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Today few people deny the existence of regional substate diplomacy (Criekemans 2010). But there is still no common agreement on a region's right to do so and, above all, on their scope of action. This question goes against what used to be the dominant approach in international relations, the state-centric approach that leads to the logic of speaking with one voice. Increasingly, a multilevel-governance approach has contested this state-centric view and proposes an alternative logic of multiple actors speaking with their voice, nuancing strongly the seminal distinction between "sovereignty-bound" and "sovereignty-free" actors (Rosenau 1990). From the 1970s, the world has seen the growing presence of sovereignty-free actors in international relations. Among these actors, non-central or, better, substate, governments of federal states have developed intensive foreign relations. These governments are using a range of techniques: from shaping the federal government's foreign policy to establishing themselves directly in the international arena (Blatter et al. 2008). For minority nation governments this is particularly a challenge, as they have to act internally – where they have developed full-fledged legislative powers within a multinational federation – and externally – where international and national laws are often still reluctant to recognise their right of action (Lejeune 2003). Yet some minority nations have thrived in developing their own international relations. Bavaria, Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, Scotland and Wallonia are often seen as successful international players even if they are not fully sovereignty bound (Michelmann 2009; Criekemans 2010). The international actions of these minority nations have been characterised under the umbrella of "identity paradiplomacy" (Paquin 2003); that is, a willingness to use international relations to foster a nation-building process within a multinational state. This observation was particularly prevalent for minority nations strongly in competition with a federal government about their nationbuilding process, albeit for different reasons, namely Flanders, Quebec and Scotland (Paquin 2004). The case of Wallonia seems to fits less well into the identity paradiplomacy framework, which therefore raises the question of alternative roads to international relations. This is the core question of this chapter: is identity paradiplomacy the only way to go for minority nations? Quebec and Wallonia are both well known for their active foreign relations.

The participation of non-state actors to international politics has been investigated since the creation of international institutions. Yet, the rules, principles and norms of global governance are no more discussed in single, isolated institutions. Rather, with the proliferation of international regimes and organisations, international issues are now negotiated in a context of institutional interactions known as "regime complexes". This poses new questions, in particular on the negotiation burden that these new processes place on international actors. To answer this question, this contribution compares non-state participation in both contexts (single regimes and regime complexes), using the international forest negotiations as a case study. It uses quantitative methods to measure the negotiation burden of single regimes and compare it to the negotiation burden of regime complexes. The negotiation burden of single regimes is found insignificant with political interest being the major motivation for participation, while the negotiation burden of regime complexes is found relevant, requiring a certain type of material and organisational resources for non-state actors to participate. Yet a certain diversity of non-state representation is maintained within regime complexes, with non-governmental organisations being dominant with respect to business groups.

While a great deal of attention is devoted to the Pacific region as the new chessboard of international politics, Pakistan remains a key actor in terms of both threat and potential. Two observations back this argument: first, Pakistan's fundamental roles as a state are challenged by its ongoing conflict with India and internal insurgencies. Second, due to a power-status gap, Pakistan experiences difficulties in holding specific self-conceived roles. In addition to hampering its socio-economic potential, these developments prevent Pakistan's quest for normalization in the system. As a consequence, we argue that engaging with Islamabad should be a priority for Washington so as to prevent the country from further aligning with Beijing, thus reinforcing China's regional leadership and status as peer-competitor to the United States. Indeed, as the potential for deviance in the international system arises from its normative dimension, the US, as the global leader, counts among its roles that of norm-setter and primary socializer for most states. Our research proposes to look at an old puzzle with new theoretical insights. By addressing the question of Washington's engagement towards non-conforming states, we aim to document a set of socialization processes as intervening variables linking American global role as leader and primary socializer to Pakistan's process of social integration (normalization/deviance). Drawing from sociology and social psychology, the paper seeks to explore the ability of the leader to act as a primary source of role location and status recognition towards non-conforming states so as to integrate them (back) into the US-led system.

The Red Devils, chocolate or beer and the King, such is the typical answers given to the oft-asked question of what is still holding Belgium together. To these three symbols, two extra elements are often added: the debt and Brussels, the capital of the country and of the Flemish Region/Community, the French Community (politically but not constitutionally the Wallonia-Brussels Federation), the European Union (to be more specific, one of the three capitals, along with Strasbourg and Luxemburg), while being as well the seat of the Brussels Capital Region. Generally, the list of factors of unity in Belgium ends with this short list. Is it already too long, or on the contrary, is it really too short? This is the main question of this chapter. Paradoxically, although this question often arises, there are very few scientific writings analyzing it. To do so, this chapter will discuss six sets of factors: historical, identity, socio-economic, political, international and symbolic. Nonetheless, it is important to take into account that such enterprise seeks to be informative and not prescriptive. This chapter does not assume that Belgium should be united. There are several points of view about what Belgium should be, and this contribution merely wishes to nurture the political debate by conveying an original approach on six types of factors.

After years of political crises and negotiations, the deep-rooted conflict between Dutch- and French-speaking parties recently led to the 2011 agreement concerning a further reform of the Belgian state. This reform mainly furthers decentralises the – already federal – state structure, including the allocation of additional competences and fiscal powers to sub-national entities (Regions and Communities). But this new state reform also brings about a radical reform of the upper house: the Belgian Senate. Since 1995, the Senate was composed of three different types of members: Senators directly elected by two linguistically separated electorate (the Dutch-speaking and the French-speaking electorates), Senators indirectly elected by the Community parliaments and Senators coopted by the two other types. The French- and German-speaking linguistic minorities had a fixed amount of seats in this assembly. The reform of the state radically changed the legislative competences of the Senate and its composition as its members will now be designated by Regional and Community parliaments (plus 10 coopted senators). Broadly speaking, the appointment of the majority of the Senators moved from a system of direct and language-based election to a system of indirect and mixed regional and language-based designation. This change is not without consequence for the representation of linguistic minorities. In May 2014, regional, community and federal elections will be organised in Belgium, testing for the first time this new system of designation of Senators by regional and community parliaments. This paper intends to present the 2013 reform of the Senate in Belgium and its consequence for the representation of linguistic minorities. The situations before and after the reform of the Senate will be compared, not only in terms of the way Senators are appointed but in terms of its consequence on the linguistic aspects of the regional and community elections campaign and of the profile of the appointed Senators.

Transparency is a widely used concept in debates on international politics, from transnational anti-corruption campaigns to renewed requests for greater disclosure on health, finance, or even security issues. Calls for transparency date back at least to the League of Nations, when internationalists demanded open diplomacy. Yet, it is in the subfield of GEG, and its developments on nonstate actors as a key research topic (see introduction), where the practice and theory of transparency has made the most profound inroads (Gupta 2010a). GEG has been a particularly fertile ground for the development of informational governance (Mol 2008) and the rise of numerous transparency initiatives which have been analyzed in a rapidly developing literature. Importantly, current GEG research is also highly relevant for other IR subfields. For one, recent GEG research can help IR scholars to further refine the concept of transparency and to increase conceptual clarity and sophistication. Second, research on GEG has improved our understanding of the factors that determine the effectiveness of transparency as a governance tool in international politics.

The EUROSUR system is supposed to further the surveillance of external borders of European Union Member States. From this point of view, it can be considered an important step in the construction of a controlled space. Drawing inspiration from the Foucauldian attention to programs and technologies, and mobilizing the Actor- Network-Theory concepts of setting and actant, the paper investigates EUROSUR main methodological operations. It highlights how the making of a controlled space is, first and foremost, a mise-en-discours going well beyond surveillance and pro- hibition: a continuous effort to make sense of a disparate multiplicity, encompassing both human and nonhuman elements, both controlled and controlling ones. From a theoretical perspective, the chapter contributes to on-going endeavors to reinvigor- ate the post-structuralist studies of International Relations with approaches inspired by Actor-Network-Theory.

บทความนี้มีวัตถุประสงค์ 3 ประการคือ 1) เพื่อศึกษาหลักการ แนวคิด ทฤษฎีและแนวปฏิบัติเกี่ยวกับรูปแบบการไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาทสากลและรูปแบบการไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาทของศูนย์ไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาทสภาทนายความ 2) เพื่อศึกษารูปแบบในการไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาททางพุทธศาสนาเถรวาท 3) เพื่อเสนอรูปแบบการไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาทของศูนย์ไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาทสภาทนายความโดยแนวทางพุทธสันติวิธี การวิจัยครั้งนี้เป็นการวิจัยเชิงคุณภาพ โดยเน้นการวิจัยเชิงเอกสารและการสัมภาษณ์ผู้ทรงคุณวุฒิด้านการไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาทจากสภาทนายความจำนวน 9 ท่าน ด้านการไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาทสากลจำนวน 6 ท่านและด้านพระพุทธศาสนาเถรวาทจำนวน 5 ท่าน ผลการศึกษาวิจัยพบว่า รูปแบบการไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาทของศูนย์ไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาทสภาทนายความมีความสอดคล้องกับหลักการ วิธีการ และกระบวนการไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาทสากล ในด้านกระบวนการไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาททางพุทธศาสนาเถรวาทเป็นแนวปฏิบัติตามหลักพุทธสันติวิธีโดยยึดหลักอริยสัจ4 ส่วนรูปแบบการไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาทของศูนย์ไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาทสภาทนายความโดยแนวทางพุทธสันติวิธี ประกอบด้วยรูปแบบด้านคุณสมบัติของผู้ไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาท มีคุณสมบัติภายในคือ เป็นผู้มีสติ มีขันติ ไร้อคติ และมีเมตตา คุณสมบัติภายนอกคือ มีกัลยาณมิตรธรรม มีศีลธรรม และมี คารวธรรม ด้านวิธีการไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาทคือมีบทบาทด้านเมตตาตามหลักสาราณียธรรมและใช้เทคนิคที่เป็นทางสายกลางหรือมัชฌิมาปฏิปทา และด้านกระบวนการไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาท มีขั้นตอนของการไกล่เกลี่ยข้อพิพาท 5 ขั้นตอน คือ 1) ตั้งต้นวิเคราะห์ทุกข์ 2) เปิดมุขด้วยปิยวาจา 3) ใช้เมตตาค้นหาประเด็น 4) ร่วมคิดเห็นอย่างไร้อคติ และ 5) มุ่งมิติอภัยทาน ; This research is of 3 objectives, i.e., (1) to study principal, ideas, theories and practices related to the model of the international dispute mediation, and the model of dispute mediation of the Lawyers Council, (2) to study model of dispute resolution in Theravada Buddhism, and (3) to present a model of dispute settlement of Mediation Center of Lawyers Council by Buddhist Peaceful Means. This research is qualitative, emphasizing documents and interviews with experts and scholars in dispute resolution from the Lawyers Council of Thailand 9 persons, from the Other Organization 6 persons and persons who experts and scholars in Theravada Buddhism 5 persons, respectively. The outcome of the research found the followings: The principles and process related to the model of the international dispute mediation and the current state of dispute mediation of the Lawyers Council are consistent. For the process of dispute resolution in Theravada Buddhism, its way of practice is by Buddhist peaceful means with the holding on to the principle of the Four Noble Truths in analyzing problems. In this research, it presents a model of dispute settlement of Mediation Center of Lawyers Council by Buddhist Peaceful Means comprising mediators' inner and outer qualities; the inner defined as being conscious, patient, unbiased and benevolent while the outer are having good friends, morality, honoring others. For the method model of dispute resolution, it consists of the role and mediating technique of dispute mediators, i.e. the role of loving kindness in accordance with the virtues for fraternal living or Sārāniyadhamma and the use of the Middle Way or technique Majjhimā patipadā. The process model of dispute mediation is the use of the Four Noble Truths in proceeding the process of dispute mediation of which having 5 steps of 1) start to analyze sorrows or Dukkha, 2) start talking with nice words or Piyavaca, 3) search for issues with loving kindness, 4) sharing opinions without bias, and 5) aiming for the aspect of forgiveness with the dispute mediating purpose of 'Peace' or disputants' settlement of disputes by forgoing matters towards each other.

Some states are widely recognized by policy makers and scholars as middle powers. The characteristics that were highlighted for these countries have become the basic guidelines for understanding middle powermanship and developing the corresponding theory. While those analyses offer rich in-depth insights into the foreign policy of specific countries, they have so far lacked a further step of generalization. When establishing such power-based rankings, we assume the possibility to determine states' capacities so as to identify their position in said ranking. As appealing as this theoretical model may be, the reality of international politics increasingly challenge it. Thus, we argue that this theoretical inadequacy is due to the fact that middle power theory as it has been developed so far should be understood as an inductive, not a deductive, approach . Consequently, the contemporary reality calls for yet another stage of development in this theory. The choice of Pakistan as our case study arises from the observation that while Pakistan can hardly fit into the current classification(s) of middle powermanship due to its poor economic and development performances, it is a nuclear state and is –at least– in the top twenty armies of the world. Moreover, we find several cases in which Pakistan has used the diplomatic tools characterizing middle powers, such as mediation or niche diplomacy. Our paper aims at answering two questions: (1) can middle power theory bring some light on Pakistan's positioning in world politics? (2) Alternatively, what does the case of Pakistan tell us about the (ir)relevance of middle power theory? We build upon role theory to develop the case of middle powermanship as a status-role bundle, by analyzing three specific cases of Pakistan's foreign policy: Pakistani nuclear posturing, its Afghan policy and its posturing vis-à-vis the Saudi-Iranian regional competition.

The purpose of this research is 1) to study government policy management from past to present; 2) to develop a strategy for the management of the oil palm policy of the government and 3) to propose the development of a strategy for the management of the oil palm policy of the sector. Effective state The qualitative research was conducted through in-depth interviews and group discussions with experts. Senior Executive of Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Ministry of Commerce Ministry of industry Ministry of Energy And the Office of Agricultural Economics. President of Southern Palm Trader Association Krabi and Chumporn Palm Oil Palm Traders Association of Surat Thani, Krabi and Chumphon, Thailand The Palm Garden of Thailand The Association of Palm Oil Manufacturers in Surat Thani, Krabi and Chumphon and the Association of Palm Oil Refineries in Surat Thani, Krabi and Chumphon. The research found that Research results to answer the objectives 2) To study government policy management from past to present. The government has set a policy to focus on bureaucratic development so that government agencies can improve their work and improve their administration. The evaluation of the performance. The management of the good. The concept and tools used in modern administration in the government. Under the application of the principles of strategic management, the development of the government's oil palm policy is an important national agenda for enhancing competitiveness and enhancing quality and standardization. Go to international standards. The research found that Research results to answer the objectives 2) To develop a strategy for managing the government's oil palm policy and Research results to answer the objectives 3) To present the strategic development of effective governmental oil palm management strategy. The development of a strategic oil palm management policy of the government will be composed of three components: oil palm farmers. The palm oil industry and government policy on the palm oil industry. The effective governmental strategy for oil palm policy is composed of six strategies. Strategy 1: Production Strategy 2: Product Innovation Strategy 3: Development of standards throughout the supply chain. Strategy 4: Use as energy crops. Strategy 5: Management Strategy 6: Development of laws and regulations. Strategy for the management of oil palm policy of the government. The key issues are: production goals. Marketing must be clear. And balance the supply and demand. Determine suitable agricultural areas. Research and development focuses on value adding and market demand in line with the National Economic and Social Development Plan. The goal is to develop high performance palm oil processing technologies to enhance competitiveness. It is a high value and sustainable industry. ; การวิจัยเรื่องนี้มีวัตถุประสงค์ 1) เพื่อศึกษาการบริหารนโยบายของภาครัฐตั้งแต่อดีตจนถึงปัจจุบัน 2) เพื่อการพัฒนายุทธศาสตร์การบริหารนโยบายปาล์มน้ำมันของภาครัฐ และ 3) เพื่อนำเสนอการพัฒนายุทธศาสตร์การบริหารนโยบายปาล์มน้ำมันของภาครัฐที่มีประสิทธิผล โดยใช้ระเบียบวิจัยเชิงคุณภาพด้วยการสัมภาษณ์เชิงลึกและการสนทนากลุ่มกับผู้เชี่ยวชาญได้แก่ ผู้บริหารระดับสูงของกระทรวงเกษตรและสหกรณ์ กระทรวงพาณิชย์ กระทรวงอุตสาหกรรม กระทรวงพลังงาน และสำนักงานเศรษฐกิจการเกษตร นายกสมาคมผู้ประกอบการลานเทปาล์มภาคใต้ สมาคมชาวสวนปาล์มน้ำมันจังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานี กระบี่ และชุมพร สมาคมการค้าลานเทปาล์มน้ำมันปาล์มจังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานี กระบี่ และชุมพร สมาพันธ์ชาวสวนปาล์มน้ำมันประเทศไทย สมาพันธ์ลานเทปาล์มประเทศไทย สมาคมโรงงานผลิตน้ำมันปาล์มจังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานี กระบี่ และชุมพรและสมาคมโรงกลั่นน้ำมันปาล์มจังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานี กระบี่ และชุมพร ผลการวิจัยเพื่อตอบวัตถุประสงค์ข้อที่ 1 เพื่อศึกษาการบริหารนโยบายของภาครัฐตั้งแต่อดีตจนถึงปัจจุบัน นับจากที่รัฐบาลได้กำหนดนโยบายมุ่งเน้นพัฒนาระบบราชการเพื่อให้หน่วยงานภาครัฐปรับปรุงการทำงานและยกระดับการบริหารให้มีประสิทธิผล โดยมีการประเมินผลการปฏิบัติราชการ ตามหลักการบริหารกิจการบ้านเมืองที่ดี โดยนำแนวคิดและเครื่องมือการบริหารสมัยใหม่เข้ามาใช้ในภาคราชการ ภายใต้การประยุกต์ใช้จากหลักการบริหารเชิงยุทธศาสตร์การพัฒนานโยบายปาล์มน้ำมันของภาครัฐซึ่งเป็นวาระแห่งชาติที่มีความสำคัญต่อการเพิ่มขีดความสามารถในการแข่งขันและมีการยกระดับคุณภาพและสร้างมาตรฐานการทำงานไปสู่ระดับมาตรฐานสากล ผลการวิจัยเพื่อตอบวัตถุประสงค์ข้อที่ 2) เพื่อการพัฒนายุทธศาสตร์การบริหารนโยบายปาล์มน้ำมันของภาครัฐ และ ข้อที่ 3 เพื่อนำเสนอการพัฒนายุทธศาสตร์การบริหารนโยบายปาล์มน้ำมันของภาครัฐที่มีประสิทธิผล พบว่าการพัฒนายุทธศาสตร์การบริหารนโยบายปาล์มน้ำมันของภาครัฐจะมี 3 องค์ประกอบ ได้แก่ ด้านเกษตรกรผู้ปลูกปาล์มน้ำมัน ด้านผู้ประกอบการอุตสาหกรรมน้ำมันปาล์มและด้านนโยบายภาครัฐเกี่ยวกับอุตสาหกรรมน้ำมันปาล์ม สำหรับยุทธศาสตร์การบริหารนโยบายปาล์มน้ำมันของภาครัฐที่มีประสิทธิผล จะประกอบด้วย 6 ยุทธศาสตร์ ประกอบด้วย ยุทธศาสตร์ที่ 1 ด้านการผลิต ยุทธศาสตร์ที่ 2 นวัตกรรมผลิตภัณฑ์ ยุทธศาสตร์ที่ 3 การพัฒนามาตรฐานตลอดโซ่อุปทาน ยุทธศาสตร์ที่ 4 การใช้เป็นพืชพลังงาน ยุทธศาสตร์ที่ 5 การบริหารจัดการ ยุทธศาสตร์ที่ 6 การพัฒนากฎหมายและข้อบังคับ ยุทธศาสตร์การบริหารนโยบายปาล์มน้ำมันของภาครัฐ จะคำนึงถึงประเด็นสำคัญ ได้แก่คือ กำหนดเป้าหมายด้านการผลิต การตลาดต้องชัดเจน และสร้างสมดุลระหว่างอุปสงค์และอุปทาน กำหนดพื้นที่เกษตรที่เหมาะสม งานวิจัยและพัฒนาเน้นการเพิ่มมูลค่าและความต้องการของตลาดสอดคล้องกับแผนพัฒนาเศรษฐกิจและสังคมแห่งชาติกำหนดเป้าหมายคือการพัฒนาเทคโนโลยีแปรรูปปาล์มน้ำมันประสิทธิภาพสูงเพื่อเพิ่มขีดความสามารถในการแข่งขัน เป็นอุตสาหกรรมที่มีมูลค่าสูงและเกิดความยั่งยืน

From the beginning of the 1990's onwards, political analysts in all Western European countries discovered the contours of what they thought to be a widespread crisis of democracy. The alleged decline of political trust and public participation, and the rise of electoral volatility pointed out that the gap between politicians and citizens had never been wider. This political climate characterized by a deep-rooted crisis of democratic legitimacy offered an excellent breeding ground for critical reflection on the role, shape and function of democracy in modern societies. It gave rise to a fruitful quest for new and innovative ways of governing a democracy. It is in this turbulent period that the ideal of a deliberative democracy was coined (Dryzek 2000). A community of international scholars and philosophers, inspired by the work of Jürgen Habermas, became more and more convinced that a vibrant democracy is more than the aggregate of its individual citizens, and that democratic politics should be about more than merely voting. The quality of a democracy and the quality of democratic decisions, according to them, did not depend on the correct aggregation of individual preferences, but rather on the quality of the public debate that preceded the voting stage. Democratic decisions were thus no longer considered a function of mere compliance with aggregation rules. Instead, they were determined by extensive argumentation about political choices before voting on them. Because of its strong focus of public involvement in politics, this deliberative model of democracy started out in life as a theory of legitimacy (Benhabib 1996; Cohen 1997; Dryzek 2001; Parkinson 2006). By including everyone who is affected by a decision in the process leading to that decision, deliberation has important political merits: it is capable of generating political decisions that receive broad public support, even when there is strong disagreement on the aims and values a polity should promote (Geenens & Tinnevelt 2007, p. 47). After all, talking about political issues allows citizens to hear other perspectives to a problem and to see their own perspectives represented in the final decision. However, deliberation's beneficial effects do not come about easily. If deliberative democracy wants to contribute to increasing the legitimacy of the political system as a whole, it has to be legitimate in itself. In other words, deliberative events have to reflect the principles of legitimacy in their own functioning before their outcomes can generate legitimate political decisions. It is therefore crucial to assess the internal legitimacy of deliberative mini-publics before making claims about their contribution to the legitimacy of the political system as a whole. Our research question is therefore: to what extent can deliberative mini-publics live up to the criteria of democratic and political legitimacy? In this paper, we set out to assess the internal legitimacy of one specific deliberative event, namely the G1000 project in Belgium (Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2012). The G1000 project takes a particular place in the world of deliberative practice because it was not only grassroots in its process and its results, but also in its organization. Most deliberative events are introduced and funded by either public administrations or scientific institutions. The G1000 was rather considered a genuine citizens' initiative from its very inception. All of the organizers of the event were volunteers, and all of the funds were gathered using crowd funding. So instead of a scientific experiment, the G1000 was more of a democratic experiment by, through, and for citizens. This grass-root structure makes it a very interesting case for students of legitimacy, because as we will see later on it situated at the heart of the democratic trade-off between input and output legitimacy.

From the beginning of the 1990's onwards, political analysts in all Western European countries discovered the contours of what they thought to be a widespread crisis of democracy. The alleged decline of political trust and public participation, and the rise of electoral volatility pointed out that the gap between politicians and citizens had never been wider. This political climate characterized by a deep-rooted crisis of democratic legitimacy offered an excellent breeding ground for critical reflection on the role, shape and function of democracy in modern societies. It gave rise to a fruitful quest for new and innovative ways of governing a democracy. It is in this turbulent period that the ideal of a deliberative democracy was coined (Dryzek 2000). A community of international scholars and philosophers, inspired by the work of Jürgen Habermas, became more and more convinced that a vibrant democracy is more than the aggregate of its individual citizens, and that democratic politics should be about more than merely voting. The quality of a democracy and the quality of democratic decisions, according to them, did not depend on the correct aggregation of individual preferences, but rather on the quality of the public debate that preceded the voting stage. Democratic decisions were thus no longer considered a function of mere compliance with aggregation rules. Instead, they are determined by extensive argumentation about political choices before voting on them. Because of its strong focus of public involvement in politics, this deliberative model of democracy started out in life as a theory of legitimacy (Benhabib 1996; Cohen 2002; Dryzek 2001; Parkinson 2006). By including everyone who is affected by a decision in the process leading to that decision, deliberation has important political merits: it is capable of generating political decisions that receive broad public support, even when there is strong disagreement on the aims and values a polity should promote (Geenens & Tinnevelt 2007, p. 47). After all, talking about political issues allows citizens to hear other perspectives to a problem and to see their own perspectives represented in the final decision. As such, deliberative democracy seeks to score high on input, throughput and output legitimacy. However, deliberation's beneficial effects do not come about easily. If deliberative democracy wants to contribute to increasing the legitimacy of the political system as a whole, it has to be legitimate in itself. In other words, deliberative events have to reflect the principles of legitimacy in their own functioning before their outcomes can generate legitimate political decisions. It is therefore crucial to assess the internal legitimacy of deliberative mini-publics before making claims about their contribution to the legitimacy of the political system as a whole. In this paper, we set out to assess the internal legitimacy of one specific deliberative event, namely the G1000 project in Belgium (Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2012a). Our research question is therefore: to what extent does the G1000 live up to the criteria of input, throughput and output legitimacy? The G1000 project takes a particular place in the world of deliberative practice because it was not only grass roots in its process and its results, but also in its organization. Most deliberative events are introduced and funded by either public administrations or scientific institutions. The G1000 was rather considered a citizens' initiative from its very inception. All of the organizers of the event were volunteers, and all of the funds were gathered using crowd funding. So instead of a scientific experiment, the G1000 was more of a democratic experiment by, through, and for citizens. This grass-root structure makes it a very interesting case for students of legitimacy, because as we will see later on it situated at the heart of the democratic trade-off between input and output legitimacy.