Suchergebnisse

1.: Tab'a 1. - 1992 = 1412 h. - 203 S. - ( ... ; 1).; 2.: Al-Masadir ad-durziya. (Dt.: Drusische Quellen.). - Tab'a 1. - 1992 = 1412 h. - 191,35 S. - ( ... ; 2)

Examines the evolution, since 1989, of the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Central Asia and the Middle East, focusing on the role of Afghanistan and the Taliban; includes role of ethnicity within Islamic sects, and shifting relations between Islamic groups and the US.

The historical Islamic state developed interesting methods of quasi-consociational and semi-corporatist aggregation of communities. From quite early on, Sunnism became the religion of the ruling elite and of the state as well as part of the state's legal and cultural system. Subsequently, the geographical distribution and the political economy of the Islamic sects and of the religious minorities manifested quite distinct features that were mainly a function of their relationship to the state. Whereas the Islamic sects did not come to terms ideologically and organizationally with the state, the religious minorities, on the whole, adjusted themselves mentally and behaviorally to its requirements. By comparison, the contemporary Middle Eastern state, both the secular and the Islamic, is achieving less success in dealing with its communal problem. Certain groups are excluded in the former type in spite of the secularist slogans, and certain groups are excluded in the latter because of the ideological or religious nature of the state. Improvisation is needed, and Muslim statesmen and intellectuals may need to go beyond, and even outside, conventional Islamic jurisprudence in order to deal with this issue.

This study is a documentation and analysis of change in ritual in the village of Sarilar, on the west bank of the Euphrates River near Yavuseli, Gaziantep. The research problem posed was identification of ritual change within the consultants' memory and some tentative ways of situating such change within the socio-economic context. The mysticism of the dervish lodge remains as a certain life attitude along with the new views of modernization that have been so well inculcated. Although modernization, at least in the Turkish Alevi context, tends to conflict with the mystical experience of the Bektashi dervish in some areas, a democratized inner core remains.

THIS ESSAY DEALS WITH THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSIONS OF BEIRUT'S PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION, FOCUSING ON THE SUNNI COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ITS POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS FROM THE TIME OF INDEPENDENCE UNTIL TODAY. NEW POLITICAL FORCES EMERGING SINCE THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR HAVE DISRUPTED THE TRADITIONAL ALLIANCES BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL POWERS, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY. AS A RESULT, THE SPECIFICALLY RELIGIOUS SPACES OF THE INNER CITY, SUCH AS MOSQUES AND CEMETERIES, HAVE BECOME A BATTLEGROUND IN THE WIDER STRUGGLE OVER THE IDENTITY OF THE SUNNI POPULATION AND THE POLITICAL CONTROL OF ITS SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS.

THIS STUDY TESTS WHETHER A HYPOTHESIS EXPLAINING POPULAR SUPPORT FOR MIDDLE EASTERN FUNDAMENTALISTS MOVEMENTS ADEQUATELY DESCRIBES THE GRASSROOTS APPEAL OF HIZBALLAH, LEBANON'S RADICAL SHIITE ORGANIZATION. USING 1992 SURVEY DATA, THE STUDY FOUND THAT HIZBALLAH ADHERENTS WERE LESS LIKELY THAN EXPECTED TO BE DEEPLY RELIGIOUS, TO HAVE A LOW SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, AND TO HAVE A STRONG POLITICAL ALIENATION. RESULTS SUGGEST THAT HIZBALLAH IS NOT THE VEHICLE OF RADICAL SHIITES AND THAT OTHER FACTORS UNDERLIE ITS ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH AND ENCOURAGE ITS EVOLUTION AS A MAINSTREAM PARTY. THE STUDY ALSO SUGGESTS THAT CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED ON ISLAMIC GOALS BY LEBANON'S PLURALIST SOCIETY AND ITS POWERFUL NEIGHBOR SYRIA HAVE INFLUENCED THE MODERATE TREND OF HIZBALLAH. THE STUDY CONCLUDES THAT ISLAMIST SUCCESS I CARVING A NICHE IN A COMMUNITY STILL SEEKING SELF-IDENTITY AND ADEQUATE NATIONAL REPRESENTATION MEANS THAT ISLAMISTS ARE UNLIKELY TO LOSE EXTERNAL BACKERS' SUPPORT SHOULD MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATION REDUCE HIZBALLAH'S RESISTANCE ROLE.

THE LEBANESE PARTY OF GOD, OR HIZBALLAH, IS AN ILLUMINATING CASE STUDY IN THE EVOLUTION OF A RADICAL ISLAMIST MOVEMENT. HIZBALLAH HAS PRAGMATICALLY CONFRONTED THE SHIFTING LANDSCAPE OF REGIONAL POLITICS AS WELL AS THE CHANGING TERRAIN OF LEBANESE POLITICS. IT HAS RETAINED ITS COMMITMENT TO ENDING ISRAEL'S OCCUPATION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON, BUT IT HAS ALSO ENTERED THE GAME OF "CONFESSIONAL," OR INTER-SECT, POLITICS WITHIN LEBANON. ALTHOUGH THE EVOLUTION OF THE IRANIAN REGIME HAS AFFECTED HIZBALLAH, AS HAS THE HEGEMONIC POSITION OF SYRIA VIS-A-VIS LEBANON, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT HIZBALLAH HAS PROVED ITSELF RESPONSIVE TO THE ATTITUDES AND ASPIRATIONS OF ITS DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCY. WITH HIZBALLAH'S ENTRY INTO THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, LATENT REGIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL TENSIONS AND DIVISIONS HAVE BEEN REVEALED.

Discusses government policies under President Askar Akaev regarding practice of religion by Christian, Islamic, and other sects; focus on the change of policy between 1991 when a law permitting greater freedom was adopted and the mid-1990s, by which time unregulated growth of religious organizations and rising fundamentalism had come to be seen as sources of social conflict.

SUDAN HAS EXPERIENCED AN ISLAMIC REVOLUTION WITHOUT VIOLENCE. IN A GRADUAL REVOLUTION THAT BEGAN IN THE 1970'S, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS CONSOLIDATED THEIR POWER THROUGH WEALTH AND SYSTEMATIC CONTROL OF THE CIVIL SERVICE, THE ECONOMY, THE JUDICIARY, AND THE ARMED FORCES. ALTHOUGH FUNDAMENTALISTS COMPRISE ONLY 20 PERCENT OF SUDAN'S MUSLIM POPULATION, THEY ARE RICHER, BETTER ORGANIZED, AND MORE HIGHLY MOTIVATED. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE "SHARIA" HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY THE ENTRENCHMENT OF DICTATORIAL RULE, THE WEAKENING OF INSTITUTIONS, THE EROSION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES, THE AGGRAVATION OF THE CIVIL WAR IN SOUTHERN SUDAN, AND AN EVER-WORSENING ECONOMIC MALAISE. THE FACT THAT THE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES IN NORTHERN SUDAN, EXCEPT THE COMMUNIST PARTY, ARE AFFILIATED WITH RELIGIOUS SECTS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THEY ALL SUPPORT THE "SHARIA." THE REVOLUTION HAS CAUSED APPREHENSION IN WASHINGTON AND SOME AFRICAN AND ARAB STATES, ALTHOUGH THERE IS AS YET NO EVIDENCE THAT SUDAN POSES A DIRECT THREAT TO ITS NEIGHBORS.

SEVEN YEARS AFTER THE GULF WAR, SUFFERING AND DESPAIR HAVE FORCED IRAQIS TO FALL BACK ON THEIR PRIMORDIAL IDENTITIES: THE FAMILY, THE CLAN, THE SECT, THE REGION. IN PARTICULAR, THERE HAS BEEN A RESURGENCE OF TRIBAL AFFINITIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN A COUNTRY WHERE MOST PEOPLE ARE DESCENDANTS OF NOMADIC ARAB TRIBES. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS ENCOURAGED THIS IN AN EFFORT TO FOSTER NATIONAL COHESION AMONG IRAQIS. THE AUTHOR DISCUSSES RESEARCHNG THIS TREND AND THE BOOK HE WROTE DISCUSSING IT CALLED "THE SHI'IS OF IRAQ." THE BOOK ATTEMPTED TO BRING TO LIFE A POLITICAL COMMUNITY MARKED BY ITS OWN DISTINCT IDENTITY - PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT NECESSARILY THE PRECURSORS OF A RADICAL ISLAMIC STATE THAT WOULD ALIGN ITSELF WITH IRAN.

A unique focus on the relationship between religion and political culture in the Third World using a comparative and thematic approach. Specific issues of religion-politics interaction in the Third World in recent times include: the rise of Islamic fundamentalist groups throughout the Middle East and other parts of the Muslim world; the political effects of the decline of Catholicism and the rapid growth of Protestant evangelical sects in Latin America; communal conflict between Hindu nationalist groups, and the politicisation of Buddhism in South East Asia. The common effect of such developments is to challenge existing forms of relationship between states and societies with religion used as a political resource

On 30 June 1989, a military coup overthrew the democratically elected government of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi in Sudan and replaced it with a fundamentalist Muslim dictatorship headed by Colonel ʿUmar Hasan al-Bashir and adhering to the radical Islamic ideology of the National Islamic Front (NIF), under the leadership of Dr. Hasan al-Turabi. Since June 1881 when Muhammad Ahmad ibn ʿAbdallah declared that he was the expected mahdī, the religious-political scene of Sudan had been largely dominated by Mahdists and Khatmiyya adherents. Even under colonial rule, in the years 1899–1955, Mahdism continued to flourish despite the fact that the British rulers treated it with suspicion and preferred Sayyid ʿAli al-Mirghani, leader of the more docile Khatmiyya Sufi order. The defeat of the Mahdist Umma Party in the first general elections in 1953, by a coalition of secularists and Khatmiyya supporters was only a temporary setback. After Sudan became independent, in 1956, Mahdist supremacy was challenged both by the Khatmiyya and other groups, but its mass support among the Ansar, a political Islamic movement, enabled them to gain control, except during brief periods when so-called secularists governed independent Sudan. This happened in 1953–56 when the Khatmiyya joined forces with the intelligentsia, and again between October 1964 and March 1965 when the country was governed by a secular, transitional, nonelected government that was ousted from power as soon as the sects regained control. Secularism also thrived briefly under the military dictatorship of Jaʿfar al-Numayri between 1969 and 1977.