Today few people deny the existence of regional substate diplomacy (Criekemans 2010). But there is still no common agreement on a region's right to do so and, above all, on their scope of action. This question goes against what used to be the dominant approach in international relations, the state-centric approach that leads to the logic of speaking with one voice. Increasingly, a multilevel-governance approach has contested this state-centric view and proposes an alternative logic of multiple actors speaking with their voice, nuancing strongly the seminal distinction between "sovereignty-bound" and "sovereignty-free" actors (Rosenau 1990). From the 1970s, the world has seen the growing presence of sovereignty-free actors in international relations. Among these actors, non-central or, better, substate, governments of federal states have developed intensive foreign relations. These governments are using a range of techniques: from shaping the federal government's foreign policy to establishing themselves directly in the international arena (Blatter et al. 2008). For minority nation governments this is particularly a challenge, as they have to act internally – where they have developed full-fledged legislative powers within a multinational federation – and externally – where international and national laws are often still reluctant to recognise their right of action (Lejeune 2003). Yet some minority nations have thrived in developing their own international relations. Bavaria, Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, Scotland and Wallonia are often seen as successful international players even if they are not fully sovereignty bound (Michelmann 2009; Criekemans 2010). The international actions of these minority nations have been characterised under the umbrella of "identity paradiplomacy" (Paquin 2003); that is, a willingness to use international relations to foster a nation-building process within a multinational state. This observation was particularly prevalent for minority nations strongly in competition with a federal government about their nationbuilding process, albeit for different reasons, namely Flanders, Quebec and Scotland (Paquin 2004). The case of Wallonia seems to fits less well into the identity paradiplomacy framework, which therefore raises the question of alternative roads to international relations. This is the core question of this chapter: is identity paradiplomacy the only way to go for minority nations? Quebec and Wallonia are both well known for their active foreign relations.
The Global Nutrition Report (GNR) provides a global profile and country profiles on nutrition for each of the United Nations' 193 member states, and includes specific progress for each country. It will be a centerpiece of the Second International Conference on Nutrition (ICN2) in Rome on 19-21 November, organized by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization. ; Supplementary Online Materials ix Acknowledgments x Abbreviations xii Executive summary xiii Chapter 1 ntroduction 2 Chapter 2 Nutrition Is Central to Sustainable Development 7 Chapter 3 Progress toward the World Health Assembly Nutrition Targets Is Too Slow1 5 Chapter 4 The Coexistence of Different Forms of Malnutrition Is the "New Normal" 22 Chapter 5 The Coverage of Nutrition-Specific Interventions Needs to Improve 29 Chapter 6 Interventions Addressing the Underlying Determinants of Nutrition Status Are Important, but They Need to Be More Nutrition sensitive 38 Chapter 7 The Enabling Environment Is Improving, but Not Quickly Enough 47 Chapter 8 The Need to Strengthen Accountability in Nutrition 56 Chapter 9 What Are the Priorities for Investment in Improved Nutrition Data? 67 Chapter 10 Key Messages and Recommendations 71 Appendix 1 The Nutrition Country Profile: A Tool for Action 75 Appendix 2 Which Countries Are on Course to Meet Several WHA Targets? 77 Appendix 3 Which Countries Are on Course for Which WHA Targets? 79 Appendix 4 Donor Spending on Nutrition-Specific and Nutrition-Sensitive Interventions and Programs 84 Appendix 5 How Accountable Is the Global Nutrition Report? 86 Appendix 6 Availability of Data for Nutrition Country Profile Indicators 88 Notes 91 References 95 PANELS Panel 11 Types of Nutrition Investment, Lawrence Haddad 4 Panel 21 Nutrition and the Sustainable Development Goals—No Room for Complacency, Michael Anderson 11 Panel 22 Some New Data from India: What If?, Lawrence Haddad, Komal Bhatia, and Kamilla Eriksen 12 Panel 23 How Did Maharashtra Cut Child Stunting?, Lawrence Haddad 13 Panel 24 Can Improving the Underlying Determinants of Nutrition Help Meet the WHA Targets?, Lisa Smith and Lawrence Haddad 14 Panel 41 Malnutrition in the United States and United Kingdom, Jessica Fanzo 25 Panel 42 Regional Drivers of Malnutrition in Indonesia, Endang Achadi with acknowledgment to Sudarno Sumarto and Taufik Hidayat 26 Panel 43 Compiling District-Level Nutrition Data in India, Purnima Menon and Shruthi Cyriac 27 Panel 44 Targeting Minority Groups at Risk in the United States, Jennifer Requejo and Joel Gittelsohn 28 Panel 51 Measuring Coverage of Programs to Treat Severe Acute Malnutrition, Jose Luis Alvarez 37 Panel 61 Trends in Dietary Quality among Adults in the United States, Daniel Wang and Walter Willett 41 Panel 62 How Did Bangladesh Reduce Stunting So Rapidly?, Derek Headey 43 Panel 63 Using an Agricultural Platform in Burkina Faso to Improve Nutrition during the First 1,000 Days, Deanna Kelly Olney, Andrew Dillon, Abdoulaye Pedehombga, Marcellin Ouédraogo, and Marie Ruel 45 Panel 71 Is There a Better Way to Track Nutrition Spending? 48 Panel 72 Tracking Financial Allocations to Nutrition: Guatemala's Experience, Jesús Bulux, Otto Velasquez, Cecibel Juárez, Carla Guillén, and Fernando Arriola 49 Panel 73 A Tool for Assessing Government Progress on Creating Healthy Food Environments, Boyd Swinburn 51 Panel 74 Engaging Food and Beverage Companies through the Access to Nutrition Index, Inge Kauer 52 Panel 75 How Brazil Cut Child Stunting and Improved Breastfeeding Practices, Jennifer Requejo 54 Panel 81 Scaling Up Nutrition through Business, Jonathan Tench 61 Panel 82 How Civil Society Organizations Build Commitment to Nutrition, Claire Blanchard 62 Panel 83 Building Civil Society's Capacity to Push for Policies on Obesity and Noncommunicable Diseases, Corinna Hawkes 63 Panel 84 Can Community Monitoring Enhance Accountability for Nutrition?, Nick Nisbett and Dolf te Lintelo 64 Panel 85 National Evaluation Platforms: Potential for Nutrition, Jennifer Bryce and colleagues 65 Panel 86 The State of African Nutrition Data for Accountability and Learning, Carl Lachat, Joyce Kinabo, Eunice Nago, Annamarie Kruger, and Patrick Kolsteren 66 ; PR ; IFPRI1; CRP4; B Promoting healthy food systems ; DGO; A4NH; PHND ; CGIAR Research Program on Agriculture for Nutrition and Health (A4NH)
The participation of non-state actors to international politics has been investigated since the creation of international institutions. Yet, the rules, principles and norms of global governance are no more discussed in single, isolated institutions. Rather, with the proliferation of international regimes and organisations, international issues are now negotiated in a context of institutional interactions known as "regime complexes". This poses new questions, in particular on the negotiation burden that these new processes place on international actors. To answer this question, this contribution compares non-state participation in both contexts (single regimes and regime complexes), using the international forest negotiations as a case study. It uses quantitative methods to measure the negotiation burden of single regimes and compare it to the negotiation burden of regime complexes. The negotiation burden of single regimes is found insignificant with political interest being the major motivation for participation, while the negotiation burden of regime complexes is found relevant, requiring a certain type of material and organisational resources for non-state actors to participate. Yet a certain diversity of non-state representation is maintained within regime complexes, with non-governmental organisations being dominant with respect to business groups.
While a great deal of attention is devoted to the Pacific region as the new chessboard of international politics, Pakistan remains a key actor in terms of both threat and potential. Two observations back this argument: first, Pakistan's fundamental roles as a state are challenged by its ongoing conflict with India and internal insurgencies. Second, due to a power-status gap, Pakistan experiences difficulties in holding specific self-conceived roles. In addition to hampering its socio-economic potential, these developments prevent Pakistan's quest for normalization in the system. As a consequence, we argue that engaging with Islamabad should be a priority for Washington so as to prevent the country from further aligning with Beijing, thus reinforcing China's regional leadership and status as peer-competitor to the United States. Indeed, as the potential for deviance in the international system arises from its normative dimension, the US, as the global leader, counts among its roles that of norm-setter and primary socializer for most states. Our research proposes to look at an old puzzle with new theoretical insights. By addressing the question of Washington's engagement towards non-conforming states, we aim to document a set of socialization processes as intervening variables linking American global role as leader and primary socializer to Pakistan's process of social integration (normalization/deviance). Drawing from sociology and social psychology, the paper seeks to explore the ability of the leader to act as a primary source of role location and status recognition towards non-conforming states so as to integrate them (back) into the US-led system.
The Red Devils, chocolate or beer and the King, such is the typical answers given to the oft-asked question of what is still holding Belgium together. To these three symbols, two extra elements are often added: the debt and Brussels, the capital of the country and of the Flemish Region/Community, the French Community (politically but not constitutionally the Wallonia-Brussels Federation), the European Union (to be more specific, one of the three capitals, along with Strasbourg and Luxemburg), while being as well the seat of the Brussels Capital Region. Generally, the list of factors of unity in Belgium ends with this short list. Is it already too long, or on the contrary, is it really too short? This is the main question of this chapter. Paradoxically, although this question often arises, there are very few scientific writings analyzing it. To do so, this chapter will discuss six sets of factors: historical, identity, socio-economic, political, international and symbolic. Nonetheless, it is important to take into account that such enterprise seeks to be informative and not prescriptive. This chapter does not assume that Belgium should be united. There are several points of view about what Belgium should be, and this contribution merely wishes to nurture the political debate by conveying an original approach on six types of factors.
After years of political crises and negotiations, the deep-rooted conflict between Dutch- and French-speaking parties recently led to the 2011 agreement concerning a further reform of the Belgian state. This reform mainly furthers decentralises the – already federal – state structure, including the allocation of additional competences and fiscal powers to sub-national entities (Regions and Communities). But this new state reform also brings about a radical reform of the upper house: the Belgian Senate. Since 1995, the Senate was composed of three different types of members: Senators directly elected by two linguistically separated electorate (the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking electorates), Senators indirectly elected by the Community parliaments and Senators coopted by the two other types. The French- and German-speaking linguistic minorities had a fixed amount of seats in this assembly. The reform of the state radically changed the legislative competences of the Senate and its composition as its members will now be designated by Regional and Community parliaments (plus 10 coopted senators). Broadly speaking, the appointment of the majority of the Senators moved from a system of direct and language-based election to a system of indirect and mixed regional and language-based designation. This change is not without consequence for the representation of linguistic minorities. In May 2014, regional, community and federal elections will be organised in Belgium, testing for the first time this new system of designation of Senators by regional and community parliaments. This paper intends to present the 2013 reform of the Senate in Belgium and its consequence for the representation of linguistic minorities. The situations before and after the reform of the Senate will be compared, not only in terms of the way Senators are appointed but in terms of its consequence on the linguistic aspects of the regional and community elections campaign and of the profile of the appointed Senators.
Δεν παρατίθεται περἰληψη στα ελληνικά. ; Lina Venturas – Dimitria Groutsis, The Cold War and international migration regulation: The establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration The immediate post WWII period saw the establishment of the Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) (now International Organisation for Migration, IOM), as a key organisation in the management of post WWII migration. This paper examines the debates and policies surrounding the creation of the ICEM as an agent responsible for the facilitation and administration of labour migration from parts of Europe to a variety of overseas countries. At the conclusion of the Second World War, the problems surrounding 'surplus population' and unemployment in Europe were discussed in many international forums. It was from these discussions that a consensus emerged which saw emigration as a viable solution. To this end, in 1951, the International Labour Organisation convened a Migration Conference in Naples, bringing together key stakeholders. The Naples Conference failed, an outcome driven mainly by the US. The US was particularly concerned with economic stagnation and mounting social unrest related to the 'surplus population' in European countries in this Cold War period. At the same time however, it strived at limiting international influence over migration and refugee policies and on receiving countries retaining their sovereign immigration policies. In spite of the disagreements and through a process of negotiation, the US subsequently led the creation of an intergovernmental body, which was established at a conference convened in Brussels in 1951. This newly formed organisation, initially named the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME), was open only to states with a 'liberal' political regime and had specifically designed functions based on inter-governmental negotiations. The US ensured its predominance in the organization through budgetary control and other means. In 1953, the PICMME became a permanent 'fixture' of migration regulation and was renamed the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). Hereafter, ICEM offered operational and financial assistance for migrants' transportation, language training, reception facilities, settlement services and labour market placement.
Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; Alexandros N. Teneketzis, Art and Politics in Cold War. The International Sculpture Competition for the Monument to the Unknown Political Prisoner The gradual transfer of the metropolis of the western art world from Paris to New York and specifically in circles around the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) under the leadership of Alfred H. Barr Jr. and with the theoretical foundation by Clement Greenberg, but practically under the guidance and financing from the CIA, was also visible in the case of public memory and art about the Second World War. The international institution that was the cause for the widespread diffusion of the artistic standards grown in USA was the "International Sculpture Competition for the Monument to the Unknown Political Prisoner", which was organized under the auspices of the Institute of Contemporary Arts (ICA) in London and the Tate Gallery, but actually with the encouragement, blessings and supervision of the CIA. The competition was from the beginning a large turnout and the proposals submitted until January 1953 surpassed 3.500 –mainly abstract or semiabstract stylistic suggestions. The biggest names at the time in the international arena of sculpture in West took part, while artists from the Eastern Bloc boycotted the process. Therefore were precluded any realistic academic representative works and of course any relationship with socialist realism, giving thus the tone for both the style, and for all other future monuments in the western world. Eventually, the first prize of 2.500 pounds awarded to the British sculptor Reg Butler, unknown to the general public until that time but with a decisive commitment to abstraction. However, the work of Butler was never completed, principally because of the changing international circumstances and relationships after the death of Stalin in '53 and Khrushchev's secret speech in '56. The new "Thaw" era in EastWest relations imposed the final rejection in 1960. A public monument like that of Butler's, which would refer to the previous tense situation, was no more possible. Nevertheless, the dual objective of recognition and legitimization of abstract art in the western world and at the same time of the weakening of socialist realism and therefore of communism was promoted and achieved up to a certain degree.
Zoi Mella, The Greek Civil War and the Spanish Press during Franco's DictatorshipIn this article we would like to approach a quite unknown subject: the presence of the Greek Civil War in the Spanish Press. Our objective was to ascertain the impact this event had at the post war Spanish Press. How would react Spain in view of such a confrontation, especially since it had already experimented a Civil War? It was a complicated period for Greece, as well as for Spain, a time when both countries experienced problems of different nature but equally serious: Greece was suffering the devastating consequences of the Second World War and Spain was trying to encounter the contempt of the international political world. The Greek Civil War was the first confrontation between two worlds that were exiting reinforced from the Second World War. It became the field of conflict between the USSR and the Anglo-Saxon allies during several years. The interior problem of some rebels, who couldn't, or wouldn't, adapt themselves to the new post war situation or were discontented with the new regime, was transformed to an international matter of great impact, that managed to confront USSR, on one hand, and the US and Great Britain, on the other, in the International Organism of the United Nations. Our interest was centred in the various approaches that the newspapers and the magazines of the time made. Moreover we were interested in the points of view and the conclusions manifested by the diverse papers, according to their political and ideological affinities, without forgetting the strict regime of control and censure that was in force at that moment. This investigation forms part of a broader subject that is the bilateral relations of these two countries, rather different at first sight, that during the XX century were affected by very similar events, such as a civil war. ; Zoi Mella, The Greek Civil War and the Spanish Press during Franco's DictatorshipIn this article we would like to approach a quite unknown subject: the presence of the Greek Civil War in the Spanish Press. Our objective was to ascertain the impact this event had at the post war Spanish Press. How would react Spain in view of such a confrontation, especially since it had already experimented a Civil War? It was a complicated period for Greece, as well as for Spain, a time when both countries experienced problems of different nature but equally serious: Greece was suffering the devastating consequences of the Second World War and Spain was trying to encounter the contempt of the international political world. The Greek Civil War was the first confrontation between two worlds that were exiting reinforced from the Second World War. It became the field of conflict between the USSR and the Anglo-Saxon allies during several years. The interior problem of some rebels, who couldn't, or wouldn't, adapt themselves to the new post war situation or were discontented with the new regime, was transformed to an international matter of great impact, that managed to confront USSR, on one hand, and the US and Great Britain, on the other, in the International Organism of the United Nations. Our interest was centred in the various approaches that the newspapers and the magazines of the time made. Moreover we were interested in the points of view and the conclusions manifested by the diverse papers, according to their political and ideological affinities, without forgetting the strict regime of control and censure that was in force at that moment. This investigation forms part of a broader subject that is the bilateral relations of these two countries, rather different at first sight, that during the XX century were affected by very similar events, such as a civil war.
Transparency is a widely used concept in debates on international politics, from transnational anti-corruption campaigns to renewed requests for greater disclosure on health, finance, or even security issues. Calls for transparency date back at least to the League of Nations, when internationalists demanded open diplomacy. Yet, it is in the subfield of GEG, and its developments on nonstate actors as a key research topic (see introduction), where the practice and theory of transparency has made the most profound inroads (Gupta 2010a). GEG has been a particularly fertile ground for the development of informational governance (Mol 2008) and the rise of numerous transparency initiatives which have been analyzed in a rapidly developing literature. Importantly, current GEG research is also highly relevant for other IR subfields. For one, recent GEG research can help IR scholars to further refine the concept of transparency and to increase conceptual clarity and sophistication. Second, research on GEG has improved our understanding of the factors that determine the effectiveness of transparency as a governance tool in international politics.
The conflict over Kashmir has been a core issue between India and Pakistan since their independence. It is not only just a territorial conflict but also the core issue of the region, which has been changing along with the regional and international environment. In particular, after the 1990's, the people of Kashmir committed to armed resistance, which has become the focus of the risk to regional and international security because both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers. Resolution of this problem is quite difficult because it would require committing to the ideas of national integration of both countries. Specifically, for India, it is secularism; for Pakistan, it is the two-nation theory. However, the people of Kashmir want to choose their own destiny—integration with neither India nor Pakistan. India promised Kashmir a degree of freedom and democracy under article 370 of the Indian Constitution; however, for the time being, these right have been curtailed. To resolve this issue, two main plans have been presented by both countries; a referendum and the partition of Kashmir along the Line of Control. But, these ideas disregard the right of self-determination or the nationalist sentiment of the people of Kashmir. Recently a new idea emerged based on the notion of shared sovereignty. The history of discord between India and Pakistan has caused critical anxiety for regional peace and stability. However, there will is hope that a constructive solution to this problem can be found in the future through continuity of dialogue and negotiation between the two countries. We as an international society surrounding these nations, we should maintain a supportive stance for continued cordial dialogue.
Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of August The Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views. ; Konstantinos Katsoudas, "A Dictatorship that is not a Dictatorship". Spanish Nationalists and the 4th of AugustThe Spanish Civil War convulsed the international public opinion and prompted most foreign governments to take measures or even intervene in the conflict. Greek entanglement either in the form of smuggling war materiel or the participation of Greek volunteers in the International Brigades has already been investigated. However, little is known about a second dimension of this internationalization of the war: the peculiar forms that the antagonism between the two belligerent camps in foreign countries took. This paper, based mainly on Spanish archival sources, discusses some aspects of the activity developed in Greece by Franco's nationalists and the way Francoist diplomats and emissaries perceived the nature of an apparently similar regime, such as the dictatorship led by general Metaxas. The main objectives of the Francoist foreign policy were to avoid any escalation of the Spanish civil war into a world conflict, to secure international assistance for the right-wing forces and to undermine the legitimacy of the legal Republican government. In Greece, an informal diplomatic civil war broke out since Francoists occupied the Spanish Legation in Athens and Republicans took over the Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Francoists combined public and undercover activity: they worked hard to achieve an official recognition of their Estado Nuevo, while at the same time created rings of espionage and channels of anticommunist propaganda. The reason of their partial breakthroughs was that, contrary to their Republican enemies, the Nationalists enjoyed support by a significant part of the Greek political world, which was ideologically identified with their struggle. Francoist anti-communism had some interesting implications for Greek politics. An important issue was the Francoist effort to reveal a supposed Moscow-based conspiracy against Spain and Greece, both considered as hotbeds of revolution in the Mediterranean, in order to justify both Franco's extermination campaign and Metaxas' coup. Although this effort was based on fraudulent documents, forged by an anti-Bolshevik international organization, it became the cornerstone of Francoist and Metaxist propaganda. General Metaxas was the only European dictator to invoke the Spanish Civil War as a raison d'etre of his regime and often warned against the repetition of Spanish-like drama on Greek soil. Nevertheless he did not approve of Franco's methods and preferred Dr. Salazar's Portugal as an institutional model closer to his vision. For Spanish nationalist observers this was a sign of weakness. They interpreted events in Greece through the disfiguring mirror of their own historic experience: thus, although they never called in question Metaxas' authoritarian motives, the 4th of August regime was considered too mild and soft compared to Francoism (whose combativeness and fanaticism, as they suggested, the Greek General should have imitated); it reminded them the dictatorship founded in Spain by General Primo de Rivera in 1920s, whose inadequacy paved the way for the advent of the Republic and the emergence of sociopolitical radicalism. Incidents of the following years, as Greece moved towards a civil confrontation, seemed to strengthen their views.
Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; Anna Mahera, Émigration et développement économique dans la Grèce d'après guerre. L'approche du problème par le milieu politique de Centre-gauche Dans les premières années de l'après guerre, en Grèce se pose de nouveau le problème du mode de développement économique. En effet, la perspective de l'arrivée massive des capitaux américains en combinaison avec la disponibilité d'une main-d'oeuvre autochtone créent des conditions favorables à un projet d'industrialisation. C'est au sein des milieux politiques grecques qu'un tel projet est élaboré, alors que les instances internationales —comme le Food and Agriculture Organisation des Nations Unies— signalent les graves difficultés à surmonter. Progressivement, dans le climat de la guerre froide des années 1950, la quasi-totalité des forces politiques grecques ont abandonné l'idée d'un développement industriel, admettant la position subalterne occupée par le pays dans la division internationale du travail. Celui-ci doit se contenter au rôle de fournisseur de main-d'oeuvre vers les pays européens, en particulier vers l'Allemagne, en phase de reconstruction économique, à travers Γ émigration du travail qui prend une grande ampleur dans les années 1950 et 1960. Tout au plus, la Grèce peut-elle envisager le développement du secteur des services. Contrairement aux autres forces politiques, le Centre-gauche a parcouru ce chemin avec une décennie de retard, en raison de la présence en son sein d'une réflexion économique affirmée, émanant d'économistes de haut niveau, orientés vers l'économie de la planification, et peut-être aussi à cause de l'éloignement de ce milieu du jeu politique immédiat. Le rangement du Centre-gauche à la politique officielle d'émigration intereuropéenne a marqué la fin d'une période de fermentation sur le projet d'industrialisation de la Grèce dont l'origine remonte à l'entre-deux-guerres.
The EUROSUR system is supposed to further the surveillance of external borders of European Union Member States. From this point of view, it can be considered an important step in the construction of a controlled space. Drawing inspiration from the Foucauldian attention to programs and technologies, and mobilizing the Actor- Network-Theory concepts of setting and actant, the paper investigates EUROSUR main methodological operations. It highlights how the making of a controlled space is, first and foremost, a mise-en-discours going well beyond surveillance and pro- hibition: a continuous effort to make sense of a disparate multiplicity, encompassing both human and nonhuman elements, both controlled and controlling ones. From a theoretical perspective, the chapter contributes to on-going endeavors to reinvigor- ate the post-structuralist studies of International Relations with approaches inspired by Actor-Network-Theory.
Lambros Flitouris, The Suez Crisis and the Greek-French Relations The Suez crisis in 1956 constitutes an important point in the development of the international relations at the period of the cold war. 1956 is a landmark year for the appointment of the Arabic nationalism as a basic constitutive element of the anti-colonialist wave that convulsed the world. During this period, the relations of Greece with the states involved in the crisis were to a large extent precarious. The anti-imperialists tones of Nasser found impression in the Greek common opinion that was exceptionally irritated from the EOKA's fight in Cyprus. In the present article we examine one particular aspect of the crisis: the relations of Greece with France. The agreements of economic collaboration that was achieved by Markezinis in 1953 signalled a new era in the activation of French capital in Greece. In combination with the big cultural tradition that Prance had in the country but also with the crisis in the relations of Greece with the UK because of the Cypriot question, the French factor in Greece acquired a great importance. However, the French diplomacy followed the policy of London and because of this the relations between Greece and France faced their more important post-war crisis. The Greek common opinion also turned against France, while the French diplomacy lost a great opportunity to strengthen her place in Greece. In the sector of economic relations and cultural exchanges befell a period of algidity with extensions in the Greek internal political life. The crisis of the period 1956-1958 constituted a negative parenthesis in the traditionally good relations between Athens and Paris, while it could be characterized as an adjacent negative result of the anti-colonial struggle and the Cypriot affair. ; Lambros Flitouris, The Suez Crisis and the Greek-French RelationsThe Suez crisis in 1956 constitutes an important point in the development of the international relations at the period of the cold war. 1956 is a landmark year for the appointment of the Arabic nationalism as a basic constitutive element of the anti-colonialist wave that convulsed the world. During this period, the relations of Greece with the states involved in the crisis were to a large extent precarious. The anti-imperialists tones of Nasser found impression in the Greek common opinion that was exceptionally irritated from the EOKA's fight in Cyprus. In the present article we examine one particular aspect of the crisis: the relations of Greece with France. The agreements of economic collaboration that was achieved by Markezinis in 1953 signalled a new era in the activation of French capital in Greece. In combination with the big cultural tradition that Prance had in the country but also with the crisis in the relations of Greece with the UK because of the Cypriot question, the French factor in Greece acquired a great importance. However, the French diplomacy followed the policy of London and because of this the relations between Greece and France faced their more important post-war crisis. The Greek common opinion also turned against France, while the French diplomacy lost a great opportunity to strengthen her place in Greece. In the sector of economic relations and cultural exchanges befell a period of algidity with extensions in the Greek internal political life. The crisis of the period 1956-1958 constituted a negative parenthesis in the traditionally good relations between Athens and Paris, while it could be characterized as an adjacent negative result of the anti-colonial struggle and the Cypriot affair.