Suchergebnisse

This article addresses the empirical puzzle as to why some formerly deeply embedded international norms either incrementally or rapidly lose their prescriptive status and, in the extreme, can even cease to exist. Why is it that some norms are replaced while others simply disappear? The IR literature has rich explanations for norm creation, diffusion and socialization, yet there is a theoretical and empirical gap on both the dynamics and scope conditions for the degeneration of international norms. Thus, we develop hypotheses on processes and outcomes of norm disappearances that are tested with a series of qualitative studies. Norm degenerations require the presence of actors who challenge the norm and the absence of central enforcement authorities or individual states that are willing and capable of punishing norm violations. Moreover, our study shows that norms are likely to be abolished swiftly if the environment is unstable and rapidly changing and if norms are highly precise. In contrast, norms are likely to become incrementally degenerated if the environment is relatively stable and if norms are imprecise. Both processes lead to norm substitutions, provided that competing norms are present. If rival norms are absent, norms simply disappear without being replaced.

This article addresses the empirical puzzle as to why some formerly deeply embedded international norms either incrementally or rapidly lose their prescriptive status and, in the extreme, can even cease to exist. Why is it that some norms are replaced while others simply disappear? The IR literature has rich explanations for norm creation, diffusion and socialization, yet there is a theoretical and empirical gap on both the dynamics and scope conditions for the degeneration of international norms. Thus, we develop hypotheses on processes and outcomes of norm disappearances that are tested with a series of qualitative studies. Norm degenerations require the presence of actors who challenge the norm and the absence of central enforcement authorities or individual states that are willing and capable of punishing norm violations. Moreover, our study shows that norms are likely to be abolished swiftly if the environment is unstable and rapidly changing and if norms are highly precise. In contrast, norms are likely to become incrementally degenerated if the environment is relatively stable and if norms are imprecise. Both processes lead to norm substitutions, provided that competing norms are present. If rival norms are absent, norms simply disappear without being replaced. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]

Article 53 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 states that a treaty is considered invalid if it is in conflict with existing norms of jus cogens, and under Article 64 of the treaty becomes invalid if it conflicts with a norm youngest of the same nature. The case Nicaragua against the United States made clear that the notion of jus cogens is steadily entrenched in international law, however, is still necessary to determine accurately that power rates referred to in Articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention. Jus cogens norms include more those norms relating to morality or natural law than with traditional positivist rates derived from State practice. In general, this includes making aggressive war, crimes against humanity, war crimes, sea piracy, genocide, apartheid, slavery, and torture.Jus cogens norms are norms of customary international law which are so important, it can not be changed through treaties. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, any treaty that is contrary to jus cogens norms is invalid. Jus cogens norms are not listed, there is no catalog , their determined by any authoritative body, but these rates come from judicial practices and political and social attitudes, which are not values static. Jus cogens norm of unconditional right international, accepted and recognized by the international community norm from which no deviation is permitted. Unlike the common law, which traditionally requires the consent and It lets change obligations between states through treaties, norms jus cogens can not be violated by any state "through treaties international or local regulations or special customary, or even through general rules of customary not have the same normative force.

The traditional conception of watertight compartmentalization between "domestic" and "international" policy issues is simply no longer realistic. The advent of globalization has fundamentally altered how we perceive of policy-making. as Sidney Tarrow put it, "[i]n today's world, we can no more draw a sharp line between domestic and international politics than we can understand national politics in the United states apart from its local roots" (Tarrow, 2005: 2). The rise of the international importance of the climate change issue is perhaps the most prominent example of the breakdown of the traditional local versus global policy distinction.

Venue — the institutional setting in which actors interact — is a critical but neglected factor in international norm creation. This article brings together constructivist and rationalist insights to explain both why and how venue affects norm creation and how norm leaders choose among different venues. First, it highlights the importance of negotiation alongside persuasion in norm emergence — the first stage of Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) norm life cycle — thus opening space for a full consideration of venues within the constructivist paradigm. Second, it details how venue membership, mandate, output status, rules of procedure/operating procedures and legitimacy affect both the content and the level of international support of an emerging norm. Third, it offers a conceptual framework for understanding how norm leaders choose venues. Finally, it illustrates the impact of venue on norm creation and the dynamics of strategic venue choice by examining venue changes during the movement to ban anti-personnel landmines and the effort to promote international consensus on humanitarian intervention.

Venue -- the institutional setting in which actors interact -- is a critical but neglected factor in international norm creation. This article brings together constructivist and rationalist insights to explain both why and how venue affects norm creation and how norm leaders choose among different venues. First, it highlights the importance of negotiation alongside persuasion in norm emergence -- the first stage of Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) norm life cycle -- thus opening space for a full consideration of venues within the constructivist paradigm. Second, it details how venue membership, mandate, output status, rules of procedure/operating procedures and legitimacy affect both the content and the level of international support of an emerging norm. Third, it offers a conceptual framework for understanding how norm leaders choose venues. Finally, it illustrates the impact of venue on norm creation and the dynamics of strategic venue choice by examining venue changes during the movement to ban anti-personnel landmines and the effort to promote international consensus on humanitarian intervention. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]

Explaining international norm change -- Banning piracy : the state monopoly on military force -- The end of conquest : consolidating sovereign rights -- Protecting cultural treasures in wartime -- Terrorism : reinforcing states' monopoly on force -- Extraterritoriality : expanding exclusive internal jurisdiction -- Slavery : liberal norms and human rights -- Genocide -- Refugees and asylum -- Humanitarian intervention : liberal norms vs. sovereignty norms -- The emerging right to democracy -- Cycles of international norm change

The constructivist research programme on international norms has demonstrated convincingly that, how, and why norms matter. Norms have been shown to constitute the identity of actors, to guide their behaviour into desired directions, and, altogether, to generate the normative basis of the international system. In the course of this intensive debate, its main concepts, such as the question of what constitutes a norm or different norm types, became fuzzy. Also, while the focus on the intended effects of norms certainly encompasses an essential part of the phenomenon, their unintended effects have been largely neglected. Motivated by these shortcomings, the article presents a new systematisation of effects of norms. The typology developed here discerns two types of intended effects, namely prohibitive and obligative effects, as well as two corresponding types of unintended effects, namely permissive and omissive effects.

Research on international norms has yet to answer satisfactorily some of our own most important questions about the origins of norms and the conditions under which some norms win out over others. The authors argue that international relations (IR) theorists should engage more with research in moral psychology and neuroscience to advance theories of norm emergence and resonance. This Element first provides an overview of six areas of research in neuroscience and moral psychology that hold particular promise for norms theorists and international relations theory more generally. It next surveys existing literature in IR to see how literature from moral psychology is already being put to use, and then recommends a research agenda for norms researchers engaging with this literature. The authors do not believe that this exchange should be a one-way street, however, and they discuss various ways in which the IR literature on norms may be of interest and of use to moral psychologists, and of use to advocacy communities.

In Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Norms Ingvild Bode and Hendrik Huelss present an innovative analysis of how testing, developing, and using weapons systems with autonomous features shapes ethical and legal norms, arguing that they have already established standards for what counts as meaningful human control.