This book analyses the specificity of the law-making activity of European constitutional courts. The main hypothesis is that currently constitutional courts are positive legislators whose position in the system of State organs needs to be redefined. The book covers the analysis of the law-making activity of four constitutional courts in Western countries: Germany, Italy, Spain, and France; and six constitutional courts in Central–East European countries: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Latvia, and Bulgaria; as well as two international courts: the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The work thus identifies the mutual interactions between national constitutional courts and international tribunals in terms of their law-making activity. The chosen countries include constitutional courts which have been recently captured by populist governments and subordinated to political powers. Therefore, one of the purposes of the book is to identify the change in the law-making activity of those courts and to compare it with the activity of constitutional courts from countries in which democracy is not viewed as being under threat. Written by national experts, each chapter addresses a series of set questions allowing accessible and meaningful comparison. The book will be a valuable resource for students, academics, and policy-makers working in the areas of constitutional law and politics.
"This book analyses the specificity of the law-making activity of European constitutional courts. The main hypothesis is that currently constitutional courts are positive legislators whose position in the system of State organs needs to be redefined"--
Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Foreword: Historical Contradictions in Contemporary State Attitudes to the International Court -- Chapter I. Contemporary Conceptions of the Rôle of International Judicial Settlement -- 1. Changing national positions on third party, (and especially Court-based) disputes-settlement -- 2. Ethnocentricity of "classical" international law institutions and processes like judicial settlement -- 3. The influence of evolving national constitutional institutions and processes upon international judicial settlement -- Chapter II. The Contemporary International Judicial Process. Law and Logic, and the "Law"/"Politics" Dichotomy -- 1. Judicial Positivism and the limits of legal logic -- 2. Competing theories of judicial interpretation. The judicial activism/judicial self-restraint continuum -- 3. Preliminary and Merits jurisdiction -- 4. Advisory Opinion jurisdiction -- 5. Preliminary and Merits jurisdiction revisited -- 6. The "law"/"politics" dichotomy, and the "political questions" exception to jurisdiction -- 7. The Rules of Procedure, and the creative rôle of Court practice in their development -- Chapter III. The Jurisdiction of the Full Court of the International Court, and the Special Chambers Gloss to Jurisdiction -- 1. Compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the Court Statute -- 2. On "regionalism", and on an alleged "regional" bias in the Court's decisions -- 3. The contemporary, Special Chambers gloss to Court jurisdiction -- Chapter IV. The Contemporary International Court as Independent, and as Representative Tribunal -- 1. Judicial independence, and judicial "interest" -- 2. Judicial representation: the nomination system for the International Court.
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The law-making role of judges has always been the subject of much controversy. For a good many a year and especially during the apartheid regime, the approach to statutory interpretation that dominated the South African courts was the orthodox textual position. According to the textualists, as they were referred to, the position that was adopted was that legislation was to be interpreted within the framework of the words used by the legislature. The courts were not empowered to make any modifications, alterations or additions to the legislative text, as this function was solely the responsibility of the legislature. The paradigmatic shift in emphasis since 1994 from a system of parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional supremacy changed this position significantly. The key consideration of statutory interpretation was that the aim and purpose of legislation was to be considered with the values of the Constitution forming the over-arching principle in the process of interpretation. The courts were enjoined to reconcile the purpose of the legislation with the provisions of the Constitution, and in particular, the Bill of Rights. The emerging view in support of the purposive or the teleological theory has been that judges do indeed have a law-making function in the process of interpretation. Since the early 1990's, it has been observed that the judiciary has been able to assert its influence on the development of the law and the emerging jurisprudence, as a result of the powers derived from the Constitution, and in particular section 39(2). The article examines the extent to which the judiciary can use this power in a post-democratic constitutional era, in South Africa, to achieve justice. From the repository of cases, which forms the basis of the discussion, the article proposes a set of factors that ought to be heeded by our courts in the application of section 39(2).
The law-making role of judges has always been the subject of much controversy. For a good many a year and especially during the apartheid regime, the approach to statutory interpretation that dominated the South African courts was the orthodox textual position. According to the textualists, as they were referred to, the position that was adopted was that legislation was to be interpreted within the framework of the words used by the legislature. The courts were not empowered to make any modifications, alterations or additions to the legislative text, as this function was solely the responsibility of the legislature. The paradigmatic shift in emphasis since 1994 from a system of parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional supremacy changed this position significantly. The key consideration of statutory interpretation was that the aim and purpose of legislation was to be considered with the values of the Constitution forming the over-arching principle in the process of interpretation. The courts were enjoined to reconcile the purpose of the legislation with the provisions of the Constitution, and in particular, the Bill of Rights. The emerging view in support of the purposive or the teleological theory has been that judges do indeed have a law-making function in the process of interpretation. Since the early 1990's, it has been observed that the judiciary has been able to assert its influence on the development of the law and the emerging jurisprudence, as a result of the powers derived from the Constitution, and in particular section 39(2). The article examines the extent to which the judiciary can use this power in a post-democratic constitutional era, in South Africa, to achieve justice. From the repository of cases, which forms the basis of the discussion, the article proposes a set of factors that ought to be heeded by our courts in the application of section 39(2).
The law-making role of judges has always been the subject of much controversy. For a good many a year and especially during the apartheid regime, the approach to statutory interpretation that dominated the South African courts was the orthodox textual position. According to the textualists, as they were referred to, the position that was adopted was that legislation was to be interpreted within the framework of the words used by the legislature. The courts were not empowered to make any modifications, alterations or additions to the legislative text, as this function was solely the responsibility of the legislature. The paradigmatic shift in emphasis since 1994 from a system of parliamentary sovereignty to constitutional supremacy changed this position significantly. The key consideration of statutory interpretation was that the aim and purpose of legislation was to be considered with the values of the Constitution forming the over-arching principle in the process of interpretation. The courts were enjoined to reconcile the purpose of the legislation with the provisions of the Constitution, and in particular, the Bill of Rights. The emerging view in support of the purposive or the teleological theory has been that judges do indeed have a law-making function in the process of interpretation. Since the early 1990's, it has been observed that the judiciary has been able to assert its influence on the development of the law and the emerging jurisprudence, as a result of the powers derived from the Constitution, and in particular section 39(2). The article examines the extent to which the judiciary can use this power in a post-democratic constitutional era, in South Africa, to achieve justice. From the repository of cases, which forms the basis of the discussion, the article proposes a set of factors that ought to be heeded by our courts in the application of section 39(2).Keywords: Concretisation; parliamentary sovereignty; constitutional supremacy; textual interpretation; teleological interpretation; value-orientated approach; reading-in; reading-down; severance; judicial activism.
[spa] Es comúnmente apreciado que el TJUE, junto con los tribunales nacionales, es un importante motor de la integración y constitucionalización de la UE. Este proceso plantea diversos problemas teóricos y prácticos, por lo que necesita una conceptualización cuidadosa para evitar su abuso y reforzar sus potenciales. En el artículo, el papel y la legitimidad de la creación judicial se analizarán en consideración al impacto del "principio de efectividad" en derecho privado a nivel Europeo y nacional. De hecho, de una parte, los jueces están llamados a reforzar el derecho europeo mediante intervenciones negativas y positivas; de otra, están limitados por los principios de separación de poderes, división de competencias, legalidad e igualdad, a menudo en conflicto con los mencionados deberes, quedando entre la espada y la pared. Tal dilema será resuelto indagando por el significado y objetivo del "principio de efectividad", para identificar: (i) en qué condiciones el uso por parte del TJUE puede considerarse legítimo; (ii) en qué medida los jueces nacionales deben aplicarlo, contribuyendo a su realización, en disputas que involucren a sujetos privados. Con este fin, se establecerán dos objetivos preliminares: (a) comprender el significado y la fuerza normativa del "principio de efectividad" en el derecho europeo, y si difiere respecto de la jurisprudencia de los tribunales nacionales; (b) analizar el impacto del derecho a un recurso efectivo (Artículo 47 Carta De Los Derechos Fundamentales de la UE) en disputas horizontales. Partiendo de la metodología ofrecida por la filosofía del lenguaje, el artículo analiza las principales especificidades de la efectividad en la jurisprudencia del TJUE –"efectividad del derecho europeo" y "efectividad de la protección judicial"–, y, de manera crítica, afirma la coherencia y ajuste institucional de cada "Sprachgebrauch", así como sus interacciones. Sucesivamente, el artículo re-conceptualiza la efectividad como un "argumento" que, al ser esencialmente indeterminado, puede ser fácilmente mal utilizado. Mi hipótesis es que a través de una serie de manipulaciones argumentativas, el Tribunal expande sus competencias contra los Estados miembros y otras instituciones de la UE, para fomentar la integración en áreas constitucionalmente sensibles, también mediante la adjudicación de leyes privadas. Este proceso puede ser enmarcado críticamente: según el principio democrático, tal práctica puede aceptarse cuando está legitimada por un consenso preexistente, pero puede ser menos aceptable cuando se necesita una nueva adhesión, configurando un debilitamiento progresivo de la unión política. De acuerdo con una teoría de la justicia en asuntos de derecho privado, las condiciones de legitimidad de tal proceso de creación judicial deben ser re-conceptualizadas, cuestionando así la dimensión regulatoria no restringida atribuida a los casos horizontales en la jurisprudencia del TJUE. En fin, los resultados serán utilizados para evaluar el impacto del principio de efectividad en el derecho privado nacional, así como para guiar su desarrollo en los tribunales nacionales, sugiriendo que los jueces deben desempeñar un papel fuerte y proactivo en su diálogo con el TJUE, obligando a este último a suponer y ponderar más sus decisiones, a fin de abrir nuevos espacios en el proceso deliberativo sobre el proyecto de la UE. ; [eng] It is commonly appreciated that the CJEU, together with national courts, constitute a main driver of the EU integration and Constitutionalization. This process raises various theoretical and practical problems, thus needing careful conceptualization to avoid abuse and reinforce its potentials. This paper analyzes the role and legitimacy of judicial law-making by addressing the impact of the «principle of effectiveness» on private law adjudication at European and national level. Indeed, on the one hand, judges are called to enforce EU law, both through negative and positive interventions; on the other hand, they are constrained by the principles of separation of powers, division of competences, rule of law and equality – often clashing with said duties –, sitting between a rock and a hard stone. Such dilemma shall be addressed by inquiring the meaning and scope of the «principle of effectiveness», to identify: (i) under which conditions its use by the CJEU may be deemed legitimate; (ii) to what extent national judges shall apply it, contributing to its realization, in disputes involving private parties. To this end, two preliminary goals shall be set: (a) understanding the meaning and normative force of the «principle of effectiveness» in EU law, and whether they differ from their national courts' understanding; (b) analyzing the impact of the right to an effective remedy (art. 47 EUCFR) in horizontal disputes. By relying on the methodology offered by the philosophy of language, the paper analyzes the two major specifications of effectiveness in the CJEU case law – «effectiveness of EU law» and «effectiveness of judicial protection» –, and critically assesses the coherence and institutional fit of each "Sprachgebrauch", as well as their interactions. It then re-conceptualizes effectiveness as an «argument» which, being essentially indeterminate, may be easily misused. My hypothesis is that through a series of argumentative twist and turns, the Court expands its competences against MSs and other EU Institutions, to foster integration in constitutionally sensitive areas, also trough private law adjudication. This process shall be critically framed: according to the principle of democracy, such practice may be accepted when sustained by a pre-existing consensus, but might be less acceptable when new adhesion is needed, in the long run weakening the political Union; according to a theory of justice in private law matters, the conditions of legitimacy of such judicial law-making need to be re-conceptualized, thus questioning the unconstrained regulatory dimension attributed to horizontal cases in the CJEU case law. The results is finally used to evaluate the impact of the principle of effectiveness on national private law, as well as to guide its deployment by domestic courts, suggesting that judges shall perform a strong and pro-active role in their dialogue with the CJEU, forcing the latter to second-guess and further weighting its decisions, to open up new deliberative spaces in the EU project.
