Suchergebnisse

International audience ; L'objet de cet article est d'étudier la manière dont le mode d'insertion internationale des économies émergentes a interagi avec les développements internationaux de la crise financière internationale. Ce faisant, nous essaierons de montrer en quoi l'étude de la trajectoire russe est pertinente pour l'analyse de la situation du Brésil, non pas tant pour comparer terme à terme ces deux économies que pour montrer qu'il est possible de tirer du cas russe des leçons intéressantes pour éclairer certains choix d'avenir qui se posent aujourd'hui au Brésil.

International audience ; L'objet de cet article est d'étudier la manière dont le mode d'insertion internationale des économies émergentes a interagi avec les développements internationaux de la crise financière internationale. Ce faisant, nous essaierons de montrer en quoi l'étude de la trajectoire russe est pertinente pour l'analyse de la situation du Brésil, non pas tant pour comparer terme à terme ces deux économies que pour montrer qu'il est possible de tirer du cas russe des leçons intéressantes pour éclairer certains choix d'avenir qui se posent aujourd'hui au Brésil.

In a cross-section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital. We document this correlation, and present a model explaining it. In the model, distrust creates public demand for regulation, while regulation in turn discourages social capital accumulation, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low trust countries want more government intervention even though the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on social capital and beliefs about government's role, as well as on changes in beliefs and in trust during the transition from socialism.

In a cross-section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital. We document this correlation, and present a model explaining it. In the model, distrust creates public demand for regulation, while regulation in turn discourages social capital accumulation, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low trust countries want more government intervention even though the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on social capital and beliefs about government's role, as well as on changes in beliefs and in trust during the transition from socialism.

In a cross-section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with social capital. We document this correlation, and present a model explaining it. In the model, distrust creates public demand for regulation, while regulation in turn discourages social capital accumulation, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low trust countries want more government intervention even though the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on social capital and beliefs about government's role, as well as on changes in beliefs and in trust during the transition from socialism.

This paper investigates if past institutional, economic, political, social, and cultural features (i.e legal origins on law and regulations and colonial legacies) interact in shaping the current institutional performances on deforestation in 116 developed and developing countries. A two step approach is implemented. First, we investigate relations between colonial legacies-legal origins and current institutional performances. We find that common law countries and previous British colonies have better institutions that French civil law and other past colonized countries. Second, we provide two econometrics procedures to capture some institutional persistences on deforestation which allow to estimate current institutional effects on deforestation conditioned to historical variables. In a first time, we run our deforestation model on different samples (under historical variables) and in a second time, interactive variables are introduced. We find that (i) French civil law countries deforest less than common law ones; (ii) less corruption and more secured property rights decrease deforestation in common law countries; (iii) better rules of law reduce deforestation but this feature is more likely in previous British colonies or non colonized countries. Finally, this paper shows that current institutional performances are important factors in the process of deforestation and that these factors are conditioned to past influences.

This paper investigates if past institutional, economic, political, social, and cultural features (i.e legal origins on law and regulations and colonial legacies) interact in shaping the current institutional performances on deforestation in 116 developed and developing countries. A two step approach is implemented. First, we investigate relations between colonial legacies-legal origins and current institutional performances. We find that common law countries and previous British colonies have better institutions that French civil law and other past colonized countries. Second, we provide two econometrics procedures to capture some institutional persistences on deforestation which allow to estimate current institutional effects on deforestation conditioned to historical variables. In a first time, we run our deforestation model on different samples (under historical variables) and in a second time, interactive variables are introduced. We find that (i) French civil law countries deforest less than common law ones; (ii) less corruption and more secured property rights decrease deforestation in common law countries; (iii) better rules of law reduce deforestation but this feature is more likely in previous British colonies or non colonized countries. Finally, this paper shows that current institutional performances are important factors in the process of deforestation and that these factors are conditioned to past influences.

International audience ; Several similarities explain the spread of the Arab revolutionary process : the polarization of economies to limited sectors, a rentier-based management of resources, very low employment rates and extremely high rates of skilled migration. Finally, a similar external pact with the Western powers, and an inner pact between elites that have both imploded. This article suggests new directions for these economies that would combine regional integration and a catch-up strategy via service activities. ; Des similitudes expliquent la diffusion du processus révolutionnaire arabe : une polarisation sectorielle des économies, une gestion rentière des ressources, des taux d'emplois faibles et des taux d'expatriation de qualifiés anormalement élevés. Enfin, un même pacte externe avec les puissances occidentales et interne entre les élites. Ces pactes ont implosé. Cet article propose de nouvelles directions pour ces économies, combinant intégration régionale et stratégie de rattrapage par les services.

International audience ; Several similarities explain the spread of the Arab revolutionary process : the polarization of economies to limited sectors, a rentier-based management of resources, very low employment rates and extremely high rates of skilled migration. Finally, a similar external pact with the Western powers, and an inner pact between elites that have both imploded. This article suggests new directions for these economies that would combine regional integration and a catch-up strategy via service activities. ; Des similitudes expliquent la diffusion du processus révolutionnaire arabe : une polarisation sectorielle des économies, une gestion rentière des ressources, des taux d'emplois faibles et des taux d'expatriation de qualifiés anormalement élevés. Enfin, un même pacte externe avec les puissances occidentales et interne entre les élites. Ces pactes ont implosé. Cet article propose de nouvelles directions pour ces économies, combinant intégration régionale et stratégie de rattrapage par les services.

American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University. ; The American Institute of Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) assembled a group of researchers and policy makers in Germany and the United States to identify research and policy issues posed by the transformation we have come to call the new economy. This paper, which is the product of their collaboration, focuses on three issues. The first relates to defining what exactly constitutes the New Economy. The second issue involves identifying the forces driving the expansion of the New Economy. The third issue pertains to research and policy questions posed by the New Economy. In addressing these issues, the authors generate several key findings. While a common myth is that the Internet and e-commerce constitute the New Economy, we suggest that what is new about the New Economy involves the shift to knowledge and ideas as the source of competitive advantage. There are at least four central aspects that, when taken together, constitute what we mean by the New Economy--(1) globalization, (2) the shift to knowledge and ideas as the source of competitive advantage, (3) the increased importance of regional agglomerations and clusters, and (4) the emergence of entrepreneurship as an engine of growth and development. The forces facilitating the expansion of the New Economy are technological change, especially ICT, but also institutional change, such as reforms in the financial sector. New government policies are required in the New Economy. They enable the creation and commercialization of knowledge. While this study is able to identify the importance that New Economy plays in Germany and the United States, it raises many more questions than it answers. In particular, this study argues for a research agenda that explicitly compares both the similarities and differences that shifting to a New Economy has impacted Germany and the United States, and which types of policies have proven to be the most effective in generating and coping with the ...

Etudes & documents ; In this paper we empirically discuss whether or not external debt affects country's governance. Indeed, indebted countries need some political governance reforms in order to send out a positive signal to international financial community and investors; and so improving business climate. However, external debt reduces their flexibility and ability to address associated costs to political governance. Our study focuses on the period 1985-2011 and spans 103 developing countries. To deal with endogeneity issue, we first lag external debt by one year and second propose two-step tobit estimator by instrumenting external debt-to-GDP ratio with real effective exchange rate. Even controlling for various conventional determinants of democratic transitions, we find that external debt constraints indebted countries to move up democracy scale but incite governments to improve investment profile and therefore improving business climate. Furthermore, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs dampen the negative effect of debt on democratic transitions.

Etudes & documents ; In this paper we empirically discuss whether or not external debt affects country's governance. Indeed, indebted countries need some political governance reforms in order to send out a positive signal to international financial community and investors; and so improving business climate. However, external debt reduces their flexibility and ability to address associated costs to political governance. Our study focuses on the period 1985-2011 and spans 103 developing countries. To deal with endogeneity issue, we first lag external debt by one year and second propose two-step tobit estimator by instrumenting external debt-to-GDP ratio with real effective exchange rate. Even controlling for various conventional determinants of democratic transitions, we find that external debt constraints indebted countries to move up democracy scale but incite governments to improve investment profile and therefore improving business climate. Furthermore, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs dampen the negative effect of debt on democratic transitions.