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Abstract
Recent philosophical work attempts to understand irrational acts on the model of practical reasoning. Such acts are regarded as intelligible in the light of ordinary propositional attitudes which are nevertheless conjoined in a way that explains the irrationality. It is here argued that some irrational acts cannot be so understood; that they are not actions, per se; and that Freud's notion of "primary process", particularly in its emphasis on hallucinatory wish-fulfillment and on what he calls "omnipotence of thought", provides a useful description of such acts. Where hallucinatory wish-fulfillment (or phantasy) is operative, an anxiety or need causes an agent to see the world as one in which the anxiety-provoking state does not exist or has- somehow been dealt with satisfactorily. The need or lack is not acknowledged, as it is when one can properly speak of desire and of a reasoning that attempts to implement it.

Ernest Gellner's understanding of the social role of absurdity is discussed & illustrated with examples of how different kinds of irrationality have social consequences. Gellner notes that anthropologists often attempt to explain away apparent incongruities with two principles of charitable interpretation: elastic contextualization & underlying structuralism. It is argued that moral & cognitive uncertainty is universal & expressed through incoherence. Absurdity may also be the consequence of a mistake or stupidity. Carlo M. Cipolla's (1989) useful analysis of stupidity is shown to be widely applicable. There is considerable reluctance to call stupid incoherence perceived by ethnographers, but not their hosts. It is argued that the recognition of absurdity is often superior to the principle of charity when interpreting societies. 28 References. H. von Rautenfeld

This paper explores the effects of a particular form of irrational behaviour by participating bidders in a common value English auction. We allow bidders to update their expected valuation of the good as the current price increases, assuming that their opponents always play the symmetric Nash equilibrium. When only one bidder adopts this type of behaviour, it is ambiguous whether the final auction price is higher or lower than at the symmetric equilibrium. However, when both bidders behave irrationally, the final auction price is never lower than the symmetric equilibrium provided bidders "match" their strategies.

Hobbes's science of politics rests on a dual analysis of human beings: humans as complex material bodies in a network of mechanical forces, prone to passions and irrationality; and humans as subjects of right and obligation, morally exhortable by appeal to the standards of reason. The science of politics proposes an absolutist model of politics. If this proposal is not to be idle utopianism, the enduring functioning of the model needs to be compatible with the materialist analysis of human behaviour. In this article, I argue that Hobbes's attempts to render his science of politics compatible with his materialism are only partly successful; a fuller compatibility is achieved in the political writings of Spinoza.

Abstract: This paper considers how Bryan Caplan's concept of rational irrationality may manifest in various political institutional arrangements, building off the demand curve for irrationality. Mob democracy, anarchy, autocracy, and constitutionally constrained democracy are the governance structures addressed. While anarchy is strictly better than mob democracy, under certain conditions, democracy, anarchy, or constitutionally constrained democracy may yield the best outcomes depending on the circumstances.