Suchergebnisse

In international relations, international security combines that set of international relations that ensures global stability. In other words, international security is a state in which states are not threatened by war or by any breach of their sovereignty or independent development by other states. In accordance with the UN Charter, the Security Council currently has the main task of ensuring world peace, also having the sole right to impose sanctions against aggressors. The idea of international security, its realization in practice is determined by historical, economic, political, social conditions, as well as other factors. The problem of international security arose with the formation of the state institution, being always close to the problem of war and peace. Over time, there has been a change in the ability to analyze and report security issues. Along with these, both the policies and the security strategies of contemporary societies have undergone a process of metamorphosis.

This article discusses the recent debate between Jürgen Habermas and Wolfgang Streeck on the relationship between capitalism and democracy in Europe. The article recounts Streeck's analysis of the financial crisis, the transformation of the tax state into the debt state, and the development of the EU towards an international consolidation state, which informs Streeck's call for a retreat from Europe to the nation-state as the last line of defense against neoliberal capitalism. The article proceeds to sketch Habermas's criticism of Streeck's argument, and it illustrates how Habermas' proposal for a reconstitution of the EU as a supranational democracy is motivated by foundational concerns in his critical theory of society. Finally, the article argues that the debate results in an unresolved dilemma: while only a democratized EU can reestablish the supremacy of politics over globalized markets, the EU is more likely to become further entrenched as an international consolidation state.

International hydroacoustic surveys have been conducted in the Baltic Sea since 1978. The starting point was the cooperation between the Institute of Marine Research (IMR) in Lysekil, Sweden, and the Institute fur Hochseefisherei und Fishverarbeitung in Rostock, German Democratic Republic, in October ¨ 1978, which produced the first acoustic estimates of total biomass of herring and sprat in the Baltic main basin (Håkansson et al., 1979). Since then there has been at least one annual hydroacoustic survey for herring and sprat and results have been reported to ICES. The Baltic International Acoustic Survey (BIAS), is mandatory for the countries that have exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Baltic Sea, and is a part of the Data Collection Framework as stipulated by the European Council and the Commission (Council Regulation (EC) No 199/2008 and the Commission Data Collection Framework (DCF) web page1 ). The IMR in Lysekil is part of the Department of Aquatic Resources within Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences and is responsible for the Swedish part of the EU DCF and surveys in the marine environment. The Institute assesses the status of the marine ecosystems, develops and provides biological advices for the sustainable use of the aquatic resources. The BIAS survey is co-ordinated and managed by the ICES working group WGBIFS. The main objective of BIAS is to assess herring and sprat resources in the Baltic Sea. The survey provides data to the ICES Baltic Fisheries Assessment Working Group (WGBFAS).

International hydroacoustic surveys have been conducted in the Baltic Sea since 1978. The starting point was the cooperation between Institute of Marine Research (IMR) in Lysekil, Sweden and the Institute fur Hochseefisherei und Fishverarbeitung in Rostock, German Democratic Republic in October 1978, ¨ which produced the first acoustic estimates of total biomass of herring and sprat in the Baltic Main basin (H˚akansson et al., 1979). Since then there has been at least one annual hydroacoustic survey for herring and sprat stocks and results have been reported to ICES. The Baltic International Acoustic Survey (BIAS), is mandatory for the countries that have exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Baltic Sea, and is a part of the Data Collection Framework as stipulated by the European Council and the Commission (Council Regulation (EC) No 199/2008 and the Commission Data Collection Framework (DCF) web page1 ). IMR in Lysekil is part of the Department of Aquatic Resources within Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences and is responsible for the Swedish part of the EU DCF and surveys in the marine environment. The Institute assesses the status of the marine ecosystems, develops and provides biological advices for managers for the sustainable use of aquatic resources. The BIAS survey are co-ordinated and managed by the ICES working group WGBIFS. The main objective of BIAS is to assess herring and sprat resources in the Baltic Sea. The survey will provide data to the ICES Baltic Fisheries Assessment Working Group (WGBFAS).

The IENE 2014 conference puts emphasis on the "greening" of transport infrastructure: both in respect to a wiser use of marginal infrastructure habitats to favour biodiversity and certain ecosys- tem services, and in respect to a more permeable and safer infrastructure that minimises the direct impact on wildlife. Transportation and infrastructure are recognised as signi cant drivers in the global loss of biodiverity. Their impacts on nature are well described and there is ample evidence for the negative effects of traffic and transportation infrastructure on nature. Even though roads and railroads may occupy but a small proportion of an area, they a ect the entire landscape, cause the death of millions of wild animals, and disturb surrounding habitats through pollution, noise and alien species. The overall impact is evident, but there are means to minimise the pressure, to adjust infrastructure facilities and, to some degree, introduce beneficial services for wildlife. Such measures can and should be implemented as a standard in infrastructure development and maintenance. Knowledge about their functionality and e cacy is, however, not always satisfying. Technical innovations and new mitigation concepts need to be tested and evaluated. Their func- tionality and e ectiveness also depends on the interplay between the transport sector and other sectors of society. Communication, knowledge transfer, and public education are just as essential here, as legal frameworks, policy, technical development and environmental science. European policy (e.g., Green Infrastructure) is developing clearly in this direction, recognizing the transport sector and transportation facilities as important players in the endeavour towards a greener and sustainable future. Obviously, this calls for international collaboration in research and practice, for enhanced exchange of knowledge between disciplines, and for the development of harmonised standards and pro- cedures that can be referred to by international actors. IENE provides this interdisciplinary arena through its conferences and workshops. The IENE 2014 international conference emphasises that transport infrastructure can be planned and designed as an ecologically well-adopted, safe and e cient system, while acknowledging that certain impacts can never be avoided. IENE, together with the Swedish Transport Administration, the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, the Danish Road Directorate and numerous other partners, invites scientists, practitioners and planners, governmental agencies and private companies, NGO's and anybody with an interest in the above to the IENE 2014 conference in Sweden. We welcome new partner- and sponsorships and o er a well-approved and international network for communication and presentation.

As a sovereign and independent state, the Republic of Moldova has been going, for more than two decades, through a long process of asserting the country globally, certifying the status of the Republic of Moldova as a member of the international community and subject to international law. An important role in this sense is also the membership of our state in various regional and international organizations, and of increased interest are those specialized in combating all forms of organized crime. Taking into account its geographical position, but also the socio-human factor, we can not neglect the strategic role played for this purpose by the organizations from the Community of Independent States, those from the Black Sea Basin, or the Western Balkans. Thus, this article aims to review the most important regional and international organizations fighting cross-border organized crime of which our country is a member, with the presentation of the activity and role of the Republic of Moldova within them

The Nordic countries have long been renowned for their contribution to international peace and security. This contribution – occasionally viewed by both Nordic and non-Nordic policy-makers and academics as a particular model for facilitating peace and development in international affairs – is based on a combination of active contributions to peaceful conflict resolution, a high level of development aid and a continuous commitment to strengthening international society. However, recently Scandinavians have been making headlines for reasons that seem to contrast with their well-established brand as humane internationalist peacemakers. This article identifies the characteristics of the Nordic model for international peace and security and discusses how and why it has changed.

Corruption manifests at an international, regional and national level, it can be considered a phenomenon of society that has a negative impact on the political, juridical, and economic system and the public services of a state. As a response to this phenomenon, the state develops anti-corruption instruments, which are: laws, normative acts, standards, political commitments, mandates for the creation of institutions and mechanisms, measures and actions against corruption. In this article are investigated anti-corruption instruments at international, regional, national, and local levels and institutional anti-corruption instruments. Moreover, it is analyzed the efficiency of anti-corruption instruments used by the National Anticorruption Center, an anti-corruption specialized institute. In conclusion, it is emphasized the importance of the realization of anti-corruption measures in Moldova, making use of international experience and developing national instruments, that correspond to the local specifics and conditions.

A special regulatory regime applies to products of recombinant nucleic acid modifications. A ruling from the European Court of Justice has interpreted this regulatory regime in a way that it also applies to emerging mutagenesis techniques. Elsewhere regulatory progress is also ongoing. In 2015, Argentina launched a regulatory framework, followed by Chile in 2017 and recently Brazil and Colombia. In March 2018, the USDA announced that it will not regulate genome-edited plants differently if they could have also been developed through traditional breeding. Canada has an altogether different approach with their Plants with Novel Traits regulations. Australia is currently reviewing its Gene Technology Act. This article illustrates the deviation of the European Union's (EU's) approach from the one of most of the other countries studied here. Whereas the EU does not implement a case-by-case approach, this approach is taken by several other jurisdictions. Also, the EU court ruling adheres to a process-based approach while most other countries have a stronger emphasis on the regulation of the resulting product. It is concluded that, unless a functioning identity preservation system for products of directed mutagenesis can be established, the deviation results in a risk of asynchronous approvals and disruptions in international trade.

Grønlands udenrigspolitiske repræsentanter benytter den store internationale interesse for Arktis til at positionere Grønland som en mere selvstændig udenrigspolitisk aktør. Det er muligt, da Danmark er afhængig af Grønland for at opretholde sin status som "arktisk stat", og fordi Grønlands udenrigspolitiske kompetence er åben for fortolkning. Denne artikel analyserer, hvordan repræsentanter for skiftende grønlandske regeringer har udvidet det udenrigspolitiske handlerum ved i diskurs og praksis at styrke Grønlands position i en arktisk kontekst. Det er blandt andet opnået ved 1) højlydt at italesætte utilfredshed i Arktisk Råd, 2) stiltiende symbolske handlinger ved Ilulissat-erklæringens tiårs jubilæum, og 3) ved at mime suverænitet ved Arctic Circle konferencen, der pga. sin mere uformelle struktur er særligt nyttig til at styrke bilaterale internationale relationer. ; Greenland's foreign policy representatives use the great international attention to the Arctic to appear and act as a more sovereign foreign policy actor. This is possible due to Denmark's dependence on Greenland to maintain its "Arctic state" status and because Greenland's foreign policy competence is open to interpretation. The article analyzes how representatives of shifting Greenlandic governments have expanded the foreign policy room for manoeuvre in discourse and praxis to strengthen Greenland's position at Arctic-related events. This has been achieved by, among other things, 1) outspoken discontent in the Arctic Council, 2) tacit gestures at the Ilulissat Declaration's 10-year anniversary, and 3) by mimicking full sovereignty at the Arctic Circle conference serving as a particularly useful platform for enhancing bilateral international relations due to its more informal setup.

Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.

Scholarship in international law aims at addressing global forest governance comprehensively. This article reviews the recent contribution Global Forest Governance - Legal Concepts and Policy Trends by Rowena Maguire and puts it into the perspective of recent political and policy science research on global forests. While finding Maguire's volume being a very timely and valuable contribution to the interdisciplinary discussions on international forest governance, we identify some weaknesses which are mostly rooted in methodological critique and a lack of a systematic framework for analysis.

This study is about seven women's organizations in Belgrade, Serbia and their relations to domestic and international donors during the period 2003-2006. My main research questions focus on their choices of either domestic or international cooperation partners. How and why did the women organize themselves? What factors were essential when selecting donors? In what ways were the organizations influenced by donors? Through interviews, with organization representatives' concepts such as gift and reciprocity, power and dependency, trust and mistrust and collective identity emerged. These concepts were used as points of departure for developing deeper understanding of women organizations' choice of cooperation partners. The women organizations' basically had two alternatives for cooperation: cooperation with foreign donors which offered funds, organizational development and social networks. Alternately, cooperation with local donors, which offered the equivalent except for the organizational development. Cooperation with the foreign donor has resulted in more professional attitudes to the work that have been desired by other international donors. A result is that they can compete with other women's organizations' for international funding. Cooperation with local donors has led to fewer resources but more independent working practices. For these women organizations' independence was important so they choose partners who, they felt more respected this allowing them to write articles or discuss gender in the media with little external influence. Regardless of the chosen donor the reciprocity is embedded in the relation between the donor and the receiver of aid, which in various ways is beneficial for both parties.

The region of Southeast Asia is faced with a complex set of challenges stemming from political, economic and religious developments at the national, regional and global level. This paper sets out to examine trade-, foreign- and security policy implications of the issues confronting the region. In ASEAN, the Southeast Asian countries are continuing their ambitious attempts at further integration. Plans outlining deeper security and economic communities have been adopted. However, huge differences in political systems, economic development and ethnic/religious structures are hampering prospects of closer cooperation. The highly controversial conflict case of Burma/Myanmar is testing the much adhered-to principle of non-interference and at the same time complicating relations with external powers. Among these, the United States and China are dramatically strengthening their interests in the region. American influence is not least manifesting itself in light of the war against terrorism, which the region is adapting to in different ways and at different speeds. By contrast, the European Union does not seem to answer Southeast Asian calls for further engagement. A flurry of bilateral and regional trade agreements is another prominent feature of the economic landscape of the region. This is to a certain degree a reflex ion of impatience with trade liberalization in the WTO and within ASEAN itself. Structures of economic cooperation are under rapid alteration in Southeast Asia. The paper analyses the above-mentioned developments with a view to assessing the prospects of future stability, economic development and integration in and among ASEAN countries. It is concluded that although the scope for increased economic benefit and political harmonization through ASEAN integration alone is limited, the organization could still prove useful as a common regional point of reference in tackling more important policy determinants at national and global level.

Nowadays, criticism of the UN is related to excessive bureaucracy, to the parallelism in the functions of many of its structures. In addition, the UN is accused of reacting more to crises than preventing them. The selective interest of the United Nations in conflicts in different regions of the world gives reasons to assert the presence in its activity of double standards. Especially, the UN authority has been greatly undermined by such events as the United States's actions in Iraq and Yugoslavia, after which many have questioned international law in general and United Nations, in particular. Thereat, there are a lot of statements that the United Nations is in the deepest crisis and there is a set of proposals and views on the content and essence of the need for UN reform. In this article, the author argues the opportunity of UN reform, elucidating some current gaps in the work of this international organization and coming up with concrete recommendations to remedy them.