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With an introduction by James N. Hyde, this is an examination of some of the negotiations which states have carried on under the auspices of internat'l org. Specific cases in which mediation, conciliation, & good offices were used as techniques are presented. They represent situations of power politics as tempered by the effect of internat'l org, or the beginnings of a growing body of procedural or objective law. The United Nations Charter places primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace upon the Security Council. Some settlement-of -dispute patterns have begun to emerge which will influence the law of the future. Developments of the cold war led to a turning to the broader role of dispute-settlement culminating in the Uniting for Peace Resolution of 1950. The Charter gives increased power to the Secretary-General in that he is permitted to bring certain questions to the Security Council & to include items on the Assembly's provisional agenda. Nations are granted the right of individual & collective defense. Any nation may bring to the attention of the Council or Assembly any matter which might lead to internat'l friction. The Assembly & Council have followed a liberal policy in inviting non-member states to participate in their respective discussions. In serious situations the Council or Assembly usually undertake provisional measures either to restore peace or prevent a further deterioration of the situation. A majority of the questions coming before both bodies are referred to a subsidiary group for detailed investigation or conciliation. Both bodies have been reluctant to create permanent subsidiary machinery for the settlement of disputes. There has been a trend toward the use of single mediators & representatives. The manner of approvals of the parent organ & the composition of the subsidiary group have played a major part in influencing the confidence of the parties in the group's operations. The effectiveness of the UN would probably be increased through greater development of peaceful settlement processes through regional org's. The major problem is to find ways of increasing its power & prestige. B. J. Keeley.

There are 2 general types of collective labor disputes: (1) disputes of a legal character involving the interpretation of an already existing legal rule; (2) disputes of a conflict of interest, or econ disputes, referring to working conditions not specified by existing rules. Some contemporary systems of law give an optional & some a compulsory character to their settlement. There is a tendency to avoid compulsory arbitration. A privileged position in the settlement of disputes is given to those institutions set up by the parties. Techniques followed in consensual conciliation procedures are scattered throughout a large number of collective conventions. The bodies entrusted with the settlement of collective disputes (CD 's) may be permanent or temporary & composed of civil servants or independent professional persons. A problem arises over whether it is desirable to set up successive stages in the settlement procedures. In this there has been a tendency to extend the powers of the federal authorities. The representation of staff in enterprises is one of the essential features of modern labor law. Conciliation is compulsory for the settlement of all CD's. The problem of mediation is much more delicate, the mediation enjoying considerably larger powers. When it is a question of procedure by agreement, the parties organize a completely informal procedure, though the spirit of legal procedures is diff in cases of an imposed settlement. Though the gov has the right to apply to the body entrusted with settling disputes, it is sometimes reluctant to exercise it. Once the mediation body has been applied to, the parties must be induced to participate in the process. Precise rules for conciliation procedure are generally avoided, & problems of settlement are seldom legal in character. The mediator must win the confidence of the parties, divest the dispute of its emotional features, & establish psychol'al conditions for success. Conciliators or mediators can make use of various soc, pol'al, & econ pressures in bringing the parties to agreement. The mediator's recommendations may be accepted either by the professional org's or through a referendum organized among the employees. Recent studies on dispute settlements are listed. B. J. Keeley.

When States Disagree about the way in which the waters of an international drainage basin should be utilized, they should try first to resolve their differences by consultation and negotiation. This is what they usually do and, for the most part, do successfully. Sometimes, however, their negotiations do not lead to agreement. They then face the question whether or not they should involve the aid of third-parties in resolving their problem. In the words of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, must they "seek a solution by … mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice"?It is proposed to examine here the obligation of states to resort to mediation, conciliation and adjudication when they cannot otherwise settle a dispute about the development of an international drainage basin that they share.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the major changes in the Russian legislation on conciliation procedures that took place in 2019. The article focuses on a comparative analysis of the process and content of judicial conciliation and mediation, as well as the requirements for mediators in disputes settlement. Assessing the prospects for the development of the abovementioned conciliation procedures, the authors come to the conclusion about vivid advantages of judicial reconciliation, while noting that introduction of the concept of a "multi door courthouse", if successfully implemented, can contribute to the development of other alternative ways of disputes settlement

The specific characteristics of collective labor conflicts in Poland are related to the ownership structure of Polish companies. Frequently the company management is not a direct party in a conflict, rather it is the company owner, e.g. State Treasury (education, health care system), a parent company based overseas, or territorial self-governmental authorities (transport, water supply). This context often leads to stagnation and prevents conflict resolution. Apart from the structural problem, also the perception of the role of mediators is noteworthy. Parties may come to an agreement when choosing one, but afterwards it may result in applying for a mediator to be appointed by the Minister (to prevent either of the parties getting the feeling that "their own mediator" has been chosen). There are also collective conflicts which are mediated by a local authority or someone considered as impartial.

This paper analysis the economic incentives that affect the conciliation and mediation of conflicts in the Conciliation Sector of Forum - Joao Mendes Junior (Civil Courts) - in São Paulo, Brazil. The study indicates a greater efficiency of agreements celebrated during the pre-judicial conciliation phase (73 % success rate), if compared to the conciliation taken place in the judicial process (22 % success rate). The civil courts have different levels of efficiency in selecting the cases that fit to conciliation, indication that using a selection criterion seems to be more efficient than simply sending all-and-every case to a conciliation hearing. The data analyzed suggests the existence of a deadline effect, a point in time after which the potential of an agreement to the parties decreases sharply. The negotiation style and strategy adopted b the conciliator are fundamental to the success in reaching an agreement, and his (her) performance could follow a sequential bargaining game in which the conciliator initially suggests an offer immediately accepted by the parties in the first interaction. However, most conciliators do not follow that strategy, and nevertheless achieve good results, indicating the existence of psychological aspects that affect the parties' decision to negotiate, and also second level effects affecting the negotiation. The participation of the lawyers generally difficult the reaching of an agreement, since they have more propensity to litigation and to avoid agreements, if compared to the cases when the parties negotiate to each other directly. The contract curve indicates that the plaintiff may be quite right about the demand issued, or that the defendant has interest in reaching an agreement only to reduce the value of the debt, in case of an frustrated execution, he will be demanded by this new value, and not by the original value of the litigation. The parties' personal feeling about winning or loosing the litigation influences the propensity to reach an agreement. The formal training of the conciliator and the judges in necessary, but not sufficient, to the success of the negotiations, and it seems to be below the needs, reducing the success rate in mainly the judicial conciliation procedure. The conciliators that actively participate in negotiations are more successful than the ones that adopt a passive approach.