The transnational approach relativizes the role traditionally assigned to the state, without heralding its demise, disposes of the spatial factor without denying territorial realities and introduces a global perspective without underestimating analytical method. Discusses one of the categories of transnational forces: what are usually known as 'international nongovernmental organizations' (INGOs) or 'trans-national associations'. (RSM)
Examines the purposes of punishment and reveals that only some are understandable when a model of means-end rationality is used, suggesting that the element of the nonrational also plays an important role in international sanctions. (Abstract amended)
An analysis of how international nongovernment organizations (INGOs) have come to modify or challenge the international system. The introduction of transnational forces -- ie, nonstate entities of a social, political, scientific, religious, environmental, or other nature -- into the study of international relations does not merely shift or cut across boundaries, but calls for a new, intrinsicially pluralistic approach. The interplay of factors & actors outside the conventional frame of reference of territorial sovereign states exposes a multipolar world that encompasses a variety of intersecting sociopolitical "forces of attraction" of a predominantly economic, ethnic, or religious character. The transnational approach particularly emphasizes three aspects of nonstate entities: their historical precedence over the state system; INGOs' role as the subjects & makers of international law; & the latter's effective scope of action in the contemporary world, either as shapers of opinion, as autonomous actors, or in competition with states. As central components of a potential international civil society, their transnationalization poses the question of the universal character of the state, & hence of civil society, & the groupings that structure it across national borders. 2 Illustrations, 41 References. AA
In this paper I am going to argue a familiar but still controversial thesis about the relation between international ethics and international law, which I would sum up in the following list of propositions:First, international law is a source as well as an object of ethical judgements. The idea of legality or the rule of law is an ethical one, and international law has ethical significance because it gives institutional expression to the rule of law in international relations.Secondly, international law—or, more precisely, the idea of the rule of law in international relations—reflects a rule-oriented rather than outcome-oriented ethic of international affairs. By insisting on the priority of rules over outcomes, this ethic rejects consequentialism in all its forms.
Much of the contemporary literature on the utility of international sanctions approaches the apparent riddle of why sanctions are embraced so eagerly when they are supposedly such an "ineffective" tool of statecraft by focusing on the instrumental and rational purposes of sanctions. As a result, one purpose that does not always lend itself to a rational means-end calculus—the purpose of punishment—tends to be overlooked or, more commonly, dismissed outright. This article explores punishment as both a useful and an effective purpose of international sanctions. It argues not only that sanctions should be distinguished from other forms of hurtful statecraft but also that they are a form of "international punishment" for wrongdoing, despite the difficulties of applying the term "punishment" in the context of international relations. The article then examines the purposes of punishment and reveals that only some are understandable when a model of means-end rationality is used, suggesting that the element of the nonrational also plays an important role in international sanctions. The argument is then applied to the case of U.S. sanctions imposed after the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan to demonstrate the different purposes of punishment at work in this case. The article concludes that just as we cannot understand punishment as a purposive human activity solely by reference to a rational model of a means to a clearly delineated end, so too we cannot entirely understand sanctions as a form of international punishment by an attachment to a rational model of policy behavior. However, some forms of punishment are exceedingly effective, and this may explain why sanctions continue to be a popular instrument of statecraft.
