Suchergebnisse

S'inspirant des récentes mesures du Comité de Bâle, ce papier présente un modèle théorique analysant le comportement des banques sous différentes régulations de leur levier. Nous examinons la prise de risque, l'aléa moral et l'endettement des banques avec une régulation commune, puis avec l'ajout d'un volant de capital pour les banques systémiques, puis lorsqu'un ratio de levier contracyclique est imposé. Nous montrons que les banques sont incitées à maximiser leur taille lorsqu'une restriction commune sur le levier est appliquée, mais sans opter pour davantage de risque. Un volant de capital supplémentaire pour les banques systémiques réduit l'aléa moral de ces banques, mais l'aléa moral de l'ensemble des banques est amplifié par la mise en place d'un ratio de levier contracyclique.

Using quarterly data of U.S. commercial banks, we investigate the impact of market liquidity shortages on banks' capitalization and balance sheet adjustments. Our findings reveal that an acute liquidity shortage leads small U.S. commercial banks, but not large ones, to positively adjust their total capital ratio. Small banks adjust their total capital ratio by downsizing, by restricting dividend payments, by decreasing the share of assets with higher risk weights and specifically by extending less loans. Furthermore, the positive impact on total capital ratios is stronger for small banks which are more reliant on market liquidity and small banks operating below their target capital ratio.

Using quarterly data of U.S. commercial banks, we investigate the impact of market liquidity shortages on banks' capitalization and balance sheet adjustments. Our findings reveal that an acute liquidity shortage leads small U.S. commercial banks, but not large ones, to positively adjust their total capital ratio. Small banks adjust their total capital ratio by downsizing, by restricting dividend payments, by decreasing the share of assets with higher risk weights and specifically by extending less loans. Furthermore, the positive impact on total capital ratios is stronger for small banks which are more reliant on market liquidity and small banks operating below their target capital ratio.

International audience ; Abstract We empirically examine whether the way a bank might use loan loss provisions to smooth its income is in‡uenced by its ownership concentration and the regulatory environment. Using a panel of European commercial banks, we find evidence that banks with more concentrated ownership use discretionary loan loss provisions to smooth their income. This behavior is less pronounced in countries with stronger supervisory regimes or higher external audit quality. Banks with low levels of ownership concentration do not display such discretionary income smoothing behavior. This suggests the need to improve existing or implement new corporate governance mechanisms.

International audience ; Abstract We empirically examine whether the way a bank might use loan loss provisions to smooth its income is in‡uenced by its ownership concentration and the regulatory environment. Using a panel of European commercial banks, we find evidence that banks with more concentrated ownership use discretionary loan loss provisions to smooth their income. This behavior is less pronounced in countries with stronger supervisory regimes or higher external audit quality. Banks with low levels of ownership concentration do not display such discretionary income smoothing behavior. This suggests the need to improve existing or implement new corporate governance mechanisms.

International audience ; Abstract We empirically examine whether the way a bank might use loan loss provisions to smooth its income is in‡uenced by its ownership concentration and the regulatory environment. Using a panel of European commercial banks, we find evidence that banks with more concentrated ownership use discretionary loan loss provisions to smooth their income. This behavior is less pronounced in countries with stronger supervisory regimes or higher external audit quality. Banks with low levels of ownership concentration do not display such discretionary income smoothing behavior. This suggests the need to improve existing or implement new corporate governance mechanisms.

International audience ; Abstract We empirically examine whether the way a bank might use loan loss provisions to smooth its income is in‡uenced by its ownership concentration and the regulatory environment. Using a panel of European commercial banks, we find evidence that banks with more concentrated ownership use discretionary loan loss provisions to smooth their income. This behavior is less pronounced in countries with stronger supervisory regimes or higher external audit quality. Banks with low levels of ownership concentration do not display such discretionary income smoothing behavior. This suggests the need to improve existing or implement new corporate governance mechanisms.

We empirically investigate the impact of shareholders' excess control rights (greater control than cash-flow rights) on bank profitability and risk before, during, and after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. We use a unique hand-crafted dataset tracing the complete control chains of 788 European commercial banks and cover the 2002-2010 period. We find that the presence of excess control rights is associated with lower profitability, higher risk- taking and higher default risk before (2002-2006) and after (2009-2010) the crisis. Conversely, it improves profitability and no longer affects risk during the crisis (2007-2008). Further evidence shows that, regardless of the period, the effect of excess control rights on profitability and risk is accentuated in family-controlled banks and in countries with relatively weak shareholder protection rights and that such an effect is only effective at intermediate and high levels of excess control rights. Overall, our findings contribute to the literature examining the corporate governance determinants of banks' performance during the 2007- 2008 financial crisis and have several policy implications.

This paper examines the relationship between opacity and the cost of intermediation in Asian banks. Using a sample of publicly traded commercial banks from 2002 to 2008, our empirical results show that higher opacity is associated with a lower intermediation cost in banking. Hence, bank managers in their efforts to overcome asymmetric information issues and to improve transparency tend to offset the higher cost of acquiring and disclosing information by increasing the cost of intermediation for entrepreneurs. Moreover, a deeper look at the country level indicates that the negative link between opacity and the cost of intermediation is reversed as globalization increases. Greater globalization therefore outweighs managerial entrenchment behavior to preserve bank opacity. Our findings highlight that bank opacity issues are even more costly in countries with higher globalization.

International audience ; We investigate the impact of changes in capital of European banks on their risk- taking behavior from 1992 to 2006, a time period covering the Basel I capital requirements. We specifically focus on the initial level and type of regulatory capital banks hold. First, we assume that risk changes depend on banks' ex ante regulatory capital position. Second, we consider the impact of an increase in each component of regulatory capital on banks' risk changes. We find that, for highly capitalized and strongly undercapitalized banks, an increase in equity positively affects risk; but an increase in subordinated debt has the opposite effect namely for undercapitalized banks. Moderately undercapitalized banks tend to invest in less risky assets when their equity ratio increases but not when they improve their capital position by extending hybrid capital. Hybrid capital and equity have the same impact for banks with low capital buffers. On the whole, our conclusions support the need to implement more explicit thresholds to classify European banks according to their capital ratios but also to clearly distinguish pure equity from hybrid and subordinated instruments.

This paper examines the impact of bank revenue diversification on the performance of banks in an emerging economy. Using a unique dataset with detailed information on non- interest income, our findings show that, conversely to studies on Western economies, a shift towards non-interest activities increases bank profits and risk-adjusted profits particularly when they are more involved in trading in government securities. Our results also indicate that foreign banks benefit more from such a shift than their domestic counterparts. Moreover, we account for the institutional and regulatory environment advocating loans to SMEs and find that higher involvement in non-interest activities is only beneficial for banks with low exposures to SMEs. Our findings have important policy implications in terms of achieving optimal diversification and lower risk exposure, which might conflict with policies aiming to promote SME lending.

We empirically investigate the impact of shareholders' excess control rights (greater control than cash-flow rights) on bank profitability and risk before, during, and after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. We use a unique hand-crafted dataset tracing the complete control chains of 788 European commercial banks and cover the 2002-2010 period. We find that the presence of excess control rights is associated with lower profitability, higher risk- taking and higher default risk before (2002-2006) and after (2009-2010) the crisis. Conversely, it improves profitability and no longer affects risk during the crisis (2007-2008). Further evidence shows that, regardless of the period, the effect of excess control rights on profitability and risk is accentuated in family-controlled banks and in countries with relatively weak shareholder protection rights and that such an effect is only effective at intermediate and high levels of excess control rights. Overall, our findings contribute to the literature examining the corporate governance determinants of banks' performance during the 2007- 2008 financial crisis and have several policy implications.

This paper examines the relationship between opacity and the cost of intermediation in Asian banks. Using a sample of publicly traded commercial banks from 2002 to 2008, our empirical results show that higher opacity is associated with a lower intermediation cost in banking. Hence, bank managers in their efforts to overcome asymmetric information issues and to improve transparency tend to offset the higher cost of acquiring and disclosing information by increasing the cost of intermediation for entrepreneurs. Moreover, a deeper look at the country level indicates that the negative link between opacity and the cost of intermediation is reversed as globalization increases. Greater globalization therefore outweighs managerial entrenchment behavior to preserve bank opacity. Our findings highlight that bank opacity issues are even more costly in countries with higher globalization.

International audience ; We investigate the impact of changes in capital of European banks on their risk- taking behavior from 1992 to 2006, a time period covering the Basel I capital requirements. We specifically focus on the initial level and type of regulatory capital banks hold. First, we assume that risk changes depend on banks' ex ante regulatory capital position. Second, we consider the impact of an increase in each component of regulatory capital on banks' risk changes. We find that, for highly capitalized and strongly undercapitalized banks, an increase in equity positively affects risk; but an increase in subordinated debt has the opposite effect namely for undercapitalized banks. Moderately undercapitalized banks tend to invest in less risky assets when their equity ratio increases but not when they improve their capital position by extending hybrid capital. Hybrid capital and equity have the same impact for banks with low capital buffers. On the whole, our conclusions support the need to implement more explicit thresholds to classify European banks according to their capital ratios but also to clearly distinguish pure equity from hybrid and subordinated instruments.

This paper examines the impact of bank revenue diversification on the performance of banks in an emerging economy. Using a unique dataset with detailed information on non- interest income, our findings show that, conversely to studies on Western economies, a shift towards non-interest activities increases bank profits and risk-adjusted profits particularly when they are more involved in trading in government securities. Our results also indicate that foreign banks benefit more from such a shift than their domestic counterparts. Moreover, we account for the institutional and regulatory environment advocating loans to SMEs and find that higher involvement in non-interest activities is only beneficial for banks with low exposures to SMEs. Our findings have important policy implications in terms of achieving optimal diversification and lower risk exposure, which might conflict with policies aiming to promote SME lending.