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The aim of the paper is the analysis of the relationship between the perception of the success factors in international collaborative relationships and firm's international experience. The results of an empirical study on the sample of 278 Polish exporters and importers cooperating with partners from China and Germany are presented and both the differences in success factor perception depending on foreign partners' home country, and the correlation of the perception of the success factors with the international experience of the firms are discussed. The study revealed that the firms working with partners in China have somewhat more international experience. The importance of the majority of the success factors in relationships with German partners did not differ significantly from those in collaboration with Chinese firms. However, some consequential differences were observed. Internationalization experience is not strongly related with the perception of international cooperation success factors.

The aim of this study was to present private and official codifications concerning the topic of responsibility of international organizations. Moreover, it highlighted some controversial issues which occurred during the work of International Law Commission (ILC). The topic of responsibility of international organizations was analyzed both by private bodies such as Institute de Droit International and International Law Association and – as mentioned above – ILC. The efforts of Institute de Droit International resulted in a resolution on The Legal Consequences for Member States of the Non-fulfilment by International Organizations of their Obligations toward Third Parties. While in 1996 International Law Association studied these topics, a Committee on the Accountability of International Organizations was established. These private drafts paid attention of ILC to some legal issues which helped ILC to identify problems which require further discussion. After completion of its work on State responsibility in 2001, ILC decided to include the topic Responsibility of International Organizations in its work program. Mr G. Gaja was appointed the Special Rapporteur and in years 2003-2011 he presented eight reports which took into account the comments and observations received from governments and international organizations. In his reports he largely followed the model of Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts. In 2011 the Commission adopted the draft of 67 articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, divided into six parts. The Draft Articles aimed at codification of a set of secondary rules applicable to a wide range of international organizations. The codifications of rules on the responsibility of international organizations was a very difficult task due to diversity of international organizations, which differ in size, functions and competence. Furthermore, there is a lack of relevant practice that would allow to elaborate the principles relating to responsibility of international organizations. Nonetheless, the responsibility for international wrongful acts is the most important institution of international law irrespective of the subject which committed a wrongful act. ; Artykuł nie zawiera abstraktu w języku polskim

There is no doubt that the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan is the most difficult operation in the history of NATO. 10‑years long international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan encounter strong Taliban resistance. Since years, NATO attempts to break this movement do not give the expected results. It is nowadays very, important as the outcome of the ISAF operation will have long‑term impact on the international security. To begin with, the result of this mission will affect the future shape and activity of the Atlantic Alliance. ISAF failure may result in reduction of NATO's role as a pillar of transatlanic security. Secondly, is fiasco may also have grave consequences for the political stability in Central Asia. Such countries as Turkmenistan, Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan since years fight with the phantom of Islamic fundamentalism. If Afghanistan will be taken over by Taliban, these efforts may be doomed to failure. What is even more important, success of the NATO's mission is strongly connected with the internal situation of Pakistan. In the worst‑case scenario, the Pakistan government might be taken over by extremists, Finally, Afghanistan nowadays became a place of increased rivalry between several regional powers: India, Pakistan, Iran, China and Russia. This may cause several challenges for the international security in future. Therefore, the results of the NATO's International Security Assistance Force operation in Afghanistan will strongly affect the international security.

ISAF operation is one of the hardest missions in the history of Polish Armed Forces in the Post‑Coll War era. Polish Army activity in Afghanistan is also noticeable among other NATO countries. However military involvement in this operation meets a number of challenges, especially when it comes to national security and defence policy. The article discusses these problems, such as: financial aspects of PKW Afghanistan; its influence on the process of modernization of Polish Army; military actitivy in Ghazni province; ideas to withdraw Polish forces prematurely; or political aspects of Polish involvement in Central Asia. Author distinguished several positive and negative aspects of Polish participation in the ISAF operation. Among negative, author listed e.g. the lack of complex solutions (financial, political, organizational) implemented by Poland to improve the security and functioning of PKW Afghanistan. However, it has to be also noted that the military involvement in Afghanistan allows to strengthen Polish position in the Atlantic Alliance. It also caused a major shift in the process of modernization of Polish Army.

Unia Europejska odgrywa na arenie międzynarodowej wiele ról, a jednym z priorytetowych kierunków w jej polityce zagranicznej jest region śródziemnomorski. Od połowy lat 90. XX wieku UE stara się odgrywać jednocześnie kilka ról wobec państw w nim położonych. Najważniejszymi z nich są role: aktywnego aktora w rozwiązywaniu konfliktu arabsko-izraelskiego; promotora środków budowy zaufania, partnerstwa, bezpieczeństwa i rozbrojenia; promotora reform rynkowych i zrównoważonego rozwoju; propagatora demokracji i praw człowieka oraz dialogu międzykulturowego.Efektywność ról międzynarodowych, analizowana na przykładzie unijnej polityki śródziemnomorskiej, jest jednak niska, ze względu na konflikt między rolami deklarowanymi, rzeczywistymi i oczekiwanymi. W konsekwencji region śródziemnomorski nie został przekształcony w obszar pokoju, stabilności, dobrobytu i porozumienia międzykulturowego, co od 1995 roku było deklarowanym przez Unię Europejską celem. ; The European Union acts in numerous capacities on the international arena, and one of its priorities in foreign policy involves the Mediterranean. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been trying to play several roles in its relations with countries in this region, the most significant being: an active participant in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict; a promoter of measures to build trust, partnership, security and disarmament; a promoter of market reforms and sustainable development; an advocate of democracy and human rights as well as cross-cultural dialogue.Assessed on the basis of its Mediterranean policy, the efficiency of the EU's international roles, however, is poor, on account of the conflict between the roles the EU declares to be playing, and its actual and expected roles. As a consequence, the Mediterranean has not transformed into the area of peace, stability, welfare and cross-cultural understanding which has been declared as the EU's objective since 1995.

Unia Europejska odgrywa na arenie międzynarodowej wiele ról, a jednym z priorytetowych kierunków w jej polityce zagranicznej jest region śródziemnomorski. Od połowy lat 90. XX wieku UE stara się odgrywać jednocześnie kilka ról wobec państw w nim położonych. Najważniejszymi z nich są role: aktywnego aktora w rozwiązywaniu konfliktu arabsko-izraelskiego; promotora środków budowy zaufania, partnerstwa, bezpieczeństwa i rozbrojenia; promotora reform rynkowych i zrównoważonego rozwoju; propagatora demokracji i praw człowieka oraz dialogu międzykulturowego. Efektywność ról międzynarodowych, analizowana na przykładzie unijnej polityki śródziemnomorskiej, jest jednak niska, ze względu na konflikt między rolami deklarowanymi, rzeczywistymi i oczekiwanymi. W konsekwencji region śródziemnomorski nie został przekształcony w obszar pokoju, stabilności, dobrobytu i porozumienia międzykulturowego, co od 1995 roku było deklarowanym przez Unię Europejską celem. ; The European Union acts in numerous capacities on the international arena, and one of its priorities in foreign policy involves the Mediterranean. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been trying to play several roles in its relations with countries in this region, the most significant being: an active participant in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict; a promoter of measures to build trust, partnership, security and disarmament; a promoter of market reforms and sustainable development; an advocate of democracy and human rights as well as cross-cultural dialogue. Assessed on the basis of its Mediterranean policy, the efficiency of the EU's international roles, however, is poor, on account of the conflict between the roles the EU declares to be playing, and its actual and expected roles. As a consequence, the Mediterranean has not transformed into the area of peace, stability, welfare and cross-cultural understanding which has been declared as the EU's objective since 1995. ; 8 ; 49 ; 61 ; 4 ; Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej

The overthrow of Libyan dictator, Muammar Al-Gaddafi, was a significant event in the Arab Spring. He was brought down by young Libyans assisted by an international coalition, mandated by the United Nations. The attitudes of different countries to the intervention in Libya were highly diversified. This paper orders, describes and partially explains the reasons behind the behavior of political elites in several countries, trying to present their motivation. The first country to be presented is Mali, which supported the dictator to the very end. Next come the countries with an ambivalent attitude to the Arab Spring in Libya, namely China, Russia and Germany. The third group of countries encompasses France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The paper is concluded with an analysis of the activities of the UN and NATO. ; Istotną częścią Arabskiej Wiosny było obalenie libijskiego dyktatora Muammara Al-Kaddafiego. Dokonała tego, oprócz młodych Libijczyków, międzynarodowa koalicja, posiadająca mandat Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych. Stanowiska państw dotyczące interwencji w Libii na areniemiędzynarodowej były silnie zróżnicowane. Poniższa praca porządkuje, opisuje i częściowo wyjaśnia przyczyny postępowania elit politycznych niektórych państw, starając się odzwierciedlić motywy, które nimi kierowały. Jako pierwsze zostało opisane państwo będące sprzymierzeńcem dyktatora do samego końca - Mali. Następnie państwa, których stosunek do Arabskiej Wiosny w Libii był niejednoznaczny - Chiny, Rosja i Niemcy. Trzecia grupa państw, która doprowadziła do zbrojnej interwencji to Francja, Wielka Brytania i Stany Zjednoczone. Na koniec zostały przeanalizowane działania Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych oraz Organizacji Paktu Północnoatlantyckiego.

Istotną częścią Arabskiej Wiosny było obalenie libijskiego dyktatora Muammara Al-Kaddafiego. Dokonała tego, oprócz młodych Libijczyków, międzynarodowa koalicja, posiadająca mandat Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych. Stanowiska państw dotyczące interwencji w Libii na arenie międzynarodowej były silnie zróżnicowane. Poniższa praca porządkuje, opisuje i częściowo wyjaśnia przyczyny postępowania elit politycznych niektórych państw, starając się odzwierciedlić motywy, które nimi kierowały. Jako pierwsze zostało opisane państwo będące sprzymierzeńcem dyktatora do samego końca – Mali. Następnie państwa, których stosunek do Arabskiej Wiosny w Libii był niejednoznaczny – Chiny, Rosja i Niemcy. Trzecia grupa państw, która doprowadziła do zbrojnej interwencji to Francja, Wielka Brytania i Stany Zjednoczone. Na koniec zostały przeanalizowane działania Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych oraz Organizacji Paktu Północnoatlantyckiego. ; The overthrow of Libyan dictator, Muammar Al-Gaddafi, was a significant event in the Arab Spring. He was brought down by young Libyans assisted by an international coalition, mandated by the United Nations. The attitudes of different countries to the intervention in Libya were highly diversified. This paper orders, describes and partially explains the reasons behind the behavior of political elites in several countries, trying to present their motivation. The first country to be presented is Mali, which supported the dictator to the very end. Next come the countries with an ambivalent attitude to the Arab Spring in Libya, namely China, Russia and Germany. The third group of countries encompasses France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The paper is concluded with an analysis of the activities of the UN and NATO.

The goal of the study is to analyze the non‑Western interpretations of sustainable development concept and the role of international organizations and international public goods in their potential realization. Numerous political and economic contradictions generated by the experiences of colonization and decolonization of the region make Western and regional understanding of the concept substantially different. While from the global perspective it is perceived as an imperative, locally it may be interpreted as a veiled form of neocolonialism. The differences result in wide range of problems, from minor misunderstandings to open resentment. The goal of the article is to prove that regional international organizations and international public goods have the potential to become a key to develop mutually acceptable form of sustainable development concept and practice.

The growing dependence of countries and societies on the use of space technologies results in the increasing activity in outer space of new actors, both state and non-state. It produces a number of adverse outcomes for the space environment, making it a less and less safe place (e.g. space debris). Emerging threats may affect national and international security on earth. As a result, an urgent need for a collective approach to the management of the use of outer space is emerging. The international legal regime for outer space that has been developing since the beginning of the space age is no longer sufficient, because it does not take into account many rapid changes. One of the attempts to overcome this problem is the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities drafted by the European Union in 2008. This paper discusses the reasons why, despite long-lasting efforts and intensifying problems, the Code has so far failed to win the approval of the powers which is requisite to constitute an important part of the international outer space regime. ; The growing dependence of countries and societies on the use of space technologies results in the increasing activity in outer space of new actors, both state and non-state. It produces a number of adverse outcomes for the space environment, making it a less and less safe place (e.g. space debris). Emerging threats may affect national and international security on earth. As a result, an urgent need for a collective approach to the management of the use of outer space is emerging. The international legal regime for outer space that has been developing since the beginning of the space age is no longer sufficient, because it does not take into account many rapid changes. One of the attempts to overcome this problem is the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities drafted by the European Union in 2008. This paper discusses the reasons why, despite long-lasting efforts and intensifying problems, the Code has so far failed to win the approval of the powers which is requisite to constitute an important part of the international outer space regime.

This article examines the reasons for adopting a non‑institutional character of the Visegrad cooperation in the years 1991‑1992. Its focus concerns two causes of the initial reluctance to institutionalise the Visegrad Group: the high level of unpredictability in Central Europe after the collapse of Communism and the symbolic role the Group was expected to play outside the region. These issues are considered through the prism of two theories in International Relations: neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Both provide theoreti‑ cal grounds to support the research hypothesis which assumes that the infor‑ mal character of the Visegrad cooperation was a pragmatic choice of its found‑ ing members. However, neorealist and neoliberal explanations of how the political background and security issues could have influenced their decision vary. The article concludes that the neorealist approach holds more explana‑ tory power in this regard, suggesting that the choice of the Visegrad states was dictated by the preservation of their national interests and subjected to ex‑ ternal limitations, rather than motivated by a common intention to facilitate their regional cooperation. ; Arkadiusz Nyzio

Rosnące uzależnienie państw i społeczeństw od wykorzystania technologii kosmicznych skutkuje nasilającą się aktywnością w przestrzeni kosmicznej prowadzoną też przez nowe podmioty, zarówno państwowe, jak i niepaństwowe. Generuje to wiele negatywnych skutków czyniących środowisko kosmiczne coraz mniej bezpiecznym miejscem (np. gruz kosmiczny). Pojawiające się zagrożenia mogą mieć wpływ na bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe na ziemi. W efekcie narasta pilna potrzeba kolektywnego podejścia do zarządzania korzystaniem z przestrzeni kosmicznej. Rozwijający się od początku ery kosmicznej międzynarodowy reżim prawny dotyczący tego środowiska nie jest już wystarczający, gdyż nie uwzględnia w wystarczającym stopniu szybko zachodzących zmian. Jedną z prób przezwyciężenia tego problemu jest przygotowany przez Unię Europejską w 2008 r. projekt międzynarodowego Kodeksu Postępowania dotyczący Działań w Przestrzeni Kosmicznej. Artykuł wskazuje ważniejsze przyczyny, dla których, mimo wieloletnich wysiłków i narastających problemów, nadal nie znalazł on akceptacji mocarstw niezbędnej, by stać się ważnym elementem międzynarodowego reżimu kosmicznego. ; The growing dependence of countries and societies on the use of space technologies results in the increasing activity in outer space of new actors, both state and non-state. It produces a number of adverse outcomes for the space environment, making it a less and less safe place (e.g. space debris). Emerging threats may affect national and international security on earth. As a result, an urgent need for a collective approach to the management of the use of outer space is emerging. The international legal regime for outer space that has been developing since the beginning of the space age is no longer sufficient, because it does not take into account many rapid changes. One of the attempts to overcome this problem is the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities drafted by the European Union in 2008. This paper discusses the reasons why, despite long-lasting efforts and intensifying problems, the Code has so far failed to win the approval of the powers which is requisite to constitute an important part of the international outer space regime.