Suchergebnisse

The primary threat to international peace and security facing the United Nations today remains proliferation of Weapons of Mass destruction (WMD). 2007 offers a turning point for the Security Council in meeting this challenge. Recently, the Economist Magazine called upon the big powers to "make better use of the existing potential for multilateral, lawful, international actions that the UN uniquely provides." A matrix of legally-binding, multilateral WMD non-proliferation agreements already exists. Each has its own discipline-specific verification mechanism. Oversight provisions and treaty mandates do not foster innovation so there is little, if any, cross-cutting interplay between them. While UN Expert Verification Studies (1990, 1995, 2006) do provide constructive, reasoned insights into concept and theory, they fall well short in the practical dimension. This paper focuses on a unique legacy of experience and expertise acquired in Iraq during UNSCOM/UNMOVIC operations under UNSCR 687 (1991) and UNSCR 1284 (1999). Drawing from that multidisciplinary legacy, members of UNMOVIC's professional staff in New York continue their research and analysis aimed at strengthening the UN's indigenous verification capability by "connecting the dots". UNMOVIC's unique legacy should not be lost by default.

The events of September 11 2001 have altered the course of arms control intended to eliminate weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and has made the role of international organizations controversial. Whether they can effectively verify compliance with the WMD treaty regime has now been questioned by the United States. In responding to this basic question, Eliminating Weapons of Mass Destruction examines how existing organizations apply the main verification tools, how they can improve and consolidate them where possible in order to meet the new security challenges more effectively.

Verification of compliance is a sensitive issue in arms control. However, these treaties make up only a very small portion of international agreements. Besides the regulation of manifold political, technical, economic and other problems more and more transnational environmental and resources protection problems are thesubjects of multilateral treaties ("ecological interdependence"). The question is raised whether these treaties contain verification provisions which can be compared with arms control verification: Therefore thirteen multilateral conventions and protocols for the protection of the environment and common resources are investigatedwith respect to their verification provisions.

This article will explore what role NGOs can play in the international verification of arms control and disarmament agreements. The influence of non-governmental actors is too powerful to be ignored. Therefore, the question facing governments today is not if, but how, these actors should be allowed to contribute. Adapted from the source document.

Historically, the failure of the peace negotiations between the National Government and the farc-ep were caused by the impossible task that was overcoming the enormous distrust between the parties involved and the negotiation strategies used in the past. However, the recent success of the negotiations under the administration of President Juan Manuel Santos Calderón with the farc-ep can be attributed to the participation of the United Nations (UN) in coordinating the Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms for the bilateral and definitive Ceasefire of the Hostilities, and as a means of verification of the guerrilla's (i.e. farc-ep) disarmament. ; Históricamente, las causas del fracaso de las negociaciones de paz entre el Gobierno nacional y las farc-ep han sido la imposibilidad de superar la enorme desconfianza entre las partes y el uso táctico dado a las negociaciones en el pasado. Sin embargo, y a partir del marco de análisis propuesto por Bárbara Walter (1997), el éxito de las negociaciones adelantadas en el Gobierno del presidente Juan Manuel Santos Calderón con las farc-ep puede atribuirse a la participación de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU) en la coordinación del Mecanismo de Monitoreo y Verificación para el Acuerdo de Cese al Fuego y de Hostilidades Bilateral y Definitivo, y como una instancia de verificación de la dejación de armas por parte de la guerrilla.