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Cut loose from its foundation in the distinction between discussion and incitement, the clear and present danger test lost its rational meaning and became a cloak for "vague but fervent transcendental-ism." In short, the activists destroyed it as an intelligible guide to decision-and then abandoned it about a dozen years ago. Meanwhile they have tried, and apparently discarded, one "new" verbalism after another. The latest is Mr. Justice Black's absolutist concentration on two untroubled words in the first amendment: "no law." This gambit--"no law means no law"--again begs all the difficulties simply by ignoring them. As Dean Griswold has suggested, it reminds one of the fundamentalist church sign which proclaimed, "God said it. We believe it. That's all there is to it." The need for judicial balancing, I suggest, results from the imperfection of mundane law. In a better world, no doubt, clear and precise legal rules would anticipate all possible contingencies. No wonder, then, that idealists are impatient with the balancing process. Mr. Frantz" solution has a familiar ring. He suggests that law precedes, and apparently even transcends, politics.' Here is our old friend "the brooding omnipresence"--"the higher law"--that Holmes and Brandeis among others fought so hard to kill. Surely in a democracy law is a creature of the political processes, constitutional and legislative. Judges,of course, cannot avoid legislating in some degree, but to repeat Holmes' much quoted phrase they must do so only interstitially--lest they rather than the people govern.

Comparative law, like comparative government in general,' has largely confined itself to unintegrated descriptions of European legal principles. Not only has comparative law traditionally been limited in its subject matter, but it also has rarely, if ever, made use of statistical techniques in accounting for the differences observed. It is the purpose of this paper to analyze statistically the relations between industrialism, democracy, and collectivism on the one hand and the judicial process on the other in ten different societies.

As evidenced by the increasing numbers of court decisions which involve statutes,' and by the large and continually growing literature in the field, the subject of statutory interpretation is one of the most important in modern law. Although it is a field in which exact rules of automatic application can very seldom be formulated, only recently a member of the Supreme Court pointed out the great need for a set of "consistently accepted principles of interpretation." Since the primary purpose of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain the meaning and to effectuate the purposes of the legislature, and since words are merely symbols without inherent meaning, every statute upon which a court is required to rule must, in some sense, be construed and interpreted.

The power of a court to punish summarily for contempt has been likened to be "the nearest [thing] akin to despotic power of any power existing under our form of government." On the other hand, it has been praised as an inherent necessity if the courts are to exercise their functions properly. The balancing of these two considerations has perplexed the courts which have dealt with the contempt cases as they have come up through the years; that is, whether to limit the power, thereby possibly sacrificing judicial decorum and standing, or to allow it to remain unlimited as an assurance of continuing dignity in all judicial proceedings. A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Wyoming, Application of Stone, seems certain to raise a storm of comment across the country. The facts are extremely interesting and raise several problems which may be of constitutional importance.

On Understanding the Supreme Court By Paul A. Freund Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1949. Pp. 130. $3.00 reviewer: Noel T. Dowling ================================== Courts on Trial By Jerome N. Frank Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949. Pp. vii, 441. $5.00 reviewer: Hugo L. Black, Jr. ================================== Hugo L. Black: A Study in the Judicial Process By Charlotte Williams Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1950. Pp. vii, 208. $3.50. reviewer: George H. Cate, Sr. ==================================== Hatch Act Decisions (Political Activity Cases) of the United States Civil Service Commission By James W. Irwin Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949. Pp. 304. $1.50 reviewer: Henry N. Williams

Book Reviews LIONS UNDER THE THRONE By Charles P. Curtis, Jr. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947. Pp. xviii, 368. $3.50 MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN AND His OPINIONS By John P. Frank (Introduction by Charles A. Beard) New York: Knopf Company, 1949.Pp. xix, 357. $4.00 ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT By Paul A. Freund Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1949. Pp. vi, 130. $3.00 MELVILLE VESTON FULLER: CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1888-1919 By Willard L. King New York: Macmillan Company, 1950. Pp.394. $5.00 CHIEF JUSTICE STONE AND THE SUPREME COURT By Samuel J. Konefsky (Prefatory Note by Charles A. Beard) New York: Macmillan Company,1949. Pp. xxvi, 289. $3.00 THE CONSTITUTIONAL WORLD OF MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: SOME REPRESENTATIVE OPINIONS By Samuel J. Konefsky New York: Macmillan Company, 1949. Pp. xviii, 325. $4.50 THE NINE YOUNG MEN By Wesley McCune New York: Harper & Brothers,1947. Pp. viii, 299. $3.50 BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE By Alpheus Thomas Mason New York:Viking, 1946. Pp. xiii, 713. $5.00 THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-1947 By C.'Herman Pritchett New York: Macmillan Company, 1948.Pp. 314. $5.00 HUGO BLACK: A STUDY IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS By Charlotte Williams Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1950. Pp. 208. $3.50 A Symposium to the Memory of Wiley B. Rutledge (1894-1949) Iowa Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Summer, 1950). Pp. 541-692. Issue Dedicated to the Memory of Mr. Justice Murphy MICH. L. REv.,Vol. 48, No. 6 (April, 1950). Pp. 737-810. $1.00 per issue. reviewer: Carl Brent Swisher ============================ CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Fourth Edition. By Walter F. Dodd. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1949. Pp. xxxv, 1477. Salie, SHORTER SELECTION Fourth Edition, 1950. Pp. xxix, 950. Same, 1950 SUPPLEMENT. Pp. vii, 23. CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Fourth Edition. By Noel T. Dowling Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1950. Pp. =xxv, 1273. CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW By John P. Frank Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1950. Pp. xxviii, ...

The history of the judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act' is a history of the legislative process working through the mechanisms of the judicial process. Starting with an act phrased in the most general of terms, nearly seventy years of judicial administration have developed a system of interdependent postulates analogous to legislative norms. None of these postulates can be considered as prevailing over all others. But the binding thread of the Sherman Act is the proposition that the market shall be dynamic, manifesting sufficient energy through price competition by the organizations participating in the market to ensure that the advances of technology will be constantly passed on to buyers.

Professor Friedmann, who had already made a notable contribution to jurisprudence in his Legal Theory, now in its second edition, has now made a second and perhaps even more notable contribution toward understanding the role and presaging the future of the common law system in the society of today. His purpose is a reassessment of the function of law and of legal institutions in England a half century after Dicey's Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century, comparing the economic function of law and how the common law was adapted to it in the nineteenth century with its function in the "vastly changed social pattern of contemporary England" (p. 3) in the twentieth century after half of that century has gone by. He seeks to coordinate recent developments with respect to the relation of the judicial function and judicial process to social problems, the role of legislation and the interpretation of statutes, the growth of standard contracts and collective bargaining, and the change in the structure and function of the law of property and to appraise the "interrelation of law and social change in present-day British society." (p. 3).

The award of permanent alimony upon a divorce a vinculo, though involving the judicial process, is historically and theoretically dependent upon such power as the legislature of the particular jurisdiction deems fit to confer upon the courts. The Washington court has necessarily recognized this since in every case where the point was raised the court looked to the statutes for its authority. The divorce act now in effect, however, does not confer such power upon the courts! Undoubtedly there have been many awards of alimony since the passage of the present divorce act in 1949, but not under it. Unless the legislature acts in this regard, a difficult situation will arise when the courts' assumed power is one day challenged. The problem can be better understood by a brief study of the history of alimony in this state.

One of the most technical problems in the field of property law is the manner in which future interests in realty and personalty may be alienated. The term, future interest, is used here to mean a presently existing interest which is deprived of possession but which looks forward to possession in the future. The term is a misnomer. Such an interest is "future" only in the sense that it looks toward becoming possessory in the future. Just as future interests is a law of words, so the alienability of future interests is, in the absence of statute, a law of methods. The initial problem is to classify the interest. Only then can the proper methods of alienation be brought into play. At least 33 states have statutes which either expressly or impliedly provide for the transfer of these interests.' But in many states there are no statutes and the common law or more modern judicial decisions control. It is the purpose of this Note to discuss two problems: (1) the voluntary or consensual inter vivos conveyance of future interests, and (2) the rights of creditors to seize these interests under judicial process in satisfaction of a debt. Particular emphasis will be placed on Tennessee law. But in order to understand the law of Tennessee in these problems and to point out possible future development in this state, it is necessary to consider in addition both the early common law decisions and recent developments in other states.

The rules of the American game of competition are numerous, diverse and often inexplicable, but none of them is as dubious in purpose or as devious in operation as those found in the statutes prohibiting sales below cost. Such statutes have been enacted in the overwhelming majority of states,' the earliest ones dating back to the Great Depression. Indeed their philosophy has infected the federal antitrust laws. That the impetus back of these statutes was not just a product of depression fears and frustrations is shown by their passage after the depression was over in some states, and during the height of post war prosperity in others. They remain a factor to be reckoned with by businessmen and their legal advisers who wish to avoid the risks of harassment caused by a lawsuit over their pricing policies. It is the purpose of this paper to report critically on the present condition of restrictions on sales below cost, with emphasis on the more recent developments. The discussion will have as a by-product some reflections about the legislative and judicial processes exemplified in the enactment and administration of these statutes.

Although a relatively small number of cases turned upon constitutional questions during the survey period, some important decisions were handed down in this area. In five separate decisions legislation was declared unconstitutional. The impact of the constitutional decisions varies from the right to millions of dollars in school funds in Shelby County and the salary of the clerk of General Sessions Court of Clay County to approval of permanent tenure for all franchised automobile dealers in the state. The scope of governmental power over the administration of estates, condemnation of private property and the pursuit of private businesses brought forth important and far-reaching judicial pronouncements. Two cases are witness to the diminishing concern for protection of contractual rights as such from legislative infringement. Although most decisions dealt with constitutional limitations on legislative power over business, private property and governmental functions, in one decision the fundamental procedural rights of one accused of crime were upheld in order to free him.

One phenomenon of recent domestic politics has been the resurgence of the American Bar Association as a vital, and often influential, group in the political process as well as in the legal profession. There is no better characterization of this than the ABA's assumption of a lead position in a profession-wide campaign to improve the quality of judges selected for the several court systems in the United States. In a relatively short span of time, the ABA has grown from a group with a minimum of influence to one with a quasi-formal role in the federal selection process. Its success has meant, among other things, that the role of the organized bar in judicial selection has acquired a measure of legitimacy never before attained. To be sure, the federal selection process is not yet completely "bar centered." But the impact of the ABA's influence on the process is clear and unmistakable. Tracing the growth of the ABA's influence and prerogatives in the selection of federal judges, and suggesting some factors contributing to this development, will be the major purpose of this article.

Conflicts between the desire to meet the felt needs of society and the desire to maintain existing property rights have long perplexed modern governments. The methods adopted for the resolution of such conflicts quite naturally reflect the prevailing social and political ideology in each nation. In the United States in the period of the Philadelphia Convention, the prevailing temper, at least among the influential, was one of insistence upon the preservation of the sanctity of private property. This insistence and the widespread public reverence for law and judicial institutions determined that state interference with or modification of private contracts be subject to a constitutional limitation prohibiting impairment of the obligation of a contract. The constitutional framers, themselves extensive property holders and creditors, did not suggest in their debates that this prohibition be extended to contracts of a public character. However, such an extension was made within three decades of the framing of the Constitution through the judicial decision-making process of the Supreme Court of the United States.

There are, generally speaking, three broad areas of exemption understatutes imposing sales and use taxes in the United States. These are: (a) Exemptions arising out of the immunities of governmental agencies and instrumentalities, or out of the exercise of governmental functions (b) Exemptions arising under the commerce clause of the federal constitution (c) Specific exemptions created out of governmental taxing policies or social economic considerations Each of these areas of exemption has grown up somewhat haphazardly over a substantial period of time, and very largely as the result of shifting judicial opinion, rather than as a matter of consistent legislative policy. As a consequence it may be said that the whole body of exemptions rests upon premises that have somewhat dubious legal foundation and somewhat incongruous legal concepts. For example, the concept of states rights from the extremist point of view, which prevailed during the first half century of our Republic, underwent a drastic and startling revision as the result of the Civil War and the revolutionary change in public sentiment which followed it. In that process a large body of judicial opinion dealing with the immunity of the federal government from any encroachment whatever by the several states and based largely on the bold opinions of Chief Justice Marshall, began to give way to the stronger demands of an economic system based upon the nineteenth century industrial revolution.