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The separation of power and the branch of the judicial power are analyzed in the US and in the European countries (first of all in Italy and in Hungary). The effects of litigation on the constitutional rights in the USA and in Hungary are outlined and the new trends of political battles in the USA and in Italy which mean the moving the political combats into the courtrooms.

In this article, I argue that apparently common values, such as 'judicial independence' have significantly different meanings in different judicial cultures. As an illustration, I take Sweden and Spain, countries with very different histories and institutional arrangements. It is my contention that basic values are understood and implemented in the light of historical and institutional settings. These have given rise to issues which a nation's judiciary feel it has to address and set the context in which the contemporary judiciary has to operate. The purpose is to examine how far national histories and traditions colour the understanding of common values, such as judicial independence and democracy in the judicial process.

This paper presents a simple framework for analyzing a hierarchical system of judicial auditing. We concentrate on (what we perceive to be) the two principal reasons that courts and/or legislatures tend to scrutinize the decisions of lower echelon actors: imprecision and ideological bias. In comparing these two reasons, we illustrate how each may yield systematically distinct auditing and reversal behaviors. While auditing for imprecision tends to bring about evenhanded review/reversal, auditing for political bias tends to be contingent on the first mover's chosen action. Examples of these tendencies can be found in a number of legal applications, including administrative law, constitutional law, and interpretive theories of jurisprudence. Our analysis also suggests that political "diversity" among initial decision makers (in addition to its other laudable goals) may be an important and generally underappreciated means for economizing on judicial administrative costs.

This paper presents a simple framework for analyzing a hierarchical system of judicial auditing. We concentrate on (what we perceive to be) the two principal reasons that courts and/or legislatures tend to scrutinize the decisions of lower-echelon actors: imprecision and ideological bias. In comparing these two reasons, we illustrate how each may yield systematically distinct auditing and reversal behaviors. While auditing for imprecision tends to bring about even-handed review/reversal, auditing for political bias tends to be significantly more one-sided. Examples of these tendencies can be found in a number of legal applications, including administrative law, constitutional law, and interpretive theories of jurisprudence. Moreover, our analysis suggests that political "diversity" among initial decision-makers (in addition to its other laudable goals) may be an important and generally underappreciated means for economizing on judicial administrative costs and easing the workload burdens on upper-echelon actors.

Koigi wa Wamwere is on trial for his life in Kenya. Both trial and charges are rigged