Suchergebnisse

The essential University missions are the education and the research. This last one is able to generate new knowledge an inovation for the companies. The economic competition between the European Union and advanced and underdeveloped countries is a permanent challenge.To take it up, the European Union has created the European Research Area as a structuring tool for the research coming from the european countries.The financing of collaborative international research project by the seventh Framework Programme encourage the searchers of various laboratories to collaborate.Like Europe, the states, the institutes define their international research policy. If the international experiences of such institutes is an element of reseachers progress, it is also an opportunity of freedom for their job. ; Les principales missions de l'Université sont la formation et la recherche. Cette dernière est source de nouvelles connaissances et d'innovation pour les entreprises. La compétition économique que livre l'Union Européenne aux pays développés et les pays en émergence est un défi permanent.Pour répondre à ce challenge, l'Union Européenne s'est engagée dans un processus de structuration et de mutualisation de la recherche des pays membres au sein de l'Espace Européen de la Recherche. En finançant par l'intermédiaire du 7ème programme cadre des projets communs de recherche, l'Union Européenne incite les chercheurs à se regrouper pour collaborer.A l'instar de l'Europe, les Etats, les institutions diverses définissent leur politique de relations internationales en recherche.Si l'ouverture internationale est un élément de progrès et d'épanouissement pour le chercheur, c'est aussi un espace de liberté pour son travail.

URL del artículo en la web de la Revista: https://www.upo.es/revistas/index.php/ripp/article/view/1861 ; Es reseña de: Democracy and International Law. The Library of Essays in International law Richard Burchill (coord.) Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006 ; Universidad Pablo de Olavide

The purpose of this research is to provide an approximation to the likely effects of the crisis on the Colombian economy and to the effectiveness of policy response. For this, the most relevant transmission channels and policy measures are simulated in the setting of a static computable general equilibrium model (CGE). The results obtained are interesting in their own right and are in line with what could be expected given the information available on the behavior of the Colombian economy. Furthermore, they call into question the effectiveness of governmental intervention as judged by its intended countercyclical effects.

From the beginning International law has been conceived as being between states. However, as a result of the progressive development of the law, new actors and new subjects have taken root. The individual is one of these and this has occurred in respect of different perspectives; under the criminal concept the individual may be held responsible before different ad hoc tribunals and the International Criminal Court. Also from the perspective of human rights. This article analyzes the means by which the state's positions on matters of international law are conveyed to individuals, corporate entities and other actors. ; El derecho internacional fue concebido como un derecho interestatal. Sin embargo, como consecuencia del desarrollo progresivo del derecho, nuevos actores y nuevos sujetos han ido surgiendo. El individuo es uno de ellos bajo diferentes perspectivas, bajo la perspectiva penal al asumir la responsabilidad de sus actos frente a los diferentes tribunales ad hoc y, ahora ante la Corte Penal Internacional. También se ha desarrollado la figura bajo la perspectiva de los derechos humanos. Este artículo analiza las formas como las políticas estatales relativas al derecho internacional se presentan a los individuos, a las personas jurídicas y a los demás actores. ; Le droit international a été conçu comme un droit interétatique. Cependant, comme conséquence du développement progressif du droit, ont émergé de nouveaux acteurs et de nouveaux sujets. L'individu est l'un de ceux-ci sous différentes perspectives : sous la perspective pénale, du fait d'assumer la responsabilité de ses actes face aux différents tribunaux ad hoc, et maintenant devant la Cour pénale internationale ; et sous la perspective des droits de l'homme. L'article analyse les manières dont les politiques des États relatives au droit international se présentent aux individus, aux personnes juridiques et aux autres acteurs.

From the beginning International law has been conceived as being between states. However, as a result of the progressive development of the law, new actors and new subjects have taken root. The individual is one of these and this has occurred in respect of different perspectives; under the criminal concept the individual may be held responsible before different ad hoc tribunals and the International Criminal Court. Also from the perspective of human rights. This article analyzes the means by which the state's positions on matters of international law are conveyed to individuals, corporate entities and other actors. ; El derecho internacional fue concebido como un derecho interestatal. Sin embargo, como consecuencia del desarrollo progresivo del derecho, nuevos actores y nuevos sujetos han ido surgiendo. El individuo es uno de ellos bajo diferentes perspectivas, bajo la perspectiva penal al asumir la responsabilidad de sus actos frente a los diferentes tribunales ad hoc y, ahora ante la Corte Penal Internacional. También se ha desarrollado la figura bajo la perspectiva de los derechos humanos. Este artículo analiza las formas como las políticas estatales relativas al derecho internacional se presentan a los individuos, a las personas jurídicas y a los demás actores. ; Le droit international a été conçu comme un droit interétatique. Cependant, comme conséquence du développement progressif du droit, ont émergé de nouveaux acteurs et de nouveaux sujets. L'individu est l'un de ceux-ci sous différentes perspectives : sous la perspective pénale, du fait d'assumer la responsabilité de ses actes face aux différents tribunaux ad hoc, et maintenant devant la Cour pénale internationale ; et sous la perspective des droits de l'homme. L'article analyse les manières dont les politiques des États relatives au droit international se présentent aux individus, aux personnes juridiques et aux autres acteurs.

1-. International relations (IR) theory has suffered a restructuring among several lines over the past two decades. The gradual but uninterrupted decline of systemic theories - primus inter pares in the discipline since the 1970s- is one of those. (1) This decline was accompanied by a rise of those approaches that privilege domestic politics as the place to look for answers. For reasons I will develop below, such an intellectual step was logical, expected, and partially appropriate. (2) While the current state of affairs should not be seen as immutable and a systemic comeback is plausible, the truth is that domestic politics, and non-systemic approaches in general, are well entrenched in a semi-hegemonic position. In this essay I will explain the reasons behind the aforementioned shift, assess its consequences, and advance some hypotheses on the future of systemic theories of IR.2-. Born between the interwar period and the dawn the Cold War world, IR was created with the explicit objective of explaining the causes of war –particularly great wars, understood under the lenses of the two devastating conflicts of the first half of the 20th century. Since then, IR scholars have struggled to respond to the main challenges –or what they perceive as the main challenges- in world politics. (3) This "duty" to explain the world drives theory to follow the patterns of change in international politics, which, as they develop, suggest new problématiques and novel ways to approach them. In important ways then –although, as discussed later, this is not the whole picture- (4) a sociology of inquiry is needed to better understand some of the key transformations in IR theory -e.g. the shift from systemic to domestic theories. Systemic approaches (5) made their meteoric rise under the shelter of K. Waltz's Neorealism. (6) They were created as a tool for a particular time with particular problems. (7) This was a world in which the primary preoccupation was how to manage the bilateral relationship between the United States and the USSR so that it would not en up in World War III. There were certainly other interests in the discipline, but this one outweighed all the rest. A Cold War context made systemic theories very appropriate. Needless to say, the bipolar conflict had been in place a long time before Waltz's path-breaking Theory of International Politics. (8) The essential point is, however, that Neorealism proved to be very successful in explaining the basic patterns of interest in this particular period of the history of IR –i.e. dynamics of polarity, relevance of nuclear weapons, consequences of anarchy and its relationship with war and cooperation, inter alia- in a more parsimonious and convincing way than the discipline had ever been able to do.The IR community recognized this "Copernican turn", as Waltz defined it, as progress and systemic approaches were established as mainstream, maybe even as "normal science." Anyone trying to explain something in international politics had to reckon with the system. This was true for realists (see the work of Gilpin, Walt, and Grieco) but also for scholars with a line of inquiry that differed substantially from Waltz's (see Keohane's Cooperation after Hegemony for a good example). 3-. A dramatic event that shakes the bases of an academic discipline is sometimes needed to motivate scholars to devise new lines of inquiry and surpass research programs that appear to be losing heuristic power. This is what the fall of the Soviet Union did with Neorealism, and systemic approaches in general. (9) Structural realism was in many ways, and problematically so, a theory for the Cold War. Its discussion on nuclear weapons, bipolarity, uncertainty, and superpower dynamics seemed to be too tied to a specific historical context. (10) The inability of neorealism, or any other systemic theory for that matter, to foresee –or even explain- the disappearance of the bipolar world –a systemic change par excellence-supposed a hard blow to its appeal. (11) Both the fall of the USSR and the subsequent appearance (or uncovering, once the Cold War veil was lifted) of new "themes" in international politics -IPE, civil wars, the role of leaders, the democratic peace, inter alia- opened a fertile camp over which to argue for the need to "go beyond systemic theory." (12) I argued supra that this was an appropriate move (or partially appropriate). But the reasons implicitly inferred up to know -failure in predicting events and a crisis in the IR community (in a Kuhnian sense)- cannot support this claim. The other face of the coin is that the thorough self-examination of the 1990s also responded to internal problems of systemic theories as research programs. For example, in the 1980s the discipline was stuck in the mud of absolute vs. relative gains debate, a degenerative discussion from a Lakatosian perspective. (13) Visible problems of heuristic power were calling for a partial move beyond the system. This was the real cause for the shift, and the best argument to characterize it as "appropriate". The exogenous shock (fall of the USSR) had the role, not at all minor, of opening a window of opportunity for dissenting scholars. Helen Milner was one of the most eloquent advocates for this turn. Her argument, in short, was that "systemic theory simply cannot take us far enough" (Milner, 1992). The assumption that anarchy was the principal variable defining states preferences and the primacy of a straight causal line from the system to the state and then to policy-making was excessively simplistic, Milner argued. How could the discipline solve this quagmire? By studying domestic politics to understand states' preferences and, consequently, the differing patterns of conflict and cooperation in international politics. (14) As Milner contended: "…cooperation may be unattainable because of domestic intransigence, and not because of the international system." (15) A reaction against systemic theories was not exclusive to the liberal trenches. Following this turn toward domestic politics, some realist scholars directed their efforts at the incorporation of domestic variables as a way to add complexity to systemic models that they saw as too crude. In his From Wealth to Power, F. Zakaria argued that anarchy and the distribution of power were not enough to explain the behavior of rising powers. After observing that at the end of the 19th century the US was not as assertive as a structural approach would have predicted, he hypothesized that this was because it did not have the governmental capacity to do so. To solve this puzzle he argued for the incorporation of models of resource extraction and governmental capability to try to get through the Neorealist corset. This was an important intra-realist challenge to a somewhat ossified systemic realism. (16)The rise of domestic approaches represented a generalized discontentment with the excessive importance given to parsimony and the inflexibility that came with it. Parsimony, which should be no more than a tool in theory building, was placed as a goal in itself, restricting research in a way that went against the discipline's own progress. Those boundaries had to be overcome if we wanted to say something about some of the important issues left unstudied by a focus on the system. Once again, the Cold War world with its apparently clear strategic problems may have seemed more propitious to a highly parsimonious approach to theory building. In a post Cold War world, the costs of parsimony were too heavy. Domestic theories certainly lost in parsimony, but they gained in a more real approach to IR problématiques. This was the primary rationale behind the turn here discussed, and in this limited sense, the shift was appropriate. (17)4-. It would be nice to unambiguously assert that the fall of systemic theories made IR a coherent and progressive discipline. This, unfortunately, is not the case. The past two decades have seen the formation of a different ethos of theory building and discipline development that may end up doing more harm than good to our broader understanding of international politics. Something not mentioned up to now is the ascent of quantitative and strategic-choice approaches in the discipline. Quantitative approaches gained prominence by the same time that, and related to, domestic theories were supplanting systemic theories. (18) Strategic choice and game theory, following developments in other academic areas -especially economics-, also gained importance in the 1990s under the idea of formalizing theories and going beyond the "isms." There is nothing wrong with these approaches per se. Quantitative work has been very important in the empirical development of IR -maybe too neglected in the past. Formal theory, on the other hand, is a powerful and clear tool to build and evaluate theories while avoiding problems of underspecification all too common in the discipline –though, this is only true if one can get through its assumptions. (19)The problems of this new "methodological bets" are to be found in the costs for the general development of the discipline. The most pressing are the ones related to the idea that theory construction should be a bottom to top affair, and the implicit notion that by building the parts individually we will eventually end up in a progressive accumulation of theoretical knowledge. However, this epistemological decision may well result in the proliferation of particularistic theories of problems ever more sophisticatedly studied, increasingly particular and micro, and in crescendo uninteresting. (20) By depending on a kind of magical automatic accumulation of theoretical knowledge we are risking to end up with an even more chaotic and incoherent discipline (more on this in the conclusion). 5-. As said in the introduction, the fall of grace of systemic theories cannot be taken as an irreversible given; it is possible to devise some scenarios in which systemic approaches could make a comeback.The first one is linked to the relationship between theory and History discussed earlier. The post Cold War world, particularly the 1990s, was a strange period for the discipline. The study of IR has historically dealt with great power politics as its core. The "curious" 1990s came with a certain absence of great power politics, especially due to the overwhelming power position of the US. This goes a long way in explaining the growing emphasis on domestic politics, civil wars, international organizations, inter alia, during those years. A partial return of classical great power politics (or the perception of it) -for example under the banner of the rise of China and some other middle powers- might motivate a recasting of systemic theories -particularly for those wanting to study polarity (a passé topic in the unipolar 1990s), (21) systemic change and its consequences, etc. (22)Another plausible scenario would be the success of some of the ongoing projects to make systemic theories more sophisticated and comprehensive by, for example, incorporating domestic variables. A good example is "Neo-classical Realism" (see fn. 16). This research project proceeds from a systemic assumption of the influences of the system (that is, a neorealist basis) but incorporates domestic politics as an intervening variable between systemic pressures and decision-making. Though a rather interesting proto-school, Neoclassical Realism is still in its infant stages and has yet to produce work of remarkable characteristics. Lastly, domestic politics, as should have been expected, were not the panacea for the development of IR theory. There might well be a social exhaustion with the results of domestic and micro-theory –a Kuhnian crisis analogous to the one that discredited systemic theories. This may eventually take IR on unexpected paths. Nevertheless, if measured by academic output and Geist, predicting a comeback of systemic approaches seems a risky bet. The discipline appears to be quite comfortable with increasing its empirical production, formalizing theories towards an Icarian "scientism", and avoiding, at its own peril, a "wholist" view of international politics. 6-. Going beyond systemic theories –not in the sense of vanishing them, but of relaxing some of their strictures, increasing their sophistication, and trying new approaches- was the necessary thing to do for a methodology that was unable to cope with many of the relevant problems in IR. The turn to domestic and particularistic perspectives brought much needed renovation, indeed. However, the excesses incurred by systemic theorists as a result of an obsession with parsimony and structural effects may now seem analogous (although for the opposite reasons) to a fixation with the particular and micro-level studies in contemporary IR theory. A blind push to obtain ever more data of increasingly micro phenomena puts at risk what we can say about international relations in general. We may, for example, be more much prepared to sophisticatedly answer why a specific insurgent group responded in a specific way to the level of aggression of a specific state, (23) but we may also be losing our interest and capacity to think about the nature of conflict in its most elemental condition. The stakes are too high for the IR community to avoid an honest discussion on how far we are willing to continue on this path. (1) This essay works with the assumption of a relative decline of systemic apporaches. To argue that they have vanished would be utterly incorrect. For a convincing argument on the inevitability of structural constraints see Jervis'sSystem Effects.(2) Although a change may be welcomed, the results are not always as encouraging as expected (more on this qualification of "appropriate" later).(3) This does not mean, of course, that there is an exclusive focus on policy or immediacy, It means that in its most basic essence, the idea of the discipline is to be able to provide some answers to the pressing problems in the international system. To give an example, few people would be interested in studying the prospects of war between France and Germany in the 21st century per se –though it surely is studied as a historical case that can shed light on other issues-, while this was one of the main topics in the nascent IR discipline.(4) Social science does not progress only by exogenous shocks, but also for endogenous reasons that cannot be explained by what happens outside theoretical disscusions.(5) Understood simply as those that privilege the influence of the structure over the behavior of the units.(6) This type of theories certainly were not born with Waltz; systemic is a much broader category than Neorealism. The important point is that Waltz devised the more convincing type of systemic theory. For simplicity, Waltz' Neorelism will be used here as the epitome and a kind of proxy for systemic theory. (7) It must be said that the rise of systemic theories also responded to changes in the social sciences in general; for example, the influence of structuralist anthorpoligist Levi-Strauss' work, which Waltz knew well.(8) Theories of IR before Waltz hosted a diverse group of analysts: Classical realism from the hand of a Hans Morgenthau, Geroge Kennan and Raymond Aron; liberal approaches from a Stanley Hoffman, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye; Bureacratic Organization and foreign policy from a Graham Allison; and a long et cetera.(9) See R. N. Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War and the Failure of Realism."(10) See I. Oren's Our Enemies and US: America´s Rivalries and the Making of Political Science.(11) As with its rise the decline of systemic theories was also linked to broader transformations in the world of ideas, to which IR seems to always be a latecomer. From a broad perspective, this phenomenon had started in the 1960s with the work of Foucault, Derrida, Geertz and others.(12) The end of the immediate preoccupation with bipolarity also gave the opportunity to rethink some long-term historical problems of Neorealism (see Schroeder 1994).(13) Some of the scholars engaged in this deabate were: Keohane, Grieco, Axelrod, and Mastanduno; cf. Milner (1992).(14) In another article in International Organization (1987) she argues that to understand the way in which states make decisions in the international economy it is not enough to look at anarchy. Her model studies the type of economic links between countries (high or low interdependence) and the influence of interests groups that may pressure the state to make particular decisions; these policy outcomes would have been incomprehensible from a systemic/anarchic stance. According to Milner, there is an important dynamic of preference construction and strategies adopted that are to be found in domestic politics.(15) See also Putnam (1988) for an interesting effort to move beyond lists of domestic factors and towards a coherent two level theory.(16) This line of research has been given the title of Neoclassical Realism (see G. Rose 1998). See the work of R. Schweller, J. Taliaferro, A. Friedberg, and T. Christensen.(17) Systemic theories were also attached to what has been discussed as the "paradigm wars" between realism, liberalism, constructivism, etc. The turn away from them can also be given credit for helping to discredit this unproductive way of theorizing.(18) This trend was tied to the notoriety of the "democratic peace" project that was, and still is, an empirical enterprise at its core. See Russett and Oneal (1999); cf. Gartzke (2007).(19) See Wagner, War and the State, and Lake and Powell Strategic Choice and International Relations.(20) This is not the nature of all the work in this approach, of course, but just a possible trend of the school as a whole. See Walt's "Rigor or Rigor Mortis" for a sharp, but not always convincing, critique.(21) For an exception see the work by N. Monteiro on unipolarity. This does not mean that polarity disappeared from the IR map, but it was certainly shrinked as a research question.(22) Some young scholars on this line of research are: P. MacDonald, J. Parent, D. Kliman and M. Beckley.(23) See Jason Lyall's "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya" To be fair, Lyall's work attempts to generalize from this specific case –how convincing he is not very clear, however. *Ph.D. StudentDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of Pennsylvania.E-mail: gcastro@sas.upenn.edu

AbstractHousing rights are now one of the most fundamental social and economic human rights. It is therefore the duty of every country to implement such rights for its own citizens, irrespective of its economicdevelopment, political situation, or social conditions. Possession of appropriate living conditions determines, in fact, the possibility of using other, more advanced human rights (e.g. the right to health, right to development, right to peace, or access to culture). Realization of the right to adequate housing is increasingly problematic for developed countries. According to the United Nations, there areover 100 million homeless people worldwide and more than 1 billion inadequately housed. Poland is an example of a country particularly afflicted by housing problems after the Second World War.Experiences of Polish democratic transformation after 1989, therefore, provide interesting lessons (and warnings) for all countries wishing to deal with the social problems arising from housing difficulties.Keywords: right to adequate housing, human rights, housing rights, social transformation, transition, economic and social human rights, social issues, Poland, United Nations, communism.ResumenEl derecho a la vivienda es uno de los derechos humanos sociales y económicos más elementales. Por lo tanto, es un deber de todos los países implementar esos derechos para susciudadanos y ciudadanas, independependientmente de su desarrollo económico, situación política, o condiciones sociales. La posesión de adecuadas condiciones de vida determinala posibilidad de utilizar otros derechos humanos más avanzados (por ejemplo, derecho a la salud, derecho al desarrollo, derecho a la paz, acceso a la cultura). La realizacióndel derecho a una vivienda adecuada es cada vez más problemática para los países desarrollados. Según las Naciones Unidas, hay más de 100 millones de personas sin hogar en todo el mundo y más de 1000 millones alojadas en viviendas inadecuadas. Polonia es ejemplo de un país particularmente afectado por los problemas de vivienda después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Experiencias de la transformación democrática de Polonia después de 1989 ofrecen lecciones interesantes (y advertencias) para todos los países que deseen hacer frente a los problemas sociales derivados de las dificultades de vivienda.Palabras clave: derecho a la vivienda, derechos humanos, transformación social, transición, derechos económicos y sociales, cuestiones sociales, Polonia, Naciones Unidas, comunismo.

AbstractHousing rights are now one of the most fundamental social and economic human rights. It is therefore the duty of every country to implement such rights for its own citizens, irrespective of its economicdevelopment, political situation, or social conditions. Possession of appropriate living conditions determines, in fact, the possibility of using other, more advanced human rights (e.g. the right to health, right to development, right to peace, or access to culture). Realization of the right to adequate housing is increasingly problematic for developed countries. According to the United Nations, there areover 100 million homeless people worldwide and more than 1 billion inadequately housed. Poland is an example of a country particularly afflicted by housing problems after the Second World War.Experiences of Polish democratic transformation after 1989, therefore, provide interesting lessons (and warnings) for all countries wishing to deal with the social problems arising from housing difficulties.Keywords: right to adequate housing, human rights, housing rights, social transformation, transition, economic and social human rights, social issues, Poland, United Nations, communism.ResumenEl derecho a la vivienda es uno de los derechos humanos sociales y económicos más elementales. Por lo tanto, es un deber de todos los países implementar esos derechos para susciudadanos y ciudadanas, independependientmente de su desarrollo económico, situación política, o condiciones sociales. La posesión de adecuadas condiciones de vida determinala posibilidad de utilizar otros derechos humanos más avanzados (por ejemplo, derecho a la salud, derecho al desarrollo, derecho a la paz, acceso a la cultura). La realizacióndel derecho a una vivienda adecuada es cada vez más problemática para los países desarrollados. Según las Naciones Unidas, hay más de 100 millones de personas sin hogar en todo el mundo y más de 1000 millones alojadas en viviendas inadecuadas. Polonia es ejemplo de un país particularmente afectado por los problemas de vivienda después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Experiencias de la transformación democrática de Polonia después de 1989 ofrecen lecciones interesantes (y advertencias) para todos los países que deseen hacer frente a los problemas sociales derivados de las dificultades de vivienda.Palabras clave: derecho a la vivienda, derechos humanos, transformación social, transición, derechos económicos y sociales, cuestiones sociales, Polonia, Naciones Unidas, comunismo.

Diferentes puntos de vista para determinar el alcance del secreto de las deliberaciones en varios tribunales internacionales han conllevado a que algunos jueces tienen el derecho de presentar opiniones separadas; mientras que otros no lo tienen. Teniendo en cuenta el rol y la misión de la jurisdicción internacional, los jueces deberían tener el derecho de presentar dichas opiniones separadas, tal y como sucede con los jueces del common law y con un amplio número de los jueces constitucionales. Sin embargo, estas analogías solo jugaron un rol marginal en los trabajos preparatorios del Estatuto de la Corte Permanente de Justicia Internacional en 1920. Además, no les parecía políticamente correcto, a los Estados, que una opinión jurídica de un juez internacional, que los personifique a ellos o a su poder soberano, fuera condenado al anonimato en virtud del principio del secreto de las deliberaciones, como consecuencia de un "tecnicismo" consistente en que dicha opinión haya sido derrotada por la mayoría en el momento de votar el proyecto de la sentencia. Hay reglas de derecho internacional público general que le garantizan un poder autónomo al poder judicial internacional. De acuerdo con las reglas de procedimiento de los tribunales internacionales, es claro que los jueces tienen el derecho de pronunciarse mediante una opinión separada, aun cuando este derecho no se encuentra tipificado de forma expresa en el Estatuto o en el tratado constitutivo de dicha entidad. Esta regla se presume a menos que se deduzca de la voluntad de los Estados parte lo contrario. El derecho relativo a las opiniones separadas puede ser analizado bajo la perspectiva de los jueces teniendo en cuenta el derecho que tienen a la libertad de expresión. De acuerdo con esta libertad, un juez internacional puede tener la libertad para demostrar, de forma sistemática, mediante opiniones separadas, las debilidades argumentativas de la mayoría. Evitando, obviamente, un estilo que sea ofensivo hacia sus colegas. Esta forma de expresarse es considerada inofensiva hacia la autoridad judicial. Los efectos positivos por la ausencia, o de la prohibición, de las opiniones separadas, si las hay, con relación a la independencia de los jueces internacionales no son fáciles de determinar; sin embargo, este tipo de medidas que restringen la libertad de expresión de los jueces no son lo suficientemente efectivas ni proporcionales para legitimar su objetivo. Hay herramientas más efectivas y menos restrictivas que conllevan al mismo resultado (por ejemplo, un mandato no renovable de los jueces internacionales). ; Différents points de vue pour déterminer la portée du secret des délibérations dans certains tribunaux internationaux ont débouché sur le fait que les juges aient le droit de présenter des opinions séparées; alors que d'autres n'ont pas ce droit. En tenant compte du rôle et des objectifs des missions internationales, les juges devraient avoir le droit de présenter des opinions séparées, de la même façon que dans le système de common law et dans un grand nombre de tribunaux constitutionnels.Cependant, ces analogies ont joué un rôle marginal dans les travaux préparatoires du Statut de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale en 1920. D'autant que les Etats ne trouvaient pas orrect qu'une opinión juridique d'un juge international soit condamnée a l'anonymat comme consequence du principe du secret des délibérations, ceci comme conséquenced'un «technicisme» relatif au fait que ladite opinion était contraire à la position majoritaire de la Cour au moment de voter le projet de la décision.Les règles générales de droit international public garantissent un pouvoir autonome au pouvoir judiciaire international. Selon les règles de procédure des tribunaux internationaux, les juges ont le droit de se prononcer avec une opinion séparée, même si ce droit ne se trouve pas typifié de façon expresse dans le Statut ou dans le traité constitutif de l'organisation. Cette règle est présumée à moins qu'il y ait eu une claire volonté des Etats dans le sens contraire.Le droit relatif aux opinions séparées peut être analysé sous la perspective des juges en tenant compte de leur droit à la liberté d'expression. En ce sens, un juge international peut avoir la liberté pour démontrer, de façon systématique, par le biais d'opinions séparées, les vides argumentatifs de la majorité, en évitant un style qui puissent être offensif envers ses collègues. Cette façon de s'exprimer est considéré inoffensive envers l'autorité judiciaire.Les effets positifs par l'absence, ou l'interdiction, d'opinions séparées, en relation avec l'indépendance des juges internationaux ne sont pas faciles à mettre de côté. Cependant, ce genre des mesures restrictives à la liberté d'expression n'est pas suffisamment effectif ni proportionné pour légitimer l'objectif du juge. Il y a des instruments bien plus effectifs y moins restrictifs qui mènent au même résultat (par exemple, un seul mandat, non renouvelable, des juges nternationaux). ; Significant discrepancies in the determination of the scope of the obligation of secrecy of deliberations by various international tribunals have led to the fact that some international judges are endowed with the right to a separate opinion, while others do not enjoy it. Taking into account the role and missions of the international judiciary, international judges should be given a right to separate opinions, like common law judges and many constitutional judges. Nevertheless, such analogies played only a marginal role in the preparatory works on the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1920. Indeed, it seemed politically unacceptable to the States that the legal opinion of an international judge, personifying them and their sovereign power within the court, should be condemned to anonymity by virtue of the principle of secrecy of deliberations, due only to the "technical" fact that such an opinion has been outweighed by the majority at the moment of voting on the draft judgment. There is a permissive rule of general International Law guaranteeing an autonomous power to the international judiciary to lay down, in the rules of procedure of any international court, the right to separate opinion, even if such a right is not expressly provided for by its statute or other constituting treaty. The aforementioned rule is presumed to apply unless it can be deduced from the behaviour of the founding States that they wished to derogate from it. The right to separate opinions can also be analysed from the perspective of judges' right to freedom of expression. In accordance with this freedom, an international judge can feel free to demonstrate systematically, in the form of separate opinions, the intellectual weaknesses of the majority views and reasoning, subject to avoiding offensive style and formulations. Such a form of expression is presumed to cause no harm to the authority of the judiciary. If some positive effects of absence or prohibition of separate opinions on the independence of international judges sitting in the case cannot be set aside too easily, nevertheless, such a serious measure restricting substantially their right to freedom of expression seems to be neither sufficiently efficient nor proportional to this pursued legitimate aim. There are other, more efficient and less restrictive tools which are also able to lead to the same result (for example, introduction of a single, non renewable mandate for international judges).

Significant discrepancies in the determination of the scope of the obligation of secrecy of deliberations by various international tribunals have led to the fact that some international judges are endowed with the right to a separate opinion, while others do not enjoy it. Taking into account the role and missions of the international judiciary, international judges should be given a right to separate opinions, like common law judges and many constitutional judges. Nevertheless, such analogies played only a marginal role in the preparatory works on the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1920. Indeed, it seemed politically unacceptable to the States that the legal opinion of an international judge, personifying them and their sovereign power within the court, should be condemned to anonymity by virtue of the principle of secrecy of deliberations, due only to the "technical" fact that such an opinion has been outweighed by the majority at the moment of voting on the draft judgment. There is a permissive rule of general International Law guaranteeing an autonomous power to the international judiciary to lay down, in the rules of procedure of any international court, the right to separate opinion, even if such a right is not expressly provided for by its statute or other constituting treaty. The aforementioned rule is presumed to apply unless it can be deduced from the behaviour of the founding States that they wished to derogate from it. The right to separate opinions can also be analysed from the perspective of judges' right to freedom of expression. In accordance with this freedom, an international judge can feel free to demonstrate systematically, in the form of separate opinions, the intellectual weaknesses of the majority views and reasoning, subject to avoiding offensive style and formulations. Such a form of expression is presumed to cause no harm to the authority of the judiciary. If some positive effects of absence or prohibition of separate opinions on the independence of international judges sitting in the case cannot be set aside too easily, nevertheless, such a serious measure restricting substantially their right to freedom of expression seems to be neither sufficiently efficient nor proportional to this pursued legitimate aim. There are other, more efficient and less restrictive tools which are also able to lead to the same result (for example, introduction of a single, non renewable mandate for international judges). ; Diferentes puntos de vista para determinar el alcance del secreto de las deliberaciones en varios tribunales internacionales han conllevado a que algunos jueces tienen el derecho de presentar opiniones separadas; mientras que otros no lo tienen. Teniendo en cuenta el rol y la misión de la jurisdicción internacional, los jueces deberían tener el derecho de presentar dichas opiniones separadas, tal y como sucede con los jueces del common law y con un amplio número de los jueces constitucionales. Sin embargo, estas analogías solo jugaron un rol marginal en los trabajos preparatorios del Estatuto de la Corte Permanente de Justicia Internacional en 1920. Además, no les parecía políticamente correcto, a los Estados, que una opinión jurídica de un juez internacional, que los personifique a ellos o a su poder soberano, fuera condenado al anonimato en virtud del principio del secreto de las deliberaciones, como consecuencia de un "tecnicismo" consistente en que dicha opinión haya sido derrotada por la mayoría en el momento de votar el proyecto de la sentencia. Hay reglas de derecho internacional público general que le garantizan un poder autónomo al poder judicial internacional. De acuerdo con las reglas de procedimiento de los tribunales internacionales, es claro que los jueces tienen el derecho de pronunciarse mediante una opinión separada, aun cuando este derecho no se encuentra tipificado de forma expresa en el Estatuto o en el tratado constitutivo de dicha entidad. Esta regla se presume a menos que se deduzca de la voluntad de los Estados parte lo contrario. El derecho relativo a las opiniones separadas puede ser analizado bajo la perspectiva de los jueces teniendo en cuenta el derecho que tienen a la libertad de expresión. De acuerdo con esta libertad, un juez internacional puede tener la libertad para demostrar, de forma sistemática, mediante opiniones separadas, las debilidades argumentativas de la mayoría. Evitando, obviamente, un estilo que sea ofensivo hacia sus colegas. Esta forma de expresarse es considerada inofensiva hacia la autoridad judicial. Los efectos positivos por la ausencia, o de la prohibición, de las opiniones separadas, si las hay, con relación a la independencia de los jueces internacionales no son fáciles de determinar; sin embargo, este tipo de medidas que restringen la libertad de expresión de los jueces no son lo suficientemente efectivas ni proporcionales para legitimar su objetivo. Hay herramientas más efectivas y menos restrictivas que conllevan al mismo resultado (por ejemplo, un mandato no renovable de los jueces internacionales). ; Différents points de vue pour déterminer la portée du secret des délibérations dans certains tribunaux internationaux ont débouché sur le fait que les juges aient le droit de présenter des opinions séparées; alors que d'autres n'ont pas ce droit. En tenant compte du rôle et des objectifs des missions internationales, les juges devraient avoir le droit de présenter des opinions séparées, de la même façon que dans le système de common law et dans un grand nombre de tribunaux constitutionnels.Cependant, ces analogies ont joué un rôle marginal dans les travaux préparatoires du Statut de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale en 1920. D'autant que les Etats ne trouvaient pas orrect qu'une opinión juridique d'un juge international soit condamnée a l'anonymat comme consequence du principe du secret des délibérations, ceci comme conséquenced'un «technicisme» relatif au fait que ladite opinion était contraire à la position majoritaire de la Cour au moment de voter le projet de la décision.Les règles générales de droit international public garantissent un pouvoir autonome au pouvoir judiciaire international. Selon les règles de procédure des tribunaux internationaux, les juges ont le droit de se prononcer avec une opinion séparée, même si ce droit ne se trouve pas typifié de façon expresse dans le Statut ou dans le traité constitutif de l'organisation. Cette règle est présumée à moins qu'il y ait eu une claire volonté des Etats dans le sens contraire.Le droit relatif aux opinions séparées peut être analysé sous la perspective des juges en tenant compte de leur droit à la liberté d'expression. En ce sens, un juge international peut avoir la liberté pour démontrer, de façon systématique, par le biais d'opinions séparées, les vides argumentatifs de la majorité, en évitant un style qui puissent être offensif envers ses collègues. Cette façon de s'exprimer est considéré inoffensive envers l'autorité judiciaire.Les effets positifs par l'absence, ou l'interdiction, d'opinions séparées, en relation avec l'indépendance des juges internationaux ne sont pas faciles à mettre de côté. Cependant, ce genre des mesures restrictives à la liberté d'expression n'est pas suffisamment effectif ni proportionné pour légitimer l'objectif du juge. Il y a des instruments bien plus effectifs y moins restrictifs qui mènent au même résultat (par exemple, un seul mandat, non renouvelable, des juges nternationaux).

El artículo aborda la política exterior de Colombia durante el gobierno de Álvaro Uribe Vélez. La tesis desarrollada es que durante su gobierno la política exterior se caracterizó por las que han sido constantes históricas en la manera como el país se ha aproximado al mundo. Sin embargo, durante su gestión se presentaron dos cambios significativos relacionados con el tradicional apego de Colombia al derecho internacional y la concepción de los vecinos como enemigos –específicamente para los casos de Venezuela y Ecuador–. El artículo inicia con una primera parte que aborda el escenario de conflicto y violencia por el que ha transitado el país y sin el cual no se podría comprender el comportamiento de Colombia en el escenario internacional. Al fin y al cabo, la situación interna ha sido su principal condicionante. ; This article examines Colombian foreign policy under the Presidency of Alvaro Uribe Vélez. The thesis developed is that during his government Colombia's external behavior have been shaped by historical trends. However two sig nificant changes took place: one related to the respect of international law, and the other with the perceptions of its neighbors- Venezuela and Ecuador. The article begins with a brief analysis of how Colombian domestic violence has been the determining factor of the country´s foreign policy

31 páginas ; El presente trabajo analiza el alcance que en la doctrina y en la jurisprudencia ha tenido el principio de internacionalidad y uniformidad en su aplicación, contenido en el artículo 7o. de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre Contratos de Compraventa Internacional de Mercaderías. Para ello, el autor aborda el alcance que tiene la naturaleza de tratado internacional de la convención, lo que permite acudir a los criterios de interpretación consagrados en la Convención de Viena de 1969 sobre Derecho de los Tratados, entre los cuales está la posibilidad de basarse en la historia legislativa del tratado. El autor propone que esto permite considerar la obligatoriedad de los precedentes extranjeros al asumirlos como aplicaciones que los Estados hacen de los tratados. ; In this paper the author analyzes the extent to which the doctrine and tribunal decisions has been the principle of internationality and uniformity in its application, contained in article 7 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. To this end, the author discusses the scope that the nature of international treaty of the Convention, which allows recourse to the rules of interpretation set in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, among which is the possibility of using in the legislative history of the treaty. Author suggests that it can consider the binding of foreign judicial precedents as applications to assume that states make treaties.

International Law is a dynamic and flexible subfield which can serve as an example of how laws are contested, negotiated, and adopted without the presence of an overarching authority with coercive powers (a leviathan). A greater understanding of the relationship between international law and the vast array of actors currently operating the in interstices of the transnational system brought about by globalization can provide valuable insights as to how laws are created and legitimized through norm socialization and dialogue leading to a shared intersubjective understanding. This brief essay aims to connect some important insights from legal anthropology to the work of constructivist scholars studying regime formation and institution building in the growing field of international studies. ; El Derecho Internacional es un campo dinámico y flexible que puede servir como un ejemplo de cómo las leyes son impugnados, negociadas y aprobadas sin la presencia de una autoridad suprema con poderes coercitivos (un Leviatán). Una mayor comprensión de la relación entre el derecho internacional y la amplia gama de actores que operan actualmente en los intersticios del sistema transnacional, provocados por la globalización, puede ofrecer una perspectiva valiosa sobre cómo las leyes se crean y se legitiman a través de las pautas de socialización y del diálogo que conducen a un entendimiento intersubjetivo compartido. Este breve ensayo pretende conectar algunos aspectos importantes de la antropología jurídica con la labor de los estudiosos constructivista estudiando el régimen de formación y creación de instituciones en el creciente campo de los estudios internacionales.

The protection of an alien's property in a host country against direct expropriation has long existed in the international arena. Examples of direct expropriation include nationalization, physical seizure of assets or legislated transfer of assets to the state. However such physical takings are no longer common practice. Nowadays, expropriation comes mainly in the form of "indirect expropriation": acts and steps taken by governments which interfere with the right to the property or diminish the value of the property. This paper explores the most relevant antecedents of the concept of indirect expropriation, its appearance in the international system, the inclusion in BITs and Investment Chapters of FTAs, and the effect that the concept is having on the regulatory activity of governments DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.22518/16578953.39

This article compares the international agenda that comes after the fall of the Soviet Union, with the economic and social development plans and programs that were adopted in Colombia since 1990 and until 2010. Its purpose is to demonstrate that Colombia has adhered fully to the guidelines of the economic agenda and international politics and that, as a consequence, its economic law simply collects such postulates, either in the external order, as in the internal order. ; El presente artículo compara la agenda internacional que surge después de que cae el sistema comunista en la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas, con los planes y programas de desarrollo económico y social que fueron adoptados en Colombia, desde 1990 y hasta el año 2010. Su propósito es demostrar que Colombia ha adherido irrestrictamente a las directrices de la agenda económica y política internacional y que, como consecuencia de ello, su derecho económico simplemente recoge tales postulados, ya sea en el orden externo, como en el orden interno.