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PurposeEvidence suggests that "single-market" alliances are more likely to form between firms in similar socially determined status positions. However, in international alliances, firms come from different status interfaces and foreign partners may become status competitors. Hence, the preference for partners with similar socially derived status positions in their respective markets, or status homophily, is unclear in 'international' partner selections. This analysis aims to better understand this issue.Design/methodology/approachThis research explores status homophily in international alliance formation using a database of hand-collected tombstone announcements for US initial public offering syndicates involving Japanese securities firms from 1975 through 1984.FindingsResults suggest that firms are attracted to partners who occupy similar socially derived status positions in their own home markets. Additionally, high-status host-country firms may signal status differences within alliances to reduce status competition from high-status foreign partners.Originality/valueThis research indicates that "international" alliance research needs to consider socially derived status positions. Additionally, academics and practitioners alike can benefit from the knowledge that status signaling within alliances can be a type of competitive behavior between cooperating firms.

I develop a model of strategic communication to study information aggregation in an alliance between multiple players. An alliance exhibits four features: i) imperfect private information among players; ii) substitutability in actions; iii) constraints on the action set; and iv) preference heterogeneity (biases). The main result of the paper derives conditions for full information aggregation within the alliance under a public communication protocol. Full information aggregation ensues as long as players' biases are sufficiently cohesive with respect to the constraints on the action set. When players can (costlessly) choose an action set ex ante, I derive the precise conditions on the minimal action set such that there is full information aggregation. Comparative statics uncovers two sources for the differences in the size of the minimal action set between players: bias over outcomes (preference effect) and degree of interdependency (interdependency effect). The results are discussed in the context of burden sharing incentives during military interventions within NATO.

I develop a model of strategic communication to study information aggregation in an alliance between multiple players. An alliance exhibits four features: i) imperfect private information among players; ii) substitutability in actions; iii) constraints on the action set; and iv) preference heterogeneity (biases). The main result of the paper derives conditions for full information aggregation within the alliance under a public communication protocol. Full information aggregation ensues as long as players' biases are sufficiently cohesive with respect to the constraints on the action set. When players can (costlessly) choose an action set ex ante, I derive the precise conditions on the minimal action set such that there is full information aggregation. Comparative statics uncovers two sources for the differences in the size of the minimal action set between players: bias over outcomes (preference effect) and degree of interdependency (interdependency effect). The results are discussed in the context of burden sharing incentives during military interventions within NATO.

Terrorist groups with a shared enemy or ideology have ample reason to work together, even if they are primarily pursuing different causes. Although partnering with another terrorist organization has the potential to bolster operational effectiveness, efficiency, and prestige, international alliances may expose partners to infiltration, security breaches, or additional counterterrorism attention. Alliances between such organizations, which are suspicious and secretive by nature, must also overcome significant barriers to trust—the exposure to risk must be balanced by the promise of increased lethality, resiliency, and longevity. In Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances, Tricia Bacon argues that although it may seem natural for terrorist groups to ally, groups actually face substantial hurdles when attempting to ally and, when alliances do form, they are not evenly distributed across pairs. Instead, she demonstrates that when terrorist groups seek allies to obtain new skills, knowledge, or capacities for resource acquisition and mobilization, only a few groups have the ability to provide needed training, safe haven, infrastructure, or cachet. Consequently, these select few emerge as preferable partners and become hubs around which other groups cluster. According to Bacon, shared enemies and common ideologies do not cause alliances to form but create affinity to bind partners and guide partner selection. Bacon examines partnerships formed by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Al-Qaida, and Egyptian jihadist groups, among others, in a series of case studies spanning the dawn of international terrorism in the 1960s to the present. Why Terrorist Groups Form International Alliances advances our understanding of the motivations of terrorist alliances and offers insights useful to counterterrorism efforts to disrupt these dangerous relationships.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on U.S. and European defense contractors' business alliances, focusing on: (1) the types alliances companies are establishing and their reasons for forming alliances; (2) why companies prefer certain types of alliances over others; and (3) whether U.S. laws, regulations, policies, and practices influence a company's decision to form an alliance or its choice of a type of alliance."

PurposeMultinational enterprises (MNEs) strive to expand into new markets either by exploiting their resource base or by gaining access to partner companies that own the required resources. Thus, companies face the compete–cooperate–coopete decision. The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of MNEs' networks of interorganisational alliances, and their interaction with resource ownership, and market attractiveness, on the choice of international expansion modes, whether they are sole venture (competitive) or collaboration agreements (cooperative) or both (coopetitive).Design/methodology/approachA biprobit model is used to analyse more than 50,000 new international operations by 164 MNEs in a five-year window. A moderation analysis is carried out to reveal the interaction between network centrality, resource ownership and market size.FindingsThe results show the extent to which the competitive–collaborative contradictory forces attenuate each other in different market scenarios. This study's contribution advances the resolution of the resource allocation dilemma by recognising the conditions for the selection of each expansion mode: sole venture, cooperation and coopetition.Originality/valueMainstream international business theory claims that firm's own resources and transaction outcomes are generally sufficient to explain their international expansion decisions, whereas network and social capital theories focus on the role of relationships and network embeddedness. Both perspectives seem to neglect the fact that firms frequently develop both factors simultaneously. This study bridges these perspectives and reveals the interplay between resource ownership, alliance network centrality and market size for MNEs' expansion mode choice.