This paper estimates trade barriers in government procurement, a market that accounts for 12% of world GDP. Using data from inter-country input-output tables in a gravity model, we find that home bias in government procurement is significantly higher than in trade between firms. However, this difference has been shrinking over time. Results also show that trade agreements with provisions on government procurement increase cross-border flows of services, whereas the effect on goods is small and not different from that in private markets. Provisions containing transparency and procedural requirements drive the liberalizing effect of trade agreements.
This paper estimates trade barriers in government procurement, a market that accounts for 12% of world GDP. Using data from inter-country input-output tables in a gravity model, we find that home bias in government procurement is significantly higher than in trade between firms. However, this difference has been shrinking over time. Results also show that trade agreements with provisions on government procurement increase cross-border flows of services, whereas the effect on goods is small and not different from that in private markets. Provisions containing transparency and procedural requirements drive the liberalizing effect of trade agreements.
In 2001, the World Trade Organization launched a highly ambitious program of multilateral liberalization. Eight years later, concluding the negotiations is uncertain, though an opportunity still exists. Since 2001, many proposals on market access have been brought to the negotiating table by the European Union, the United States, and the G-20. Because it is politically and economically acceptable to many parties, the final December 2008 package could be the basis of an agreement. An evaluation of these various proposals shows how trade negotiations have been following countries' strategic interests. In eight years, the ambition of the formula to reduce agricultural market access tariffs has increased, but flexibilities added to accommodate domestic political constraints have offset delivered market access. The December 2008 package would reduce these average tariffs by 25 percent, a reduction very close to the one implied by the Harbinson and Girard proposals of 2003. This has to be compared with the 73 percent reduction in world agricultural protection of the very ambitious 2005 U.S. proposal. The 2005 G-20 and EU proposals were intermediate outcomes. The December 2008 package implies a reduction of agricultural protection by 6 percentage points in high-income countries and 0.5 percentage points in middle-income countries. If the U.S. proposal had been applied, these figures would have been 12.4 and 4.7, respectively. Different scenarios imply losses for developing countries, reflecting eroded preferences and rising terms of trade for imported commodities, including food products. We study how this trade reform can be more development-friendly.
In 2001, the World Trade Organization launched a highly ambitious program of multilateral liberalization. Eight years later, concluding the negotiations is uncertain, though an opportunity still exists. Since 2001, many proposals on market access have been brought to the negotiating table by the European Union, the United States, and the G-20. Because it is politically and economically acceptable to many parties, the final December 2008 package could be the basis of an agreement. An evaluation of these various proposals shows how trade negotiations have been following countries' strategic interests. In eight years, the ambition of the formula to reduce agricultural market access tariffs has increased, but flexibilities added to accommodate domestic political constraints have offset delivered market access. The December 2008 package would reduce these average tariffs by 25 percent, a reduction very close to the one implied by the Harbinson and Girard proposals of 2003. This has to be compared with the 73 percent reduction in world agricultural protection of the very ambitious 2005 U.S. proposal. The 2005 G-20 and EU proposals were intermediate outcomes. The December 2008 package implies a reduction of agricultural protection by 6 percentage points in high-income countries and 0.5 percentage points in middle-income countries. If the U.S. proposal had been applied, these figures would have been 12.4 and 4.7, respectively. Different scenarios imply losses for developing countries, reflecting eroded preferences and rising terms of trade for imported commodities, including food products. We study how this trade reform can be more development-friendly.
CEPII Working Paper, No 2018-05 - April 2018 ; There has been considerable attention paid to the endogenous nature of regional trade agreements Geography, economic size, or common history help predicting signed agreements. However, not all signed RTAs are "natural" according to economic determinants, as trade negotiations can be used as a tool of external policy. Recent developments in terms of structural gravity help clarifying this debate by taking account of all theoretically relevant determinants of bilateral trade, as well as general equilibrium effects of signing an agreement. Indeed, the endogeneity of trade arrangements has a time dimension and is related to firm strategies. These are the two mechanisms addressed in this paper. We estimate the time-varying probability for a country pair to sign a trade agreement and build upon structural gravity in general equilibrium to determine how the patterns of Global Value Chains shape the evolving geography of optimal trade agreements. Our results confirm that the endogenous geography of RTAs is shaped by the development of GVCs. ; Une grande attention a été accordée à la nature endogène des accords commerciaux régionaux. La géographie, la taille économique ou l'histoire commune aident à prévoir les accords régionaux (ACR) signés. Cependant, tous les ACR signés ne sont pas "naturels" du point de vue des seuls déterminants économiques, dans la mesure où les négociations commerciales peuvent être utilisées comme un outil de politique extérieure.Les développements récents en termes de modèles structurels de gravité des échanges aident à clarifier ce débat en prenant en compte l'ensemble des déterminants théoriques du commerce bilatéral. En effet, l'endogénéité des accords commerciaux a une dimension temporelle et est liée aux stratégies des firmes. Ces deux mécanismes sont abordés ici : nous estimons a probabilité pour chaque paire de pays de signer un accord commercial et utilisons la gravité structurelle en équilibre général pour déterminer comment les chaînes de ...
CEPII Working Paper, No 2018-05 - April 2018 ; There has been considerable attention paid to the endogenous nature of regional trade agreements Geography, economic size, or common history help predicting signed agreements. However, not all signed RTAs are "natural" according to economic determinants, as trade negotiations can be used as a tool of external policy. Recent developments in terms of structural gravity help clarifying this debate by taking account of all theoretically relevant determinants of bilateral trade, as well as general equilibrium effects of signing an agreement. Indeed, the endogeneity of trade arrangements has a time dimension and is related to firm strategies. These are the two mechanisms addressed in this paper. We estimate the time-varying probability for a country pair to sign a trade agreement and build upon structural gravity in general equilibrium to determine how the patterns of Global Value Chains shape the evolving geography of optimal trade agreements. Our results confirm that the endogenous geography of RTAs is shaped by the development of GVCs. ; Une grande attention a été accordée à la nature endogène des accords commerciaux régionaux. La géographie, la taille économique ou l'histoire commune aident à prévoir les accords régionaux (ACR) signés. Cependant, tous les ACR signés ne sont pas "naturels" du point de vue des seuls déterminants économiques, dans la mesure où les négociations commerciales peuvent être utilisées comme un outil de politique extérieure.Les développements récents en termes de modèles structurels de gravité des échanges aident à clarifier ce débat en prenant en compte l'ensemble des déterminants théoriques du commerce bilatéral. En effet, l'endogénéité des accords commerciaux a une dimension temporelle et est liée aux stratégies des firmes. Ces deux mécanismes sont abordés ici : nous estimons a probabilité pour chaque paire de pays de signer un accord commercial et utilisons la gravité structurelle en équilibre général pour déterminer comment les chaînes de valeur mondiales façonnent la géographie optimale des accords commerciaux. Nos résultats confirment que la géographie endogène des ACR est façonnée par le développement des chaînes de valeurs mondiales.
CEPII Working Paper, No 2018-05 - April 2018 ; There has been considerable attention paid to the endogenous nature of regional trade agreements Geography, economic size, or common history help predicting signed agreements. However, not all signed RTAs are "natural" according to economic determinants, as trade negotiations can be used as a tool of external policy. Recent developments in terms of structural gravity help clarifying this debate by taking account of all theoretically relevant determinants of bilateral trade, as well as general equilibrium effects of signing an agreement. Indeed, the endogeneity of trade arrangements has a time dimension and is related to firm strategies. These are the two mechanisms addressed in this paper. We estimate the time-varying probability for a country pair to sign a trade agreement and build upon structural gravity in general equilibrium to determine how the patterns of Global Value Chains shape the evolving geography of optimal trade agreements. Our results confirm that the endogenous geography of RTAs is shaped by the development of GVCs. ; Une grande attention a été accordée à la nature endogène des accords commerciaux régionaux. La géographie, la taille économique ou l'histoire commune aident à prévoir les accords régionaux (ACR) signés. Cependant, tous les ACR signés ne sont pas "naturels" du point de vue des seuls déterminants économiques, dans la mesure où les négociations commerciales peuvent être utilisées comme un outil de politique extérieure.Les développements récents en termes de modèles structurels de gravité des échanges aident à clarifier ce débat en prenant en compte l'ensemble des déterminants théoriques du commerce bilatéral. En effet, l'endogénéité des accords commerciaux a une dimension temporelle et est liée aux stratégies des firmes. Ces deux mécanismes sont abordés ici : nous estimons a probabilité pour chaque paire de pays de signer un accord commercial et utilisons la gravité structurelle en équilibre général pour déterminer comment les chaînes de valeur mondiales façonnent la géographie optimale des accords commerciaux. Nos résultats confirment que la géographie endogène des ACR est façonnée par le développement des chaînes de valeurs mondiales.
Production risks in agriculture due to biotic elements such as pests create biodiversity effects that impede productivity. Pesticides reduce these effects but are damaging for the environment and human health. When regulating farming practices, governments weigh these side-effects against the competitiveness of their agriculture. In a Ricardian two-country setup, we show that free trade results in an incomplete production specialization, that restrictions on pesticides are generally more stringent than under autarky and that trade increases the price volatility of crops produced by both countries and some of the specialized crops. If biodiversity effects are large, the price volatility of all crops is larger than under autarky.
Production risks in agriculture due to biotic elements such as pests create biodiversity effects that impede productivity. Pesticides reduce these effects but are damaging for the environment and human health. When regulating farming practices, governments weigh these side-effects against the competitiveness of their agriculture. In a Ricardian two-country setup, we show that free trade results in an incomplete production specialization, that restrictions on pesticides are generally more stringent than under autarky and that trade increases the price volatility of crops produced by both countries and some of the specialized crops. If biodiversity effects are large, the price volatility of all crops is larger than under autarky.
Production risks in agriculture due to biotic elements such as pests create biodiversity effects that impede productivity. Pesticides reduce these effects but are damaging for the environment and human health. When regulating farming practices, governments weigh these side-effects against the competitiveness of their agriculture. In a Ricardian two-country setup, we show that free trade results in an incomplete production specialization, that restrictions on pesticides are generally more stringent than under autarky and that trade increases the price volatility of crops produced by both countries and some of the specialized crops. If biodiversity effects are large, the price volatility of all crops is larger than under autarky.
Despite the "Phase One Deal" agreed on mid-December 2019, bilateral tariffs between US and China remain at unprecedented high levels, which will have long-lasting effects. US tariffs remain very high on parts, components and other intermediate products; similarly, only the last wave of Chinese retaliatory tariffs has been half cut. We investigate in this paper how such tensions between highly interdependent economies will impact trade, income and jobs. We rely on a set-up featuring General Equilibrium, imperfect competition and importantly differentiating demand of goods according to their use, for final or intermediate consumption. This authorizes tracing the impact of protection along the value chains, on prices, value added and factor income. Additional tariffs from official lists are taken into account at the tariff line level, before being aggregated within sectors. Beyond the direct toll of sanctions, US exports to the world post a sizeable decrease as a result of reduced competitiveness led by vertical linkages along the value chains. Because of the tariffs in place as of February 2020, three quarters of the sectors decrease their value added in the US. Consistent with political economy determinants, these twists of value added are transmitted to production factors, leading to sizeable creation and destruction of jobs, and reallocation of capital to the benefit of protected sectors, mostly at the expense of their clients. Ultimately, this paper sheds light on the economic consequences of policies disrupting global value chains.
Despite the "Phase One Deal" agreed on mid-December 2019, bilateral tariffs between US and China remain at unprecedented high levels, which will have long-lasting effects. US tariffs remain very high on parts, components and other intermediate products; similarly, only the last wave of Chinese retaliatory tariffs has been half cut. We investigate in this paper how such tensions between highly interdependent economies will impact trade, income and jobs. We rely on a set-up featuring General Equilibrium, imperfect competition and importantly differentiating demand of goods according to their use, for final or intermediate consumption. This authorizes tracing the impact of protection along the value chains, on prices, value added and factor income. Additional tariffs from official lists are taken into account at the tariff line level, before being aggregated within sectors. Beyond the direct toll of sanctions, US exports to the world post a sizeable decrease as a result of reduced competitiveness led by vertical linkages along the value chains. Because of the tariffs in place as of February 2020, three quarters of the sectors decrease their value added in the US. Consistent with political economy determinants, these twists of value added are transmitted to production factors, leading to sizeable creation and destruction of jobs, and reallocation of capital to the benefit of protected sectors, mostly at the expense of their clients. Ultimately, this paper sheds light on the economic consequences of policies disrupting global value chains.
Despite the "Phase One Deal" agreed on mid-December 2019, bilateral tariffs between US and China remain at unprecedented high levels, which will have long-lasting effects. US tariffs remain very high on parts, components and other intermediate products; similarly, only the last wave of Chinese retaliatory tariffs has been half cut. We investigate in this paper how such tensions between highly interdependent economies will impact trade, income and jobs. We rely on a set-up featuring General Equilibrium, imperfect competition and importantly differentiating demand of goods according to their use, for final or intermediate consumption. This authorizes tracing the impact of protection along the value chains, on prices, value added and factor income. Additional tariffs from official lists are taken into account at the tariff line level, before being aggregated within sectors. Beyond the direct toll of sanctions, US exports to the world post a sizeable decrease as a result of reduced competitiveness led by vertical linkages along the value chains. Because of the tariffs in place as of February 2020, three quarters of the sectors decrease their value added in the US. Consistent with political economy determinants, these twists of value added are transmitted to production factors, leading to sizeable creation and destruction of jobs, and reallocation of capital to the benefit of protected sectors, mostly at the expense of their clients. Ultimately, this paper sheds light on the economic consequences of policies disrupting global value chains.
The debate on trade wars and currency wars has re-emerged since the Great recession of 2009. We study the two forms of non-cooperative policies within a single framework. First, we compare the elasticity of trade flows to import tariffs and to the real exchange rate, based on product level data for 110 countries over the 1989-2013 period. We find that a 1 percent depreciation of the importer's currency reduces imports by around 0.5 percent in current dollar, whereas an increase in import tariffs by 1 percentage point reduces imports by around 1.4 percent. Hence the two instruments are not equivalent. Second, we build a stylized short-term macroeconomic model where the government aims at internal and external balance. We find that, in this setting, monetary policy is more stabilizing for the economy than trade policy, except when the internal transmission channel of monetary policy is muted (at the zero-lower bound). One implication is that, in normal times, a country will more likely react to a trade "aggression" through monetary easing rather than through a tariff increase. The result isreversed at the ZLB.
The debate on trade wars and currency wars has re-emerged since the Great recession of 2009. We study the two forms of non-cooperative policies within a single framework. First, we compare the elasticity of trade flows to import tariffs and to the real exchange rate, based on product level data for 110 countries over the 1989-2013 period. We find that a 1 percent depreciation of the importer's currency reduces imports by around 0.5 percent in current dollar, whereas an increase in import tariffs by 1 percentage point reduces imports by around 1.4 percent. Hence the two instruments are not equivalent. Second, we build a stylized short-term macroeconomic model where the government aims at internal and external balance. We find that, in this setting, monetary policy is more stabilizing for the economy than trade policy, except when the internal transmission channel of monetary policy is muted (at the zero-lower bound). One implication is that, in normal times, a country will more likely react to a trade "aggression" through monetary easing rather than through a tariff increase. The result isreversed at the ZLB.
