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It is argued that Max Weber's concept of charismatic leadership is useful in better understanding current political developments, using the example of the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini & the religious establishment to revolutionary power in Iran during the 1960s & 1970s. Most analyses fall short in explaining the breakdown of the Iranian monarchy by relying too much on social factors that were characteristic of Iranian society long before it entered the revolutionary decades, & by failing to recognize the interrelationship among revolutionary developments. If the charismatic character of Khomeini's leadership is acknowledged, charisma reveals itself as the most central element in the revolution & the social, political, economic, & religious causes of the revolution become explicable as a by-product of this single fact. 4 Tables, 35 References. Modified AA

Reading the news about Iran today one can hardly imagine that relations between the Netherlands and Iran were excellent until 1979. Mohammed-Reza Pahlavi, the last shah of Persia, was known in The Netherlands as a visionary and reformer. Persia was represented as a mythical land with an ancient civilization. The Dutch royal family enjoyed visiting the shah, and large and small Dutch companies were successful in Iran.

When in the 1970s awareness spread about repression under the shah, the Dutch government was faced with difficult choices. How could these relations be continued, now that public opinion had turned against it? The Dutch government decided to ignore the criticisms, and firmly held on to the idea of the shah as an enlightened despot. As such, it did not see the Iranian Revolution coming, and suffered the consequences.

Hans Schippers surveys the position of Hezbollah in Lebanese politics and its relations with Iran and Syria. Hezbollah is an organisation with two faces. Together with Amal it represents the Shia in Lebanon. It participates in elections and the government. However, in the Southern part of the country Hezbollah constitutes a state within a state, with a militia and a social and medical network of its own. Most of the costs of this structure are paid for by Iran. The Shia leadership of Iran also played a vital role in the establishment of the organisation in 1982. Syria acted as the protector of Hezbollah in its agitation against Israel. With the departure of Syrian troops following the Cedar Revolution in the spring of 2005 most non-Shia Lebanese wanted to see the Hezbollah militia, seen as a pro-Syrian force, dissolved. However, this was refused by leader Nasrallah. The militia protected Lebanon against Israeli aggression, he declared. It is unclear what motivated Hezbollah to kidnap the Israeli soldiers. This action seemed to be co-ordinated with Iran and Syria to divert attention from the Iranian troubles with the United Nations about Iran's uranium enrichment programme. However, also solidarity with Hamas and the personality of Nasrallah may have played a role. The War of Summer 2006 made it clear once more that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict maybe exploited by forces not directly involved, like Iran. The strong presence of European soldiers in the new peace force presents an opportunity for the EU to take the initiative for a restart of the peace process in the region. A new Madrid type conference may offer away out of the deadlock.

Hans Schippers assesses the position of the Islamic AK Party led by Prime Minister Erdogan in the light of the relationship between religion and the state in Turkey. Although the AK Party won the general elections in 2002, Erdogan has the Damocletian sword of a military coup hanging above his head ever since. The military consider themselves to be the guardians of Kemal Atatürk's legacy of Turkey as a secular state. In the past decades they intervened four times in politics, the most recent one the 1998 'post modern' coup to oust the Islamic Prime Minister Erbakan, whose approach to Iran, critical opinions on the EU and NATO and favourisation of religious education had gone too far in the eyes of the military. Erdogan cleverly avoided the mistakes of his predecessor. He declared the AKP to be a conservative, pro-EU and pro-NATO party that would seek adherence to the mostly christian-democratic European Peoples Party. His government would be liberal and respect people with different opinions on religion. Erdogan did well in regional elections of 2004. However, he met with growing criticism in the following two years. The organisational structure of the AKP is undemocratic and the number of women active in the party is far too limited, his critics remarked. The party is accused of conducting a campaign of 'creeping islamisation' of Turkish society. The military closely monitor every decision of the government near two-thirds majority in parliament and he could They have the support of the secular president have a party member elected. This would increase Sezer who has amended or rejected a large number the chances of military intervention. Erdogan will of Erdogans proposals. A crucial moment for the probably opt for a compromise candidate. However, AKP-government will be the election by parliament until the arliamentary elections of November, the of a new president, coming May. Erdogan has a political.