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This paper explores the effects of religion and Islamic sects on bilateral trade activities by employing an extended version of the gravity model. A stratified sample of 33 countries for the average period 1996-99 is selected. Although gravity models have been extensively used in the literature, to the best of our knowledge, they have neither been used to examine the impact of Islamic sects on bilateral trade nor to estimate religion within a model that incorporates oil-exporting countries, culture, regional trading arrangements, and political freedomessential control variables for the specification of the model. Findings reveal that Muslim majority countries trade less than their Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, or other counterparts. In addition, when disaggregating the Muslim sample into Sunni and Shia sects, results show that Sunni majority countries trade more than their Shiite counterparts. Other results and policy implications are discussed.

This article seeks to address the problem of historiography and perspective in Middle East studies concerning dominated ethno-nations, especially the Kurds, while examining the religio-political confrontations between the Islamic empires and their significant socio-political consequences in Kurdistan through a historical study (primarily) based on secondary sources. With the dominance of the early Islamic Caliphate from the 7th century, the political powers of the Kurds' ancestors were removed and the non-Muslim population severely declined. From the middle of the Abbasid Caliphate period (750-1258) Kurdish governments grew again. After the Abbasids, various Islamic sects gained power and Kurdistan gradually becoming the battlefield of various political powers. With the emergence of two empires, the Sunni Ottoman and Shiite Safavid (and its successors) in the 16th century, the internal conflicts in the Islamic world culminated and lasted until the early 20th century. Between the 7th and the early 20th century religio-political confrontations converging in Kurdistan have severely affected the land's socio-political situation. This article examines how the Islamic empires used religion politically as a means to fight each other, as well as engage with the Kurdish revolts.

This chapter addresses the designation of Ṣūfi Master Javād Nūrbakhsh (1926–2008) and the Niʿmatullāhī 'Khaniqahi' Order or Khāniqāh-i-Niʿmat Allāhī as sectarian. Within the field of Islamic Studies, or even the broader scope of the study of Islam, there is no sufficient term that equates with 'sect' or 'sectarian'. Generally, Islamic history—from early on—is replete with examples of divisions between political alliances/parties (for example, shīʿat ʿAlī or shīʿat Muʿāwiya) pertaining to leadership (imāma) and schools of thought (madhhab) and to methods of reading and practicing the religion. Yet it has to be cautioned that none of these are tantamount to the 'church-sect typology' as set out in the sociology of religion for the Western Christian context. Max Weber (1922) and Ernst Troeltsch (1912) used the typology as a heuristic tool. In their theorising, the church was equated with the larger bureaucratic state-sponsored organisation that ministered to the general population, whilst the sect was the smaller evangelical group that adopted a radical stance towards the state. Bryan R. Wilson (1959, 1992) later modified the typology to define sects by the way in which they positioned themselves in opposition to social values or demonstrated their indifference to societal norms. In this sense, it has been more about a study that assists in the categorisation of dissention and along with it claims about the return to true religion. As such, and despite my own reservations about the application of 'sectarian' to groupings within Islam, one point of entry into the debate might very well be the combined issue of the interpretation of religion and legitimation of rule that both dominated early debates and forced Muslims to pick sides. Obviously, Muslims gradually became aware of partisanship, dissention, apostasy (ridda), and secession (khawārij), although more sharply once a sense of orthodoxy had begun to take shape.

This report includes a historical background of the Sunni-Shiite split and discusses the differences in religious beliefs and practices between and within each Islamic sect as well as their similarities.

This report includes a historical background of the Sunni-Shiite split and the differences in religious beliefs and practices between and within each Islamic sect as well as their similarities.

This report includes a historical background of the Sunni-Shiite split and discusses the differences in religious beliefs and practices between and within each Islamic sect as well as their similarities.

This research tackles the issue of interior interpretation and attempts to show its influence on doctrinal sects in the Islamic world. The research shows the sources of interior interpretation (Greek, Jewish and Christian sources) and the way it sneaked into doctrinal sects in the Islamic world (Ibn Saba', fanatic Sufi and Khawarij). Examples of interior interpretation from some sects (Isma'iliyyah and Nusayriyyah) are presented. The danger of these interpretations is highlighted by showing that the interior way employed to from inside destroy the Islamic doctrine and legislation. Finally, the Islamic attitude from interior interpretation is given.

This paper describes the fundamental teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, the development of religious knowledge, and the social and political context that shaped the intellectual tradition of Islam. Abdullah Saeed, in the transmission of spiritual experience and Islamic thought, introduced the basic teachings of Islam. The emergence of Islam is closely related to the history of its birthplace, the city of Mecca. Besides, Abdullah Saeed also discussed the beginning of the development of religious knowledge, which was immediately explained by the Qur'an and the emergence of sects that influenced the course of change towards truth. Each of these sects and sects has its doctrine, and if there is anything against it, there is undoubtedly a separate assessment of the differences that are believed. Several groups with various theological or religio-political orientations emerged. Among them are Kharijis (khawarij), Shia, Qadaris (qadariyya), Mu'tazilis (mu'tazila), Jabris (jabriyya) and Murji'is (murji'a).

Muslim communities in Lebanon have developed radically new institutions of religious leadership since the advent of the confessional state. These leaderships were created or refined over the course of Lebanon's first five decades (1920s–1970s), often building on pre-existing institutional norms but shaped by common patterns of integration into a state-centric system of confessional representation. Such institutions have played a key role in representing and reinforcing the sectarianisation of Islam in the country. On the other hand, their proximity to the state has made them prominent advocates of peaceful coexistence and political participation. This paper shows (1) how three Islamic religious leaderships have become institutional expressions of a distinctive Lebanese sectarianism, and (2) how they have in the process become defenders of the nation-state. Focusing on the Sunni office of mufti, this leadership is surveyed alongside its Shi'i and Druze counterparts to highlight their convergence on a single institutional model. These developments began in response to a French colonial demand for interlocutors with religious communities, and gained urgency as these interlocutors negotiated communal autonomy in religious aff airs. The project of communal self-governance – which included jurisdiction over personal status law – called for centralized religious institutions that could manage nationwide bureaucracies. Thus a Sunni mufti, Shi'i sheikh, and Druze sheikh al-'aql were each elevated to leadership of new religious hierarchies. While competition among these three leaderships played a part in their development, this paper uses the history of the 1975–90 civil war to show how their common enculturation into the life of the state has generated a strong centripetal tendency in their political behavior.

One of the significant conditions of the progress of a democratic society is the clash of ideas for surveying them from different aspects, which is the result of a free space, and is called as criticism. Since beside the western democratic countries, there are a few countries within the Islamic world, especially in the Middle East such as Iran, who, having Islam, try to perform democracy as well, it is necessary for them to know the method of establishing the culture of criticism as one of its basic principles. This article is to speak about the essence, necessities, and conditions of criticism. The direct relation between the durability of the governments and the peoples' right to criticize the governments' functions is another issue that is discussed in this article. Applying the theoretical and Islamic sources proves that both Shi'ite and Sunni sects can potentially support governmental criticism. The referencing style of this research is based on the Chicago style.

Alevilik is the second largest religious movement in Turkey after Sunnite Islam. The Alevi worship Ali and the twelve Imams of his family. Ali is more or less deified and therefore Alevis are considered as being ghulat ('exaggerated', 'extremist') and heterodox. The elevated Ali personifies an aspiration to justice and righteousness. He fought on the side of the weak and oppressed against those with power in society. Theologically, Ali is assumed to be blessed by the divine light and is therefore able to see into the mysterious spirituality of Islam. Many Alevis today however totally dissociate themselves from Shi'ism. Still, the degrading­ abel kızılbaş ('red-head') is associated with Ali and thus is something alleged to be anti-Osman, since Isma'il fought against the Osman Empire. The colour red represents the blood of Mohammed: he was wounded in battle and Ali saw the prophet's blood flowing. As Ali grew older, he wanted to remind people of Mohammed's struggle and therefore started wearing red headgear. Red thus became the colour of the Shi'ites and over time a symbol of Shi'ite martyrdom. Later red also gained political significance for the Alevis. The religious and the political are closely intertwined, but despite this, neither the Left nor Shi'ism does simply stand on one side and the Right/Sunni on the other – there are no such simple dichotomies in reality.

This study is a documentation and analysis of change in ritual in the village of Sarilar, on the west bank of the Euphrates River near Yavuseli, Gaziantep. The research problem posed was identification of ritual change within the consultants' memory and some tentative ways of situating such change within the socio-economic context. The mysticism of the dervish lodge remains as a certain life attitude along with the new views of modernization that have been so well inculcated. Although modernization, at least in the Turkish Alevi context, tends to conflict with the mystical experience of the Bektashi dervish in some areas, a democratized inner core remains.

Many writers have associated contemporary manifestations of extremism with early Islamic sects, which is argued against in this article. The study employs critical analysis of available sources and argues for additional scrutiny. Our position is supported by detailed scrutiny of early sectarian contributions to the development of Islamic thought. We discovered remarkable limitations in the tracing of the roots to the early firaq (sects) due to a strong reliance on secondary sources muddled in the complexities of dogmatic polemics. Nonetheless, relevant historiography improved our view of what actually happened when nascent Muslims confronted humorless political and social problems. Rather than producing extremist deviants, early Islamic thought was exceedingly dynamic and governed by a pressing need to defend sound Islamic principles. Early Muslims sought answers to perennial issues and did much to stimulate subsequent Muslim philosophy and thought. Indeed, any negative understanding of this early legacy undermines the dignity of that era and people.

The U.S. has been battling ISIS and its forerunners for over two decades; however, ISIS continues to endure and expand. While described as a death cult by some political leaders and other key stakeholders, this assertion received little consideration in the scholarly literature. The purpose of this study was to ascertain whether ISIS satisfied the criteria of an apocalyptic Islamic cult through the application of a historical qualitative research design and meta-analysis. Based on the results, the null hypothesis that ISIS does not satisfy the criteria of an apocalyptic Islamic cult was rejected, and the hypothesis that ISIS satisfies the criteria of an apocalyptic Islamic cult was accepted. This outcome has significant implications regarding U.S. policy and how practitioners develop effective strategies to neutralize the threat.

Andalusian civilization was formed by a combination of complex societies consisting of Arabs, Berbers, Goths, Israelis, Africans, and Salsabes. Logically it is difficult for multi-ethnic communities to coexist peacefully. This social mosaic is a challenge when Islam entered Andalusia. That is because Islam was born in the Arabian Peninsula which has a different culture from Andalusia. Based on the problem of how the influence of Islamic and Muslim tolerance on freedom of religion, culture and thought in Andalusia and through literature study with a historical approach; data collection (heuristic), verification, interpretation and historiography, the authors get the conclusion that cultural assimilation has interacted with tolerance as an influence of Islamic teachings. The influence is not only limited to the development of teachings, but the life of the Andalusian people. For example the birth of the Moor and Mozarabic groups, the development of linguistics and politics. Another indication is the attitude of the Andalusian community and especially Muslims who tolerate religious schools, sects that are different from Islam. Andalusian people lived side by side peacefully for centuries. Educated Jewish and Christian communities are satisfied with their situation under Islamic hegemony and its laws.