Suchergebnisse

It is well settled in Anglo-American law that national courts are
competent, in general, to adjudicate rights and duties with respect to all
things or persons found within the territory which the process of the court
controls. Exceptions find an especial justification in considerations of
national or international convenience. A situation which seems to have been
insufficiently considered, however, is presented by the case of the thing or
person which has been seized or arrested abroad, in violation of
international law, and brought within the state and thus within reach of the
process of the state's courts. Should the courts be considered competent, on
the basis of physical presence thus procured, to adjudicate in the usual
way?

Abstract
This article responds to Cedric Ryngaert's commentary on the treatment of the customary international law of jurisdiction in the Restatement of the Law (Fourth): The Foreign Relations Law of the United States. With respect to prescriptive jurisdiction, the article explains that the Restatement (Fourth) has not abandoned reasonableness as a rule of customary international law, although its 'genuine connection' requirement differs from the interest-balancing approach of the Restatement (Third). With respect to adjudicative jurisdiction, the article explains that the Restatement does not exclude the possibility of limits under customary international law but simply finds that no such limits currently exist, apart from the rules on foreign sovereign immunity. In each case, the Restatement reflects a modest approach to the customary international law of jurisdiction that insists on state practice and opinio juris.