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PurposeThe recurrence of banking crises throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and in the more recent 2008‐09 global financial crisis, has led to an expanding empirical literature on crisis explanation and prediction. The purpose of this paper is to provide an analytical review of proxies for and important determinants of banking crises‐credit growth, financial liberalization, bank regulation and supervision.Design/methodology/approachThe study surveys the banking crisis literature by comparing proxies for and measures of banking crises and policy‐related variables in the literature. Advantages and disadvantages of different proxies are discussed.FindingsDisagreements about determinants of banking crises are in part explained by the difference in the chosen proxies used in empirical models. The usefulness of different proxies depends partly on constraints in terms of time and country coverage but also on what particular policy question is asked.Originality/valueThe study offers a comprehensive analysis of measurements of banking crises, credit growth, financial liberalization and banking regulations and concludes with an assessment of existing proxies and databases. Since, the review points to the choice of proxies that best fit specific research objectives, it should serve as a reference point for empirical researchers in the banking crisis area.

The article provides an analysis of the present condition and prospects of development of banks and the banking business in the face of international sanctions. It identifies current trends, problems and the risks of banks and banking in Russia and in the world. Special attention is paid to the analysis of sectoral international sanctions against the Russian banks and the need to minimize negative impact of sanctions on the banking business, both nationally and internationally. Great value in these conditions has the state monetary policy. Anti-crisis policy pursued by the Bank of Russia, in a context of stagnating economy, leads to a reduction in the Russian share in the world economy and increases in the standard of living gap with the developed countries. The article argues that Russia's economic growth opportunities in 2016 are limited by restriction level of bank interest, the high volatility of the exchange rate of the national currency, insufficient development of credit relations, tough, high-budget (at the level of developed Europe) tax burden, increasing administrative costs, dramatically increasing the concentration of risks of subjective decisions at the present stage of the electoral cycle. In a situation of uncertainty of predictions regarding the scope and duration of the application of sanctions, the Russian Government and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation had rightly seek to use a combination of anti-sanctions measures of austerity measures on introduction of contra-sanctions to create more comfortable conditions for doing business in Russia and her allies from member countries of Eurasian Economic Union, SCO, BRICS. The article examines the strategic aspects of development banks and banking business in Russia under the new circumstances. Given the practical recommendations on improvement of the development strategy of banks in Russia. The necessity to improve the theoretical, conceptual, methodological, her reasoning and extend the range of retrospective and prospective analysis of the State of the banking sector development strategy of the Russian economy.

Despite the most recent period of calm on the financial markets, the long-term resilience of the European financial system is not yet assured, even several years after the financial crisis began. However, the stability of the financial system playsa crucial role for real economic development and consequently for growth and prosperity. The financial crisis has shown that stricter regulation is required to improve the stability and resilience of the banking system. Further, it has become evident in recent years that banking supervision requires better international coordination in this age of globalization. The present report first analyzes current developments with regard to the European banking system: what regulatory and institutional changes have been introduced since the crisis? How have market structures and the stability of the banking system developed? Second, the report proposes recommendations to further promote the stability of the banking system: the European banking sector has not been fully consolidated and this should be driven forward as a matter of urgency. The transparency of the new regulatory and institutional structure should be increased. The close ties between banks and governments must also be loosened further. Beyond the adjustments planned to date, policy makers should promote alternative financing sources for small and medium-size firms, e.g. the direct access to capital markets.

© 2019 Elsevier Inc. The accountability of bank supervisors to the executive and the legislative branches of the government varies across countries and over time. Using cross-country panel data, we explore whether a banking crisis can affect these accountability arrangements. According to our results, supervisory accountability to the executive branch only becomes more likely following a banking crisis. Our contribution is to the nascent but important literature on the governance of bank supervisors.

Banks are subject to capital requirements because their privately optimal leverage is higher than the socially optimal one. This is in turn because banks fail to internalize all costs that their insolvency creates for agents who use their money-like liabilities to settle transactions. If banks can bypass capital regulation in an opaque shadow banking sector, it may be optimal to relax capital requirements so that liquidity dries up in the shadow banking sector. Tightening capital requirements may spur a surge in shadow banking activity that leads to an overall larger risk on the money-like liabilities of the formal and shadow banking institutions.

Banks are subject to capital requirements because their privately optimal leverage is higher than the socially optimal one. This is in turn because banks fail to internalize all costs that their insolvency creates for agents who use their money-like liabilities to settle transactions. If banks can bypass capital regulation in an opaque shadow banking sector, it may be optimal to relax capital requirements so that liquidity dries up in the shadow banking sector. Tightening capital requirements may spur a surge in shadow banking activity that leads to an overall larger risk on the money-like liabilities of the formal and shadow banking institutions.

AbstractThis article examines bank lobbying in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). While excessive bank lobbying is routinely linked to weakened banking regulations, we still know little about bank mobilization patterns. In particular, when and why do some banks lobby the BCBS while others do not? I argue that the decision to lobby is a function of two factors: banks' organizational characteristics and domestic banking regulations. I test my argument using a unique dataset of over 33,000 banks worldwide during the period in which Basel III was negotiated. My findings confirm a pronounced bias in bank mobilization patterns toward wealthy, internationally active banks. I also find that banks facing more stringent banking regulations at home tend to lobby the BCBS in an effort to level the playing field with international competitors. This effect is particularly salient for stringent regulations on banking activities as well as higher capital adequacy requirements.1

Banks are subject to capital requirements because their privately optimal leverage is higher than the socially optimal one. This is in turn because banks fail to internalize all costs that their insolvency creates for agents who use their money-like liabilities to settle transactions. If banks can bypass capital regulation in an opaque shadow banking sector, it may be optimal to relax capital requirements so that liquidity dries up in the shadow banking sector. Tightening capital requirements may spur a surge in shadow banking activity that leads to an overall larger risk on the money-like liabilities of the formal and shadow banking institutions.