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Polityka Izraela wobec Strefy Gazy po 2005 r
The 2005 Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip dramatically changed the political situation of said territory. Due to the poor economic situation of its inhabitants, itself caused by years of Israeli policy of isolation, and general perception of being mistreated by the Israeli government, the power vacuum created in the wake of the withdrawal was filled by Hamas. The fundamentalists took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, which caused the decision-makers in Tel Aviv to take radical measures to deal with the organization. A tight blockade of the Gaza Strip was introduced and while it may have curbed some of Hamas activities, it also worsened the living conditions of the inhabitants, creating a humanitarian crisis. Israeli policy has been criticized by many members of the international community. Moreover, Tel Aviv carried out several military operations, two of which ("Cast Lead" in 2008/2009 and "Protective Edge" in 2014) were characterized by signifi cantly high numbers of civilian deaths. All of these actions, aimed at eliminating terrorists and improving Israeli citizens` security, seem to be rather short-sighted. Israeli policy only popularizes Hamas propaganda among Palestinians, therefore strengthening the organization and creating a vicious circle of misery and violence.
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The European Union in the face of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2009–2017 ; Unia Europejska wobec konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego w latach 2009–2017
In 2009–2017, the European Union continued its prior policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nonetheless, taking into consideration the rapidly changing internal and international situation, this policy is becoming increasingly less effective. Problems confronting the European Union and its member states over the recent years, Brexit, the destabilization of North Africa and the Middle East, the Ukrainian crisis, the redistribution of power in the world system, to name a few – are the most significant determinants of the current EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Compared to other actors, the role of the European Union in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been decreasing. ; W latach 2009–2017 Unia Europejska kontynuowała swoją dotychczasową politykę wobec konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego, jednak w obliczu dynamicznie zmieniających się uwarunkowań wewnętrznych i międzynarodowych polityka ta staje się coraz mniej efektywna. Problemy, z jakimi Unia Europejska i jej państwa członkowskie borykają się od kilku lat – Brexit, destabilizacja obszaru Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu, kryzys ukraiński, zmieniający się układ sił w świecie – to najważniejsze determinanty obecnej polityki UE wobec konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego. W ich wyniku rola Unii Europejskiej w rozwiązywaniu konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego, na tle innych aktorów, maleje.
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Unia Europejska wobec konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego w latach 2009–2017 ; The European Union in the face of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2009–2017
W latach 2009–2017 Unia Europejska kontynuowała swoją dotychczasową politykę wobec konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego, jednak w obliczu dynamicznie zmieniających się uwarunkowań wewnętrznych i międzynarodowych polityka ta staje się coraz mniej efektywna. Problemy, z jakimi Unia Europejska i jej państwa członkowskie borykają się od kilku lat Brexit, destabilizacja obszaru Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu, kryzys ukraiński, zmieniający się układ sił w świecie to najważniejsze determinanty obecnej polityki UE wobec konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego. W ich wyniku rola Unii Europejskiej w rozwiązywaniu konfliktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego, na tle innych aktorów, maleje. ; In 2009–2017, the European Union continued its prior policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nonetheless, taking into consideration the rapidly changing internal and international situation, this policy is becoming increasingly less effective. Problems confronting the European Union and its member states over the recent years, Brexit, the destabilization of North Africa and the Middle East, the Ukrainian crisis, the redistribution of power in the world system, to name a few are the most significant determinants of the current EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Compared to other actors, the role of the European Union in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been decreasing.
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Arabska Wiosna a kwestie bezpieczeństwa Izraela i jego sąsiadów ; The Arab Spring and its Consequences for the Security of Israel and its Neighboring Countries
Arabska Wiosna nie zakończyła się po zmianach politycznych jakie miały miejsce w wielu państwach Afryki Północnej w roku 2011. Przedstawiona analiza odnosi się bezpośrednio do roku 2012 oraz początków 2013, wskazuje na dynamiczny charakter procesów z nią związanych, zarówno w odniesieniu do całego regionu, jak i poszczególnych państw. W artykule szczególnym obszarem analizy jest Izrael oraz jego sąsiedzi, a także inni ważni gracze na scenie politycznej Bliskiego Wschodu – Arabia Saudyjska, Iran, Rosja, Turcja, USA oraz Unia Europejska. Najbardziej dramatyczny charakter ma w chwili oddawania tego materiału do druku, krwawa wojna domowa w Syrii, która jest strategicznym sąsiadem Izraela. ; The Arab Spring did not end after the political transformations that occurred in numerous North African states in 2011. The analysis presented here refers directly to 2012 and early 2013 indicating the dynamic character of the processes related to the Arab Spring, both in respect of the entire region and individual states. Particular attention in the analysis is devoted to Israel and its neighbors, as well as other important actors on the Middle Eastern political stage, namely Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia, Turkey, the US and the European Union. At the time this paper is being submitted for print, the most dramatic events are taking place in Syria, a strategic neighbor of Israel, where a bloody civil war is ongoing.
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Bliskowschodni proces pokojowy 25 lat po porozumieniu z Oslo – rola Unii Europejskiej
Celem poniższego opracowania jest syntetyczne przedstawienie zaangażowania Unii Europejskiej w rozwiązanie konfl iktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego. Rok 2018 jest dobrym momentem na podsumowanie roli Unii Europejskiej oraz innych aktorów regionalnych i międzynarodowych w rozwiązaniu kwestii palestyńskiej. Obecnie mija 25 lat od podpisania porozumienia z Oslo i 30 lat od deklaracji niepodległości ogłoszonej przez Organizację Wyzwolenia Palestyny. Z kolei w 2017 r. minęło 50 lat od zajęcia przez Izrael Strefy Gazy oraz Zachodniego Brzegu Jordanu. W artykule autorka zdecydowała się przyjąć tezę, iż konfl ikt izraelsko-palestyński stanowi jedno z głównych wyzwań dla polityki zagranicznej UE oraz jest nieodłączną cechą regionalnego układu sił i bez jego uregulowania nie można myśleć o trwałym pokoju na Bliskim Wschodzie86. Implikacje konfl iktu dla Unii Europejskiej są wielowymiarowe oraz dotyczą bezpieczeństwa, dialogu politycznego, kwestii gospodarczych i społecznych. Mają również wpływ na całościową politykę prowadzoną przez Unię wobec regionu śródziemnomorskiego. Powyższe zagadnienie stanowi ponadto ważny przyczynek do pogłębienia badań nad ewolucją Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa Unii. Artykuł podzielony jest na pięć części. Pierwsza przedstawia źródło, ewolucję oraz poszczególne etapy konfl iktu od końca drugiej wojny światowej. W drugiej części wskazane zostały implikacje zapisów porozumienia z Oslo dla procesu negocjacji pokojowych. W trzeciej zawarto zidentyfi kowane najważniejsze problemy, które uniemożliwiają osiągnięcie trwałego pokoju między Izraelem a Palestyną. W czwartej części przedstawiono stanowisko Unii Europejskiej wobec konfl iktu i rozwiązania dwupaństwowego oraz współpracy dwustronnej z Izraelem i Palestyną. Ostatnia, piąta część stanowi omówienie problemów związanych z zaangażowaniem Unii Europejskiej na rzecz zakończenia konfl iktu. Analiza przeprowadzona w niniejszym artykule oparta została na zróżnicowanych źródłach i literaturze przedmiotu, w szczególności z lat 2015–2018 oraz badaniach własnych autorki. W opracowaniu zastosowano ujęcie krytyczne i problemowe, uwzględniające zachowanie podstawowych aktorów, ważnych z punktu widzenia omawianego tematu oraz wykorzystano następujące metody badawcze: czynnikową, instytucjonalno-prawną, analizy zawartości oraz elementy metody decyzyjnej. ; The aim of the article is to present the European Union's commitment to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict. 2018 is a good time to take stock of the role of the European Union and other regional and international actors in resolving the Palestinian issue. Currently, it is 25 years since the signing of the Oslo Agreement, 30 years after the declaration of independence announced by the PLO. A year earlier, 50 years have passed since Israel seized the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The article assumes the thesis that the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict is one of the main challenges for the EU's foreign policy, is an inherent feature of the regional balance of power and without its regulation it is impossible to think about a lasting peace in the Middle East. Its implications are multidimensional and concern security, political dialogue, economic and social issues. The confl ict also has an impact on the overall policy pursued by the Union towards the Mediterranean. The article is divided into fi ve parts. The fi rst presents the source, evolution and individual stages of the confl ict from the end of the Second World War. In the second part, the implications of the provisions of the Oslo Agreement for the negotiation process were indicated. The third identifi es the most important problems that prevent a lasting peace between Israel and Palestine. In the fourth part author shows the position of the European Union towards the confl ict and a two-state solution, and bilateral cooperation with Israel and Palestine. The fi fth part discusses the problems related to the involvement of the European Union in ending the conflict. The analysis carried out in this article is based on diversified sources, literature on the subject, in particular from 2015–2018, and the author's own research. The study uses a critical, problematic approach, taking into account the behavior of the basic actors, important from the point of view of the discussed topic, and the following research methods were used: factor analysis, institutional and legal, content analysis and elements of the decision method.
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Izrael wobec zakazu sprzymierzania się z poganami w wybranych tekstach Septuaginty: część I ; Israel and its prohibition to ally with Gentiles in selected texts of the Septuagint, part I
This article analyses the problem of Israelites forming an alliance in diff erent times chiefl y described in the Pentateuch. Many existing exegetic commentaries lack a clear answer explaining the extent of the prohibition to ally with Gentiles described in Ex 23:32; 34:12; Deut 7:2 and Judg 2:2. The author wants to give a full answer to the question why the prohibition concerns only the nations neighboring Israel after the chosen people started to occupy the Promised Land; or perhaps it also concerns the Gentile nations that neighbored Israel. Should the prohibition be interpreted restrictively or extensively? One should also defi ne the necessity of the prohibition, that is what it actually concerned — any sort of signing a pact with Gentiles or merely the realm of purity of faith so as to dodge the temptation of idolatry. An attempt to answer these questions will broaden the knowledge about these important times of the chosen people. ; This article analyses the problem of Israelites forming an alliance in diff erent times chiefl y de-scribed in the Pentateuch. Many existing exegetic commentaries lack a clear answer explaining the extent of the prohibition to ally with Gentiles described in Ex 23:32; 34:12; Deut 7:2 and Judg 2:2. The author wants to give a full answer to the question why the prohibition concerns only the nations neighboring Israel after the chosen people started to occupy the Promised Land; or perhaps it also concerns the Gentile nations that neighbored Israel. Should the prohibition be interpreted restric-tively or extensively? One should also defi ne the necessity of the prohibition, that is what it actually concerned — any sort of signing a pact with Gentiles or merely the realm of purity of faith so as to dodge the temptation of idolatry. An attempt to answer these questions will broaden the knowledge about these important times of the chosen people
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A Political Upheaval as a Form of Succession of the Royal Power in the United Monarchy of Israel. From Saul to Solomon ; Przewrót polityczny jako forma sukcesji władzy królewskiej w monarchii zjednoczonej Izraela. Od Saula do Salomona
The aim of this article is to analyse the issues related to a political upheaval as a form of the succession of royal power in the monarchy of united Israel in the period that started during the reign of the first king of the Hebrews – Saul – till the last years David spent on the throne. During the period analysed in this article, there were several unsuccessful attempts to seize power through a political coup. Due to the fact that the inheritance based on the principle of primogeniture was never unambiguously introduced in the Kingdom of Israel, the most serious upheaval, described as a palace revolution, took place at the end of King David's life. As a result, the younger son of David – Solomon – ascended to Israel's throne, despite the fact that there were no legitimate grounds for him to take power. ; Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza zagadnień związanych z przewrotem politycznym jako formą sukcesji władzy królewskiej w monarchii zjednoczonej Izraela w okresie panowania pierwszego króla Hebrajczyków – Saula, po czasy ostatnich lat pobytu na tronie Dawida. W okresie, który został poddany analizie, miało miejsce kilka nieudanych prób przejęcia władzy królewskiej w drodze przewrotu politycznego. W związku z faktem, iż w królestwie izraelskim nie wprowadzono w sposób jednoznaczny dziedziczenia tronu na zasadzie primogenitury, doszło pod koniec życia króla Dawida do najpoważniejszego przewrotu, określanego jako przewrót pałacowy. W następstwie tego wydarzenia na tron Izraela wstąpił młodszy syn Dawida – Salomon, mimo że nie było uzasadnionych podstaw do przejęcia przez niego władzy.
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Izrael już nie frunie
System partyjny Izraela w perspektywie struktury podziałów socjopolitycznych
In: Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis 3351
Political changes in the Arab World in 2011 from the perspective of Israel's Strategic Security Interests ; Zmiany polityczne w świecie arabskim Anno Domini 2011. Próba oceny z perspektywy strategicznego bezpieczeństwa Izraela
The end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 in Arab countries marked its place in history as the Arab Spring or the Arab Awakening, since during this period mass social, political and economic protests could be observed in almost all the countries in the region. Due to the nature, dynamics and the issues underlying the Arab-Israeli conflict, each and every material change in Arab countries is and has to be important for Israel and the whole Middle East. Considering the phenomenon being analyzed from the perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel's external and internal situation, in my opinion it is particularly important to attempt to answer the following question: Has the Arab Spring changed Israel's strategic situation, and if so, to what extent? Looking at the ensuing situation from the perspective of Israel and also the Arab-Israeli conflict, at the very beginning we can have doubts or an opinion even less optimistic than in Europe about the nature of these changes. The Arab Spring may be regarded by Israel and also by the analysts related with the country as the beginning of the "era of uncertainty". This is mainly connected with the changes regarding political regimes and the possibility of coming to or sharing power with Islamic movements and parties hostile towards Israel. The collapse of political regimes was accompanied by failures of the ruling political parties connected with these regimes.The gap was filled by dozens of new parties, with religious and Islamic parties being particularly strong. Time will show its long-term consequences. Israel cannot afford unjustified optimism and false opinions, and that is why it has to be prepared for negative scenarios since both the country's elites and society are aware of that there may be no second chances in event of failure. ; The end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 in Arab countries marked its place in history as the Arab Spring or the Arab Awakening, since during this period mass social, political and economic protests could be observed in almost all the countries in the region. Due to the nature, dynamics and the issues underlying the Arab-Israeli conflict, each and every material change in Arab countries is and has to be important for Israel and the whole Middle East. Considering the phenomenon being analyzed from the perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel's external and internal situation, in my opinion it is particularly important to attempt to answer the following question: Has the Arab Spring changed Israel's strategic situation, and if so, to what extent? Looking at the ensuing situation from the perspective of Israel and also the Arab-Israeli conflict, at the very beginning we can have doubts or an opinion even less optimistic than in Europe about the nature of these changes. The Arab Spring may be regarded by Israel and also by the analysts related with the country as the beginning of the "era of uncertainty". This is mainly connected with the changes regarding political regimes and the possibility of coming to or sharing power with Islamic movements and parties hostile towards Israel. The collapse of political regimes was accompanied by failures of the ruling political parties connected with these regimes.The gap was filled by dozens of new parties, with religious and Islamic parties being particularly strong. Time will show its long-term consequences. Israel cannot afford unjustified optimism and false opinions, and that is why it has to be prepared for negative scenarios since both the country's elites and society are aware of that there may be no second chances in event of failure.
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Rola narodów w religijnej formacji Izraela u proroków pisarzy
The author deals with the problem of the role played by foreign nations in the religious life of Israel as the people of Yahwe . He examines the prophetic oracles of the Old Testament where the foreign nations were mentioned in a general way i. e. without their names (about 530 vs.). His conclusions are as follows: The idea that the alien nations were a tool of punishment i the hand of God appeared earlier in the prophetic writings than the idea that the alien nations were an object of Yahwe's salvific care. Punishments and calamities sent by heaven upon sinful nations were a warning or a kind of instruction for Israel that Yahwe was the upright judge of all mankind. The nations, since they witnessed the special care of Yahwe toward the chosen People, exercised a greater or a lesser impact on the implementation of the convenant of Israel. This happened in two ways: negatively (bringing about in Israel feelings of horror, shame or fear of God) and positively (awaking an awarness of the duty to give a good example and to witness for God). In the later prophetic writings the idea emerged that the alien nations were to be gained for Yahwe, but this was more a passive than an active attitude. The prophetic utterences about the nations not mentioned by name were moral and religious admonitions and were not concerned with political affaires. Those admonitions, down the centuries, became more and more eschatological and at the time, they tended to stress the importance of cult.
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