Suchergebnisse

Valamennyi tagállamra azonos szabályok vonatkoztak az európai integráció Maastricht előtti unitárius szerkezetében. Többsebességű integráció lehetséges a Gazdasági és Monetáris Unió rendszerében: különféle kormányzási modellek, bonyolult intézményi feltételek állnak fenn. Milyen változásokat hozhatna az "európai gazdasági kormányzás", illetve a "teljes" gazdasági unió kiépítése az EU intézményi szerkezetében? Hogyan alakulna e körülmények között az euróövezetbe tartozó, illetve az abból kimaradó tagállamok helyzete? Milyen eltérések lehetnek az egyes tagállamok között az uniós szabályok alkalmazásában? Milyen szerepet tölthet be a megerősített együttműködés a tagállamok szűkebb csoportjának mélyebb integrációjában? Hogyan alakulhat a mediterrán periféria, illetve a közép- és kelet-európai "új tagállamok" pozíciója? Többek között a fenti kérdésekre is választ kapunk a kötetben. = All member states were subject to the same rules in the pre-Maastricht unitary structure of European integration. Multi-speed integration is possible in the Economic and Monetary Union system: different governance models, complex institutional conditions. What changes could the construction of a "European economic governance" or a " full" economic union bring to the institutional structure of the EU? How would the situation of Member States in and out of the euro area evolve under these circumstances? What differences might there be between Member States in the application of EU rules? What role could enhanced cooperation play in the deeper integration of a narrower group of Member States? How might the position of the Mediterranean periphery and the "new Member States" of Central and Eastern Europe evolve? Among other things, these questions are answered in this volume.

This paper explores how Britain's and Colombia's privileged relations with the United States (U.S.) influenced their journey through the European Community (EC) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). The Anglo–American Special Relationship (AASR) was compatible with British participation in the European Single Market, but not with adherence to creating the EC's common currency, nor with leadership in building a European defence structure autonomous from NATO. Thus, since the start of the Iraq war, Britain played a rather obstructive role in what later was called European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The US–Colombia Partnership (USCP), based on a longstanding military association reinforced under Plan Colombia, naturally discouraged any meaningful Colombian participation in UNASUR's South American Security Council (CDS), a regional cooperative security project, promoted by Brazil. Cherished projects of the liberal CAP – such as triangular cooperation (to export Colombian security expertise to Central America with U.S. co-financing and oversight) and NATO partnership – also distracted Colombia's interest from UNASUR, diminishing the latter's relevance collaterally. A role for UNASUR – alongside the Organization of American States (OAS) – in South American security management was compatible with the liberal CAP, but not with the neoconservative CAP. Even a lopsided complementation – such as the one between NATO and the CSDP – proved unviable between the OAS and UNASUR.