latter's relevance collaterally. A role for UNASUR – alongside the Organization of American States (OAS) – in South American security management was compatible with the liberal CAP, but not with the neoconservative CAP. Even a lopsided complementation – such as the one between NATO and the CSDP – proved unviable between the OAS and UNASUR.

Tanulmányunk a nemzetközi rendszer átalakulásával foglalkozik, azt Polányi kettős mozgásának a nemzetközi politikai gazdaságtan három vizsgálati szintjére (rendszer szintje, nemzetállam szintje, ideák szintje) való kiterjesztésével mutatja be. A cél annak az ingamozgásnak a bemutatása, mely az önszabályozó piac és a Bretton Woodsi "beágyazott liberalizmus" között írható le. Bemutatjuk azt is, hogy a populista pártok napjainkban megfigyelhető növekvő népszerűsége a piacosító folyamatokkal szembeni ellenmozgásként értelmezhető. = Our paper examines the transformation of the international economic system. We examine the process of Polanyi's double movement on the three levels of analysis of the international political economy: systemic, domestic and cognitive. Our aim is to show that during the development of the international system a certain pendulum is present which swings between the idea of the self-regulating market and 'the embedded liberalism' of the Bretton Woods System. We will also show, that the increasing popularity of populist political parties might be also understood as a countermovement against forces of marketization.

Geopolitics as a multidisciplinary branch of social science and as a theory of foreign policy appeared on the Latin-American continent in the second half of the 1920s. The main features they include are the next: aggressive approach to the space, the continental adaption of the organic state-theory elaborated by Ratzel and Kjellen, moreover, the developed geopolitical theory was thought to be converted into practice via the growing role of the army. In all Latin- American countries the armed forces and their various institutions became the scientific centre of elaborating the new attitude to the international relations as a theory. When the army az an institution assumed the political power, however, it was given an opportunity to put these theories into practice. With the definition of the constant and conjuntural national goals those countries of the vast territories aimed at both re-determination of their international economic and political positions and solving their problems connected with their own inner space. Therefore the regional transitions, the settling in the rarely- populated areas, the usage of sources of raw material and reserves, the control of transport and communication network of international significance and obtaining the influence over the new territories were the problems that in many of those countries came to the front. On the Latin-American continent the geopolitical schools with important theo-retical background were established in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. In this study we are going to introduce the Chilean geopolitical theory and practice established by generals Ramon Cañas Montalva and Augusto Pinochet. Apart from the theoretical outlines we will analyse the Chilean attitude to the possession of the Beagle-channel, The Drake-passage and the Magellan-strait and the Antarctic. ; Geopolitics as a multidisciplinary branch of social science and as a theory of foreign policy appeared on the Latin-American continent in the second half of the 1920s. The main features they include are the next: aggressive approach to the space, the continental adaption of the organic state-theory elaborated by Ratzel and Kjellen, moreover, the developed geopolitical theory was thought to be converted into practice via the growing role of the army. In all Latin- American countries the armed forces and their various institutions became the scientific centre of elaborating the new attitude to the international relations as a theory. When the army az an institution assumed the political power, however, it was given an opportunity to put these theories into practice. With the definition of the constant and conjuntural national goals those countries of the vast territories aimed at both re-determination of their international economic and political positions and solving their problems connected with their own inner space. Therefore the regional transitions, the settling in the rarely- populated areas, the usage of sources of raw material and reserves, the control of transport and communication network of international significance and obtaining the influence over the new territories were the problems that in many of those countries came to the front. On the Latin-American continent the geopolitical schools with important theo-retical background were established in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. In this study we are going to introduce the Chilean geopolitical theory and practice established by generals Ramon Cañas Montalva and Augusto Pinochet. Apart from the theoretical outlines we will analyse the Chilean attitude to the possession of the Beagle-channel, The Drake-passage and the Magellan-strait and the Antarctic.

This paper is aimed at analysing the impact of the crisis of the liberal international order on the transatlantic relations. Both the EU and the US have vital interest to maintain the existing international order, however regarding certain foreign policy goals we witness an increasingly divergent approach to world politics. This is the case with the Middle East, where the EU acts as a global player based on historical ties, while the United States have recently started a gradual disengagement from the region. The so-called post-American Middle East have its own opportunities as well as challenges for the European diplomacy. This article focuses on the differences between the EU and the US foreign policy goals related to the Middle East. It primarily addresses the Iranian nuclear program and the Middle East Peace Plan recently launched by the US. The author argues despite some differences in interests, the EU and the US do not perceive the region in an entirely different way.

Transparency is a widely used concept in debates on international politics, from transnational anti-corruption campaigns to renewed requests for greater disclosure on health, finance, or even security issues. Calls for transparency date back at least to the League of Nations, when internationalists demanded open diplomacy. Yet, it is in the subfield of GEG, and its developments on nonstate actors as a key research topic (see introduction), where the practice and theory of transparency has made the most profound inroads (Gupta 2010a). GEG has been a particularly fertile ground for the development of informational governance (Mol 2008) and the rise of numerous transparency initiatives which have been analyzed in a rapidly developing literature. Importantly, current GEG research is also highly relevant for other IR subfields. For one, recent GEG research can help IR scholars to further refine the concept of transparency and to increase conceptual clarity and sophistication. Second, research on GEG has improved our understanding of the factors that determine the effectiveness of transparency as a governance tool in international politics.

Der Artikel sucht eine Antwort auf die Frage, welche Rolle die Unabhängige Kleinwirtenpartei der Kulturdiplomarie zu einer Zeit geben wollte, zu der die politische Pluralität einzelartige Möglichkeiten zur nationalen Entwicklung geboten hat. Die Analyse zeigt, dass die Partei eine europäische, gleichzeitig verpflichtet-nationale Kulturpolitik führte. Durch Forschungen wurde bewiesen, dass die Partei mit der Kriegsbeendigung in kurzer Zeit von einem Null-Standpunkt zu einer niveauvollen Kulturpolitik kommt, die den Forderungen der politischen Pluralität entspricht. Zur Zeit der internationalen Isolierung wollte die Partei ein reales Nationalitätsbild (Ungarnbild) schaffen. Die UKWP wollte eine kritische Stellung zur nationalen Vergangenheit beziehen, aber sie hatte diese Erwartung auch im Falle der Nachbarvölker. Als eine Möglichkeit der ungarischen Entfaltung hat sie die Zusammenarbeit im Karpaten-Becken gesehen. Ihrer Ansicht nach ist die "große Welt" durch die Nachbarn, durch die Versöhnung der Völker im Karpaten-Becken zu erreichen.

After the transformation to democracy and market economy the Visegrad Four (V4) countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) have rejoined the group of donors providing international development assistance to poor emerging countries. The aim of the paper is to help to better understand the foreign aid policy and practice of the V4 countries and their contribution to the development of the poor emerging countries by providing foreign aid for them. The main research questions focus on the following issues: What is the history and the major motif of the V4 countries for providing foreign aid? Which are the most preferred beneficiary countries and why? How much foreign aid and in what area is provided? How does it relate to other international donors? What does it mean to the recipient countries? Are there similarities or differences between the V4 countries in this respect? What are the major features distinguishing V4 donors from others? What kind of challenges and opportunities can arise? The hypotheses of the research to be tested are as follows: 1. Providing foreign aid by the V4 countries has its roots in the past regime which still has an influence on the present practice. 2. The V4 countries represent a special model for development cooperation with the aid recipient countries. 3. The major motif of the V4 countries for providing foreign aid was to support the geopolitical interest of the ex "Soviet Block", while after the change of the regime the aspiration of the V4 countries shifted towards gaining economic benefits from the cooperation with the aid recipient countries. The method of the research is literature review related to development theory and foreign aid as well as statistical analysis based on data on Official Development Assistance (ODA). Results prove the hypotheses.

The peace treaty that was signed by the representatives of the Hungarian government at the Grand Trianon Palace in Versailles on the 4th June 1920, closed the hostilities between the warring parties, and with its 364 articles, it recorded the severe conditions of peace, striking on the defeated Hungary. The peace agreement has not yet become effective with the signing ceremony. The enactment, ratification and sanction of the signed treaty were just ahead. Since the peace treaty was among the international agreements that came in force only after the ratification – and the implementation could also be demanded after the act – the Hungarian party done all to ensure that the ratification take place as late as possible. They wanted to achieve their limited revisionist goals during this period. However, the victorious powers urged the prompt ratification. It was more than a year process from the beginning of the ratification till the peace agreement entered into force which period can be divided into two major clearly separable phases. The first phase lasted from the signing of the peace treaty on 4 June 1920 till 26 October 1920 with its submission to the National Assembly. The second phase includes parliamentary debates and the ratification itself lasting until 26 July 1921, the exchanging of the ratification documents. The size of the subject made it necessary to present the events of the two periods in two separate studies. Thus, the present study describes and analyzes the events of the first period. The essay gives full details of the ratification as an international norm, covering the codification position of Hungary and the Little Entente states and, relating to the victorious powers efforts. The document gives a detailed analyzes of the great powers's policy which finally forced the Hungarian government to submit the ratification of the Trianon Peace Treaty to the National Assembly.