Suchergebnisse

Normae de gravioribus delictis, the new Church legislation on offenses reserved to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, published on May 21, 2010, compiles the accumulated legal experience of recent years, defining the offenses over which the Congregation has competence, and establishes the procedural route to be followed in judicial processes. This article examines the development of such processes in the diocesan and Roman phases, in both the administrative and judicial channels. Certain issues that arise from the application of the rules –preliminary investigation, right to defence, publicity, cooperation with civil authorities, and compensation for damages– are also addressed. ; La nueva legislación sobre los delitos reservados a la Congregación para la Doctrina de la Fe, Normae de gravioribus delictis, del 21 de mayo del 2010, ha recogido la experiencia jurídica de estos últimos años, la definición de los delitos que es competente y el recorrido procesal a aplicar al juzgarlos. En este artículo se estudiará el desarrollo de estos procesos en fase diocesana y en fase romana, tanto en vía administrativa como judicial, así como algunas preguntas que se suscitan a la hora de aplicar estas normas: investigación preliminar, derecho de defensa, publicidad, colaboración con la autoridad civil, resarcimiento de daños.

Cut loose from its foundation in the distinction between discussion and incitement, the clear and present danger test lost its rational meaning and became a cloak for "vague but fervent transcendental-ism." In short, the activists destroyed it as an intelligible guide to decision-and then abandoned it about a dozen years ago. Meanwhile they have tried, and apparently discarded, one "new" verbalism after another. The latest is Mr. Justice Black's absolutist concentration on two untroubled words in the first amendment: "no law." This gambit--"no law means no law"--again begs all the difficulties simply by ignoring them. As Dean Griswold has suggested, it reminds one of the fundamentalist church sign which proclaimed, "God said it. We believe it. That's all there is to it." The need for judicial balancing, I suggest, results from the imperfection of mundane law. In a better world, no doubt, clear and precise legal rules would anticipate all possible contingencies. No wonder, then, that idealists are impatient with the balancing process. Mr. Frantz" solution has a familiar ring. He suggests that law precedes, and apparently even transcends, politics.' Here is our old friend "the brooding omnipresence"--"the higher law"--that Holmes and Brandeis among others fought so hard to kill. Surely in a democracy law is a creature of the political processes, constitutional and legislative. Judges,of course, cannot avoid legislating in some degree, but to repeat Holmes' much quoted phrase they must do so only interstitially--lest they rather than the people govern.

Charles L. Barzun (University of Virginia School of Law) & John C. P. Goldberg (Harvard Law School) have posted Introduction: The Nature of the Judicial Process at 100 (Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities) on SSRN. Here is the...