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International audience ; The growing literature indicates that poor living conditions (unhealthy housing, education access,labor market access.) or low socio economics status are majors determinants of health and healthinequalities (Jusot, 2006). Regarding poor living conditions, a section of energy economics concerns thefuel poverty concept. In France, fuel poverty was deÖned in the Article 11 of the national commitmentto the environment (Grenelle II) of 12 July 2010: "an household who has di¢ culties disposing of thenecessary energy satisfy his basic needs due to the inadequacy of his resources or his living conditions isin fuel poverty under this Act ".The french deÖnition of fuel poverty appears as a interaction betweenhouseholds, their socio-economic situation and their dwelling. This one can create some cumulativese§ects or constitute a ripple e§ect. Moreover, the fuel poverty can considered as a part of the Precar-iousness framework as the food precariousness, the health precariousness, the Önantial precariousness.So, the fuel poverty can interact with the others types of precariousness. In this way, the fuel povertyconstitute a additional source of weakening for individuals. In more general terms, the fuel poverty con-tribute to increase vulnerability to Poverty.

International audience ; The growing literature indicates that poor living conditions (unhealthy housing, education access,labor market access.) or low socio economics status are majors determinants of health and healthinequalities (Jusot, 2006). Regarding poor living conditions, a section of energy economics concerns thefuel poverty concept. In France, fuel poverty was deÖned in the Article 11 of the national commitmentto the environment (Grenelle II) of 12 July 2010: "an household who has di¢ culties disposing of thenecessary energy satisfy his basic needs due to the inadequacy of his resources or his living conditions isin fuel poverty under this Act ".The french deÖnition of fuel poverty appears as a interaction betweenhouseholds, their socio-economic situation and their dwelling. This one can create some cumulativese§ects or constitute a ripple e§ect. Moreover, the fuel poverty can considered as a part of the Precar-iousness framework as the food precariousness, the health precariousness, the Önantial precariousness.So, the fuel poverty can interact with the others types of precariousness. In this way, the fuel povertyconstitute a additional source of weakening for individuals. In more general terms, the fuel poverty con-tribute to increase vulnerability to Poverty.

U vezi sa svetačkim kultom kraljice i monahinje Jelene († 8. februar 1314. godine) postoje duboka neslaganja, koja se kreću od mišljenja da je bila "kanonizovana" već 1317. godine, do toga da nikad nije dobila kult. Uvidom u poznate i u još neobjavljene pisane izvore može se ustanoviti da je stvaranje kulta gradačkoj ktitorki započeo arhiepiskop Danilo II pisanjem Žitija kraljice Jelene desetak godina posle njene smrti, dok je druge proslavne sastave dobila tek oko 1600. godine. Služba joj nikada nije bila napisana, zbog čega je i njen kult, u liturgijskom smislu, ostao nedovršen. Uprkos tome, Jelena je od početka uživala izuzetno, neretko kultno poštovanje, koje je ostavilo značajne tragove u književnosti i umetnosti. ; The Serbian Queen Jelena was the wife of King Uroš I (1242-1276). After the violent change on the throne (1276), Jelena got from the new King Dragutin a "state" of her own to administer, vast areas she practically ruled independently, which she also continued to do during the reign of her other son, King Milutin. She became a nun around 1285, but she continued to rule in her lands at least until 1306. She died on 8 February 1314 and was buried at Gradac Monastery, which she had built already at the beginning of her reign. Queen Jelena acquired her status of an exceptional and revered person, both as a ruler and as a nun, even during her lifetime that was filled with good and pious deeds, charities, fasting, prayers and tears. Her death was blessed and in all aspects like the death of the selected God's favourites. Three years later (1317), her body was found intact, not decomposed and as if covered in dew, which were the signs of particular grace, and then it was taken out of the grave and laid down in a coffin in front of the sanctuary screen. The veneration of such a Queen and nun also continued after her death and yet still limited to the court, Monastery Sopoćani, with which she used to have multiple ties, and undoubtedly Gradac where the memory of her was longest and most intensive. It was only three centuries later that Jelena "declared" herself as a thaumatourgos, through myrrh gushing or the fine scent of the remains (which is more probable) and through miraculous healing of the ill. As a saint, she was invoked in pleas and prayers, she was expected to render help and praises were offered to her at the church. The liturgical shaping up of Jelena's sainthood cult started very early. Only a dozen years after her death, Archbishop Danilo II wrote her Biography, with all the characteristics of a proper hagiography; the writer, however, does not call her holy in any part of his work, only blessed, and he does not mention at all any of her miracles either. A lot of time had passed before other necessary celebratory writings dedicated to Saint Jelena were written. The centre of her cult was Gradac Monastery, in the church of which her remains lay, as it appears, until the end of the 17th century. An impetus to the revival and further shaping up of the cult of Queen and nun Jelena was given by the Metropolitan of Ras Visarion around 1600. It was probably he who wrote the first doxologies, hymns and collect-hymns, and perhaps even the synaxarion. According to the usual practice, they were written on the basis of the older hagiographic and hymnographic texts dedicated either to Jelena or to some other saints. They contained a completed hagiological image of Jelena as a ruler turned nun and a venerable woman who became famous through her miracle-working and as a representative of the faithful before God. There are signs that the liturgical use of the cult of Jelena spread also outside Gradac: the only known transcript of her synaxarion from the second half of the 17th century was created at the Holy Mount and was intended for Mileševa Monastery, which means that it was read also there on every 8 February. It should be presumed that there were more transcripts of this synaxarion, as well as of hymns and collect-hymns, which is quite certain for the extended Biography of Queen Jelena written by Danilo II. In order for the Jelena's cult to have a full liturgical form, it was necessary for the saint also to get a service or Akolouthia, but it was never written for her. This was either omitted by the Metropolitan of Ras Visarion who was the most responsible - after Archbishop Danilo II - for the hagiographic and hymnographic shaping of her sainthood cult or he never got to do it. Because of this lack of service, in the liturgical sense the cult of Queen Jelena thus remained unfinished. The postponed and never accomplished writing of the Service was probably contributed to by the difficult circumstances in the last decades of the 17th century when Gradac Monastery, the main centre for the spreading of Jelena's cult reverence, got deserted. This cult, however, continued to be upheld for quite a while, mostly at the top of the Serbian Church. The artistic, painting materials show that the veneration of Queen Jelena remained and even spread in the 18th century when it also received a proper position within the religious and political programme of the Metropolitan of Karlovci. It was only in the next century that Jelena was introduced into the church calendar under the date of 30 October, where together with King Dragutin (Venerable Teoktist) she was joined to the Holy King Milutin.

In France, access to health care greatly depends on having a complementary health insurance coverage (CHI). Thus, the generalisation of CHI became a core factor in the national health strategy created by the government in 2013. The first measure has been to compulsorily extend employer-sponsored CHI to all private sector employees on January 1st, 2016 and improve its portability coverage for unemployed former employees for up to 12 months. Based on data from the 2012 Health, Health Care and Insurance survey, this article provides a simulation of the likely effects of this mandate on CHI coverage and related inequalities in the general population by age, health status, socio-economic characteristics and time and risk preferences. We show that the non-coverage rate that was estimated to be 5% in 2012 will drop to 4% following the generalisation of employer-sponsored CHI and to 3.7% after accounting for portability coverage. The most vulnerable populations are expected to remain more often without CHI whereas non coverage will significantly decrease among the less risk averse and the more present oriented. With its focus on private sector employees, the policy is thus likely to do little for populations that would benefit most from additional insurance coverage while expanding coverage for other populations that appear to place little value on CHI.

In France, access to health care greatly depends on having a complementary health insurance coverage (CHI). Thus, the generalisation of CHI became a core factor in the national health strategy created by the government in 2013. The first measure has been to compulsorily extend employer-sponsored CHI to all private sector employees on January 1st, 2016 and improve its portability coverage for unemployed former employees for up to 12 months. Based on data from the 2012 Health, Health Care and Insurance survey, this article provides a simulation of the likely effects of this mandate on CHI coverage and related inequalities in the general population by age, health status, socio-economic characteristics and time and risk preferences. We show that the non-coverage rate that was estimated to be 5% in 2012 will drop to 4% following the generalisation of employer-sponsored CHI and to 3.7% after accounting for portability coverage. The most vulnerable populations are expected to remain more often without CHI whereas non coverage will significantly decrease among the less risk averse and the more present oriented. With its focus on private sector employees, the policy is thus likely to do little for populations that would benefit most from additional insurance coverage while expanding coverage for other populations that appear to place little value on CHI.

A concise assessment of the risks to human health and the environment posed by exposure to 2 2-dichloro-1 1 1-trifluoroethane (HCFC-123) a volatile liquid used as a refrigerant in commercial and industrial air-conditioning installations in gaseous fire extinguishers as a foam-blowing agent and in metal and electronics cleaning. Although HCFC-123 is known to contribute to ozone depletion the significance of its role in global warming is far smaller than that of chlorofluorocarbons and bromofluorocarbons which are being phased out in compliance with the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that

The papers in Part I of this ebook cover a range of topics and issues on benchmarking in health. The papers emphasise the growing application and significance of benchmarking and examine the possibility of its use to better understand and improve health service performance. It draws together evidence of various attempts to better understand Best Practice(s)

This paper presents a general framework for modeling the impact of insurance on healthcare demand extending some of the results of the two-risk model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), but including the latter as a special case. Rothschild and Stiglitz's approach assumes equivalence between the price of treatment and the discomfort caused by the disease. Relaxing this assumption turns out to be key in understanding participation in the insurance and healthcare markets. The demands for insurance and healthcare are modeled simultaneously, under symmetric and asymmetric information. Four main results arise from the relaxation of this assumption. First, only the presence of an insurance market can produce healthcare consumption at higher prices than the discomfort. Second, adverse selection may lead healthcare to be sold at a price lower than that under perfect information. Third, the potential non-participation of one type risk arises despite competition, depending on the degree of information. Last, in a public voluntary regime, one type risk may prefer to be uninsured and still consume healthcare. ; Ce papier propose d'étendre le modèle de Rothschild et Stiglitz (1976) afin de cerner l'impact de l'assurance santé sur la demande de soins. Alors que le modèle pionnier suppose implicitement l'équivalence entre prix du traitement et inconfort lié à la maladie, nous introduisons la possibilité que le "coût des réparations" diffère du "montant des dommages". Demande d'assurance et demande de soins sont étudiées parallèlement sous information symétrique et asymétrique. La distinction introduite entre prix du traitement et inconfort a trois conséquences majeures. Premièrement, les agents sont prêts à payer plus pour se soigner en présence d'un marché d'assurance santé. Deuxièmement et paradoxalement, la sélection adverse peut conduire le marché à diminuer le prix des soins (par rapport à une situation d'information parfaite). Finalement, notre modèle fait apparaître un phénomène fréquemment observé dans la réalité mais inexistant dans le modèle de Rothschild et Stiglitz : une partie de la population peut choisir de ne pas s'assurer (bien que ne renonçant pas à se soigner en cas de maladie) et ce, même en présence d'une concurrence sur le marché de l'assurance.

This paper presents a general framework for modeling the impact of insurance on healthcare demand extending some of the results of the two-risk model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), but including the latter as a special case. Rothschild and Stiglitz's approach assumes equivalence between the price of treatment and the discomfort caused by the disease. Relaxing this assumption turns out to be key in understanding participation in the insurance and healthcare markets. The demands for insurance and healthcare are modeled simultaneously, under symmetric and asymmetric information. Four main results arise from the relaxation of this assumption. First, only the presence of an insurance market can produce healthcare consumption at higher prices than the discomfort. Second, adverse selection may lead healthcare to be sold at a price lower than that under perfect information. Third, the potential non-participation of one type risk arises despite competition, depending on the degree of information. Last, in a public voluntary regime, one type risk may prefer to be uninsured and still consume healthcare. ; Ce papier propose d'étendre le modèle de Rothschild et Stiglitz (1976) afin de cerner l'impact de l'assurance santé sur la demande de soins. Alors que le modèle pionnier suppose implicitement l'équivalence entre prix du traitement et inconfort lié à la maladie, nous introduisons la possibilité que le "coût des réparations" diffère du "montant des dommages". Demande d'assurance et demande de soins sont étudiées parallèlement sous information symétrique et asymétrique. La distinction introduite entre prix du traitement et inconfort a trois conséquences majeures. Premièrement, les agents sont prêts à payer plus pour se soigner en présence d'un marché d'assurance santé. Deuxièmement et paradoxalement, la sélection adverse peut conduire le marché à diminuer le prix des soins (par rapport à une situation d'information parfaite). Finalement, notre modèle fait apparaître un phénomène fréquemment observé dans la réalité mais inexistant dans le modèle de Rothschild et Stiglitz : une partie de la population peut choisir de ne pas s'assurer (bien que ne renonçant pas à se soigner en cas de maladie) et ce, même en présence d'une concurrence sur le marché de l'assurance.

This paper presents a general framework for modeling the impact of insurance on healthcare demand extending some of the results of the two-risk model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), but including the latter as a special case. Rothschild and Stiglitz's approach assumes equivalence between the price of treatment and the discomfort caused by the disease. Relaxing this assumption turns out to be key in understanding participation in the insurance and healthcare markets. The demands for insurance and healthcare are modeled simultaneously, under symmetric and asymmetric information. Four main results arise from the relaxation of this assumption. First, only the presence of an insurance market can produce healthcare consumption at higher prices than the discomfort. Second, adverse selection may lead healthcare to be sold at a price lower than that under perfect information. Third, the potential non-participation of one type risk arises despite competition, depending on the degree of information. Last, in a public voluntary regime, one type risk may prefer to be uninsured and still consume healthcare. ; Ce papier propose d'étendre le modèle de Rothschild et Stiglitz (1976) afin de cerner l'impact de l'assurance santé sur la demande de soins. Alors que le modèle pionnier suppose implicitement l'équivalence entre prix du traitement et inconfort lié à la maladie, nous introduisons la possibilité que le "coût des réparations" diffère du "montant des dommages". Demande d'assurance et demande de soins sont étudiées parallèlement sous information symétrique et asymétrique. La distinction introduite entre prix du traitement et inconfort a trois conséquences majeures. Premièrement, les agents sont prêts à payer plus pour se soigner en présence d'un marché d'assurance santé. Deuxièmement et paradoxalement, la sélection adverse peut conduire le marché à diminuer le prix des soins (par rapport à une situation d'information parfaite). Finalement, notre modèle fait apparaître un phénomène fréquemment observé dans la réalité mais ...

This paper presents a general framework for modeling the impact of insurance on healthcare demand extending some of the results of the two-risk model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), but including the latter as a special case. Rothschild and Stiglitz's approach assumes equivalence between the price of treatment and the discomfort caused by the disease. Relaxing this assumption turns out to be key in understanding participation in the insurance and healthcare markets. The demands for insurance and healthcare are modeled simultaneously, under symmetric and asymmetric information. Four main results arise from the relaxation of this assumption. First, only the presence of an insurance market can produce healthcare consumption at higher prices than the discomfort. Second, adverse selection may lead healthcare to be sold at a price lower than that under perfect information. Third, the potential non-participation of one type risk arises despite competition, depending on the degree of information. Last, in a public voluntary regime, one type risk may prefer to be uninsured and still consume healthcare. ; Ce papier propose d'étendre le modèle de Rothschild et Stiglitz (1976) afin de cerner l'impact de l'assurance santé sur la demande de soins. Alors que le modèle pionnier suppose implicitement l'équivalence entre prix du traitement et inconfort lié à la maladie, nous introduisons la possibilité que le "coût des réparations" diffère du "montant des dommages". Demande d'assurance et demande de soins sont étudiées parallèlement sous information symétrique et asymétrique. La distinction introduite entre prix du traitement et inconfort a trois conséquences majeures. Premièrement, les agents sont prêts à payer plus pour se soigner en présence d'un marché d'assurance santé. Deuxièmement et paradoxalement, la sélection adverse peut conduire le marché à diminuer le prix des soins (par rapport à une situation d'information parfaite). Finalement, notre modèle fait apparaître un phénomène fréquemment observé dans la réalité mais inexistant dans le modèle de Rothschild et Stiglitz : une partie de la population peut choisir de ne pas s'assurer (bien que ne renonçant pas à se soigner en cas de maladie) et ce, même en présence d'une concurrence sur le marché de l'assurance.

This paper presents a general framework for modeling the impact of insurance on healthcare demand extending some of the results of the two-risk model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), but including the latter as a special case. Rothschild and Stiglitz's approach assumes equivalence between the price of treatment and the discomfort caused by the disease. Relaxing this assumption turns out to be key in understanding participation in the insurance and healthcare markets. The demands for insurance and healthcare are modeled simultaneously, under symmetric and asymmetric information. Four main results arise from the relaxation of this assumption. First, only the presence of an insurance market can produce healthcare consumption at higher prices than the discomfort. Second, adverse selection may lead healthcare to be sold at a price lower than that under perfect information. Third, the potential non-participation of one type risk arises despite competition, depending on the degree of information. Last, in a public voluntary regime, one type risk may prefer to be uninsured and still consume healthcare. ; Ce papier propose d'étendre le modèle de Rothschild et Stiglitz (1976) afin de cerner l'impact de l'assurance santé sur la demande de soins. Alors que le modèle pionnier suppose implicitement l'équivalence entre prix du traitement et inconfort lié à la maladie, nous introduisons la possibilité que le "coût des réparations" diffère du "montant des dommages". Demande d'assurance et demande de soins sont étudiées parallèlement sous information symétrique et asymétrique. La distinction introduite entre prix du traitement et inconfort a trois conséquences majeures. Premièrement, les agents sont prêts à payer plus pour se soigner en présence d'un marché d'assurance santé. Deuxièmement et paradoxalement, la sélection adverse peut conduire le marché à diminuer le prix des soins (par rapport à une situation d'information parfaite). Finalement, notre modèle fait apparaître un phénomène fréquemment observé dans la réalité mais ...