Suchergebnisse

International cooperation through multilateral organizations sharply distinguishes the post-World War II economic policies of the United States from those it employed following World War I. After World War I, the United States eschewed any form of international economic organization, which some governments thought should be continued; early in the more recent conflict, United States officials pressed hard for the acceptance of world-wide institutional cooperation. The purpose of the present article is to review, through an examination of its policy toward multilateral financial arrangements, some of the important discussions and decisions which moved the United States towards internationalism in economic relations; to emphasize the role of political factors in the development of financial organizations, in the retreat from international "democracy," and in the growth of regional cooperation; and to examine some of the difficulties of international financial cooperation.A primary objective of the United States government's postwar policy preparations was the re-creation of amethodof conducting international economic transactions which would not result in economic warfare; the major technique was that of international agreement on accepted rules for conducting transactions. Government officials considered that this approach was not only desirable but also possible, in view of the success of wartime collaboration.

International Financial Cooperation today may require a more complex preparation than ever, particularly in the era of globalization. It is known that the global economy may bring about changing socio-economic, cultural, technological, and political condition of many countries, whilst the globalization itself has often surpassed domestic circumstances among nations which consequently leads to the need of providing a more advance principles of international financial cooperation. Regardless to these changing circumstances, the international financial cooperation may differ in nature which relatively depends on the types and objectives of the international institution involved. On the other sides, the literatures on international policy coordination are vast and multifaceted (there is no one size fits for all). However, there are some basic conditions that can be shared in common. Based on the study of various literatures, it is found that the challenges of international financial cooperation today may encircle not only about the readiness of the nation states, institutions, and related projects in utilizing the international financial cooperation, but it may also include other variuos aspects such as an optimal structure of cooperation agreement, a pattern of compliance with cooperation agreements, principles for cross border cooperation on crisis management, sharing rules of the costs of future interventions, and perhaps specific issues and barriers. All of these challenges and barriers certainly need coordinated actions to ensure that the optimal objectives of the international financial cooperation are achieved. Thus, these pre-requisite conditions should be embraced in the more advance guiding principles of the international financial cooperation. As such, the relevant authorities, including supervisory agencies, central banks, and finance ministries will also be able to tackle a severe stress in case of sudden financial crisis and managing them successfully.

AbstractAt the latest the global financial crisis has raised the awareness of the need for a globally coordinated financial market regulation. Even though the necessity to cooperate is widely acknowledged, cooperation is often limited in practice. This article characterizes the formation of self-enforcing international financial regulation agreements. Our analysis allows to evaluate the desirability and feasibility of cooperative solutions and explains the challenges associated with the process of cooperation. We model the cooperation of national financial regulators in a game-theoretical framework that considers financial stability to be an impure public good. Joint national supervisory effort is supposed to increase aggregate welfare in terms of a more stable financial system both on a global and on a local level by simultaneously generating incentives to free-ride. Our analysis in general indicates the difficulty of reaching a fully cooperative solution. In our basic version of the model we show that partial cooperation of two or three countries is stable and improves the welfare of all countries relative to the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Further analyses highlight the role of additional club benefits. When signatory countries of a coalition gain benefits over and above the joint welfare maximization, stable coalitions of any size become feasible.

The objective of this paper is to provide a balanced assessment of international cooperation among financial regulators, with a focus on banking supervision. While recognizing the undeniable -- and even unexpected -- achievements of these regulators in building a cooperative framework for financial supervision, we also suggest that this remains a work in progress, given the contemporary financial risk environment. Briefly, we argue that this environment -- to the extent we understand it, for it remains opaque in important respects -- has an almost paradoxical quality, in that risk has become both more consolidated and more atomized at the same time. On the one hand, large and complex financial institutions (LCFIs) which may be "too big to fail", increasingly dominate the banking landscape; on the other, these same institutions have shifted at least a portion of their risks onto other firms and households, whose absorptive capacity has yet to be severely tested. It is the effectiveness of the international supervisory architecture in the face of this risk environment that we consider, and we then provide some suggestions for future policy reforms

"Assesses how regional financial institutions can help developing countries, often at a disadvantage within the global financial framework, finance their investment needs, counteract the volatility of private capital flows, and make their voices heard"--Provided by publisher