In an analysis of basic rights in the context of the legal profession, standards of legal measurement are first evaluated. Court procedures & issues of legal methodology play a major part in the study, which focuses on the process of legal decision making & instruments of legal rationalization. Specific legal decisions & cases are presented in support of the analysis. A. Simms-Clark
The shift of political power from legislators to judges in contemporary democracies is examined within the theoretical framework of Carl Schmitt's (1912 & 1938) views on constitutional law & making comparative references to Niklas Luhmann's (1993) system-theoretical proposals. Questions how the nonlegal becomes legal, what is the relationship between the norm & decision-making process in the judicial interpretation of constitutional law, & whether legal opinions issued in constitutionality cases are creations ex nihilo are addressed from the perspective of Schmitt's decisionism & Luhmann's notion of system's autopoiesis. The relationship between the social systems of law & politics & decision rendering as a political dimension of jurisprudence are discussed; the "decision paradox" is discussed at some length. The weaknesses of Schmitt's decisionism vis-a-vis the deconstructivist, system-theoretical decision-making theory are pointed out in an analysis of opinions rendered by the German Constitutional Court. It is concluded that legal decisions are impermanent & subjective despite their seeking precedence, argumentation, & procedure for objective decision making. However, the difference between power & jurisprudence is that the former is interested in only making a decision, regardless of procedural or argumentative obstacles. Legal decisions are made not ex nihilo by an authoritative decision maker but searches for truth & fairness, & as such, they are signification processes separating the before from the after. Z. Dubiel
The author attempts to show that the presumption that public hearings regarding judicial appointments lead to political pressure regarding this process & damage the authority & independence of later judges cannot be empirically confirmed. On the contrary, a successful hearing contributes significantly to the personal authority of the candidate, which translates into greater independence in handing down verdicts. The author briefly describes the process of judicial appointments in the US & concludes that public hearings regarding appointments to the BVerfG need not be at the expense of legitimacy of the constitutional jurisdiction. E. Sanchez
The judicial power is vested in the judges according to Art. 92 of the Basic Law, the 'independent and subject only to the laws' are in turn under Art. 97 para. 1 GG. Unlike the wording could suggest, is not described with this particular 'independence of the judge' that found a state, rather than set up a constitutional requirement. Indeed, it is even far one of the few constitutional claims, which is not only every law student, but as a fundamental expression of constitutional principles and the public at large known. Serious intervention (or suspected serious interventions) in the decision-making of the independent judiciary - were mentioned from jungerer time only the processes in Ukraine and Russia - are accordingly (and quite rightly) as a violation of fundamental notions of justice and thus as a sign of a lack (material) interpreted the rule of law, which open into the statement that right at all there only exist where there are independent judges. Adapted from the source document.
The papers of the Parliamentary Council, which 60 years ago formulated the Basic Law, have been published almost entirely now. Although the genesis of the articles of the Basic Law may easily be reconstructed, the political intentions of its authors remain rather vague. The reasons for this were the political situation of the Parliamentary Council as well as its debating style. Since the Basic Law had to be approved by the occupying powers, administrative & judicial arguments seemed to be appropriate. Apart from this, the politicians in the Parliamentary Council had to curb their temper in order to reassure a broad majority for the provisional constitution. Therefore, the motivations of the authors can only be understood by analyzing the debate on constitution making & democracy since 1946. The "parents" of the Basic Law intensively contributed to this debate. The position of the elected parliament was the salient issue of their discussion. At this point the different versions of democracy confronted each other. The outcome was the questionable compromise of a "semisovereign state" which until now has been subject of various constitutional reform projects.
The article discusses how corporations in the U.S., mostly economic, have managed over the last 200 years to claim human rights elaborated in the U.S. Constitution for themselves (e. g. the right due process of law, or free political speech). A multitude of court rulings offer a wealth of empirical material. In the United States an ever-growing critical movement has attempted to criticize and scandalize such corporate rights. An analysis derived from sociology and Political Economy can show that gaining such corporate rights, can be referred to as an increasing privatization of political power and as a historical institutionalization of the -- nowadays globally applicable -- corporate form. Adapted from the source document.
The German systems of social state security have reached their financial & legitimate limitations due to the manifold social processes of change within. The author outlines reform proposals regarding the social state such as model variants of & alternatives to the basic security. In order to avoid the creation of future judicial dilemmas, a new compromising combination of both main representations of justice is necessary. 8 References. E. Sanchez
Between October 2005 & January 2006, 30 interviews were conducted with active & former justices of the Federal Constitutional Court, The average interview lasted 53 minutes and anonymity was promised to the participants. How decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court come about is rather unclear as internal judicial decision processes have to be hidden from the casual observer according to the confidentiality of deliberations & the obligation to confidentiality. The variety of methods regarding constitutional interpretation & the 'unclear' dogmatic developed by the Federal Constitutional Court allows the court to react situationally & adequately to constitutional & political issues. E. Sanchez
Even in the 1990ies international law was still characterized by a "culture of impunity" concerning sexualized & gender-related violence. Only when transnational women's movements became the direct agents of this process of transnationalization of law was it possible to scandalize & gradually transform these power relations. Against the background of a feminist approach to legal theory this change is to be reflected in an exemplary documentation analyzing the judicial implications in one of the most outstanding, though as yet unacknowledged & unremedied injustices of the Second World War, committed against women in the Japanese system of sexual slavery. Adapted from the source document.
"Die politikwissenschaftlichen Bemühungen, das Blockadepotenzial des deutschen Föderalismus in der Gesetzgebungsstatistik nachzuweisen, waren bisher weitgehend erfolglos. So bleibt beispielsweise entgegen der landläufigen Meinung das endgültige Scheitern von Gesetzesentwürfen am Widerstand eines oppositionsdominierten Bundesrats die Ausnahme. In der Literatur ist damit der Einfluss des Bundesrats auf die Gesetzgebung bei gegenläufigen Mehrheiten zwischen Bundestag und Bundesrat weiterhin umstritten. Dieser Beitrag führt ein aus der 'Judicial-Review'-Literatur entnommenes Modell gesetzgeberischer Autolimitation in die Debatte ein, das die Auswirkung der Mehrheitsverhältnisse im Bundesrat auf die strategische Interaktion von Regierung und Opposition und damit auf die Politikergebnisse modelliert. Die zentrale These des Autolimitations- oder Selbstbeschränkungsarguments ist, dass sich deutlich gegenläufige Mehrheiten zwischen Bundestag und Bundesrat im Regelfall nicht in einem offenen parteipolitischen Konflikt niederschlagen, sondern zu Kompromissen und zu erheblicher politischer Selbstbeschränkung der Regierung führen. Herrschen jedoch im Bundesrat knappe oder uneindeutige Mehrheitsverhältnisse, spekulieren sowohl die Regierung als auch die Opposition auf die Durchsetzung von weniger kompromissbereiten Positionen sowie auf eine Abstimmungsniederlage des politischen Gegners, so dass wir hier intensiven parteipolitischen Konflikt erwarten. Aus dem Modell ergeben sich eine Reihe von empirischen Implikationen, die mit Hilfe eines detaillierten Datensatzes zur deutschen Gesetzgebungstätigkeit zwischen 1976 und 2002 überprüft werden. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen im Wesentlichen die Autolimitationsthese und unterstreichen damit auch das erhebliche Blockadepotenzial des bundesdeutschen Föderalismus." (Autorenreferat)
