Suchergebnisse

In this paper, I use a pseudo-panel approach with data from the European Union Labour Force Survey to study the impact of paternity leave policies on mothers' employment in ten countries. Using a dynamic Difference-inDifference strategy, I show that paternity leave increased mothers' employment rate by up to 17% in the long run, and average hours worked by 2 to 4%. There is substantial heterogeneity across countries in the effect of paternity leave policies. The impact on employment rates is positive and significant in eight of the ten countries of the sample, while the impact on hours worked can be either positive or negative. I find no evidence that the reforms had any impact on Greece or Portugal.

In this paper, I use a pseudo-panel approach with data from the European Union Labour Force Survey to study the impact of paternity leave policies on mothers' employment in ten countries. Using a dynamic Difference-inDifference strategy, I show that paternity leave increased mothers' employment rate by up to 17% in the long run, and average hours worked by 2 to 4%. There is substantial heterogeneity across countries in the effect of paternity leave policies. The impact on employment rates is positive and significant in eight of the ten countries of the sample, while the impact on hours worked can be either positive or negative. I find no evidence that the reforms had any impact on Greece or Portugal.

The retirement system is usually regarded as giving a fair reward for a long life of labor. However, the fairness of that system can be questioned, on the grounds that only workers who have a su¢ ciently long life benefit from that reward, but not workers who die prematurely. In order to reexamine the fairness of retirement systems under unequal lifetime, this paper compares standard retirement (i.e. individuals work before being retired) with - purely hypothetical - reverse retirement (i.e. individuals are retired before working). We first show that, whereas reverse retirement cannotbe a social optimum under the utilitarian criterion (unlike standard retirement), reverse retirement can be optimal under the ex post egalitarian criterion (giving priority to the worst-o¤ in realized terms). From an ex post egalitarian perspective, reverse retirement dominates standard retirement in economies with high life expectancy and a flat age-productivity profile, whereas the opposite holds in less developed economies.

The retirement system is usually regarded as giving a fair reward for a long life of labor. However, the fairness of that system can be questioned, on the grounds that only workers who have a su¢ ciently long life benefit from that reward, but not workers who die prematurely. In order to reexamine the fairness of retirement systems under unequal lifetime, this paper compares standard retirement (i.e. individuals work before being retired) with - purely hypothetical - reverse retirement (i.e. individuals are retired before working). We first show that, whereas reverse retirement cannotbe a social optimum under the utilitarian criterion (unlike standard retirement), reverse retirement can be optimal under the ex post egalitarian criterion (giving priority to the worst-o¤ in realized terms). From an ex post egalitarian perspective, reverse retirement dominates standard retirement in economies with high life expectancy and a flat age-productivity profile, whereas the opposite holds in less developed economies.

The retirement system is usually regarded as giving a fair reward for a long life of labor. However, the fairness of that system can be questioned, on the grounds that only workers who have a su¢ ciently long life benefit from that reward, but not workers who die prematurely. In order to reexamine the fairness of retirement systems under unequal lifetime, this paper compares standard retirement (i.e. individuals work before being retired) with - purely hypothetical - reverse retirement (i.e. individuals are retired before working). We first show that, whereas reverse retirement cannotbe a social optimum under the utilitarian criterion (unlike standard retirement), reverse retirement can be optimal under the ex post egalitarian criterion (giving priority to the worst-o¤ in realized terms). From an ex post egalitarian perspective, reverse retirement dominates standard retirement in economies with high life expectancy and a flat age-productivity profile, whereas the opposite holds in less developed economies.

The retirement system is usually regarded as giving a fair reward for a long life of labor. However, the fairness of that system can be questioned, on the grounds that only workers who have a su¢ ciently long life benefit from that reward, but not workers who die prematurely. In order to reexamine the fairness of retirement systems under unequal lifetime, this paper compares standard retirement (i.e. individuals work before being retired) with - purely hypothetical - reverse retirement (i.e. individuals are retired before working). We first show that, whereas reverse retirement cannotbe a social optimum under the utilitarian criterion (unlike standard retirement), reverse retirement can be optimal under the ex post egalitarian criterion (giving priority to the worst-o¤ in realized terms). From an ex post egalitarian perspective, reverse retirement dominates standard retirement in economies with high life expectancy and a flat age-productivity profile, whereas the opposite holds in less developed economies.

The retirement system is usually regarded as giving a fair reward for a long life of labor. However, the fairness of that system can be questioned, on the grounds that only workers who have a su¢ ciently long life benefit from that reward, but not workers who die prematurely. In order to reexamine the fairness of retirement systems under unequal lifetime, this paper compares standard retirement (i.e. individuals work before being retired) with - purely hypothetical - reverse retirement (i.e. individuals are retired before working). We first show that, whereas reverse retirement cannotbe a social optimum under the utilitarian criterion (unlike standard retirement), reverse retirement can be optimal under the ex post egalitarian criterion (giving priority to the worst-o¤ in realized terms). From an ex post egalitarian perspective, reverse retirement dominates standard retirement in economies with high life expectancy and a flat age-productivity profile, whereas the opposite holds in less developed economies.

The retirement system is usually regarded as giving a fair reward for a long life of labor. However, the fairness of that system can be questioned, on the grounds that only workers who have a su¢ ciently long life benefit from that reward, but not workers who die prematurely. In order to reexamine the fairness of retirement systems under unequal lifetime, this paper compares standard retirement (i.e. individuals work before being retired) with - purely hypothetical - reverse retirement (i.e. individuals are retired before working). We first show that, whereas reverse retirement cannotbe a social optimum under the utilitarian criterion (unlike standard retirement), reverse retirement can be optimal under the ex post egalitarian criterion (giving priority to the worst-o¤ in realized terms). From an ex post egalitarian perspective, reverse retirement dominates standard retirement in economies with high life expectancy and a flat age-productivity profile, whereas the opposite holds in less developed economies.

Job insecurity can have wide-ranging consequences outside of the labour market. We here argue that it reduces fertility amongst the employed. The 1999 rise in the French Delalande tax, paid by large private firms when they laid off workers aged over 50, produced an exogenous rise in job insecurity for younger workers in these firms. A difference-in-differences analysis of French ECHP data reveals that this greater job insecurity for these under-50s significantly reduced their probability of having a new child by 3.9 percentage points. Reduced fertility is only found at the intensive margin: job insecurity reduces family size but not the probability of parenthood itself. Our results also suggest negative selection into parenthood, as this fertility effect does not appear for low-income and less-educated workers.

We here ask whether the U-shaped relationship between life satisfaction and age is flatter for those who are partnered. This is the case in cross-section EU-SILC data, where the drop in life satisfaction from the teens to the 50s is almost four times larger for the non-partnered than for the partnered, whose life satisfaction essentially follows a slight downward trajectory with age. However, the same analysis in three panel datasets (BHPS, SOEP and HILDA) reveals a U-shape for both marital groups, although still somewhat flatter for the partnered than for the non-partnered. We suggest that the difference between the cross-section and panel results reflects compositional effects: there is in particular a significant shift of the relatively dissatisfied out of marriage in mid-life. These composition effects will flatten the U-shape in age for the partnered in cross-section data.

Job insecurity is one type of risk that workers face on the labour market. As with any risk, individuals can choose to insure against it. We consider marriage as potential insurance against labour-market risk. The 1999 rise in the French Delalande layoff tax for older workers produced an exogenous rise in job insecurity for younger workers. A difference-in-differences estimation in panel data reveals that this greater job insecurity for the under-50s led to a significant rise in their probability of marriage, and especially with partners who had greater job security, consistent with marriage providing insurance on the labour market.

Job insecurity can have wide-ranging consequences outside of the labour market. We here argue that it reduces fertility amongst the employed. The 1999 rise in the French Delalande tax, paid by large private firms when they laid off workers aged over 50, produced an exogenous rise in job insecurity for younger workers in these firms. A difference-in-differences analysis of French ECHP data reveals that this greater job insecurity for these under-50s significantly reduced their probability of having a new child by 3.9 percentage points. Reduced fertility is only found at the intensive margin: job insecurity reduces family size but not the probability of parenthood itself. Our results also suggest negative selection into parenthood, as this fertility effect does not appear for low-income and less-educated workers.

We here ask whether the U-shaped relationship between life satisfaction and age is flatter for those who are partnered. This is the case in cross-section EU-SILC data, where the drop in life satisfaction from the teens to the 50s is almost four times larger for the non-partnered than for the partnered, whose life satisfaction essentially follows a slight downward trajectory with age. However, the same analysis in three panel datasets (BHPS, SOEP and HILDA) reveals a U-shape for both marital groups, although still somewhat flatter for the partnered than for the non-partnered. We suggest that the difference between the cross-section and panel results reflects compositional effects: there is in particular a significant shift of the relatively dissatisfied out of marriage in mid-life. These composition effects will flatten the U-shape in age for the partnered in cross-section data.

Job insecurity is one type of risk that workers face on the labour market. As with any risk, individuals can choose to insure against it. We consider marriage as potential insurance against labour-market risk. The 1999 rise in the French Delalande layoff tax for older workers produced an exogenous rise in job insecurity for younger workers. A difference-in-differences estimation in panel data reveals that this greater job insecurity for the under-50s led to a significant rise in their probability of marriage, and especially with partners who had greater job security, consistent with marriage providing insurance on the labour market.

Job insecurity can have wide-ranging consequences outside of the labour market. We here argue that it reduces fertility amongst the employed. The 1999 rise in the French Delalande tax, paid by large private firms when they laid off workers aged over 50, produced an exogenous rise in job insecurity for younger workers in these firms. A difference-in-differences analysis of French ECHP data reveals that this greater job insecurity for these under-50s significantly reduced their probability of having a new child by 3.9 percentage points. Reduced fertility is only found at the intensive margin: job insecurity reduces family size but not the probability of parenthood itself. Our results also suggest negative selection into parenthood, as this fertility effect does not appear for low-income and less-educated workers.