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This article deals with the Iranian motivations for building military nuclear programme. The motivations are analyzed through three models presented by Scott D. Sagan (1997): the security model, the domestic politics model and the norm model. These models are used in a competitive way. We claim that despite the fact that all the models are able to find certain motivations in the case of Iran, the security model is the best model in terms of applicability, but only when its weak aspects are overcome. Regarding the domestic politics model we were able to identify the structures (the Revolutionary Guards and scientists) which might have the greatest profit from Iran's nuclearization. However, other motivations within the political system are hardly found. From the perspective of the normative model we discuss the role of international and cultural norms in the context of the Iranian nuclear programme, and we especially discuss the image of modernity, nationalism and the double standard applied from the side of the Western countries in connection with this topic. Adapted from the source document.

The article deals with the former US President Bush's plan for the so-called third pillar of the American missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic in the context of American-Iranian and American-Russian relations. We assess the explanatory power of different but interconnected (neo)realist conceptualizations of security dilemma and deterrence. Specifically, the study evaluates the relative importance of classical security dilemma versus imperialist security dilemma and the explanatory power of three different modalities of deterrence. The paper further shows how Iran and Russia balanced the United States. We also argue that the American missile defense system was not primarily motivated by defensive realist worries about security, but rather by an offensive realist struggle for power and gains at the expense of others. Adapted from the source document.

Using the empirical case of the Iranian nuclear program, the presented text is intended to test and conceptualize the security model of nuclear weapons proliferation, as it was outlined by Scott Sagan. As a byproduct of alternative explanations, the security model offers an implied interpretation rather than a clear conceptualization. A defensive reaction to a perceived threat from another nation is inherently expected within the security model. The security related but offensive intent is not appropriately covered by the model, though. Assuming that a defensive purpose requires a present danger from the other nation and the ability of a prospective arsenal to effectively challenge this danger, the two parts of the article's body are respectively devoted to two issues: first, it is examined whether the threat perceived by Iran actually exists, and second, the ability of the arsenal to deter opponents is subsequently addressed within the framework of nuclear strategy. Adapted from the source document.

Article describes the books of two authors, who try to compare Russian and Iranian revolutions and political development generally. Whereas Ghoncheh Tazmini uses Hegelian structuralist approach, that sees these revolutions as an inevitable result of modernization from above, another Iranian political scientist Zhand Shakibi puts stress on the role of human actor – pre-revolutionary monarch and his (miss)management of the situation in explaining the origins of revolution. Shakibi applies the human agency perspective to the analysis of the character of pre-revolutionary monarch and his modus operandi. According to Shakibi the structural variables did not by themselves cause the revolution, they create only potential for revolution. The revolutions must be explained by describing complex interactions between structural variables and modus operandi of the monarchs.