Suchergebnisse

This article traces the ways in which political, economic, domestic, and international factors converged to provoke a massive financial crisis in Mexico in 1994/5, as well as its consequences for future reform efforts. The author argues that the ruling PRI party and international investors were equally adamant in defending the anchored exchange rate. However, in attempting to appease both domestic and foreign interests, the Salinas administration lost control of the macroeconomic fundamentals. While the combination of a massive multilateral loan and the shift to a floating exchange rate paved the way for Mexico's rapid economic recovery, a main legacy of the crisis was the political demise of the PRI. (Rev Econ Pol/DÜI)

Having just completed its second consecutive "lost decade", the Venezuelan case confirms that there are no short cuts to sound political economic management in the era of high capital mobility and securitized capital flows. The maintenance of a muddling-through exchange rate strategy has triumphed, at least for the time being, and enabled an elite executive-level coalition to prevail in pursuing a less than optimal macroeconomic policy. The author argues that Venezuela has avoided a full-blown Mexican or Brazilian-style devaluation by virtue of the Central Bank's ability to effectively manage the exchange rate. (Rev Econ Pol/DÜI)

The South American presidents meeting held in Brasilia (September 2000) has been an important step in Brazil's effort to consolidate its long standing policy of asserting its South American identity as a means of furthering the ties whith its geographic neighbors. That identity has been gradually imposing itself upon a country whose own traits threatened to perpetuate a culture of exclusion and of isolationism towards the subcontinent. Considering the growing force of this South American identity, the Brasilia summit symbolizes the culmination of a long history of converging paths, still in progress. (Polit Externa/DÜI)

This paper analyzes the outlook for Latin American economic integration at three interrelated levels: multilateral, hemispheric and sub-regional. At the multilateral level, it argues that the WTO is not prepared to regulate the competition patterns engendered by the information revolution, and this implies an interim role for regional institutions. At the hemispheric level, it shows that the FTAA will not provoke immediate threats to sub-regional agreements such as Mercosur, Andean Community and CARICOM. Consequently, the main challenge to be faced by Latin American governments in the near future is to manage the interplay between domestic policies and their agreements at sub-regional levels. (Rev Econ Polit/DÜI)